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Abstract 
 
The political success of Hugo Chávez and Venezuela’s Bolivarian Revolution has 
relied on the promise of both emancipation and improved terms of patronage for 
the urban poor. This thesis takes a journey through barrio Pueblo Nuevo, the oldest 
informal township in Mérida city, to consider the tension between these ways of 
thinking about the relationship between people and government as a context for 
community organising. 
Different kinds of evidence are presented from fieldwork conducted between 2013 
and 2014, when Mérida made international headlines as violent protests erupted 
and the middle-class neighbourhoods around Pueblo Nuevo barricaded themselves 
against the state. Observations from community meetings in and around the barrio 
show how different groups position themselves strategically in relation to political 
parties and city authorities. Experiences from nine months volunteer teaching 
work is used to explore the participatory methodology of the barrio’s famous ‘little 
school’ - the Fundación Cayapa education collective – and its work to reduce gang 
violence. Experiences of living and participating in Pueblo Nuevo and of building 
relationships with key community members are drawn on to explore perceptions 
of the lawlessness and political radicalism of Venezuela’s barrio populations. 
Interviews with activists, residents and local officials are used to map the 
intellectual landscape of the barrio, identifying different overlapping folk concepts 
about the urban poor – including as ghetto thugs and as social revolutionaries – and 
connecting these to notions about government and democracy.  
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These connected areas of analysis are used to bring together the existing 
scholarship around Venezuela’s experience of Chavismo – as a public narrative, as 
a set of institutions and policies and as the context for barrio organising. The thesis 
contributes to these existing areas of literature by challenging the representation 
of Bolivarianism as a break from the pre-Chávez political era. Historical evidence is 
presented to connect the contemporary experience of Pueblo Nuevo with the 
history of the barrio as Mérida’s first so-called “land invasion” following rural-
urban migration during the mid-Twentieth Century. Important continuities are 
identified with the pre-Chávez era in the strategies of community groups, their 
administration by partisan city authorities and within the Bolivarian public 
narrative of class warfare and popular empowerment. The thesis argues that 
community organising in Pueblo Nuevo is shaped by the inherited tension between 
processes of social emancipation and patronage and their premises in competing 
folk concepts about the urban poor. 
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1. The Revolution visits Pueblo 
Nuevo: politics, participation and the 
urban poor 
 
 
 “Chávez lives, lives! The struggle goes on, on!” 
The ten foot-tall mannequin of the late President waves his approval, stumbles for 
a moment, then lurches forward as the march pushes on towards the barrio. Inside 
the costume Andre the puppeteer cleans his glasses, sweating proudly as he carries 
the weight of el gigante – the giant Chávez – on his shoulders.  
There are several hundred of us now. At the front, the local youth brigade of the 
United Socialist Party of Venezuela (Juventud PSUV) lead the chants. Andry Rangel, 
a student leader who works in the barrio, stands in the back of a pick-up truck, 
brandishing a giant red flag overhead. Her eyes flash with revolutionary pride as 
she calls into a megaphone and the crowd responds as one. From a stack of 
speakers an anthem rings out: 
 “Chávez: heart for everyone!” 
I am marching with my adopted collective, the Frente de Vanguardia – the 
Vanguard Front - flanked by giggling schoolgirls still in uniform and followed by 
group after group of Chavistas in their red shirts. As we approach the barrio - or 
township – there are some nervous faces among our group. The voices in the crowd 
waver now. The clenched fists are a little less assured. For most, this is their first 
visit to the twin barrios of Simon Bolivar and my new home, Pueblo Nuevo. These 
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are the communities that people in Mérida City grow up avoiding. They are the 
areas where taxi drivers refuse to come and where even the right-wing militia and 
the police fear to tread. For those marching, these places are a contradiction: home 
to those responsible for the murders that fill the back pages of every local 
newspaper, but somehow also home to the new constituents of Bolivarianism, the 
righteous urban poor. 
Down in the barrio, they hear us before they see us. The old men sitting on the steps 
pause in conversation. Curious heads begin to peer from between the bars of 
upstairs windows. Children look up from where they are playing in the street and 
the stray dogs start to bark. The march appears around the bend in the valley. First 
comes the pickup, then a news team and the marchers with the giant mannequin 
giving way to a sea of banners and upturned faces. As we reach the entrance of 
Simon Bolivar we stop outside three brand-new yellow tower blocks. Opened just 
five weeks before and painted with the watchful eyes of Hugo Chávez, they are the 
result of a four year occupation campaign by mothers from the two barrios. A child 
no older than six or seven addresses the collected crowd, her eyes screwed shut as 
she preaches revolutionary catchphrases into the megaphone. The marchers share 
a smile and answer her call. 
We continue into the barrio and are joined by local children who scamper along the 
raised walk-way to keep pace with these strange visitors. Some of the residents 
watching seem bemused by the spectacle. A few leave their doorways and join the 
procession. The marchers snatch sideways glances at the houses – some crumbling 
into disrepair, others neatly painted. They mingle with the people in the barrio, 
until the only difference is the red shirts.  
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Photo 1. Looking up the hill from Pueblo Nuevo to Simon Bolivar, July 2014 
We pass the crossroads where Simon Bolivar joins Pueblo Nuevo. I wonder if the 
marchers from my adopted collective, the Vanguard Front of Hugo Chávez, are 
aware that, just here, they cross a point that until recently the residents could not. 
It is the point where gang violence had separated the two communities until only a 
few years ago. Now we pass on, and head down the street where between 2005 and 
2012 shootouts over gang territory would regularly leave the bodies of the sons 
and brothers of the barrio.  
Into Pueblo Nuevo we go, and in the occupied school building on Calle Principal, 
the teachers at La Escuelita – the barrio’s famous ‘little school’ - stop class and spill 
out into the street outside. My colleagues for the previous year, Vannesa, Juan and 
Gerardo, joke with friends they recognise in the crowd. They are joined by Joshua 
Wilson – the North American doctor who stands proudly in front of the Barrio 
Adentro health clinic in his white doctor’s coat. They smile and watch the visitors 
file past - past the point where, only a year before, the Communal Council had last 
met on school chairs spilling out across Calle Principal, before moving inside as 
numbers and enthusiasm decreased. 
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We are moving faster now, gathering pace as the road slopes down and the street 
widens into the older barrio, Mérida’s first invasión - or land “invasion” as they 
were once known. Janeath, founder of La Escuelita and a life-long resident of Pueblo 
Nuevo joins the flow of people and she and I link arms and walk together down the 
main street that is rich with memories and symbolism. Past the mural of Chávez’s 
face and a saluting Fidel Castro, we march, waving to Miguel as he leans on the 
counter of the MERCAL subsidised food store. Faster now, past the stoop where the 
old men sit outside the bodega and pass their bottle of rum, where I sheltered with 
Jose when his wheelchair was stranded in the winter floods. Past Nico’s new 
shopfront, where he weighs plantain on the scales behind the counter – the store 
opened, some speculate, with funds from his role as council spokesperson. Past the 
evangelical house church with Father William’s tiny Renault parked outside, just 
returned home from his latest prison visit. Past my house on La Cuesta where my 
“Venezuelan mother”, Marleny, must be inside shaking her head at “all this Chavista 
nonsense”. 
As we climb out of the barrio, the road winds past the half-finished police station, 
the bare girders grasping like fingers towards where Mount Bolivar dominates the 
horizon. The structure marks the site where the police destroyed the land toma – 
or “taking” - of 1973, crushing a student-led residents’ movement when the barrio 
overstepped its limits. We pass the basketball court that marks the end of the 
barrio, renovated with public funds by the Communal Councils – depending on who 
you believe. We pass through the southern entrance to Pueblo Nuevo, where the 
student Juan Carlos Davila Barrios was murdered in June 2013, sparking student 
protests and police raids into the community (see Appendix Six). We cross the 
Campo Elias Bridge, where commuters still pass fearfully over the barrio and which 
was blocked-off with piles of rubble for months during the anti-government 
occupations in the spring of 2014. We pass the spot where we gathered to watch 
one afternoon in April, anxious spectators as the tanks of the National Guard rolled 
in to liberate the west of the city.  
At the end of the bridge, the march turns left up Avenue Independencia, and Janeath 
and I turn back against the tide of people. The marchers who pass us seem relaxed 
now that they are back on the familiar ground of the city centre. They head on 
towards Plaza Bolivar, to hear speeches we have heard before and chant the chants 
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we have chanted many times. As Janeath and I turn back into Pueblo Nuevo, the 
tail-end of the march passes us and the excitement is over. Men lean into the 
bonnets of old cars. Conversations continue, the rum bottle passing from hand to 
hand. The stray dogs have returned to lie in the sun. In the school and the health 
clinic, the staff go back to work. 
1. Revolution in tension: emancipators or patrons for the urban 
poor? 
On my last day in Pueblo Nuevo in July 2014, the march through the barrio to mark 
the birthday of the late President Hugo Chávez illustrated something of the tension 
at the heart of this thesis. The enthusiastic but temporary spectacle of the march 
seemed to illustrate how the Bolivarian Revolution’s grand political project in some 
ways struggles to connect to the day-to-day lives of the people I met in Pueblo 
Nuevo.  
While the Bolivarian socialist project won support among the urban poor with its 
narrative of social inclusion and with the extension of basic services in the 
country’s barrios, the social separation of the low-income townships that ring the 
country’s cities continues in some important ways. For all the talk of compassion 
and political inclusion for the worst-off, Venezuelan political culture is still defined 
in part by tensions inherited from the pre-Chávez era – known as Puntofijismo - 
when party legitimacy was founded on the ability to provide services and broker 
the country’s oil wealth. These tensions can be seen today both in the limited 
success of participatory politics and in the different ways that communities like 
Pueblo Nuevo and their populations are thought about by the rest of society. 
This thesis brings together different kinds of information about the processes and 
discourses involved with the relationship of people and government in and around 
Pueblo Nuevo immediately following the death of Chávez. Observations from nine 
months of volunteer teaching work are used to explore the participatory 
methodology of the barrio’s famous ‘little school’ - the Fundación Cayapa education 
collective – and its work to reduce gang violence. Experiences of living and 
participating in Pueblo Nuevo and of building relationships with key community 
members are drawn on to explore perceptions of the lawlessness and political 
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radicalism of Venezuela’s barrio populations. Interviews with activists, residents 
and local officials are used to map the intellectual landscape of the barrio, 
identifying different overlapping folk concepts about the urban poor – including as 
ghetto thugs and as revolutionaries – and connecting these to notions about 
government and democracy.  
Accounts collected through a “dialogical interview strategy” (Ritchie & Lewis 
2003:140 in Bell 2013) are brought together with first-hand experiences of 
participating in a methodology, discussed in detail in Chapter Five, that connects in 
some ways with Schiller’s (2011a) explanation of “activist research”. The resulting 
description of Pueblo Nuevo’s experiences with community organising is 
connected in with historical studies of Mérida’s first so-called “land invasion” 
following rural-urban migration during the mid-Twentieth Century. Important 
continuities are identified with the pre-Chávez era in the strategies of community 
groups, their administration by partisan city authorities and within the Bolivarian 
public narrative of class warfare and popular empowerment.  
In this way, this thesis challenges thinking about the exceptionalism of 
participatory politics during the Bolivarian Revolution by showing important 
continuities with the pre-Chavez era - in the inherited tension between processes 
of emancipation and patronage and their premises in competing folk concepts 
about the urban poor. This is achieved through the development of a detailed 
account of the history, institutions and activities of a particular community that has 
payed a historic role in the development of barrios and their organisations in 
Mérida City.  
Revolution for the poorest? Pueblo Nuevo as part of national and regional 
politics 
Like many of the small group of international researchers, film-makers and 
solidarity activists working in the country in the first fifteen years of the Bolivarian 
Revolution, I was drawn to Venezuela by the promise of a political alternative and 
stories of vibrant and empowered grassroots movements. Bolivarianism promised 
social transformation instead of development - progress made from the bottom up, 
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without the IMF and the World Bank.1 It was a promise of political and empowering 
change, without the contradictions of tied aid or the external agendas of 
international NGOs. The Bolivarian vision was of a Venezuela where the 
institutions of Participatory Democracy – the Communal Councils, cooperatives 
and social movements - define the direction for their communities (García-Guadilla 
and Pilar 2002: 90; Foley and Irazábal 2010: 108). It was a vision of a new kind of 
a ‘Twenty First Century Socialism’: a reimagining of Latin American populism that 
was different, fairer, and where the government wouldn’t only deliver change from 
above, but in the words of Janeath would “open the window” for communities to 
change themselves (interview w JL, 24.05.14, PN). 
Inconsistencies behind this compelling vision provide the context for this study. 
The fetishisation of popular power seems to jar with the personality cult built 
around Hugo Chávez and his successor, the self-styled “son of Chávez”, President 
Nicolas Maduro. Orienting society to the needs of the people is hindered in 
Venezuela in part by partisan ideas about who counts as “the people”. This is 
socialism without much of an industrial working class, and where the economy still 
depends on the sale of oil to the country’s biggest foreign agitator, the United States. 
It is a system with a discourse of grassroots empowerment, but with an ever-
present and penetrating national politics. Above all, Venezuela today is a country 
where talk of social emancipation clashes with the day to day experience of millions 
who still live somewhat separate lives in somewhat separate communities, where 
the patronage politics of the pre-Chávez era in some ways continues. 
Despite these tensions, the Bolivarian vision retains its undeniable romance. Hugo 
Chávez’s divisive pro-poor rhetoric and his defiance of “oligarchs” at home and 
abroad are not forgotten. In Venezuela, Chávez’s progressive ideas around class, 
age, gender, race, and LGBT equality are still presented as part of a near-religious 
crusade of social redemption (Emerson 2011). During his fifteen years as 
President, the ex-paratrooper Captain-turned-political prisoner built a convincing 
                                                          
1 Like Lula in Brazil, Chávez paid off Venezuela’s debts to the IMF, citing the need for 
economic self-sufficiency (Tran 2007). He also banned all international funding for 
Venezuelan development, in part out of concerns about the funding of opposition groups by 
the US. Finding an entirely blank page for Venezuela at the World Bank website was 
something of a shocking discovery during my initial research into Venezuela –one that 
would fit with the tone for the three years of research that would follow.  
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narrative for many on the left in Latin America. Many see his struggle as the 
continuation of that of Che Guevara, Fidel Castro and Salvador Allende. His election 
in 1998 has come to be seen across the continent as the antecedent for the ‘Pink 
Tide’ neo-socialist governments of Morales, Lula and Correa. Chávez, many 
believed, was not just another caudillo – an old-style Latin American strong man - 
but a new kind of compassionate and responsive politician. In Venezuela, he was 
seen by his supporters as both patron and emancipator, the missing father for a 
fatherless generation who not only built health clinics and schools in the country’s 
barrios, but who Chavistas say “awoke the people” who lived in them.  
Outside of Venezuela, the appeal of the Chavista political narrative can be seen not 
only in the solidarity literature that has grown up around the Bolivarian project 
(e.g. Dominguez 2011; Raby 2006; Harnecker 2009) but in the large international 
pro-Chávez Venezuela Solidarity Campaign (VSC), and Hands off Venezuela. The 
VSC is based in London, with groups set up around the country where committed 
groups of activists meet and work primarily to address what they see as a right-
wing anti-Chávez campaign by the mainstream international media. As Venezuela 
became a symbol among activist networks as a country said to be empowering its 
grassroots, the VSC has developed considerable support in leftist circles – 
providing me the access to conduct interviews with Ken Livingston and Jeremy 
Corbyn for broadcast on Venezuelan television in support of Maduro.  
My involvement with the VSC would also lend me a certain credibility and provide 
contacts in Venezuela’s network of international activists and journalists. This 
association also helped me to build credibility - I was able to join the National 
Electoral Commission (CNE) as an international observer for the nationwide ‘6D’ 
municipal elections in 2013. Mérida in particular has become a hub for 
international journalism, due in part to its reputation as a focal point for anti-
government campaigning. During fieldwork, Paul Dobson (Correo del Orinoco), the 
film-maker Edward Ellis, the photographer Marcus Murray, and the leftist 
journalists Ewan Robertson (Venezuela Analysis), Tamara Pearson and Ryan 
Mallett-Outtrim (both Venezuela Analysis and Telesur) were all based in the city. 
My involvement with this network and with the UK solidarity campaign, meant a 
connection to some of the more pro-Chávez English-language material coming out 
of the region. In this context, it was often difficult to separate what we knew about 
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what was happening in Venezuela, from what we hoped was happening there. 
Analysing these hopes as part of the discourse around the Bolivarian Revolution 
would become an important part of the work of this thesis.  
These different notions about Hugo Chávez also connect with different ideas about 
Latin America’s ‘left turn’ in the first years of the Twenty First Century. For Ellner 
(2011: 96), this is about a distinction between the centre-left governments that 
were elected in Brazil, Argentina and Uruguay in the 2000s, and the governments 
in Venezuela, Ecuador and Bolivia that embrace a more “radical” understanding of 
democracy involving “direct popular involvement in decision-making”. Likewise, 
Castaneda (2006: 28) identifies “two lefts” in Latin America – one “open-minded 
and modern”, the other “close-minded and stridently populist”. Beaseley-Murray 
(2009), however, rejects a simple distinction between what have been called the 
‘populist’ and ‘social democratic’ currents of the Latin American Left, instead 
describing a multiplicity of left wing efforts that are defined by deep-seated 
tensions between socialism and liberalism. For Venezuela, different labels may be 
needed for different branches of the Venezuelan government. Enriquez (2013) 
characterises the state of “dual power” in Venezuela, in which different parts of the 
government remain in the hands of the previously predominant class, while a new 
powerful class gains influence in others. This is a reading that fits with the defence 
of the government’s policy record made by Chavistas during fieldwork, but may 
overlook the inherited culture of partidismo described in this thesis. 
These discussions continue the work of describing political processes in Latin 
America – from the literature that grew up around the different paths to democracy 
in the region (e.g. Mainwaring and Scully 1995), the role of social movements (e.g. 
Escobar and Alvarez 1992; Kaufmann and Alfonso 1997) to attempts to map trends 
of populism and neo-populism (e.g. Knight 1998; Conniff et al. 2012). This thesis 
uses a more situated approach, presenting evidence from a single, specific urban 
neighbourhood to explore local experiences and discourses of democracy. In 
Pueblo Nuevo, ideas about the relationship between people and govenrment were 
less about definitions of democracy, and more about the ways that Chávez and the 
Bolivarian government were talked about in the community – as either the patrons 
or the emancipators of barrio populations. 
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Of particular relevance to this thesis is the connected regional literature that seeks 
to describe different local cultures of politics – from detailed accounts of 
community life (e.g. Scheper-Hughes 1992; Goldstein 2013), experiences from 
within social movements and the literature around clientelism and brokerage (e.g. 
Auyero 2000; Zarazaga 2014). Again, examples from the villas of Argentina (ibid) 
as well as the favelas of neighbouring Brazil (e.g. Perlman 1973; Ireland 2011; Arias 
and Rodrigues 2006) provide useful precedents, by engaging with assumptions 
about political life in poor urban communities. These community studies offer 
evidence to improve the way we describe political processes in the region. For 
Saskia (2016), for example, it is the predominance of clientelistic practices in Latin 
America has reduced the importance of the left-right distinction by offering an 
alternative rationale for voting. Cannon and Kirby (2012), meanwhile, draw on a 
range of studies from across the region – building a picture of political participation 
that identifies the corporatist and clientelist practices by so-called radical leftist 
governments.  
Part of understanding these local political processes is about exploring the 
discourses they are bound up with. As Canel (1997: 190) puts it, social movements 
are engaged in a negotiation not only for goods and services, but for new identities 
for their participants. In Latin America, this connection of government processes 
and the identities of the people involved in them has often been usefully thought 
about in terms of citizenship (e.g. Roberts 1995). For this thesis, this analysis is 
about describing the ways that different identities represented by and about the 
urban poor provide the context for local experiences of community organising – 
including where these connect with ideas about government being either the 
patrons or the emancipators of the urban poor. This analysis draws on the “folk 
concepts” (Slater 2010) discussed in the remainder of this chapter as part of a 
description of these processes and identities in a particular community setting. 
In Pueblo Nuevo, the grand politics of the Bolivarian Revolution - and its place in 
discussions about populism and democracy in Latin America - connects with 
people’s day-to-day lives in limited ways. Chávez’s system of Participatory 
Democracy is represented by several Communal Councils that each report low 
membership and irregular activity. Another Chavista initiative, the MERCAL 
groceries store offers food and household goods subsidised by the government – 
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sold mostly to Chavista customers and the occasional opposition supporter in 
disguise. The Barrio Adentro – “into the barrio” – medical clinic, set up with staff 
and expertise from Cuba, continues to offer free treatment with a new generation 
of Bolivarian ‘community doctors’. The Brisas de Alba housing campaign offers a 
chance to leave the barrio behind once and for all and move to newly-built 
apartments on land occupied at the edge of Pueblo Nuevo. For all this, some men of 
the community of a certain age still lounge on the steps outside the local alcohol 
store, sipping rum or Polar beers. Families keep to the strict curfew that comes with 
a history of drug-related violent crime in the community. In the occupied school 
building, residents organise alongside the latest generation of middle-class leftist 
students who have found their way to Pueblo Nuevo to teach participatory 
education.  
The work of this thesis, therefore, is asking how the big political ideas surrounding 
Bolivarianism connect and don’t connect to people’s experience of participating in 
politics – where community organisations still position themselves as clients for 
government support, where the business of state is still enmeshed with party 
politics and where in Pueblo Nuevo, after the parade has passed, life goes on. 
Venezuela during fieldwork: the death of Chávez and the anti-government 
protest movement 
Three months before fieldwork began for this study, and shortly following my first 
scoping trip to Caracas and Mérida, Chávez’s death in March 2013 made 
international headlines and brought hundreds of thousands to the streets of 
Caracas to mourn. This loss was deeply felt by the left in Latin America, where 
Chávez had symbolised the possibility of a lasting alternative to neoliberalism. It 
would also shape the tone of a political moment in Venezuela - where the 
commanding symbolism and personality of President Chávez had to be deployed 
differently to deflect from a deepening political and economic crisis. Since Chávez’s 
death, the PSUV have tried to maintain their association with their late leader. 
Chávez’s “hand-picked” successor, Nicolas Maduro, has sworn to follow el camino 
de Chávez - “the path of Chávez” – but to date has proven a less convincing figure. 
His victory in the Presidential elections in April 2014 was won with a 1.7% margin, 
sparking fears among the Chavistas and renewed energy for the divided and 
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weakened opposition coalition, the Democratic Unity Roundtable (MUD). Had 
people been voting for participatory socialism, or for Hugo Chávez? What would 
happen without him?  
 
Photo 2. In 2013, Chávez’s messianic status would be bolstered by one last campaign. 
Defying cancer to deliver a final rousing speech to a mass rally in the pouring rain, El 
Commandante – ‘the giant’ Chávez - won a sixteenth national election. 
This thesis, therefore, is the story of a particular political moment - of a Venezuela 
trying to move on from the heady days of Chavismo at its height, as the country 
holds its breath and wonders what will follow. As people queue around the block 
to visit supermarkets with empty shelves, Chávez’s new-style populism no longer 
provides the same returns for his supporters. As discontent around the party’s 
growing disconnection from their support base has grown (Denis 2015), the PSUV 
have largely failed to show themselves to be capable of reform. Will the urban poor 
continue to turn out and vote for Chávez’s legacy in their millions, or will the “hills 
come down” as they did in 1989 when barrio populations took to the streets in 
mass riots, sparking a movement that led to the end of the pre-Chávez Puntofijista 
regime? 
For all this uncertainty, there is still a sense in Venezuela that politics matters. As 
part of Chávez’s attempt to use election campaigning as a way of fostering public 
involvement in politics (in Harnecker 2005: 164), nearly every year the country is 
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plunged into another fresh round of voting: Presidential, National Assembly, State 
or Municipal. The fierce polarisation of the press, constant marches and public give-
aways mean that Chávez’s struggle never feels far away. Every government office 
or food programme is branded with the colours of the PSUV. Every slow-moving 
public works project is painted with a fresh slogan, boasting that community 
improvements are “Only Possible in Socialism”. Today, in the “battleground city” of 
Mérida, the walls of the historic centre are still a canvas for a vitriolic political 
debate over Chávez’s legacy.  Here, utopian slogans make a patchwork with last 
year’s faded campaign promises and compete for space with creative personal 
attacks on politicians past and present. In the spring of 2014, mid-way through 
fieldwork, the Andean city became a flashpoint for political conflict. As the country 
was thrown into crisis, as protesters occupied middle-class neighbourhoods, 
blocked roads and burnt down health clinics, it was the university city of Mérida 
where the guarimba occupations and street shootouts lasted longest. Now politics 
meant masked militants or National Guardsmen on the street corners, the smell of 
scorched tarmac and the burnt-out houses of Chavista supporters.   
As with the coups attempts – one by Chávez’s clandestine movement in 1992, and 
one against him by CIA-backed protesters a decade later – the heightened political 
tensions give Venezuelans a sense of being at the epicentre of a clash of political 
systems. There is a feeling of having the eyes of a continent on the struggle between 
two competing visions for society: one seen by Chavistas as home-grown and 
socialist, the other as imperialist and neoliberal. We are told that at stake is the 
survival of a political model, while the problems facing Venezuelans – the worst 
murder rates of any peace time country, endemic corruption, and record-breaking 
inflation – are sensational. For a decade, analysts have talked about “Venezuela at 
the Crossroads” (Ellner and Rosen 2002; Alverez 2011; Ignacio 2013) as the 
country sags under a perpetual political urgency that seems to roll on from year to 
year. 
For all the constant reminders of politics, however, there is a sense in Venezuela of 
a population going about their daily lives without thinking about the Revolution 
every second of the day. What Arberola (in Uzcategui 2010: 1) calls “the pretended 
renewal of the bipolar political struggle” doesn’t seem to fit with the famously 
unhurried Venezuelan outlook. Where party allegiances are well-known to the man 
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on the street, families divided by political allegiance use humour to cope with 
divisions, as Chavista activists joke about “my husband the opositor”. In part, this 
fits with how people think about the relationship between people and government. 
Hellinger’s (2001: 42-44) survey of barrio populations found that providing basic 
services and “meeting the demands of the poor” were considered far more 
important elements of democracy than political pluralism or representing minority 
views. 
For some people in Mérida, politics seem to simply provide someone to blame for 
economic hardship. For others, it means quoting Mao in neighbourhood meetings 
and feeling part of a process beyond the edge of their barrio. In more insulated 
communities like Pueblo Nuevo and Simon Bolivar, even the political violence of 
2014 cannot compare with the gang violence of recent memory, when just crossing 
between the communities made you an instant target. Today, people in Venezuela 
shrug and get on with the business of dealing with the day-to-day symptoms of 
living a country in a seemingly endless transition from capitalism to something not 
quite clear. “This is not yet Cuba”, they say, and shrug at the endless queues, the 
scarcity of goods, and the log-jammed bureaucracy that makes the Soviet-style 
PSUV slogan “Efficiency or Nothing!” seem like cruel irony. For others, making a 
personal contribution to el proceso – to the revolutionary process - is an important 
part of how they spend and their time and construct their identities. This might 
mean becoming a community spokesperson - a vocero – or contributing to anti-
government public actions. It might mean marching through Pueblo Nuevo, or 
moving to live there as a community doctor or a teacher. It might mean painting 
socialist murals, or joining the ranks of the pro-Chávez militia, the Tupamaros, who 
fight their own revolutionary struggle at night with petrol bombs and bullets. 
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Photo 3. Mérida’s Fuga Muralistas collective use paint-by-numbers so that local people - 
and the odd international researcher - can contribute. Their murals have been 
commissioned by Mérida State, but are kept free of any PSUVista symbolism. Avenida 
Independencia, 2014. 
In Pueblo Nuevo, the Fundación Cayapa education collective has put the barrio on 
the map and in many ways reflects the participatory principles were part of 
Chávez’s promise of emancipation. The barrio’s famous “little school” - La Escuelita 
- with its mix of middle class leftist students and local residents has connected the 
barrio to a network of international and national leftist activists.2 With their 
participatory model, the students and facilitators seems to prioritise the here and 
now over bigger ideas about social transformation. Community organisations like 
Cayapa continue a history of vibrant and combative barrio organising that goes 
back to guerrilla organising during the struggle for independence, via the 
Liberation theology worker priests that brought the ideas of participatory 
socialism in the 1970s (Fernandes 2010: 50-51). It is these rich experiences of 
                                                          
2 The PROUT institute in Caracas, run by Dada Maheshvarananda, is a centre for learning 
around participatory socialist principles and the cooperative economy. As the centre – 
which overlooks Petare, the continent’s largest poor urban settlement - is a hub for 
volunteers, activists and researchers, an irregular stream of visitors from around the world 
hear about La Escuelita. Many choose to visit on their way through Mérida, helping with 
youth work or teaching yoga classes. In a notable exchange, children from Pueblo Nuevo 
visited the capital in 2012 to visit the institute and display their photography of the barrio 
at a gallery in Belles Artes. 
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grassroots organising that are better thought about as part of the origins of Chávez, 
than as his legacy (Ciccariello-Maher 2013). 
As much as politicians like to paint society as red and yellow – as PSUV or MUD – 
and draw neat lines around groups with shared identities and interests, these 
categories of Chavista and opositor cannot reflect the complexity of personalities 
and characters in Venezuela. Around Mérida’s commercial centre, my regular black 
market money lender takes time out from speculating on tourist dollars to eulogise 
on the imminent victory of international socialism. At loud community meetings in 
the dilapidated hall at the edge of Pueblo Nuevo, a feminist activist argues 
ideological points while clutching a Prada handbag. On Avenida Independencia, 
fierce critics of Maduro queue sullenly for goods discounted by the National Guard 
by Presidential decree. Down in the barrio, opposition supporters visit the 
government’s subsidised grocery stall in false beards (interview w MP, 16.04.14, 
PN). On my street, a local anti-government protester praises Chávez’s public record 
(interview w GM, 9.4.14, PN), while Pueblo Nuevo’s most well-known opositor 
works to make the communal council more inclusive and participatory. Here, 
Barrio Adentro doctors dream of visiting Paris and London, while in the town 
centre protesters wearing Guy Fawkes masks and waving human rights banners 
call for an end to free public healthcare. 
In this context, understanding the importance of the myth of Chávez and the 
combative narrative of the Bolivarian Revolution for people’s day to day 
experiences is part of the challenge of conducting social research in Venezuela. A 
march by Chavistas through Mérida’s oldest barrio, appears at first glance to be a 
spontaneous example of popular power. At second glance it appears to be part of a 
strategy to consolidate what Mérida’s Director for Communes and Social 
Movements described to me as to establish “territorial authority” (interview w DA 
12.05.14, OF. The march through Pueblo Nuevo, however, also shows us how the 
Bolivarian Revolution is more than simply the Revolution as Spectacle - the title of 
Uzcategui’s (2010) left-wing critique. Electoral success might depend on the votes 
of barrio populations, but an event where outsiders visit the barrios they fear the 
most shows the acknowledgement of the political importance of these long-avoided 
“red zones”. If nothing else, this new route forced the marchers to see what visitors 
often commented during fieldwork – that these notorious communities are not so 
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different after all. If Pueblo Nuevo’s half-built police module is a failed electoral 
promise, the health clinic, the school, and the new tower blocks are all seen locally 
as the Chavismo answering the needs of the most vulnerable. 
The description of political culture that is developed throughout this thesis is 
therefore an attempt to show how politics is important in different ways at 
different times and to different people. Part of what Chávez achieved, Chavistas say, 
was to make politics seem urgent every day – to bring his “struggle” into people’s 
homes with weekly broadcasts and by telling people that politics was meant for 
them. Describing the political culture of Pueblo Nuevo today means connecting the 
experience of this one community at the moment of fieldwork both with its specific 
historical conditions and with the discursive context of the Bolivarian political 
narrative. It means understanding the curiosities of life in Pueblo Nuevo as at once 
unique, and as distinctly Latin American - part of a regional spectrum of different 
shades of personality politics, populism, and participatory socialist rhetoric. It 
means also leaving behind those phrases that have become inseparable from 
Chavista politics – the language of empowered, popular, protagonistic, direct 
democracy – to find a less normative set of language and to identify more stable 
reference points for analysis. This is done in two main ways: i) by tracing longer 
histories of community organising from the pre-Chávez era, and ii) by teasing out 
how different Bolivarian and older conceptions of the urban poor frame accounts 
and processes of participation. 
The remainder of this introductory chapter introduces the language and concepts 
that I draw on throughout the thesis to communicate my findings. First, I make a 
case for the use of “folk concepts” as a way of talking about the ways that political 
notions from Pueblo Nuevo connect to everyday experiences. I then identify some 
important folk concepts for understanding attitudes towards urban poverty and 
community organising and for thinking about the role of the state in Venezuela. I 
argue that different theories about marginality provide useful reference points for 
describing Venezuelan attitudes towards the public and towards possible roles for 
the urban poor in political life. I then begin to map out two ways of thinking about 
poor urban communities and their populations that can be identified from the 
accounts of my participants. I link these back to the two roles that Venezuelan 
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governments have offered to fulfil for the urban poor in both the Chávez and pre-
Chávez eras. Finally, I outline the structure for the thesis. 
2. Connecting discourse and practice: overlapping folk concepts 
about the urban poor 
Connecting the big ideas of Bolivarianism with observations of participatory 
politics in and around Pueblo Nuevo needs a set of analytical language. The work 
of this thesis is not only to connect Bolivarian rhetoric and local experiences, but to 
understand how tensions in practices link with tensions between different sets of 
political ideas that people and institutions draw on differently from one moment to 
the next. In this thesis I consider how different overlapping ideas about the 
populations of barrios like Pueblo Nuevo appear in the accounts of different 
research participants, and in the processes both for organising and for 
administering community groups.   
Considering different notions about the urban poor is of particular relevance for 
contemporary Venezuela, where competing notions about the urban poor inform 
policy and are reproduced in political rhetoric in the street reformulations of 
political ideas that occur in meetings of activists and dissidents across the country. 
They are part of the big, messy sets of ideas that are drawn upon by people to make 
sense of their government, their politics and their immediate surroundings. These 
are ideas that are commonly overheard, that are part of the interplay from above 
and below – contained in the speeches of politicians or reproduced in activists’ 
grumblings about party oversight. They connect to, and are part of, the public 
narrative of the Bolivarian mission (Emerson 2011). I argue in this thesis that these 
different notions connect with different ideas about the role of government 
contained within the Bolivarian ideology – where the revolutionary state appears 
as either the patron or the emancipator for the urban poor. 
Relating these different notions about the urban poor to the different sorts of 
information collected during field work needs a theory to explain the role of ideas. 
Gramsci’s (1971) and Foucault’s (1980) theories about the political power of ideas 
– including as hegemony and governmentality – set out to describe processes 
where the control of ideas results in the influence of actions, typically to normalise 
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population behaviour and reinforce the status quo. For both, describing how social 
processes connect to different kinds of discursive information also has a political 
function to critique strategies for domination, and an underlying concern for the 
vulnerable.1 In this sense, these social theories can be connected to Paolo Freire’s 
(1972) analysis of systems of education and knowledge production. For Freire, the 
world of ideas is a part of the dynamic of the cultural and political oppression of 
the poor in Latin America. While Freire’s work offers a framework for research and 
teaching, more expansive conceptions of discourse can become unwieldy for 
certain kinds of social and political analysis. At a certain point theories about 
discourse blur the line between signifier and signified, as discourse or culture come 
to mean to mean not only texts, notions, and ideology but the actions and social 
institutions that result from and inform discursive factors. Laclau (2005: 68), for 
example, rejects any distinction between discourse and social institutions, 
explaining that “…by discourse I do not mean something that is essentially 
restricted to the areas of speech and writing, but any complex of elements in which 
Relations play the constitutive role”.3 
Among political researchers, analysis of meaning includes examining 
representations of the urban poor. Wacquant (2008: 8), in the preface to Urban 
Outcasts, writes that:  
“(I)t is imperative to establish a clear cut separation between, on the 
one hand, the folk concepts used by state decision-makers, city 
authorities and the residents themselves to designate neighbourhoods 
of exile and, on the other, the analytical concepts that social scientists 
must construct, against the pre-notions of urban common sense.”  
                                                          
3 From attempts to describe the interplay between ideas and behaviours, Bourdieu’s (1979) 
social theory is among the more complete. Key to his analysis is the concept of habitus, 
which acknowledges the mutual interplay between ideas and actions as behaviours and 
inform social conventions, and conventions inform behaviours and dispositions. Bourdieu’s 
concepts of fields, meanwhile, allows for the local renegotiation of guiding social ideas as 
“field rules” and prompts the independent study of different social instances and their 
different doxic or ‘naturalised’ sets of assumptions. These sophisticated theories have also 
been applied since the second half of the Twentieth Century to support the study of 
particular political communities. 
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This notion is somewhat flattering to social scientists, where the prevalence of 
subjective and doxic assumptions no doubt results in an equally ‘folk’ logic. 
However, in “folk concepts” Wacquant provides us with a relatively modest term 
with which to sum up the inevitably vague role that different ideas play for different 
actors. From Wacquant, the notion of the folk concept has been picked up by Slater 
(2010: 167), who calls for “a revolution in the politics of knowledge production” 
and turns his attention to the forces that encourage folk logic in academic 
scholarship. This analytical work – to consider discourse and meaning alongside 
experiences of community organising in Venezuela - is on display already in some 
of the important preceding studies for this thesis; in particular by Fernandes (2007, 
2010), Wilde (2014, 2016) and Schiller (2011, 2011a 2011b).  
During fieldwork, folk concepts were observable as notions that were commonly 
reproduced in interview responses, attitudes expressed in meetings and in 
different political symbols and actions. The march through Pueblo Nuevo, 
described above, connects to the folk concepts reproduced by many Chavistas, who 
argue that barrio residents hold the key to political change in Venezuela. Other sets 
of political notions were reproduced among more specific groups. Among the 
accounts of representatives of different city authorities, for example, these 
included an idea about the need to “correct” the behaviours of “disordered” 
parochial communities (see Chapter Seven). Different political notions can also be 
collected from the literature on community organising in Venezuela, for example in 
the different expectations of democracy among barrio residents (e.g. Hellinger 
2005) and from analyses of the Bolivarian public narrative (e.g. Zuquete 2009; 
Emerson 2011). Again, it is important in describing these ideas to use specifically 
non-Bolivarian language, and part of the journey of this study has been a move 
away from the normative notions of “empowerment” or “constituent power” 
towards more temperate language that might help discuss what those ideas mean 
for my research participants. 
Different kinds of evidence from Pueblo Nuevo showed how people reproduce and 
deploy folk concepts about different overlapping barrio identities. These occurred 
often as representations of the urban poor – notably as the malandro or ghetto thug 
and the social revolutionary. At other times throughout the thesis, overlapping 
notions about thee urban poor – as the humble poor, as migrant invaders, as the 
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clients of the state and rightful citizens – are also presented as part of the 
intellectual landscape of Pueblo Nuevo. Most commonly, these related to 
assumptions about the criminality or the political radicalism of barrio populations. 
As described in Chapter Three, the former folk concept is a product of the pre-
Chávez era, while the latter has been adopted by Chavismo and dates from the 
history of grassroots activism in Venezuela - including the resistance to 
authoritarian rule in the first half of the Twentieth Century (Velasco 2011; Emerson 
2011). These ideas in turn connect with ideas about the relationship between 
people and government from both the pre-Chávez era, and from Bolivarian 
rhetoric, that represent the role of government as being either the emancipator or 
the patron for the urban poor.  
3. Malandros, criminality and theories of urban marginality  
In Mérida, notions of criminality were a fundamental part of the popular wisdom – 
the folk concepts - about Pueblo Nuevo. It is the malandros - or ghetto thugs - from 
barrios like Pueblo Nuevo that ‘ordinary’ Mérideños fear when they take the public 
bus or hurry over the Campo Elias Bridge above the community. It is people of the 
city’s barrios who are assumed to commit the murders that fill the back pages of 
the local paper, Pico Bolivar, and who sell drugs by day and fight each other in street 
shootouts after dark. 
During fieldwork, folk concepts about barrio populations were produced 
inconsistently. Most people in Mérida City had never visited the barrio, and were 
shocked to find that I had moved to live there. Luciano Lopez’s personal experience 
of Pueblo Nuevo, however, meant his account contained different ideas about the 
community: 
“Really, you live there? That’s the ghetto. That’s where they sell drugs. 
Have you never heard of the ghetto? Ghetto is a rap word. It means the 
marginal zones, the poor people - the gente pobre. In Pueblo Nuevo it is 
very dangerous… over there, there are murderers. It’s like that for 
anyone that goes there from the city. I know because I had a fucking 
addiction before. To the shit that they sell there. (…) But of course they 
have schools. The barrio is normal. They have bodegas, they have the 
29 
 
community radio. But it is another world.” (Interview w LL, 07.04.13, 
MC) 
In accounts like Luciano’s, notions of criminality overlap with an awareness that 
“normal” life also happens in the city’s barrios.  
In Pueblo Nuevo, notions of criminality are also part of the struggle of barrio 
residents. Mani Toledo was one of the few residents who had moved to the barrio. 
He explaiend how:  
“This is a very tough community. Here you have to learn to live in the 
middle of good things and bad things. I’ve lived here on this land for 
eighteen years. Here was pure malandros, taking drugs, selling drugs - 
it was pure mountain and trees. And I rescued the land from both.” 
(interview w MT, 18.04.14, SB) 
Here, the notion of ‘other’ community members who are somehow more primitive, 
more criminal are almost part of the natural hazards of the environment.  
These ideas about Pueblo Nuevo are part of broader sets of overlapping folk 
concepts about Venezuela’s urban poor. In Latin America, a continent whose cities 
are often depicted as hot beds of urban crime, Venezuela is especially notorious for 
its street violence and gang culture. This violence, we are told, is perpetrated by 
malandros, the ghetto thugs from the country’s barrio communities who maraud 
city centres and whose communities are refuges from the police. As with Brazil’s 
favelas (e.g. Ireland 2011), we are told that in the barrios drugs are bought and sold 
openly and lives are cheap. There, violence is normal and an “alternative culture 
and morality” replaces the rule of law as people take justice into their own hands 
(Romero and Rujano 2007). In Venezuela, these ideas follow on from notions that 
developed around the first barrio communities. During the first wave of rural-
urban migration in the 1930s and 1940s, new urban settlements were seen as “land 
invasions” (Jugo Burguera 1974; Hernández de Padrón 1998) that were populated 
by “migrant invaders” (Rogler 1967: 516). Venezuela’s new barrio populations 
were seen as being ill-equipped for city life, with frustration the resulting low 
quality of life in the country’s townships (Ray 1969). 
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The malandro was the dangerous criminal was made famous by the Venezuelan 
crime cinema wave of the 1940s (Chacón 2014), where they were represented as 
cunning, socially-disconnected and violent.4 These folk concepts about barrio 
populations tie in with Venezuelan notions of bravado, machismo and masculinity 
(Fernadiz Martin 2003). In the wake of the 1989 Caracazo uprising, President 
Andres Perez emphasised the threat that these frustrated barrio populations posed 
to the middle classes. He promised to “safeguard the right to peace and safeguard 
the property of our nation” against protesters from poor urban communities (in 
Emerson 2011: 92). These ideas were reinforced by the rising violent crime in the 
1990s that would provide an ongoing problem for Chavismo from 1998 to the 
present day. 
Connecting folk concepts from Pueblo Nuevo with theories of urban 
marginality 
These notions about Pueblo Nuevo and Venezuela’s other barrios have parallels in 
academic thinking about urban marginality. The concept of urban marginality can 
be traced from the Chicago school in 1930s, where it developed as part of an 
attempt to describe what was seen as the difference and separateness of poor 
urban communities. Following the proliferation of new urban settlements around 
the cities of Latin America, these theories would later applied to Latin America. 
Vekemans and Guiusti (1969) and Germani (1980) began to explain the lack of 
social integration of poor urban areas with so-called contemporary institutions and 
values as being about a division between two coexisting sectors, one modern and 
the other traditional. Here, marginality was presented as a state of exclusion from 
participation and development: a “multi-dimensional phenomenon” where the 
conditions of economy, production, consumption, culture, politics and education 
were meaningfully different to the rest of society (Delfino 2012: 23). 
North American scholars sought to explain what they saw as new social 
environments both within the US sphere of influence (e.g. Lewis 1966) and in cities 
like Chicago (e.g. Suttles 1968) and New York (e.g. Bourgois 1977; Gans 1982). As 
                                                          
4 These ideas are also reproduced in contemporary Venezuelan cinema. Recent films that 
dramatise the clash between barrio and non-barrio people include Piedra, papel o tijera 
(2012), and Hermano (2010). 
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these new settlements also emerged in the historical centres of cities, as well as at 
their edges, the idea of marginality lost its topographical meaning (Delfino 2012: 
20), and came to reflect an otherness that is more cultural, behavioural and even 
psychological. Oscar Lewis’s (1966) controversial ethnography, La Vida: A Puerto 
Rican Family in the Culture of Poverty focused on a family of prostitutes from the 
Costa Rican slum of La Perla. Lewis’ “cultures of poverty” theory argued that the 
poor in capitalist societies shared a culture that transcended national boundaries, 
“…including in family structure, relationships, psychology and personality, and in 
the relationship between the poor and the larger communities they lived in”. The 
behavioural and psychological traits outlined by Lewis form a cultural explanation 
for poverty. They include: a lack of class consciousness, people seeing themselves 
as marginalised or unworthy, dependence on others, fatalism about the world, 
provinciality, and not connecting their struggles with those from elsewhere. More 
positive characteristics include high levels of community pride, the existence of 
some basic organisations like youth gangs, but no stable structures beyond the 
extended family. 
In the Social Order of the Slum, Suttles (1968) describes what he sees as an 
alternative morality of the urban poor. He describes social rules that are 
established within street corner groups and other informal institutions, who 
established “their own” social standards that both compare and contrast with the 
conventions of “the wider community”. Likewise, Gans’ (1982). Urban Villagers: 
group and class in the life of Italian-Americans, describes the North American ‘urban 
jungle’, for example Little Italy, the Ghetto, or the Black Belt. Like Suttles, Gans 
(1982: 14) compares the West End to the ‘rest’ of society, stating that how everyday 
life in was “not that much different from that in other neighbourhoods, urban or 
suburban.” 
The essentialising generalisations about poor urban people that form a part of 
theories of urban marginality have been challenged by writers like Perlman (1979, 
2005, 2007), who gives an account of the diversity of experiences and identities in 
the favelas or Rio de Janeiro. Despite this, these sentiments persist in the study of 
poor urban communities. Wacquant’s (2008) Urban Outcasts: a comparative study 
of advanced marginality reinforces the idea that marginal communities around the 
world are separate places, inhabited by people who share important differences to 
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mainstream society. For Wacquant (2008: 272), marginal communities are at the 
bottom of a “…hierarchical system of places that compose the new spatial order of 
the city…”.5 Here, “street capitalism” is law, leading to the “virtual imprisonment” 
of the residents (ibid: 121).6 Wacquant’s assessment of community relations 
identifies “logics of urban polarization from below”, including the loss of 
“identification and attachment to a community”: 
“This weakening of territorial based communal bonds (…) fuels a retreat 
into the sphere of private consumption and stimulates strategies of 
mutual distancing and denigration (‘I am not one of them’) that further 
undermine local solidarities…” (271).  
For Wacquant (2008: 197), residents of marginal communities therefore adopt “the 
mental structures of marginality” - a mind-set that leads to basically entrenched, 
often ethnic violence.7  
After living, working and building lasting relationships with people in Pueblo 
Nuevo as well as in some of the most disadvantaged urban areas of the UK over 
several years, Wacquant’s description of marginal “creatures” makes for an 
abrasive read. Nevertheless, the descriptions by Lewis, Gans and Wacquant have a 
certain common sense appeal. They reflect certain aspects of how people in Mérida 
and in Pueblo Nuevo itself talk about the community and its populations. It is 
important to emphasise that the reproduction of marginality-type folk concepts is 
not limited to opponents of the Chavista project – with its narrative of 
emancipation for the urban poor. In this thesis, these folk concepts appear in the 
accounts of Chavistas, barrio residents, and officials that connect to the particular 
experience of participatory politics practiced in Mérida.  
                                                          
5 In his book, Wacquant (2008: 242-243) describes the marginal community as “a perilous 
battlefield” between gangs, state agencies, grassroots residents’ groups and “outside 
institutional predators” (2008: 242-243). 
6 The people living in Wacquant’s (2008: 226) “imploding ghetto” are “…first and foremost 
creatures of state policies…” (272) who are “divided” (157) and who live in “virtual 
imprisonment” (242). 
7 For Wacquant (2008: 157), “(i)n the American ghetto, physical violence is a palpable 
reality that overturns all parameters of ordinary existence.” His accounts of the effects of 
crime and violence – the exaggeration of which read as if they may be tied up with the 
bravado of an urban folk tradition - appear to be taken at face value, without having their 
subjectivities considered. 
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The application of these conceptions of urban marginality in Venezuela scholarship 
can be seen in particular in the wake of the Caracazo uprising of 1989. Discourses 
of alternative morality developed, used in part to blame of barrio populations for 
the massacres that had taken place at the hands of the police and National Guard 
(Lezama 2012).  More recently, some scholars have turned their attention to the 
ways that ideas about malandro culture are experienced by barrio populations, 
including Ferrándiz Martin’s (2003: 712) discussion of a young delinquent’s 
struggle with both the stigma of the malandro label, and the pressure to live up to 
notions of family honour and machismo.  
In Mérida, these folk concepts were also by Chavistas as they seek to explain a 
recent loss of support among the urban poor, or deviation from communitarian 
values, for example through the misuse of community funds (see Chapter Seven). 
The alternative values in Venezuela’s barrios are described as being more in line 
with the individualism of capitalism than the communitarian mind-set of the 
revolutionary. For some, this might appear in the belief that people in Pueblo Nuevo 
are “not accustomed to” participating in politics (interview w AR, 03.06.14. MC), 
while people in the barrio talked about feeling the shame of malandro stigma. 
4. Revolucionarios, political radicalism and theories of grassroots 
emancipation 
These ideas of lawlessness also feed into assumptions about the political radicalism 
of barrio populations. In Mérida, Pueblo Nuevo and the city’s other barrio 
communities were talked about not only as being Chavistas strong-holds, but as 
being areas with especially high grassroots activism and collaborative community 
development. This folk concept of the barrio revolucionario is one that is central to 
Bolivarian discourses about the relationship between people and government.  
During fieldwork, at Chavista meetings at the edges of Pueblo Nuevo, people sought 
to connect with this revolutionary identity in different ways. At the Frente de 
Vanguardia de Hugo Chávez, participants wore military green in place of the 
traditional red shirts (see Photo 1), while members of the militant Tupamaros 
group wore Che Guevara-style berets and camouflage clothing. Chavista militantes 
from the barrios were talked about as being hardworking, principled and often 
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portrayed as living on very little – for example as living with food shortages by 
stoically going without, or by taking showers instead of using scarce toilet paper. 
In Pueblo Nuevo itself, notions about autonomous, heroic barrio activists were part 
of the “epic version” of community achievements (Auyero 2000: 170-171). They 
appeared especially in accounts of community progress that emphasise the spirit 
of communitarianism, including in the Brisas de Alba housing movement, and at the 
Communal Council Calle Principal (see Chapter Seven).  
Marcelo Lischinsky, a member for the Frente de Vanguardia de Hugo Chavez and a 
community orgnaiser from Mérida, took time out from the May Day workers’ march 
to explain the new place at the centre of politics for the formerly-marginaliased in 
Venezuela:   
“The Bolivarian Revolution has (…) enabled us to recuperate our own 
collective memory: our memory of struggle, our memory of battle. The 
Bolivarian Revolution has converted the forgotten story of Venezuela 
into the official story of Venezuela. Where before we had the 
perspective of the dominant class, now we have the perspective of the 
dominated class.”8 
This notion of the urban social hero is connected to the history of guerrilla struggles 
in Venezuela, when the barrios of Caracas were the base for guerrilla resistance 
against the dictatorships of the first half of the twentieth century (Fernandes 2010: 
62; Velasco 2011). Since 1989’s Caracazo, it is the barrio populations who are seen 
as having the numbers and tenacity to change the political trajectory of the country. 
Today, Chavistas connect with this “rebel history” in the ways they think about the 
urban poor (Velasco 2011). In the Bolivarian narrative, the barrio revolutionary is 
seen as being the empowered agent of social transformation (Spanakos 2008; 
Emerson 2011). He or she is often presented as holding communitarian values, as 
attending community meetings and working to improve their communities. The 
barrio revolutionary is seen as being well-versed in political theory, as 
understanding of the vision of Bolivarianism and often as holding feminist and 
other progressive views. Coming from barrio communities is now something  of a 
                                                          
8 See Appendix Four for full interview. 
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badge of honour for Chavistas - the state media makes heavy reference to Nicolas 
Maduro’s childhood in Petare, while Mérida’s Director for the Ministry of 
Communes quickly established his revolutionary credentials during our interview 
by bringing up his childhood in the famous 23 de Enero barrio (interview w DA, 
12.05.14, OF). 
 
Photo 4. Lisseth Pavon was presented in the media as an example of a modern 
revolucionaria.9 
Connecting folk concepts from Pueblo Nuevo with theories of grassroots 
emancipation 
As folk concept of the malandro barrio residents connects with theories of urban 
marginality, ideas about the barrio revolucionarios connect with the body of 
Marxist-oriented literature that has grown up in Latin America around the practice 
                                                          
9 After the death of Chavez in March 2013, this photo of Lisseth Pavon, a 23-year old woman 
from a poor barrio in Tachira was widely circulated. Lisseth is a law student, a young 
mother, a National Guard member and community activist and was described as having 
made the 25-hour journey to Caracas, then in the same clothes she’d been travelling in, with 
some water and an empanada, before waiting ten hours to visit Chavez’s remains. As one of 
the more famous images of mourning for the late President, it encapsulates the values of 
the social revolutionary: humble, informed, patriotic, communitarian and a committed 
Chavista. 
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of community organising and popular education. These theories provide a more 
optimistic conception of the urban poor (e.g. Freire 1972; Gómez and Puiggrós 
1986; Becker 1995) and have proven influential in leftist political movements of 
the Twentieth Century Latin America, including Bolivarianism. These theories 
argue not only that poor populations ought to be emancipated, but that they have 
leadership qualities, resilience and learnings needed for social change.  
More emancipatory thinking about marginality developed from the 1950s in 
connection with Latin America’s Dependency Theory scholarship. Fernando 
Henrique Cardos, Aníbal Quijano, Miguel Murmis and José Nun all shifted from a 
technical analysis of marginality to a political analysis - one that broke from 
modernisation theory and demanded a break from imperialism and the national 
bourgeoisie (Delfino 2012). Writers in this Marxist-oriented tradition saw 
marginality less as a state and more as a process - a distinction that offers and 
explanation and attributes blame for the ongoing process of marginalisation (ibid: 
23). These theories of urban poverty are part of a broader critique of capitalism. 
They explain marginality as the growing inability of industrialisation to absorb the 
growth of the labour-force. In this context, Murmis and Nun argue that it is the 
urban poor who are most affected by changes in the system as it moves between 
different economic phases. 
These alternative theories of marginality also have a message of social 
emancipation and look to marginal populations as the driving force for social 
revolution (Delfino 2012: 23). For advocates of popular education, it is through 
sharing experience from poorer communities that “….people who have historically 
lacked power can discover and expand their knowledge and use it to eliminate 
societal inequities” (Wiggins 2011: 357-358). The anti-imperialist sentiment and 
the notion of a transformative role for Latin America’s working and landless classes 
has been a central idea for the social movements across the continent. This role for 
marginal populations also informed their reconceptualization.  Touraine (1977: 
1105) described Latin America’s urban poor as having been shown by history to be 
“the most conscious and most militant of the exploited workers.” Che Guevara’s 
(1965) call for el hombre nuevo – the new socialist man – joined the development 
of poor populations as individuals with broader processes of social and political 
change. Leftist movements in Cuba, Nicaragua and elsewhere found new 
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empowering narratives to give marginal sectors a sense of inclusion in political life. 
These narratives would be told and retold across the continent, and would be taken 
up by grassroots movements in Venezuela and elsewhere, and finally be 
institutionalised by the government of Hugo Chávez and the new “pink tide” 
governments in Bolivia, Ecuador and elsewhere.  
These theories of emancipation and the notion of the barrio revolucionarios play 
different roles in Venezuela today. The narrative that has developed around 
Bolivarian Participatory Democracy, emphasises the role poor urban communities 
can play as the “protagonists” to shape social change (Raby 2006), as new 
Bolivarian Citizens (Emerson 2011). In Pueblo Nuevo, this empowering sentiment 
was central to the ways that teachers and volunteers in Fundacíon Cayapa talked 
about community development. In addition, and lie the “alternative culture and 
morality” of the malandros (Romero and Rujano 2007), Chavistas in some barrios 
are also considered to have their own standards of revolutionary behaviours. Wilde 
(2014: 22) describes how, in barrio El Camoruco, “…residents could be 
admonished, often by their own neighbours, for failing to live up to Chavista 
aspirations of participation”. In both El Camoruco and in Mérida, Chavistas also 
talked about having formación” – ideological development – a value inherited from 
the pre-Chávez era and one of the characteristics and expectations of 
revolucionarios (Hernández de Padrón 2000: 208). 
5. Aims and structure of the thesis: imaginaries of politics and Pueblo 
Nuevo 
In Venezuela the folk mythology around barrio malandros and revolucionarios 
overlaps with other ideas about the urban poor as the passive clients of the state 
or as the rightful citizens of a new era of pro-poor politics. These different identities 
also connect a broader discussion that is taking place around identities in Latin 
America, not least those analyses that pay greater attention to the roles that race 
and gender play both as part of the relationship between people and government. 
In Venezuela, race is seen as being is deeply entwined with class (Cannon 2008), 
meaning that ideas about the emancipation of barrio populations connects with 
historic struggle against discrimination around ethnicity (Fernandes 2001: 87-90) 
and the analysis of Chávez’s “ethnopopulism” (Gottberg 2011). Lallander (2016: 
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149), is among those who talks about both about “… the empowerment of 
Venezuelan women (…) achieved through their protagonist roles in the new 
participatory democratic model…” – and the lack of similar progress around race 
politics. New political roles for barrio women as part of the relationship between 
people and government also connect to a broader discussion of Venezuela’s 
machista culture, and to the longer-running negotiation of gender roles within 
families and communities.  
These identities, along with the overlapping folk concepts of the malandro, the 
revolutionary and their academic reference points in theories of marginality and 
emancipation are used in this thesis to discuss the relationship between the big 
ideas of the Bolivarian Revolution and local experiences of participatory politics in 
and around Pueblo Nuevo. For Perlman (2005: 15), marginality ideas about the 
urban “other” are part the “common sense view” of Brazil population - a view that 
has been legitimized by social scientists and used to justify public policies of favela 
removal. In this way, marginality, she writes can be “a material force as well as an 
ideological concept and a description of social reality” (ibid). Part of the 
contribution of this thesis, therefore, is to expand this analysis to include the 
analysis to examine the function of equally political but less-studied folk concepts, 
including the Chavista discourses that represent barrios as places of political 
radicalism. Different kinds of evidence are used to show how inherited tensions in 
the ways of thinking about poor urban populations connect with both 
contemporary and historical experiences of participation in Pueblo Nuevo.  
Chapter Two outlines a history of Pueblo Nuevo from its founding in 1945 as part 
of the rural-urban migration of the mid twentieth century, to the economic crisis of 
the 1980s and the birth of Chavismo. I map the evolution of Pueblo Nuevo’s 
different community organisations against a history of political change, including 
the transition to democracy in 1958 and the barrio’s experiences of the power-
sharing politics of the pre-Chávez era. I show how representations of barrio 
populations changed from migrant invaders, to rightful citizens, and finally to the 
notions of criminality with the events of the Caracazo.  
In Chapter Three, I chart the evolution of community organisations and public 
services in Pueblo Nuevo between the Caracazo uprising of 1989 and 2014 when 
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fieldwork began. I map local changes in barrio services against the rise of the 
Chavista mass movement and the period of Bolivarian government from 1998. I 
show how new public services and organisations in Pueblo Nuevo in the 2000s 
were part of a new national era of pro-poor politics that followed the increased 
political significance of barrio populations in the 1980s and 1990s. As new 
opportunities for local organising and for basic healthcare, education, housing and 
subsidised goods formed part of improved terms of patronage under the Bolivarian 
Revolution, I connect this history to shifting ideas about barrio populations, as the 
new Chavista rhetoric redeemed the urban poor and cast them first as empowered 
social revolutionaries, and then as the embattled loyal subjects of a deepening 
political crisis. 
In Chapter Four, I describe the different bodies of literature used in the thesis and 
locate my contribution among i) analyses of the Bolivarian public narrative, ii) 
analyses of institutional and policy changes under Chavismo, and iii) studies on 
Chávez era and pre-Chávez era community organising. I show how these bodies of 
literature provide precedents for understanding the politics of community 
organising in and around Pueblo Nuevo. I argue that there is a need for a study that 
links these bodies of literature to help understand how contemporary tensions 
with their roots in different conceptions of the urban poor, and different state roles, 
have been inherited from the pre-Chávez era.  
In Chapter Five, I outline my research methodology. The challenges of living and 
doing research in Pueblo Nuevo are used to explain the ways that the social 
separateness of the barrio is maintained. I discuss how my participation in 
community life, and the dialogical approach used during fieldwork help to break 
down my assumptions about the community. A timeline of political events during 
fieldwork is presented, and I make a case for the role of secondary historical 
literature as a way navigating the complex politics of the current era. I also discuss 
my own shifting political attitude and subjectivities. 
Chapter Six describes three contemporary examples of participatory politics in and 
around Pueblo Nuevo. The Brisas de Alba housing movement, the anti-government 
protests movement and the Communal Council Calle Principal are used to show 
different areas of continuity with the different kinds of political organising seen in 
40 
 
the pre-Chávez era. These examples are used to related Mérida’s participatory 
politics in Pueblo Nuevo and Mérida to the processes of brokerage from Villa 
Paraiso in Buenos Aires, where processes of exchanging political support fit 
alongside the “epic version” (Auyero 2000: 170-171) of community collaboration 
told by local people. 
Chapter Seven brings together observations from thirty city-level community 
meetings to identify how certain characteristics of these meetings work to exclude 
non-Chavistas and fuel discontent among the Chavista grassroots. The chapter also 
presents evidence from interviews with key bureaucrats from seven government 
institutions, outlining the extensive bureaucracy involved with administrating 
Mérida’s community organisations. These accounts are used to show the tensions 
faced by bureaucrats to balance inclusiveness with more conventional bureaucratic 
priorities and the influence of the PSUV. Finally, the accounts of community 
organisers and officials are contrasted to show some of the contemporary tensions 
around party and state involvement in participatory politics. 
Chapter Eight draws on observations made during nine-months spent working as 
a volunteer teacher with the education collective Fundación Cayapa’s little school - 
La Escuelita. Observations, interviews with staff members and recordings of staff 
meetings are used to locate the project within three connected sets of precedents: 
Bolivarian education reform, Latin American popular education and Pueblo 
Nuevo’s history of student-led, alternative community organising. I argue that in 
working against violence, so-called “private” family problems and the social 
separateness of the barrio, Fundación Cayapa draws on the rich regional and local 
history of education and community work to outreach both Mérida’s conventional 
public services and new Bolivarian popular institutions. In particular, I consider 
the contribution Cayapa makes in encouraging the freedom of movement of non-
residents to the community, to help challenge folk concepts about the barrio’s 
population. 
Finally, in Chapter Seven, I conclude the thesis by connecting Pueblo Nuevo’s past 
and present to wider debates about Chavismo and community organising in Latin 
America.  
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These different chapters work together to connect experiences of community 
organising from Pueblo Nuevo with both shifting folk concepts about barrio 
populations and different notions of the role of government in Venezuela. I show 
how mapping this intellectual landscape can help us to understand local processes 
of participatory politics as part of a particular political moment, as Venezuela 
enters a deepening political crisis after the death of Hugo Chávez.  
4. A note on names 
In almost all cases, the people I mention in this thesis gave permission for their real 
names to be used. In most cases, real names have been used. I took this decision in 
part because some people in the text are easily identifiable from their descriptions, 
and in part because I gave this decision over to my research participants, who 
would be disappointed to see that they are not mentioned. In this respect I follow 
Fernandes (2010). In the cases where permission to use real names was not given, 
and in the cases where I felt that the details from people’s accounts might bring 
about unpredictable consequences, names have been changed. 
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2. Politics, place and stigma: organising 
Mérida’s land invasions in the pre-
Chávez era, 1945-1988 
 
 
 
 
In May of 1973, a force made up of National Guard and Municipal Police approached 
Pueblo Nuevo from the south in large numbers. As they neared the edge of the 
barrio they entered a new rancho –a settlement of lean-tos and improvised houses, 
made from scrap wood and corrugated iron and built on land that had been recently 
cleared by the settlers. The police entered the homes, forcing the occupants out. 
They proceeded to demolish the new houses, breaking their materials apart until 
the residents dispersed. Several who resisted or were identified as the leaders of 
the settlement were arrested and removed to the police station. Among them were 
the settlement’s student leadership, who would be held as collateral for 
negotiations with a growing university movement which supported the city’s 
poorest residents.1 
This short-lived community was made up of sixty families who had moved from 
Pueblo Nuevo in a coordinated toma - a “taking” or occupation. In clearing the new 
land they had attempted to extend the community to the south. The toma was 
reportedly planned by the mothers of the more vulnerable families in the barrio, 
supported by students and university workers who led residents’ assemblies and 
                                                          
1 See Hernández de Padrón (1998: 97-89) for a description of the incident.  
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coordinated a committee de lucha – a committee of struggle – to improve the new 
area and work on their reputation with local authorities (Hernández de Padrón 
1998: 88). The toma was the third of the year in Mérida, as new arrivals from a 
wave of responded to the failure of the city authorities to provide a generation of 
new urban citizens with adequate housing. 
City authorities said the violent reaction was in the interests of national security – 
the group were accused of holding communist sympathies and of having 
connexions to national guerrilla groups. In this way, different emerging ideas about 
Mérida’s new barrio populations – as invaders, as citizens and as political radicals 
- connected with the way the toma organisers encountered city authorities. The 
incident also shows how Pueblo Nuevo fits with experiences from across Latin 
America, where community organisations in new urban settlements encountered 
shifting thinking about the urban poor. During fieldwork, the National Guard and 
police again engaged in violent clashes with students and residents’ groups. This 
history of organisations, ideas and policies from the pre-Chávez era is central to 
understanding the continuities that shape politics in Pueblo Nuevo today. 
Aims and structure of the chapter 
This chapter charts the evolution of popular organisation in Pueblo Nuevo 
alongside a history of Mérida’s urban expansion and the growth and politicisation 
of so-called “unplanned” (Prato Vicuna 2013) barrio communities in the city. Thirty 
years of community organisation in Pueblo Nuevo and Mérida’s other barrios prior 
to the rise of the Chavista mass movement in the 1990s provide important 
precedents for thinking about community participation today. This chapter 
supports the analytical work of the thesis by showing the antecedents for 
contemporary tensions around community organising in Pueblo Nuevo – in the 
actions of local groups, in their encounter with city authorities and in the evolving 
ways that Latin America’s poor urban communities have been thought about across 
the continent. This history connects with the evidence presented in the remainder 
of the thesis, where I show how different contemporary groups have found ways of 
organising around the state, including by positioning themselves as clients, or by 
fitting with more emancipatory Bolivarian notions of citizenship. 
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This chapter makes two connected arguments about the experience and evolution 
of barrio politics in the pre-Chávez era. First, I show how community organisations 
in Pueblo Nuevo were shaped by the encounter with city authorities. These 
experiences are connected with emerging thinking about the new urban poor. 
Political parties and city officials attempted at different times either to gain 
authority over what they saw as disordered barrio communities, or to appeal to 
emerging regional thinking about political emancipation. These different ways of 
thinking are also part of a discussion of the historicity of the different sources 
drawn on for the chapter. Second, I show how patronage politics, the co-opting 
community organisations and the division of student and barrio activists led to a 
complicated politics of community organising in Pueblo Nuevo. These experiences 
discredited formal barrio organisations and also led to a lasting sense of social and 
separation in Mérida. 
The structure of this chapter situates the history of community organising in 
Mérida within the attempts of successive governments to manage the proliferation 
of barrios and barrio organisations – including through different representations 
of barrio populations. The chapter begins by drawing on Jugo Burguera’s (2014) 
history of town planning in Mérida, contrasting the colonial vision for the city with 
the “uncontrolled” land invasions by so-called rural “migrant invaders” (Rogler 
1967: 516), beginning with Pueblo Nuevo in 1945. The chapter continues by 
tracing the evolution of barrio organisations during the 1960s and 1970s, drawing 
on Hernández de Padrón’s (1998) study into the different attempts by barrio 
residents and political parties to establish different groups and institutions. For 
Pueblo Nuevo, the toma of 1973 was in part a response to the failure of city 
authorities to live up to the notions of citizenship rights that had been promised 
during Venezuela’s transition to democracy. Histories of barrio politics from 
Caracas (Ray 1969; Fernandes 2010; Duffy 2012; Ciccariello-Maher 2013) and 
Valencia (Wilde 2014), are used to support Hernández de Padrón’s analysis and to 
locate Mérida’s experience in national context. The successful incorporation of 
barrio organisations into clientelist networks is then connected to the decline of 
formal community organisations in the 1980s. Ellner’s (1999) analysis of the 
Neighbours’ Associations is used to explain the shift towards more cultural and 
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social forms of organising in Pueblo Nuevo, as barrio residents disengaged with 
political narratives that represented them through notions of criminality.  
1. The historic city and the first land invasions, 1813-1958 
The city reaches its limits 
The history of the Mérida State is characterised by the negotiation of territorial 
authority. The Andean province was the site of the invasion of Simon Bolivar in 
1813, as his army entered Venezuela from Colombia and declared independence 
from Spain. In 1810 Mérida province separated from Maracaibo State and allied 
itself with the political project of the new national government in Caracas. In 1811 
it was recognized in the Venezuelan Constitution as one of the provinces of the new 
Republic of the United States of Venezuela, with the City of Mérida as its capital. 
During the Nineteenth Century, the city developed into the administrative centre 
of the coffee-growing region and as an ecclesiastical centre and a centre of 
education, with the founding of the University of the Andes (ULA) (Franco 2014). 
As well as negotiating the post–independence conflicts and geographical 
marginalization (Rios 2008: 13), the nineteenth century saw successive territorial 
disputes as neighbouring municipalities competed for jurisdiction (Cesar 1994). 
These negotiations over jurisdiction would change, as the accommodation of new 
urban populations became the priority for city authorities. The oldest street plan 
of the city (Map 1) dates from 1856 and tells us something about the city’s intended 
expansion. On the 1856 street plan, the right side of the map shows the steep drop 
to the valley of the Chama River. The drop of several hundred feet marks the natural 
limit to the city centre, and would only be connected by cable car in 2012.2 At the 
left side of the map, running top to bottom, lies the Albarregas River basin which 
would come to house the twin barrios of Pueblo Nuevo and Simon Bolivar between 
the 15th and 26th cross streets. The map shows a cluster of houses, churches and 
open-places, including the plazas that were the main public spaces in Spanish 
                                                          
2 A series of cable car projects to connect lower-income residential areas to city centres – 
including several in Caracas – were part of Chávez’s attempts to link barrios to areas of 
economic opportunity and incorporate barrio communities. As well as heavy symbolism of 
physically connecting of these areas, residents save an enormous amount of travel time. In 
Mérida, the drive from El Pueblito had been over two hours on heavily congested roads and 
subject to changing bus fares. This journey is now just four minutes and is free of charge. 
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Colonial cities. The grid lines stretch north and south, housing empty and half 
empty plots that indicate parameters for expansion that would be kept to until the 
rapid population growth of the middle of the twentieth century (Jugo Burguera 
2014: 94). 
 
Map 1:  1856 Street Plan, Gregorio F. Mendez (Jugo Burguera 2014: 94) 
During the 19th century, as today, the area directly adjacent to Pueblo Nuevo’s 
future site was the cultural centre of Mérida. Plaza Bolivar was the only built-up 
plaza in the city, and marked the route of the Bolivar’s march through the area in 
1813. Then, as today, Plaza Bolivar was used to congregate and for different social 
and economic activities. These included markets on Mondays and cultural festivals 
including bull-fights. The Plaza became the social centre for the city with a fountain 
fed by a channel in the street and the gardens and sidewalks a place for strollers, 
social gatherings and music events (Photo 1) (Jugo Burguera 2014: 92).  
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Photo 1. An early image with the Plaza Bolivar on the right (date unknown, Jugo Burguera 
2014: 92) 
The early part of the twentieth century brought modernisation and the new 
economic opportunities and services that would draw migrants from agricultural 
areas. These new arrivals would populate the first city’s first barrio communities. 
In the 1920s the Trans-Andean highway was built under the government of General 
Vincente Gomez, connecting the city to Tovar and San Cristobal. Following the 
arrival of the first motor vehicles, city authorities built paved streets and new 
sidewalks throughout the city and began building the city’s first sewers, a process 
that would continue for the next three decades.3 After the death of Gomez in 1935, 
Venezuela underwent a period known as the “transition to modernity” (ibid: 95). 
During the governments of Eleazar López Contreras and Isaías Medina Angarita, 
between 1936 and 1945, city authorities built a series of important private and 
public infrastructures, including the Municipal Market hospitals, colleges, new 
                                                          
3 For some people in Pueblo Nuevo, Chávez’s political appeal was founded partly on a 
symbolic connection with this earlier productive period. His military position and 
patriarchal public persona connected to a belief that a return to dictatorship would have 
been better than the clientelism and inefficiency of the two-party democratic system. 
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public plazas and cultural and services facilities.4 In 1945 the runway was 
completed, connecting Mérida to increased possibilities for trade and tourism.  
During this period, Caracas was the first Venezuela city to experience significant 
rural-urban migration, in part due to a declining agricultural sector and the draw 
of city jobs and the growing bureaucracy, commercial services and an acceleration 
of public works and social programs (Fernandes 2010: 42).5 This new unhoused 
population would led to the founding of the first ranchos – communities of the basic 
dwellings constructed by the new arrivals that would become Caracas’ distinctive 
barrios.  
The founding of Pueblo Nuevo: Mérida’s first land invasión (1945-1958) 
As in Caracas in the 1930s, and at the same time as cities like Valencia (Wilde 2016), 
Mérida experienced its own first wave of rural-urban migration in the 1940s. As 
the agricultural sector continued to decline, workers came to the newly-
modernised cities to take advantage of economic opportunities and make use of 
schools, churches and hospitals. Once the natural limits of the city were reached, 
Mérida’s urban expansion took the form of so-called land “invasiones” as existing 
residential areas could not accommodate the new arrivals (Prato Vicuna 2013: 13). 
This terminology in itself is revealing of the perceptions about barrio settlers. Prato 
Vicuna’s (ibid) use of the phrase in 2013, echoes the use of the English-language 
equivalent by scholars within the marginality literature during the mid-twentieth 
century. Rogler (1967: 516), for example, sought to make sense of Latin America’s 
experiences with urban “migrant invaders” which he saw as contributing to the 
“vast problem of slum growth” across the continent (ibid: 528). Here, the notion of 
invading outsiders has connotations of illegitimacy, violence and a sense of 
                                                          
4 These included the Mercado Municipal, the Hospital of the Andes, the Arzobispal Palace, 
various colleges, the Belen Children’s Hospital, cinemas, the School of Medicine, Plaza 
Glorias Patrias, Mérida Stadium, the Municipal Police station and the Tuberculosis Hospital 
(Jugo Burguera 2014: 95). 
5 Analyses of rural-urban migration in Latin America in the mid-twentieth century differ. 
Yap (1976) found that most new arrivals in Brazil’s cities quickly found themselves gaining 
the economic benefits of their migration and eventually caught up with the earnings of with 
city-born workers. Shultz (1971: 159-163), however, used evidence from Colombia to show 
the variety of reasons for rural-urban migration. While these included the search for 
improved schooling and personal security, assumptions of higher urban wages by rural 
workers were found to be inaccurate. In both cases, migration is motivated by notions about 
the benefits of city life that may or may not have been accurate.  
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separateness from the existing resident population. This term also emphasises 
ownership, and distinguishes the newer processes of migration from equally 
‘invasive’ practices of colonial settling. Ray (1969: 41), who uses the term in 
reference to Venezuela, describes the “extreme informality” of the way parcels of 
land were distributed in Venezuelan barrios. Again, this sentiment, along with 
stories about new residents drawing lots for their plots of land, is part of a 
discourse of otherness that tacitly questions the legitimacy of ownership and 
belonging. For Perlman (2007: 5), this notion of new settlers “who had ‘invaded the 
citadel of the elite’” is part of a powerful classist ideology against the Latin 
American urban poor. In Venezuela, this sense of lawless invasion may also be 
unfounded - Matos Mar’s (1960) survey found that 93% and 96% of residents 
owned their homes in two Caracas barrios. 
In Mérida, the first of these new communities was founded in the Albarregas valley 
in 1945 with the construction of the settlement that came to be known as Pueblo 
Nuevo – translated as either ‘New Village’ or ‘New People’. Although the steep 
valley sides had prevented the expansion of the historical centre up to this point, 
the proximity of the community to Plaza Bolivar meant new arrivals had access to 
economic opportunities in the centre, while the river itself provided a natural water 
supply. Older inhabitants also recall how, before the Albarregas became polluted, 
the river also provided swimming and fishing opportunities (interview with DV, 
19.09.13, PN). The physical difference of the barrio is also likely to have contributed 
to the sense that the people living in these new urban areas were being somehow 
different – most barrios cling precariously to hillsides, giving the impression that 
life there is equally precarious and unstable, while Pueblo Nuevo’s site had 
previously been overlooked for development and is physically separated from the 
centre. The lack of a grid-style street system is another mark of difference that 
connects with historical social hierarchies. The European system of urban planning 
had been a symbol of colonial power across Latin America, with plazas typically 
bordered by the buildings that symbolised foreign authority (church barracks, gaol, 
house of the governor) (Wilson 2000: 245). 
This sense of difference is also maintained through language. The term “barrio” 
itself translates simply as “neighbourhood”, but the connotation in Venezuela is 
more accurately translated as “slum”. Gilbert (2007: 697) challenges the use of the 
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word “slum”, describing it as “an old and dangerous word” that recreates the myths 
about poor people, in part “by confusing the problem of poor quality housing with 
the people living there”. For barrios like Pueblo Nuevo, this was evident through a 
wider variety of language during fieldwork. Barrios were described variously as 
“red zones”, barrios humildes or barrios populares – emphasising the 
neighbourhoods as being dangerous, humble or popular. These three descriptions 
relate to the overlapping folk concepts about barrio residents discussed in Chapter 
One, including the ghetto thug, the humble poor and the social revolutionary.  
Although the word “invader” is used in descriptions about Pueblo Nuevo, the 
historical accounts cited in this chapter do not provide information about the legal 
conditions around the founding of the community. In Caracas, however, much of 
the settlements of rural migrants in the late 1930s were on land owned by the 
government, much of it that been reclaimed from General Gomez’s vast 
landholdings in 1935. Some new residents bought land from the government, while 
others were technically squatters (Fernandes 2010: 43). In Pueblo Nuevo today, 
community members describe the area as having once been a single hacienda 
known as La Lyria. One resident, Dafne Vega, described how the first families had 
worked for the landowners and had bought plots from them with the purposes of 
building houses (interview with DV, 19.09.13, PN). This account conflicts with the 
accounts of Jugo Burguera (2014: 96) and Garcia et al. (1994: 113), however, who 
state that the river basin had been designated as a protected area during the 
1940s.6  
The physical difference of Pueblo Nuevo, with its informal construction techniques7 
and spatial separation, may have emphasised the challenge the community 
                                                          
6 Garcia et al. (1994: 13) report that 87% of the territory of the state of Mérida was 
designated ABRAE or ‘Area under the Regime of Special Administration for the department 
of Ministry of the Environment and Natural and Renewable Resources. This meant that 
there were restrictions for the occupation of these areas and an obligation on the state to 
conserve them, although they suggest that the state would later be the first to violate these 
laws. 
7 There is little information about early construction techniques for Pueblo Nuevo. The first 
houses in Caracas’s barrios during this period were typically made with precarious zinc 
roofs and wooden or carton walls (Fernandes 2010: 42). Today, houses in Pueblo Nuevo 
almost all have brick walls with corrugated iron roofs. These vary significantly in size and 
condition - while a few have three stories, tiled floors and balconies, others are much 
smaller and more basic. Some are in a state of disrepair, while a small number of homes at 
the extreme periphery of the community - for example those adjacent to the Eastern 
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presented to the territorial jurisdiction of city authorities. This signified the end of 
colonial-style planning as the compact development in the Spanish style gave way 
to a surge of diverse growth and the urban sprawl more characteristic of North 
American city landscape (Prato Vicuna 2013: 13). From this period, the historical 
accounts of the architects and urban planners describe the start of “urban 
disarticulation” (Jugo Burguera 2014), with Pueblo Nuevo symbolising the 
transition from planned expansions to a new era of “spontaneous” and “anarchic” 
urban development (Prato Vicuna 2013: 3). Again, here we see how language 
serves to reinforce a sense of difference for communities like Pueblo Nuevo. While 
Ray’s (1969: 38-43) account of barrio settlement describes a process that is 
different to the way building work is planned in Venezuela’s modern city centres, 
this is a different kind of planning, rather than the chaos implied by this language. 
Response of authorities and the continued expansion 
These new urban settlements across Venezuela, driven by rural-urban migration, 
reshaped the spaces and imaginaries of Venezuela’s cities. New urban settlers 
appeared to be taking advantage of a particularly unstable political period for 
Venezuela, with the overthrow of General Isaías Medina Angarita in 1945. This was 
followed by three years of revolutionary government, leading to a first and 
temporary taste of democracy in 1948 with the election of Rómulo Gallegos. 
Despite this instability, new policies to deal with urban growth were introduced, 
with the creation of the National Urbanism Commission in 1941 with goal of 
establishing “…an urbanism that corresponded to legal norms and was coordinated 
by national technical agencies” (D’Onghia 1973, in Jugo Burguera 2014: 100). 
In Mérida, a surge in the general population following the modernisation of the city 
throughout the 1930s and early 1940s saw the city’s population double between 
1945 and 1958 and triple by the 1970s. As well as the invasion of Pueblo Nuevo, 
buildings were built to fill the grid-system of the centre, while some buildings had 
                                                          
entrance - are crude constructions with simple roofs and cardboard walls. These 
construction methods are a potential health hazard in a country where the low-quality 
construction of barrio houses led to a national crisis as recently as 1999, when tens of 
thousands of people were killed in mudslides in communities surrounding Caracas.  This 
detail is a particular relevance as the river basin also follows the Albarregas fault line, the 
source of the earthquakes including one that killed between four hundred and five 
thousand people in Mérida in 1812 (Laffaille and Ferrer 2005). 
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additional floors added to cope with demand. Jugo Burguera (2014: 97-98) 
describes an early attempt by Mérida’s city authorities to manage the growth in 
working class populations by designing a new ‘workers’ neighbourhood’ in the 
south of the city. Barrio Obrero, today known as Santa Elena, was constructed 
between 1947 and 1948 to accommodate the growing urban working class. 
Designed following Pueblo Nuevo’s “spontaneous” construction and development, 
the new community was an attempt to return to public planning, and to the colonial 
style of a regular grid system organised around public spaces including a plaza and 
a park (ibid). 
Attempts to prevent the proliferation of spontaneous barrio communities would 
ultimately be unsuccessful in Mérida. Ray (1969: 43) described how city authorities 
permitted barrio advances in some cases due to the fact that they did need to take 
planning responsibility for what they saw as new informal zones, meaning they 
didn’t need to send architects, planners or provide services. In Mérida, a second 
wave of settlements saw the development of three new barrios in 1950 known as 
Campo de Oro, Pie de Llano and El Llanito. In 1953 three more barrio communities 
sprang up, as new roads connected the centre to the areas known today as La 
Hoyada de Milla, La Vuelta de Lola and El Amparo. This trend continued nation-
wide – the invaders were here to stay. 
2. Transition to democracy and the first grassroots organisations, 
1948-1974 
Venezuela’s series of political transitions in the 1940s, including a ten year return 
to military dictatorship, would lead to the increasing importance of barrio 
communities as sites of potential political insurgence. The brief democratic 
government of Romulo Gallegos was ousted by the military in November of the 
1948, and in 1952 General Marcos Pérez Jiménez seized power. Like General 
Gómez in the 1920s, Pérez Jiménez saw himself as a moderniser and a nation-
builder, channelling rising oil revenues into public works, centralising government 
and brutally suppressing the growing public dissent (Wilde 2014: 30). During this 
period, Caracas’s emerging barrio neighbourhoods became the location for dissent 
against the regime, contributing to the conception of these areas as both lawless 
and politically radical. Militant dissidents from Accíon Democrática (AD) and the 
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Communist Party of Venezuela (PCV) built support bases among the popular 
sectors and used the barrios as refuges for their leadership and as sites for 
demonstrations against the government (Fernandes 2010: 44). Notions about the 
political radicalism of barrio residents can be traced through the barrio movements 
of the 1970s, while evidence from fieldwork described in the remainder of the 
thesis shows how these folk concepts persist today.  
Revolutionary student leadership and the Comités Pro-Defensa  
Hernández de Padrón’s (1998) study, Historia de las Organizaciones de base en los 
barrios populares de Mérida, uses interviews with residents, local leaders, and 
technical planners from State institutions to tell the story of the evolution of barrio 
politics. In Mérida, the first grassroots organisations were formed from the 
movements of campesinos who had recently arrived in the city. Hernández de 
Padrón (1998: 80) describes how new ‘Pro-Defence Committees’ arose in the late 
1950s, led by members of the Communist Party of Venezuela and helped by 
university students who saw territorial redistribution as part of the national 
revolutionary struggle. The main objective of the new organisations was to 
promote and preserve the recently created communities and to look for new 
territories and opportunities for the out of work agricultural workers and their 
families. One participant described this philosophy: 
“The communist leaders - above all the students and a few university 
workers, like in my case - we entered the struggle in defence of the 
most poor that live in the ranchos. We decided to organise them, to 
enact land seizures and to support them in the construction of their 
houses… it was a constitutional right that had to be defended… the 
students were the great support within the Pro-Defence Committees…” 
(Interview with University worker and “communist militant”, in 
Hernández de Padrón 1998: 81) 
In this description, we see ideas that had become familiar from the pro-poor 
discourses emerging across Latin America, as movements inspired by the 1959 
Cuban Revolution adopted a rhetoric of class solidarity and took up the struggle for 
land rights. Hernández de Padrón argues (ibid) that in Mérida, the participation of 
workers and students together in the city’s first grassroots organisations instilled 
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the new settlers in the 1950s with a philosophy that promoted the rights of all 
Venezuelans to land and housing.  
As in Caracas, the evolution of these movements in Mérida was connected to 
fundamental questions about the relationship of people and government. This 
reflected a growing challenge to notions of democracy, as social movements across 
the continent began to reconceptualise social structures (Escobar and Alvarez 
1992: 8). The collaboration between the student leaders and barrio residents again 
reflected a growing trend across the continent, seen for example in the Mexican 
student movement of 1968 (Sanders 2013). This collaboration also provides an 
important precedent for the contemporary political landscape in Mérida, where 
leftist students participate both in Pueblo Nuevo’s Fundación Cayapa, while many 
of their peers take to the streets as part of the anti-government protest movement.  
In Mérida, the Pro-Defence Committees organised into working teams, with areas 
including medical assistance, support to help families to build and improve their 
houses, and legal support for the territorial disputes. Their leftist leaders “put the 
committees to work” first to improve existing communities, like Pueblo Nuevo, and 
secondly to mobilise the recently arrived populations to look for new land, new 
houses, and to improve them (Hernández de Padrón 1998: 81). These new 
organisations sought improvements in communities that had little in the way of 
basic services, with limited or contaminated water supplies and flooding during 
Mérida’s frequent heavy rains (Garcia et al. 1994: 114-115).  
Life in Mérida’s barrios also meant a readjustment from rural lifestyles and 
agricultural employment. Writing from first-hand observations in the early 1970s, 
Jugo Burguera (2004: 8) describes the first residents as “not qualified for urban 
life”, arguing that rather than improving these areas, quickly contributed to the 
deterioration of living standards until they were much worse than the areas that 
residents had migrated from. He describes the lower incomes of new arrivals, 
cultural differences between metropolitan and agricultural communities and the 
ongoing absence of the state as leading to not only a deterioration in living 
conditions, but worsening exclusion and social stratification. This account fits with 
other accounts of rural-urban migration from the region (e.g. Shultz 1971: 159-
163), but also connects with descriptions from the marginality literature. Gans 
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(1982: 4) describes the struggle of new city arrivals to adapt “…to the urban 
milieu”. Perlman (1976: 136-137) questions these representations, and uses 
survey data from Rio de Janeiro to challenge the notion that recent migrants have 
not benefitted from the move, or long to return to rural areas. The idea of a new, 
more primitive population who are unsuited to life in the city challenges the 
legitimacy and belonging of poor urban communities. This conception is challenged 
by other studies that show that rural-urban migrants adjust quickly to city life (e.g. 
Yap 1976). 
Democratic transition and the Juntas Pro-Mejoras  
Thirteen years after Pueblo Nuevo’s founding, and following Mérida’s second wave 
of barrio invasiones¸ Venezuela’s transition to democracy8 reoriented national 
politics towards questions of political legitimacy. The fall of the ten-year 
dictatorship of General Perez Jimenez resulted largely from the loss of support in 
key areas of the armed forces after 1957’s fraudulent plebiscite victory. This led to 
two weeks of street protests and finally a general strike, which saw Perez Jimenez 
flee the Miraflores Palace on the 23rd of January 1958. Mass looting, an attack on 
the National Security headquarters and the lynching of some officials underlined 
the importance of the public support for the incoming government. Urban 
populations also took advantage of the crisis period to seize new territories for 
residential areas (Fernandes 2010: 45).  
Rómulo Betancourt – who had been President in the short-lived democratic 
government of 1945 to 1948 - won Presidential elections in December 1958 for the 
Accíon Democrática party (AD).9 Among the tasks facing Betancourt’s new 
government was a housing crisis fuelled by the continued migration of rural 
                                                          
8 Mainwaring et al (1995) group new democratic systems in Latin America according to 
progress towards a certain political ideal, with Venezuela, Colombia, Argentina and the 
Southern Cone states as having the most developed “institutionalised party systems”. This 
linear idea of democratisation, however, is challenged by the more nuanced literature 
around the experience of politics of poor urban communities. 
9 It is worth highlighting a certain coherence between the environments of the democratic 
transition in the 1960s and the early years of the Bolivarian Revolution from 1998. Both 
saw new national policies directed at improving the lives of barrio residents and new forms 
of community organisation arising in an environment of recovered democracy and 
alongside a national political narrative of liberation and transformation. 
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workers to Venezuela’s cities (Fernandes 2010: 45).10 Betancourt needed 
Venezuela’s new barrio populations to support his new plan or urban development, 
and tried to court them by promising that the new democratic state would mediate 
between the poorer labouring and landless classes, and a “parasitic elite’ that had 
previously “enriched themselves at the public expense through political 
favouritism” (in Emerson 2011: 90). Here we see an example of a populist rhetoric 
in Venezuela. As in new democratic governments across Latin America, Betancourt 
tried to connect with the emerging citizenship discourses that recognised the rights 
of poorer citizens to basic public goods as part of the transition from 
authoritarianism. Prefiguring the Bolivarian public narrative, Betancourt 
presented his government as the patrons who would deliver this emancipation.  
Despite this discourse, some of Venezuela’s new urban settlements would become 
sites of dissent and insurgence against the nee democratic government. 
Betancourt’s AD party, along with the leaders of the newly formed Christian Social 
Party (COPEI), signed the power-sharing agreement known as the Pact of Punto 
Fijo. Despite the leftist origins of the two parties involved, the agreement notably 
excluded their former ally, the Communist Party of Venezuela (PCV). The PCV, along 
with the Revolutionary Left Movement (MIR) began a decade of guerrilla 
insurgence that relied on urban barrios for support. ‘Puntofijismo’ would come to 
symbolise the power-sharing, clientelist politics and “pacted democracy” (Karl in 
Fernandes 2010: 45) of the pre-Chávez era.  
In Mérida, despite overcrowding and declining living conditions in barrio 
communities, population increases continued due to the arrival of domestic 
migrants throughout the 1960s. As across Latin America (Koonigngs and Kruijit 
2007: 8), the promise of citizens’ rights that accompanied Venezuela’s transition to 
democracy was not be fulfilled for the growing numbers of the urban poor.  
Mérida’s growth matched that of the industrialising cities in the interior of the 
country, with an average growth of 5% per year during the decade (Lopez 1974). 
For Pueblo Nuevo, new arrivals led to an expansion north up the river valley with 
the founding of barrio Simon Bolivar in 1962. Despite their physical connection, the 
                                                          
10 The transitional government’s (1958-1959) Emergency Plan, which set a first minimum 
wage or unemployed workers in Caracas and encouraged more rural-urban migration 
(Fernandes 2010: 45). 
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two barrios retain distinct identities today, and would enter a state of violent inter-
barrio conflict during the 2000s (see Chapter Three).  
While it is unclear if the Simon Bolivar invasion was planned by a Pro-Defence 
Council in Pueblo Nuevo or elsewhere, the role of barrio organisations in settling 
new areas and politicising their populations across the country had drawn the 
attention of the new democratic government. In response, and as part of a new 
national Emergency Plan intended to stabilise new urban communities, the 
government created the “Juntas Pro-Mejoras ” (Wilde 2014: 164). These were a new 
form of grassroots institution that was intended to replace the Pro-Defence 
Committees - whose student leaders remained loyal to the Communist Party - with 
new, less combative barrio organisations. 
Hernández de Padrón (1998: 81) argues that this change signalled a transition from 
a more spontaneous form of participation to one that followed a national model, 
set out by Accíon Democrática. She describes how “…(i)n the case of Mérida the 
pro-defence committees were dismantled and their leaders were persecuted”. In 
her study, one student leader recalled how:  
“The government of Betancourt attacked with strength against the 
student movement, finishing with the organisations that had been 
created in the barrios… From this moment, the Juntas Pro-Mejoras 
were created and controlled by the official organisms” (interview with 
a student dirigente in 1961, Hernández de Padrón1998: 82).  
Following the loss of their student leadership, Hernández de Padrón (ibid) writes 
that these groups “submitted to and acted from the actions of the state” and were 
easily controlled by members of the new ruling party, Accíon Democrática. This 
assessment is supported by experiences from elsewhere in Venezuela, as the State 
established patterns of “‘dominated’ articulation” with the popular urban 
organisations (Hurtado 1991: 12; see also Fernandes 2010: 45). This collaboration 
between the student leaders and barrio residents provides another important 
precedent for the contemporary political landscape in Mérida, where leftist 
students participate both in Pueblo Nuevo’s Fundación Cayapa, while many of their 
peers take to the streets as part of the anti-government protest movement.  
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Although she sees the Juntas Pro-Mejoras more as an instrument of the party of the 
government than as an instrument to improve the barrios, Hernández de Padrón 
(1998: 83) suggests that these groups did bring some important benefits to 
Mérida’s barrio communities. Materials were donated by the state to help with the 
improvement of houses and party leadership meant mobilisations were well-
controlled and largely free from conflicts. Formalised links with the ruling party 
also brought legal recognition for the invasions.11 In other parts of the country, 
however it was these benefits that were used to incorporate barrio communities 
into clientelist networks and to install community leaders who were loyal to Accíon 
Democrática. Ray (1969) describes how intermediaries with close links to party or 
municipal officials would offer tacit approval for the so-called land invasions, in 
exchange for electoral support from the new settlers. These practices have a strong 
regional precedent, and are similar to practices of vote buying in Buenos Aires’s 
villas (Auyero 2000, 2001) and to patterns of political patronage in the favelas of 
Rio de Janeiro (Arias and Rodrigues 2006; Ireland 2011). Where these kinds of 
shifting and complicated political relationships take place in the context of unclear 
legal status of communities’ tenancies, as Ramakrishnan (2014: 759) also observes 
in her study of resettlement colonies in Delhi, they keep community members 
guessing about what sort of intervention might come next.This intervention into 
barrio politics by the state, characterised by the transition to Juntas Pro-Mejoras, 
signalled the regularisation of clientelist relationships between political parties, 
the State and grassroots organisations in Venezuela (Ray 1969; Fernandes 2010: 
46; Wilde 2014: 164). Hernández de Padrón (1998: 82) describes the transition 
between the two forms of organisation as a moment “when all of the ambiguities 
that existed in the committees and Juntas were eliminated”, as political pluralism 
had come to be seen as a destabilising factor by the newly established political 
order. Ultimately, Hernández de Padrón (1998: 82) writes, the Juntas  coordinated 
the different special urban services of the government and served as their 
                                                          
11 The value of “recognition” for barrio organisations remains today, where resources are 
attached to formal status of Councils Communal and where the legacy of the questionable 
legal status of land invasions like Pueblo Nuevo adds symbolic importance to registration 
processes (see Chapter Six). 
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“intermediaries with the population”, eventually being accepted  as legitimate by 
barrio populations due to their recognition by the state.12  
This takeover in Mérida took place against a background of optimism in 
transitional democracies across Latin America around the potential for community 
organisation to bring about meaningful change. A new ‘autonomist school’ of 
thought emphasised the capacity of collective action for transforming social 
relations. Ellner (1999: 76) describes how “…much of the writing of the period 
emphasised the autonomy of social movements and their consciousness-raising 
impact rather than their political function as interest groups which negotiate with 
power brokers.” In Venezuela, these negotiations were brief, as the functions of the 
Pro-Defence committees were assumed formally by the new Juntas, as part of what 
was renamed the National Plan for Community Development (ibid: 78). Under the 
Plan, the State promoted a mobilisation in the popular sectors around housing 
needs and basic urban services.  
In Mérida’s city-wide census of 1961, the barrio population had grown to twenty 
five percent of Mérida’s total population. However, as politics in the barrios became 
oriented to the technical plans of the AD, only the Juntas Pro-Mejoras in Sana Anita, 
San Jose de Las Flores and Campo de Oro actually implemented the  to improve the 
barrios (Hernández de Padrón 1998: 83-84). In the rest of the barrios, casas de 
partido –or “party houses” – were set up by AD to recruit and train new leaders and 
to encourage electoral support. For Hernández de Padrón, (1998: 84) this system 
was a new form of patronage, as campesinos arrived in Mérida and quickly 
transferred their loyalty from the rural landowners to the party and their leaders. 
The Organizacion Comunitaria and the first barrio studies 
While AD consolidated their new clientelist relations with barrios, COPEI, in 
opposition, attempted to design their own, city-wide institution INCOATE. When 
Rafael Caldera won the Presidential election for COPEI in 1969, this alternative 
                                                          
12 The relationship between state, party and community in this scenario is reflected today. 
Voceros in the Communal Council at Calle Principal attribute low levels of participation in 
Pueblo Nuevo to the lack of formal recognition by the state. The exclusion of Communist 
Party members is also fundamentally similar to how opositores are seen today, with some 
Chavista activists explained the exclusion of non-Chavistas due to this fear of destabilisation 
(interviews w LD, 15.07.14, SB; LR, 16.05.14; PN, VR, 21.07.14, PN). 
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structure was formalised, bringing Mérida’s barrio organisations under the 
Orgnanizacion Comunitaria. The Juntas then multiplied, as barrio organisations 
constructed under the AD government transferred their loyalty to COPEI, who used 
the new umbrella institution to strengthen ties with the city’s poorest 
communities.13 
Although there had been various planning initiatives in Mérida in the 1960s, it was 
only in 1970 that the city designed its first Plan for Urban Development. From this 
point on, city authorities would consider the barrios as areas of potential 
redevelopment. The Plan included the first proposals from a group of architects at 
the ULA, headed by Professor D’Onghia, aimed at developing new public spaces for 
the city and reducing congestion (Jugo Burguera 2014: 101). These included the 
three bridges that linking the different sectors of the city, including Campo Elias 
Bridge over the Albarregas to the south of Pueblo Nuevo.14 The river basin itself 
was reimagined as Albarregas Metropolitan Park, but on investigation the 
architects they found that the river was contaminated and also that “the area had 
been taken over by land invasions” of Pueblo Nuevo and Simon Bolivar (Jugo 
Burguera 2014: 101). The planners’ proposals show a divergence between their 
vision of “Mérida, Park City” and what they saw as the “savage urbanism” of the 
barrios (1973, in Burguera 2004: 104, see also Prato Vicuna et al 2013; Burguera 
2014). It is not clear whether city authorities planned for the relocation of the 
populations of Pueblo Nuevo and Simon Bolivar, as they had in Caracas,15 but the 
planners’ proposals for “transitional populations” did include the relocation of 
                                                          
13 This was achieved partly through the support of the church and different religious 
groups, as COPEI framed these popular organisations as part of their “social Christian 
project” (Hernández de Padrón 1998: 86). This political connection to the church was 
reinforced by donations of materials and medicine via voluntary associations of the church 
but funded by international organisms like the Catholic group Caritas from the United 
States (ibid). 
14 Today this bridge is now a source of income for some residents, with food and pirate DVD 
stalls. Along with these, the bridge is a regular site for begging and muggings that take 
advantage of the only commuter routes for the Western suburbs whose residents fear to 
take the path through the barrios and would do so only during the street protests of 2014 
when the entrance to the bridge was occupied by armed militants (see Chapter Six). 
15 In 1971 plans were made to demolish parts of barrio San Augustin in Caracas to make 
way for a park, but were met with active resistance from local groups, and the plans were 
eventually abandoned (Fernandes 2010: 212). 
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those barrios on the precarious hillsides at the edge of the city (1973, in Jugo 
Burguera 2004: 82).  
As well as providing evidence of a contested vision for Pueblo Nuevo and Simon 
Bolivar specifically, the 1973 study describes the characteristics and socio-
economic conditions of the seven “most important” barrios in Mérida, including 
Pueblo Nuevo, Simon Bolivar and near-by Santo Domingo (in Jugo Burguera 2004: 
83). Up to this date there had been no government study of conditions in these 
communities. Map 2 shows the areas examined in detail in the study, with Pueblo 
Nuevo in the centre.  
 
Map 2. Showing the location of the three barrios in 1970 including Pueblo Nuevo 
(2), Simon Bolivar (3) and Santo Domingo (1) (Jugo Burguera 2004: 79) 16 
From 1969 onwards, Mérida’s barrio communities had continued expanding and 
by 1973 Jugo Burguera’s study estimated that of 36,138 inhabitants lived in 
“marginal zones” in the city (ibid: 79). In describing the living conditions for these 
communities, this study exposes the extent to which the state had failed in its 
promises to fulfil basic citizen’s rights by providing basic services and regulate 
building work for public safety. Most families lived at the most basic levels of 
subsistence, Jugo Burguera writes, often with contaminated water supplies, a lack 
                                                          
16 The key reads: “Prominent Slopes, total change in elevation 30 metres.” Title reads: map 
of the location of three neighbouring barrios in the centre of the City of Mérida in the 
Albarregas River valley.” The bridge in construction at the far right of the map was never 
completed. 
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of sanitation, and conditions where water-borne parasites and illness bred.17 The 
main problems for barrios included in the 1973 study include spatial organisation 
and lack of electricity, water, garbage collection, and an lack of social spaces, 
including for the “amusement and recreation for the young people and children” 
(ibid: 82).18 Other problems highlighted in the study included dangerous housing, 
unstable employment and the lower incomes of residents and lower education 
when compared with the residents of the city centre and middle class suburbs.  
 
As well as noting the physical disrepair and lack of services in the barrios, Burguera, 
writing in 1973, commented that seven communities, including Pueblo Nuevo, had 
“not been properly assimilated by the social, economic, political and cultural 
structures, causing a rift between the inhabitant of marginal sectors and the rest of 
the core in which they live.” (in Jugo Burguera 2004:79). Again, these notions about 
barrio residents connect with ideas from the marginality literature that suggest 
that rural migrants are unsuited for city life (Gans 1982: 4. In Mérida, conflicts 
between the barrios and the rest of the city revolved in particular around problems 
of waste collection and disposal (Garcia et al. 1994: 116, see Photo 2).19 After the 
Bolivarian Revolution, the politicisation of class in government narratives would 
attempt to recuperate the image of barrio residents. 
                                                          
17 The state was not entirely absent in Pueblo Nuevo and Simon Bolivar and had tried to 
protect Pueblo Nuevo from flooding with dredging and concrete flood defences (Jugo 
Burguera 2004:83). This concern with flooding remains a community priority today, 
centred around attempts to repair the storm drain on Calle Principal, for which the council 
must negotiate with the state’s water company, Aguas de Mérida. These negotiations are 
hampered by the lack of official recognition for the Communal Council (see Chapter Six). 
18 Burguera’s concern in this respect predates a contemporary priority for Fundacíon 
Cayapa, as the group tries to provide alternatives to gang culture for young people as a way 
of disrupting the cycle of violence in the barrio (interview w JW, 31.05.14, SB). 
19 Garcia et al. (1994:116) comment that when the mayor had gave the contract for refuse 
collection in Mérida to a private company, this reduced conflict in the city by raising 
cleanliness levels. In 2012, the Mayor Lester Rodriguez would be accused of the theft of the 
funds for waste collection, leading to piles of rubbish in the streets, months of protests and 
a variety of organised community responses (see Chapter Six). 
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Photo 2. ‘Aseo protests’, undated. Garcia et al. 1994: 116 
As state and political parties sought to use community organisations to gain 
authority in barrios like Pueblo Nuevo, however, these aspirations were not 
matched by the delivery of improvements for these communities, which Burguera 
(2004: 82) comments saw only gradual improvement or deterioration. The 
resulting lack of legitimacy of political actors would leave the urban poor ready for 
a new vision for Venezuelan politics. Twenty years later, Hugo Chávez would tap 
into these attitudes, promising solutions for basic needs, social inclusion for 
Venezuela’s barrios and the creation of more autonomous and empowered 
community organisations. These visons of a longer-term social transformation 
were part of the political ambitions in the 1970s, but shared space with shorter-
term social demands as residents in Caracas organised around water, public 
services and amenities (Velasco 2011: 168-174), and in Mérida, around housing 
and land. 
Mérida’s Comités de Toma, and the invasion of barrio Pueblo Nuevo, 1973 
Although Hernández de Padrón’s study describes the proliferation of Juntas Pro-
Mejoras in Mérida under AD and COPEI governments, the team of architects visiting 
Pueblo Nuevo and Simon Bolivar in 1969 found that there were no communal 
organisations (Jugo Burguera 2004: 206). They did report the existence of some 
Cultural Centres, however, described by Burguera as:  
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“…a species of organizations emerging from the base, bringing together 
young leaders with radical ideas who persisted in their struggle to 
promote an organized movement, and whose initiatives gradually 
began to take hold in the rest of the population.” 
This account fits with local memory, with reports of a cultural centre called Simon 
Bolivar in the 1970s. Although these alternative institutions were primarily 
engaged in cultural activities, residents also described consciousness raising 
activities (Lopez 2009). In this way, political discussions continued away from the 
dependent organisations such as the Juntas Pro-Mejoras. This impression of an 
apparent rejection of state-run community institutions is reinforced by Hernández 
de Padrón’s account of the events of 1973, as the dependent governance 
institutions were gave way to more combative social movements. Hernández de 
Padrón (1998: 86-90) presents these movements as a test of whether it was 
possible in Mérida “to have democratic movements within a political system that 
was perfectly able to control and integrate any form of social protest.” The 
responses by the state provide us with precedents for the management of social 
movements in Mérida in the present day.  
Venezuela had suffered a chronic housing crisis throughout the 1960s and 1970s, 
due to an ever-expanding urban population and made worse by the concentration 
of state resources into projects for the middle classes under President Caldera 
(Hernández de Padrón 1998: 90). In Mérida, a new wave of land seizures were 
planned and executed by the city’s existing barrio populations. In May of 1973, the 
incident described in the introduction to this chapter took place, as sixty families 
invaded the land next to Pueblo Nuevo in a coordinated collective action.20 
Hernández de Padrón describes how these families had largely been living in 
precarious conditions, or renting parts of the houses of friends and family. The 
movement in Pueblo Nuevo was led by the mothers of these families who “decided 
in a spontaneous manner” to use the vacant land and set up new rancho-style 
                                                          
20 While the story of Pueblo Nuevo’s Comité de Toma did not appear in interviews with 
residents of Pueblo Nuevo, the area to the south of the community has been a used by 
Municipal police for the several years, and reportedly was the location for a police module 
until the electoral campaign of 2011, when the module was demolished to make way for a 
new police station that was never completed. 
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dwellings (ibid). The mobilisation was completed with the support of leftist student 
and university workers who lived in barrio Pueblo Nuevo, and who led the 
organisation.21  
The destruction of the ranchos by the municipal police and National Guard and the 
imprisonment of the student leaders of the toma, were met with mass student and 
union mobilisations in the form of street protests. The protesters denounced 
“violations against public opinion” and demanded the liberation of the leaders 
(ibid: 89). Here, the demands of the Student Federation differed somewhat from 
the objectives of the barrio residents because they gave more attention to those 
who were imprisoned. To negotiate with the forces on the left, the state said they 
would free the students if they abandoned the Pueblo Nuevo movement. The state 
again offered to deal with the families on an individual basis, and the invasion 
eventually dispersed. 
The example of the Toma of 1973, led in part by the mothers of the barrios, also 
shows us something about the role for women in the more combative types of 
barrio organising in Mérida. Hernández de Padrón (1998: 90) also describes two 
other tomas in the early 1970s in the city, each led by mothers attempting to 
alleviate the problems associated with poor quality housing and over-crowding. 
Although these examples show that ideas of gender roles did not prevent these 
women from playing leading roles in the more combative community organising of 
the period, this may also be evidence of what Fernandes would later observe in 
Caracas during the Chávez era - that reoriented gender identities ultimately leave 
some barrio women with responsibility for Moser’s (1986 in Fernandes 2007: 119) 
“triple burden” of productive, reproductive and community managing work. 
                                                          
21 The movement formed a Comité de Lucha, distributing tasks among the group. They 
organised in work groups to prepare the land, parcels of lands and streets, and improve the 
new ranchos (Hernández de Padrón 1998: 87). The new leadership did this in part because 
they wanted to present the image of an organisation as being was well-organised. They 
intended to politicise the toma and tie in with the themes of other collectives of longer-term 
socialism and the revolutionary transformation of society. This, however, gave them a 
certain combative character which would provoked the violent reaction from the state 
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Pueblo Nuevo’s location within a broader picture of contested relations between 
politics and society is further illustrated by Burguera’s eyewitness account of the 
encounter between city authorities and the local leaders:  
“In 1975, in an Assembly to organize the Junta Comunal, held in Calle 
Primera of Pueblo Nuevo, convened by ORDEC (Regional Agency for 
the Development of the Community) we were witnesses to how a 
funcionario tried to direct the participants to elect their candidates, 
while the young people from the Cultural Centres did not slacken in 
their struggle to elect their leaders, which in the end they achieved. 
However, you could see from that moment that the relations of 
collaboration between the public funcionarios and the elected young 
people would not lead to fruitful work.” (Jugo Burguera 2004: 206) 
While this account implies a continuation of the contested forms of community 
organisation in Pueblo Nuevo, it is not clear from Burguera’s account if the Junta 
was successfully convened on this occasion. This contest between funcionarios and 
barrio residents appears in all of the sources drawn on for this chapter, and will be 
drawn on for the analysis of contemporary frustrations with city authorities 
described in Chapter Six and Chapter Seven.  
Hernández de Padrón sees these attempts to control community organisations - 
along with the violent reaction to Pueblo Nuevo’s expansion and the other barrio 
movements of 1973 demonstrate the social-Christian government’s intention to 
“pacify” the urban poor. This perceived intention connects with discourses in 
neighbouring Brazil that Wacquant (2003) describes as ‘penalising’ poverty. 
Hernández de Padrón’s analysis reflects much of the optimism about community 
organising from the New Social Movements literature. In these accounts, the 
limited results of community organisations are more often explained in terms of 
structural pressures from above, as state and class power are structurally 
maintained (Kaufman and Alfonso 1997: 6). Evidence from Pueblo Nuevo today, 
where levels of participation are relatively low (see chapters five and six), suggests 
that the romantic idea of vibrant community organising limited only by state 
controls may be unrealistic. What is especially useful however, is where Hernández 
de Padrón’s account fits with studies into shifting ideas about the urban poor in 
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Latin America. Although the notions of citizenship for the urban poor that 
accompanied the transition to democracy had to some extent replaced the idea of 
barrio “invaders” in Venezuela, the new discourses of the made little difference for 
communities like Pueblo Nuevo.  
3. 1979-1988: Service Modules, Cultural Centres and the first 
Neighbours’ Associations 
Representations of barrio residents as Venezuela’s new urban citizens would give 
way to representations of barrio criminality, as fearful attitudes towards poor 
urban populations were taken up by a new AD government with the election of 
Carlos Andres Perez in 1979. In contrast with Betancourt’s rhetoric about the 
integration of barrio populations, Pérez accused identified the poor majority of 
being “obstacles to progress” (Emerson 2011: 92). Folk concepts about barrio 
populations as “barbarous law-breakers” were developed (Leary 2011: 41-42). 
These conceptions had existed in the public consciousness since the 1940s and 
1950s – when a new wave of Venezuelan crime cinema sensationalised “malandro 
culture” (Chacón Mora 2014; see also Martínez Aponte 2012). Now these notions 
about the urban poor became a central part of the national political discourse. 
Perez’ new discourse in part developed around a promise to protect Venezuelan 
elites at a time of national prosperity (Emerson 2011: 92). Due to an enormous rise 
in oil revenues, Perez presided over the best economic conditions in the history of 
the country. While these new resources helped overcome some of the symptoms of 
the national housing crisis, they also led to the expansion of the state bureaucracy 
and to new centralising tendencies, as the President sought to control the 
distribution and was awarded ‘extraordinary powers’ by the National Assembly.22 
This new, affluent era saw a vision of “la Gran Venezuela”, with the cities were now 
seen as the location for the new national project, fuelling another wave of 
urbanisation in the 1970s.  
Under Perez, the Juntas would soon be outdated. A new national Plan for 
Urbanisation and Equipment, and Programs for the Marginal Zones, was 
                                                          
22 Extraordinary Presidential powers, known today as “poderes habilitantes”, would be 
secured by both Hugo Chávez and Nicolas Maduro in times of supposed national crisis, 
including as recently as 2014. The laws allow the President to legislate by decree. 
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coordinated by a new institution, the FUNDACOMUN. This institution remains a 
part of the administrative structure for civil society groups to this day, including 
coordinating funding and registration for the Communal Councils. In Mérida, 
FUNDACOMUN reports from this period state that 50% of the barrios did not have 
adequate public services (FUNDACOMUN-Mérida 1978 in Hernández de Padrón 
198: 92). This was the “illusion petrolera”, as the AD government promoted the idea 
that the State can do everything, a sentiment Hernández de Padrón describes as “el 
Estado lo puede todo” (Hernández de Padrón 1998: 92). This reinforced a culture of 
paternalism by using petrol money to reinforce clientelist networks. This era, 
according to Hernández de Padrón (1998: 92), also saw the new idea that civil 
society organisations could be “like a subsidy of the political economy”. This 
sentiment has some reflection in contemporary public narrative around 
community organisation in Venezuela, where officials emphasise the potential of 
the Communes to contribute to “productive capacity” of the country (interview w 
DA, 12.05.14, OF).  
The mechanism for the coordination and service delivery in the barrios were new 
Service Modules. Hernández de Padrón’s study questions the effectiveness of these 
modules in Mérida, drawing on the government’s own appraisal. One Corpo Andes 
worker commented:  
“The service modules did not succeed in their functions, contributing 
more to reinforce paternalism, to the solution of the immediate and 
individual problems. Furthermore, the local government and the 
party gave exit to the problems, bypassing the technical plans (…) 
(T)he planned Juntas Comunales never worked (…) for the majority 
of the inhabitants it was easier to go to the Governacíon or to the 
house of the party (AD), to solve their problems, than participate in a 
community activity with the Modules…”23 (Interview with Corpo 
Andes technical staff, in Hernández de Padrón 1998: 93). 
                                                          
23 To some extent this process remains in place today, as the AD functionary in the barrio, 
uses his access to party resources as part of his role as a vocero in the Communal Council 
Calle Primera. 
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From the different reports, these ineffective and dependent forms of organising 
appear to have damaged public confidence in the potential of community 
organisations with government or party involvement. This resonates with 
contemporary evidence from Pueblo Nuevo, where clientelist practices were 
blamed for the decline in participation (interviews w GL, 04.07.14, CD; and RS, 
11.05.14, PN, see also Chapter Six).  This shift away from the optimism of the 1960s 
was occurring across the region, as the radical social transformation predicted by 
the autonomist school had not come about, and social movements and community 
groups had not become major political actors (Ellner 1999: 76). At this time, 
experiences from across Latin America that fit with the dependent and “dominated” 
articulation described in Mérida (Hurtado 1991: 12) would lead to the emergence 
of the 'political interaction' school (e.g. Evers 1985), which was influenced by North 
American social movement scholars who rejected the optimism of the earlier 
period. This new school began to analyse the day-to-day performance of social 
movements under new democratic regimes that were coordinated around 
networks of political influence (Ellner 1999: 76). During the 1970s, neither the 
networks of political influence or the autonomous power of community groups 
were delivering significant change for barrio communities. While Barrios 
(1987:32), for example, highlights this period in Venezuela as “a new chapter of 
progress” with the building of an integral programme to provide services and 
organisation for barrio communities, this era of the high revenues of the bonanza 
petrolera were not matched by improvements to barrio services.   
In line with this declining optimism across the continent, Hernández de Padrón 
(1998: 93) reports that studies in Mérida’s barrios in the 1970s found little 
evidence of the older forms of spontaneous participation, with groups instead 
functioning to reinforce party influence and loyalties to local political elites. 
However, these studies did find Cultural Centres in some barrios led by leftist 
groups. Hernández de Padrón reports that these were created as part of the thesis 
of the rescue of the cultura popular – the “popular culture”. The Cultural Centres 
also drew on the support of the ULA and recalls that “(t)heir activities were 
isolated, but recognised in particular by the young populations in the barrios.” This 
analysis is supported by the subsequent development of community organisations 
in Pueblo Nuevo from the 1980s until the present day. 
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The Neighbours’ Associations and Pueblo Nuevo’s cultural projects, 1980-
1988 
In line with Burguera’s account above and Hernández de Padrón’s study, which 
runs to 1980, participation in formal political organisations in Pueblo Nuevo 
declined, in favour of cultural and young persons’ activities that were beyond the 
remit of the State or political parties. Local activist Gerardo Lopez’s account for the 
barrio for this period reflects Hernández de Padrón’s city-level analysis, in that the 
first barrio organisation he mentions is the Critical Cultural Centre Simon Bolivar. 
The cultural centre, he writes, organised theatre, dance, song, and sports activities, 
but also gave classes designed to “improve the consciousness” of residents about 
national geography (ibid: 3). From these experiences, a succession of groups were 
started that practiced non-political activities. These groups would eventually move 
into more political territory. 
In Pueblo Nuevo, the presence of the Communist Party (PCV) – leaders of both the 
original barrio organisations in the 1950s and the toma of the 1973 - continued in 
this period with a branch of the Communist Youth. Gerardo describes how their 
activities included creating a cultural space in the community with a library 
containing copies of the communist manifesto, Marxist philosophical texts and 
Latin American political literature.24 Here, residents could study the Bolshevik and 
Cuban revolutions, and participate in different circles of political agitation. 
According to Gerardo, members also participated in electoral movements with 
other parties from the Revolutionary left Movement (MIR).25  
The desire for more autonomous community organisations than the dependent 
Juntas would also lead to a national change. The Neighbours’ Associations 
originated not with the state, but from the successful lobby groups in the wealthy 
areas of Eastern Caracas. Ellner (1999: 78) describes how the first associations 
were “generally free of political party interference” when compared with the Juntas 
that they had replaced. The two main networks of organisations, the Federation of 
Associations of Urban Communities (FACUR) and the Escuela de Vecinos embraced 
                                                          
24 Today, the CEDECOL library includes Chavista pamphlets and related political literature, 
but is dedicated primarily to educational texts, in particular geography and the sciences. 
25 There is no Communist Youth organisation in Pueblo Nuevo today. In Venezuela, the rise 
of Chávez’s MBR and later the PSUV would lead to a decline in support for the PCV. 
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an anti-party discourse that attributed shortcomings of community organisations 
to the party intrusions that had damaged their autonomous status. These new 
movements organised against a backdrop of economic crisis and increasing public 
dissatisfaction at the effects of structural adjustment throughout the 1980s. 
In the Albarregas Valley, the Neighbours’ Association AVEPUNSIMBO was founded 
to cover both the barrios of Pueblo Nuevo and Simon Bolivar (Lopez 2009). The 
Organic Law of Municipal Regimes of 1979 required that an area had two hundred 
families to constitute an association. Burguera’s (2004: 7) 1973 study recorded two 
hundred houses in Pueblo Nuevo, with no data for Simon Bolivar, which would have 
had much less. If most households contained one family, this would have meant 
that there were only enough families for an inter-barrio organisation to be 
recognised.26 This inter-barrio format would provide a hindrance to community 
organising in the 2000s, when the violent conflicts between gangs in the two 
communities made each barrio a no-go zone for residents of the other (interview 
w JW, 31.05.14, SB; and Focus Group 2). This threshold of two hundred families 
would be challenged by the associations and amended in the LORM's amendment 
in 1990 after pressure from communities who said they had not been consulted for 
the 1979 law (Ellner 1999: 79).  
In Pueblo Nuevo and Simon Bolivar, Gerardo’s report describes the Neighbours’ 
Association’s health committee, which ran a first aid course for community 
members. This committee had high levels of involvement of young people from 
Pueblo Nuevo, who started a primary care service in a space borrowed from by the 
nearby ambulance service at the edge of the barrio (located at the ‘Zona Asistencial’ 
on Map 2, above). This activity shows the desire among the residents to provide 
those services that were not provided by the state during this period.27  
                                                          
26 On the evidence of today, two hundred may also have been a serious obstacle to 
registration. Today, it is also about how many people a group can mobilise to attend 
meetings, vote for proposals and complete any census. This remains a real barrier to 
recognition for the Communal Council at Calle Principal today, as a proportion of signatures 
is required to complete any official application or formal status and resources  (see Chapter 
Seven). 
27 Apart from this detail, I did not uncover a lot of information about the Neighbours’ 
Association in the 1980s. As this group structure lasted until the 2000s and the arrival of 
the Communal Council system, it is difficult to draw anything specific for this period from 
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Although the new associations were intended to be an autonomous movement, it 
is reported that Accíon Democrática attempted to gain control of Neighbours’ 
Associations in the 1980s in an attempt to compensate for the loss of influence and 
prestige of the labour movement - with which they had strong ties (Ellner 1999: 
82). AD provided all “community activists” in the party a special vote in internal 
party elections, while any party members on the executive board of a Neighbours’ 
Association became automatic delegates at the party’s municipal conventions in an 
attempt to encourage the penetration of these groups by party members (ibid). In 
Pueblo Nuevo and Simon Bolivar, alongside the Neighbours’ Associations, the 
youth of the barrios formed a Rescue Group to learn mountaineering. The group 
learnt climbing, survival skills and became involved in ecological activities and 
conservationism. Gerardo describes how the group had seventy eight members and 
would become the basis for the Moaco group in the late 1980s. This second group 
sought to combine sports and cultural activities with social and political concerns, 
and a continued emphasis on the health of local residents and the general 
improvement of everyday life in the two barrios. This organisation, Gerardo adds, 
provided “…the sorts of things that today a communal council should do.” (Lopez 
2009: 7).  
Moaco’s objective was to create a holistic solution to the barrios’ problems, 
including by creating “unity and consciousness” between residents (ibid). In this 
combined social and cultural approach, the focus on youth membership, and the 
separation from formal political organisation such as the Neighbours’ Association, 
Moaco provided the blueprint for some of the contemporary activities of Fundación 
Cayapa (see Chapter Eight). This group would have a part to play in the period of 
civil unrest at the end of the 1980s and would connect to the rise of the new left in 
Venezuela in the 1990s.  
4. Linking contemporary and historical community organisation in 
Pueblo Nuevo 
Today, the site of 1973’s toma at the southern edge of Pueblo Nuevo is fenced-off 
from the rest of the barrio. In the decades since the occupation, the police made use 
                                                          
the general comments of my participants, whose descriptions appeared to relate to more 
recent phases of the organisation. 
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of the space they had reclaimed from the occupying families by dumping dozens of 
damaged police cars. People in Pueblo Nuevo described how, during an election 
campaign in 2011, the area was eventually cleared and promised to be developed 
into a police station. Now, through the chain link fence or from the Campo Elias 
Bridge overhead, the bare concrete foundations and the girders that might have 
supported the walls of the police station share space with a row of kennels for 
police dogs. If the toma and the violent reaction from the state show the limited 
acceptance of Pueblo Nuevo’s “migrant-invaders” by city authorities in the 1970s, 
the unbuilt police station seems to suggest a certain contemporary reluctance to 
invest in pacifying the so-called malandros in the barrio. As described in Chapter 
Six, however, an occupation to the North of Pueblo Nuevo, would have considerably 
more success during the Chávez era, with the construction of new tower blocks as 
part of the Brisas de Alba housing campaign. 
Canel (1997: 190) describes social movements in Latin America as engaged not 
only in struggles over the allocation of goods and public services, but over “the 
production of meaning and the constitution of new collective identities”. This 
chapter has shown how both public services and identities have been part of the 
history of community organising in Pueblo Nuevo, where experiences reflect the 
wider challenges facing community groups across Latin America in the mid-
Twentieth Century. For Pueblo Nuevo, the founding of the community outside of 
the parameters that had previously been imagined for urban development, the co-
optation and replacement of the first community groups, and finally the turn to less 
formal kinds of community organising are part of the development of a complex 
relationship between people and government in and around the barrio. This 
history provides us with important precedents for the analytical work undertaken 
in the remainder of the thesis. 
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3. Citizens, revolutionaries and opositors: 
community organising around shifting 
representations of the urban poor, 1989-2014 
 
 
 
In November 2013, rumours spread around Pueblo Nuevo that the National Guard 
had taken over several stores in Mérida city centre, and had begun selling their 
stock off at dramatically lowered prices. Some people left the barrio to visit the 
centre, joining queues that stretched around city blocks to buy electrical goods, 
clothing and household appliances. People left the clutching their cut-price goods, 
squeezing past the young recruits with rifles who kept order over the queues. 
Meanwhile, new deliveries of stock arrived from warehouses and scowling 
shopkeepers looked on. 
The national wave of enforced price-fixing came just six months after new 
President Nicolas Maduro’s narrow electoral victory in April 2011, and just a few 
weeks before December’s “8D” national municipal elections that had been 
presented by the opposition as a plebiscite on the Bolivarian project. Maduro 
explained the period of price-fixing as the re-appropriation of goods that had been 
bought with subsidised US dollars that had been awarded to importers with the 
intention of lessening the impact of high inflation. It was said that dramatic savings 
were made by importers, who were able to buy dollars at ten times less than real 
market value. Where these savings were not being passed on to customers, and 
these importers were said to be making several thousand percent profit on some 
items. 
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In Mérida, Chavistas and opositors queued side-by-side in the hot sun. At Kristy’s 
clothes store, three generations of one family used the imposed store-wide 
discounts to buy new clothes. Alba, Morliana and Lilia explained how they saw the 
reductions as a necessary action in the face of increasing price speculation, and 
hopped that what they saw as the “real prices” would continue. At Yamil electronics 
store, goods arrived as fast as people could buy them as vans shuttled hoarded 
goods from the owners’ warehouses. One shopper queuing to purchase a 
discounted television accused the owners of black-marketeering, and echoed 
Maduro’s announcement by describing the involvement of the National Guard as 
part of “economic warfare” against Venezuela’s greedy elites.  
Other bargain hunters were less approving of the government action. Students 
Belkis and Renson saw the new scrutiny around prices as an attempt to centralise 
power over the retail sector. One shopkeeper said that he planned to leave the 
country as a result of the increased attention to his business practice, saying that 
“…there is no life here in Venezuela”. 
This period of price-fixing was intended to be an emblematic moment for the new 
Maduro government. The spectacle of armed National Guard members selling off 
the stock of “bourgeois” clothing and electronics goods importers was a good fit 
with the narrative of class struggle that had become a central part of the Bolivarian 
public narrative. For critics of the government, however, the price-fixing was 
simply another example of populist vote-buying, coming as it did weeks before an 
election. For many Chavistas, price-fixing was a necessary anti-corruption 
measure, but one that was long overdue. In the context of a deepening crisis of 
legitimacy for the PSUV, and as Maduro called repeatedly for “loyalty” from the 
Chavista voter base, the price-fixing seemed to be part of an attempt to reproduce 
the material benefits enjoyed during the Chávez era.1 
Aims and structure of the chapter 
This chapter considers the evolution of community organising in Pueblo Nuevo 
during the twenty-five years leading up to the period of fieldwork. This period 
                                                          
1 See Appendix Three for an article I wrote for Veenxzuelanalysis.com describing the 
period of price-fixing. 
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included the rise of the Bolivarian Revolutionary Movement (MBR), Chávez’s 
fifteen years in government, and the onset of the contemporary political crisis 
facing Maduro’s government today. The previous chapter described the founding 
of Pueblo Nuevo and Mérida’s other barrio communities during processes of rural-
urban migration in the mid-twentieth century. Different kinds of barrio 
organisations evolved in connection with a changing national political context that 
included the transition to a new democratic system. For Pueblo Nuevo, this also 
meant organising in the context of shifting representations of the urban poor: first 
as land invaders, as rightful citizens and finally as the urban criminal underclass. I 
argued that these representations connected with different ideas about the 
relationship of people and government in poor urban communities. 
This analysis is continued in this chapter by again charting the evolution of 
organisations and services in Pueblo Nuevo alongside a history of shifting national 
politics and changing representations of the urban poor. The increased importance 
of barrio populations after the Caracazo riots of 1989 is connected with the rise of 
Bolivarian Revolutionary Movement in the 1990s, culminating in Chávez’s election 
in 1998. I give an account of Pueblo Nuevo’s experience of the pro-poor politics of 
the Chávez era, leading up to the fieldwork period and the contemporary economic 
and political crisis following the death of Chávez. This period of political change for 
Venezuela was also marked by new notions of political constituency, entwined with 
shifting representations of the urban poor: from the dangerous criminals of pre-
Chavista rhetoric to the revolutionaries capable of social change, the rightful 
citizens in a new political era, and finally as the embattled loyal subjects in an 
enduring political crisis.    
The chapter makes two arguments about how local experiences from Pueblo Nuevo 
connect with the reorientation of national politics towards the interests of the 
urban poor. First, I argue that new public services and institutions introduced in 
Pueblo Nuevo in the 2000s - including opportunities for local organising and for 
basic healthcare, education, housing and subsidised goods - can be usefully thought 
about as part of improved terms of patronage for barrio populations. Second, I 
show how the Bolivarian public narrative reformulates the political discourse of 
the pre-Chávez era, again drawing on different folk-concepts about barrio 
populations, and promising emancipation as well as patronage for the urban poor. 
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The chapter begins following the economic crisis of the late 1980s, drawing on 
Gerardo Lopez’s (2009) account and Hernández de Padrón’s (2000) city-level 
analysis to highlight the increased political focus of neighbourhood movements in 
Mérida. The politicisation of Pueblo Nuevo’s Moaco youth organisation and the 
occupation of the disused school building in the barrio by residents’ groups are 
located in national context, as public dissatisfaction grew and barrio populations 
were drawn to the new empowering identities offered by the Chavista public 
narrative. The chapter continues by discussing the evolution of public services and 
institutions in Pueblo Nuevo after the election of Hugo Chávez in 1998. This section 
draws on local memory and accounts of national institutional change to describe 
new social ‘Missions’ for health, food and education and the limited implementation 
of the Communal Council system in Pueblo Nuevo. New services and political 
rhetoric are connected with new, more sympathetic representations of the urban 
poor. Finally, I reflect on the experiences of the Bolivarian politicisation of identity 
for people in Pueblo Nuevo, where conceptions of el pueblo – the people – have 
developed meanings that involve both partisanship and class. 
1. Barrio populations as the agents of social change: the reorientation 
of Venezuelan national politics, 1989-1998 
As the economic crisis of the mid-1980s worsened,2 optimism about the potential 
of social movements to effect social change for the urban poor had waned across 
Latin America. The radical social transformation predicted by the autonomist 
school had not come about, and community groups had not become major political 
actors (Ellner 1999: 76). Venezuela’s growing neighbourhood movement would be 
increasingly divided between those who sought short-term social improvements 
and those who wanted to work towards a national political alternative (Hernández 
                                                          
2 The 1980s saw a worsening economic crisis in Venezuela, as declining oil prices along with 
state mismanagement of funds, massive over-spending and corruption led to 
hyperinflation. The Accíon Democrática (AD) government of Jaime Ramón Lusinchi (1984-
1989) shifted from the country’s state-based development model in search of the 
efficiencies needed to compete in globalised market-place, reducing expenditure on 
infrastructure, healthcare, education and social services leading to a growing urban 
segregation and deterioration in living conditions and public services (Fernandes 2010: 
67). 
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de Padrón 2000: 198). In the early 1990s, this political alternative finally emerged 
as the Revolutionary Bolivarian Movement. 
Pueblo Nuevo’s Moaco group and the re-politicisation of civil society 
In Pueblo Nuevo, Gerardo Lopez’s (2009: 8-11) study describes how the youth-led 
Moaco group shifted from organising around culture, sports and health to more 
overtly political activities. Then, as today, this meant connecting with groups 
outside of the barrio. The Moaco group became involved with campaigns for the 
leftist coalition – including the militant La Causa Roja (LCR) as Gerardo and other 
teenagers from the barrio became involved in instances of “social struggle” (ibid: 
8), including instances of public disorder and the now-familiar strategy of tomas – 
occupations. The political role of the group continued with the founding of the 
political pamphlet Moaco Informa. Gerardo describes how “…we intended to give 
an account of our local reality…”, reporting on the increasingly violent exchanges 
between the state and dissenting citizens and on the new wave of violent crime as 
rival gangs competed for the profits from increasing levels of drug use in the 
community. 
The growing sense of public anger at Venezuela’s economic crisis and the loss of 
legitimacy of the political system – including at attempts to dominate or co-opt 
community groups - spilled over into nationwide riots in 1989, with the events of 
the Caracazo. In January, Carlos Andres Perez was re-elected President following a 
classic populist campaign that promised an end to austerity policies and a return 
to the public spending of his previous term during the 1970s oil boom years - the 
bonanza petrolera. In an electoral strategy that would be echoed by Hugo Chávez 
ten years later, Andres Perez promised to reject the prescriptions of the 
International Monetary Fund and defend the living standards of the Venezuelan 
public (Raby 2006: 141). Following his election, however, Andres Perez announced 
El Gran Viraje – the great turn - a set of policies that reversed his electoral promises 
and committed to privatisation, price-deregulation, the removal of public subsidies 
to local industries and a reduction in social spending. In response, local 
manufacturers cut back production and shops began to hoard goods, leading to 
growing frustration among the urban poor (Fernandes 2010: 68). On February 
26th, bus fares in Caracas were doubled, sparking nationwide riots and looting. 
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These riots affected the major cities across the country, including Mérida (Gott 
2011: 43). As improvised road blockades were put up and looting continued into 
the night, the police and armed forces were called in to restore order, opening fire 
on the looters and leaving over two thousand dead, mostly from the barrios of 
Caracas. 
Until the events of the Caracazo, Venezuela’s politicians had treated the countries 
barrio communities as potential sources of votes, delivered through clientelist 
networks while city authorities concentrated more on containing their expansion 
than extending public services (Hernández de Padrón 1998). The riots – known as 
the day ‘the hills came down’ - exposed the fragility of urban segregation in 
Venezuela’s cities and emphasised the potential of the dissatisfied urban poor to be 
the force for political change that had been forecast following independence (e.g. 
Ray 1969: 142). The Caracazo also signalled the importance of barrio populations 
to a new generation of Venezuelan political leaders, and are now held by Chavistas 
as the incident that marked the shift to a new revolutionary politics in Venezuela.  
Following the riots, Andres Perez’s continuation of austerity further discredited the 
Venezuelan political system (Raby 2006: 142). The events of the Caracazo had also 
reinforced the reputation of barrio population as anarchic law-breakers (Emerson 
2011: 92) and increasingly repressive tactics were used across the country 
(Fernandes 2010: 39). These incidents would be repeated across the barrios of 
Mérida, as captured in the photograph below (Photo 1) and underlined the failure 
of Puntofijismo to deliver the needs of the urban poor. 
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Photo 1. “State repression in Mérida”, from Molina Diario Frontera, undated, 
in Garcia et al (1994: 118). 
The takeover of the CEDECOL building in Pueblo Nuevo, 1991 
As notions about the capacity of barrio populations to be actors for social change 
spread among the future leadership of the Bolivarian Revolution, community 
organisations in Pueblo Nuevo would take direct action to alleviate worsening 
public services. One area that had particularly suffered was education, as the 
community’s only school had already relocated to a site outside the barrio in the 
late 1980s, interrupting the education of a generation of students.3 The school 
building, located at the crossroads where the two barrios of Pueblo Nuevo and 
Simon Bolivar meet, temporarily served as a school for the blind but would be 
closed altogether during the period of austerity during the Andres Perez 
presidency. Following its closure, a collective of local community groups took over 
the school building, in a move that would shape both barrio organising and services 
for the two communities. 
The takeover was planned and executed in 1991 by an alliance between the Moaco 
youth activists, a food supplies cooperative known as Salud Para Todos and the 
joint Neighbours’ Association for the two barrios, Avepunsimbo. The centre 
                                                          
3 These students were among those who I would later teach in adult high-school classes at 
Fundación Cayapa. 
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reopened under community control as the Lyria Centre of Community 
Development (CEDECOL), named after the plantation that had existed in the 
Albarregas valley prior to the founding of Pueblo Nuevo in 1945 (interview w JW, 
31.05.14, SB; see also Diaz and Freitez 2007: 6). From 1991, the three community 
organisations responsible for the takeover began using the facilities for a variety of 
activities - including workshops led by the different groups. Today, the CEDECOL 
building houses Fundación Cayapa, the Barrio Adentro health clinic, meetings of 
the Communal Council Calle Principal, a library and Infocentro computer room, the 
Radio ECOs studio and the MERCAL subsidised food store. 
As with the community organisations from the 1970s and 1980s, Neighbours’ 
Associations in the 1990s are said to have suffered from party penetration and 
domination (Hernández de Padrón 2000; Fernandes 2010: 56-58). For some 
Neighbours’ Associations in Mérida in the 1990s, the reaction to clientelism and 
party influences was an increasing political isolationism, with Hernández de 
Padrón (2000: 209) describing a growing dynamic of “comuntarismo” where party 
politics were banned and where groups focused only on the internal issues of their 
barrios. Despite this, actions like the takeover of the CEDECOL building were 
reminiscent of the more independent actions like 1973’s comité de toma, described 
in the previous chapter, while members of national movements were renewing the 
call for more political roles (Ellner 1999). During our interview, which took place 
in the same building, Gerardo described climbing the walls of the school to break 
into the building (interview w GL, 04.07.14, CD). He writes that “…before the 
possibility that an official body of the police of the National Guard could occupy it, 
the community organised and took it” (Lopez 2009: 18). This concern reflects the 
lesson of the 1973 toma, when the land intended for the building of new housing to 
the south of Pueblo Nuevo was taken over by the police, preventing the community 
from using it. The take-over also reflects a tradition from the wider region, where 
low-income urban communities has often looked for local alternatives to 
supplement public services, including by taking control of local physical resources 
(e.g. Arias and Rodrigues 2006; see also Fernandes 2010: 212-232). 
The rise of pro-poor politics and the Revolutionary Bolivarian Movement 
(MBR), 1992-1997 
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As public dissatisfaction grew in communities like Pueblo Nuevo, civilian groups in 
Caracas began plotting with a leftist-nationalist faction within the military known 
as the Revolutionary Bolivarian Movement or MBR-200. Among the members of 
this faction was the young Lieutenant Hugo Chávez. By this time, the clandestine 
MBR-200 had been radicalised by the events of the Caracazo.4 On the 3rd of 
February 1992, the MBR-200 launched a military coup, with the goal of capturing 
President Andres Perez and his cabinet. Major Arias Cardenas seized control of the 
city of Maracaibo near the Colombian border, while other military groups took over 
Maracay and Valencia to the West of Caracas. In the capital itself, Chávez arrived 
with his unit in the early hours of the 4th of February, but encountered unexpected 
resistance after the plot was leaked (Raby 2006: 150). Chávez decided to surrender 
to prevent further bloodshed, asking for an opportunity to address the nation on 
television as his one condition. This brief speech would bring Chávez nation-wide 
recognition, as he called for the military units in the other major cities to lay down 
their arms and publicly took responsibility for the coup. In stating that the strategic 
objectives of the “Bolivarian movement” had not been achieved por ahora – “for 
now”, Chávez’s speech also coined a key slogan of the Revolution.  For a population 
that had largely lost faith in AD and COPEI, this “for now” was taken as a 
commitment to continue the struggle to end the power-sharing agreement of 
Puntofijismo. 
The failed coup of February 1992 and a second failed attempt by more senior 
military officers in November of the same year signalled a shift in Venezuelan 
politics and started a new nationwide political movement that would culminate in 
the election of Chávez in 1998. By accepting accountability publicly and receiving a 
prison sentence, Chávez had won credibility across the country, where it was 
widely considered that politicians failed to take responsibility for their actions 
(Raby 2006: 150). He would receive an amnesty from new President Rafael Caldera 
in 1994, who capitalised on public sympathy for the MBR-200 leadership during 
                                                          
4 Several members of the MBR reflected on the riots as a turning point. One member, Major 
Arias Cardenas had refused to order his troops to fire on looters, while other officers are 
said to have facilitated peaceful looting (Raby 2006: 148). Following the massacre of 1989, 
Chávez was also briefly arrested under suspicion of an assassination plot against President 
Andres Perez, while the faction sought to build links with community groups and form a 
civilian-military alliance capable of taking power. 
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his election campaign. By his release, Chávez had been transformed into a national 
political figure and was able to present himself as an alternative to the 
delegitimised two-party system and a new potential patron for the urban poor.5 
Marta Harnecker’s interviews with president Chávez in 2004, show how the 
circumstances of the 1992 coup’s failure also went some way to determining the 
attitudes of the emerging political leadership towards the role and organisation of 
civil society. Chávez (in Harnecker 2005: 35) saw members of different leftist 
civilian groups as having failed to join the uprising, having committed to taking part 
and receiving caches of arms to join the struggle. Leaders of the La Causa Roja (LCR) 
who had pledged their support publicly condemned the uprising following its 
failure (ibid, see also Gott 2000: 63-65). From this point on, Chávez would work to 
find new ways to consolidate civilian support, calling for public participation by 
connecting with revolutionary discourses from the pre-Chávez era (Zuquete 2008; 
Velasco 2011). Now, without the possibility of launching a military coup, the MBR 
200 committed to democratic political change, but wanted a different kind of 
relationship with the public than the conventional and discredited political party 
system (Chávez in Harnecker 2005: 35-43). This strategy would also tie in with the 
frustrations of Venezuela’s neighbourhood movement, and connect with the 
struggle for new political identities among the urban poor. 
From 1992, the MBR 200’s “mega-project” of mass political mobilisation began the 
work of politicising Venezuela’s barrios (ibid: 42-43), including via attempts to 
redeem barrio residents in national political discourses. Alongside Chávez’s 
revolutionary rhetoric, this involved more inclusive discourses of citizenship that 
moved on from the notions of criminality employed by President Andres Perez 
following the Caracazo of 1989. For the Venezuelan public, not least the urban poor 
                                                          
5 The increased involvement of the military in politics was also supported in some sections 
of society. During fieldwork, one Chavista interviewee attributed this to the considerable 
public works achieved under General Vincente Gomez in the early twentieth century 
(interview w CO, 09.09.13, MC), while members of several activist groups explained how 
the idea of necessary violence was accepted on the Venezuelan left, with their history of 
clandestine military opposition of Puntofijismo and long-standing relations with the Cuban 
Revolution. Today, the use of the military in Mérida to end street protests in 2014, and to 
enforce price controls in 2013, were also supported by Chavistas, while marches and 
meetings often include those in military style berets after the style of ‘Commandante’ 
Chávez. 
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living in barrios like Pueblo Nuevo, Chávez’s attempted coup connected the 
Bolivarian movement with the perceived politics and the militancy of the rioters. 
The redemption of identity offered by Chávez meant framing all Venezuelans as 
rightful “Bolivarian citizens” - as the revolucionarios capable of delivering social 
change – not least the urban poor (Spanakos (2008: 527). To deliver this, Chávez 
proposed a plan to formally rewrite longstanding inequalities in Venezuela, as the 
clandestine military faction transformed itself into an electoral movement 
proposing a national constituent assembly and a legal rewriting of Venezuelan 
politics. The proposed new Constitution included new citizens’ rights that had been 
proposed by President Betancourt following independence (Emerson 2011: 90), 
but were seen by the supporters of the MBR-200 as having never been delivered. 
The commitment to political inclusion was demonstrated through large-scale 
public consultation that would become a hallmark of Chavismo. In Pueblo Nuevo, 
the MBR 200, along with the Communist Party (PCV) and the Unified Independent 
Neighbours’ Movement (UVI) began to organise public citizens’ assemblies (Lopez 
2009: 9). These political activities would continue alongside social activities, as the 
CEDECOL collective attempted to address both worsening public services and the 
increasing levels of violence in the community.6  From 1995, the group began a 
four-year literacy project known as the New Readers Circle (CILEN) with help from 
FUNDACITE Mérida and including a series of discussions with professors from the 
University of the Andes (Lopez 2009: 13). Gerardo also writes that “The work of 
CILEN gave an organic balance to the different collectives in the community…”. This 
balance that is to some extent evident today as community events and holistic 
services revolve around the work of the Cayapa group and the school building. 
Gerardo also describes how the group approached these workshops with the goal 
of achieving “social transformation” seeing education as a liberating process 
connected to the interests of the person (ibid: 14). Education would become a focus 
                                                          
6 Venezuela’s economic crisis continued as the Caldera government continued the shift to 
neoliberalism, with the effects felt most at the bottom of society. President Caldera 
continued the decentralisation begun by Andres Perez, but the delegation of social services 
to local government and NGOs was largely done with insufficient resources (Fernandes 
2010: 71). Hernández de Padrón (2000: 209) describes how in Mérida, although 
community groups saw decentralisation as having the potential to improve democratic 
accountability, the shift in some ways reinforced the position of old elites from political 
parties and among the offices of the Governor and the Mayor, and local party concejales. 
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for the collective, as they began to see work with children and young people as a 
strategy through which to improve life in the barrio.  
As CEDECOL focused on achieving local “transformation” in Pueblo Nuevo (ibid), 
attempts to achieve national political transformation would shape barrio services 
and organising. In their new political activities, Pueblo Nuevo’s organisations were 
part of a neighbourhood movement of increasing political relevance. In part this 
was prompted by the surge in urban poverty. By 1998 the number of Venezuelans 
living in poverty was 81%, with 48% in extreme poverty, up from 10% in 1978 
(Roberts 2003). The majority of these populations lived in Venezuela’s a cities, 
where most were informally employed (ibid). With few legal opportunities for 
employment, some people in barrio communities like Pueblo Nuevo turned to 
criminal activities like the drug trade to sustain their families (Fernandes 2010: 
75). The needs of this new majority of the population were increasingly reflected 
in the MBR-200’s campaigning, which focused on the rights to better living 
standards, employment and personal security for the urban poor (Chávez in 
Harnecker 2005: 42). 
The election of Chávez confirms the reorientation to pro-poor politics  
By the presidential elections of 1998, the MBR 200 had grown into a mass 
movement with a new political narrative built around the personality of Chávez, 
nationalism, and a broadly conceived Venezuelan class identity. In the 
confrontational Chavista rhetoric, promises of political emancipation and a shift to 
more “protagonistic” democracy shared space with the demonization of both 
Venezuelan elites and the United States (Spanakos 2008: 536). This “agonistic” 
political narrative (ibid) achieved multi-class support for Chávez, who framed the 
elections as a contest between the “pole of national destruction” of the old political 
parties and the “patriotic pole” of his re-branded Fifth Republic Movement (MVR) 
(Chávez 1997 in Gott 2000: 143).7 The movement promised a new beginning for 
the country – including a national constituent assembly, a new, active role for its 
citizens and a charismatic patron to resolve the economic crisis and address social 
marginalisation. The campaign slogan con Chávez manda el pueblo – “with Chávez, 
                                                          
7 Venezuela had undergone four distinct ‘republics’ since independence, with the fourth 
lasting from 1830 to 1998. 
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the people rule” - encapsulated this dual appeal, simultaneously implying both 
direct democracy and the subordination of popular sovereignty to executive power 
(Cameron and Major 2001).8  
Chávez won the 1998 Presidential elections with 56.2% of the vote and with a 
majority in seventeen out of twenty three states, including Mérida State. His victory 
brought about an end to the power-sharing of Puntofijismo and confirmed the path 
to a national constituent assembly. His victory has divided academics. More 
sympathetic commentators present Chávez as the embodiment of a national class 
sentiment (Raby 2006; Dominguez 2011) while others attempt to unpack the 
complex message and strategy of Chávez’s political discourse (Zuquete 2008; 
Spanakos 2008; Emerson 2011).9 In different ways, both perspectives attribute this 
victory to the successful “politicisation of class” and including a renewed identity 
for the urban poor as active citizens in a new national democratic process (Heath 
2009: 185). These different interpretations also share an emphasis on Chávez’s 
ability to position himself as a patron for the neglected urban poor, while the 
combative Bolivarian class narrative is evidence of the increased importance of 
barrio populations and the working class in Venezuelan politics.  
2. The new patronage of the Bolivarian Revolution: improved barrio 
services and another national system for community organising, 
1998-2012 
Chávez’s campaign had promised emancipation for the urban poor, but the first 
improvements to conditions in barrio communities would come from above. After 
his election in 1998, Chávez began the ‘Plan Bolivar 2000’ program of public works 
using the military “in cooperation with local communities” to repair roads, schools 
and community centres and providing basic healthcare and other services in 
                                                          
8 Vivas (in Cameron and Maor 2001: 72) explains the success of Chávez's confrontational 
style, describing the essence of his message as: "You Venezuelans are not to blame; you and 
I know who is to blame for what has happened to us; I am going to get rid of these people 
around us, don't doubt it; and, what's more, I will solve all your problems". 
9 Hellinger (2005) highlights Chávez’s support among the unemployed urban and rural 
poor, with less votes among “working” working class Venezuelans. Despite the movement’s 
polarising class narrative, Canache (2002) also emphasises the role “ambivalent” voters 
played in Chávez’s victory. Evidence from Pueblo Nuevo today, where partisanship is 
typically understated and allegiances are mixed, supports this messy picture of support 
from 1998. 
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poorest areas (Raby 2006: 160; see also Harnecker 2005: 74-82). Plan Bolivar 
2000, and later the government response to the Vargas landslides crisis in 1999 
gave an immediate demonstration of Chávez’s status as a new patron of the poor 
and vulnerable. The constitutional assembly of 1999 would also signal his 
commitment to public consultation. As well as separate national referendums to 
convene the assembly, elect its deputies, and ratify the new constitution, regional 
assemblies were held to canvass proposals and to delegations from mass 
movements were also consulted (Raby 2006: 162-163). Gerardo Lopez recalled 
how the process allowed active members of Pueblo Nuevo to apply what they had 
learned in community participation inside the barrio, conducting mesas de trabajo 
- round table discussion groups – to propose community development projects for 
the Libertador Municipality. The text of the constitution (1999 in Spanakos 2008: 
528) also contained a commitment to continue this direct role for the Venezuelan 
public by launching a system of “participatory and protagonistic democracy”. 
The new constitution was ratified with 71% of the national vote, renaming the 
country as the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and creating a strengthened and 
recallable Presidency, a new unicameral National Assembly, Supreme Court, 
National Electoral Council and new ombudsmen to tackle political corruption. 
Renaming the country was an indication that the revolucionarios had succeeded, 
while the new statutes established a broad set of social and human rights and 
responsibilities, including the right to health and education and women’s rights, 
including banning gender discrimination and formally recognising motherhood as 
a form of labour. These new legal rights, founded in a process of public consultation, 
would also establish the constitution as a symbol of public morality and political 
legitimacy for Chavistas. During fieldwork, the constitution was frequently 
referenced in Chavista meetings to argue for rights to basic services and political 
freedoms, and as an example and a foundation for collective action. The ‘little blue 
book’ containing the statutes was also held aloft by participants on marches and in 
particular at the mass rally I attended in Caracas in January 2013, when Chavistas 
flooded the streets of the capital to defend Chávez against an anticipated coup 
attempt on the date of his re-inauguration. That this book -containing the citizens’ 
rights delivered by Chávez via popular consultation - has become such an 
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important political symbol, is illustrative of the ways that the public recognises and 
feels ownership of the rights delivered by the Bolivarian process.  
Under the new electoral system, Chávez was re-elected in July 2000, setting a trend 
for frequent national elections and consolidating the new political order. Aside 
from the localised efforts of Plan Bolivar 2000, however, barrio communities like 
Pueblo Nuevo would not see significant changes to their institutions or services 
until after the Chávez government until after the short-lived military coup of April 
2002, when Chávez was briefly removed from office following violent clashes 
between his supporters and striking oil sector workers. His reinstatement by 
military forces occurred as barrio populations again took to the streets of Caracas 
in support of Chávez. As protesters demanded the return of “our president” to 
finish the Presidential term they had elected him for, this is seen by Chavistas as 
having further reinforced Chávez’s association with this long-overlooked section of 
the Venezuelan public. During fieldwork, one Chavista activist described this event 
as being the consolidation of Chávez’s relationship with normal Venezuelans, as 
citizens fulfilled their new political roles and protected the new citizens’ rights they 
had voted for (interview w DV, 12.04.14, MC).  
Pueblo Nuevo’s experience of the Bolivarian Social Missions 
Until 2002, this new era had yet to provide improved public services for 
Venezuela’s urban and rural poor. Barrios like Pueblo Nuevo were still recovering 
from the effects of the economic crises of the 1980s and 1990s. Briggs et al. (2009) 
describe how, at first, change was frustrated by the Venezuelan bureaucracy, for 
example where proposed improvements to health services had been hampered by 
the top-down organisation of the service and the alignment of the Venezuelan 
Medical Federation with AD and COPEI, now in opposition. The events of April 
2002, however, had not only reinforced Chávez’s messianic public persona, but is 
seen as having reinforced his connection to the urban poor - who had now elected 
him twice and taken to the streets to reinstate him following the coup. After 
resisting a second national strike and a further “lock-out” of PDVSA in 2002, Chávez 
had also strengthened his control of Venezuela’s oil revenues. In 2003 he 
announced a national program of public works known as the Bolivarian Missions 
that would reshape services for the urban poor across the country.  
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In Pueblo Nuevo, a health clinic was set up in part of the occupied CEDECOL school 
building as part of the government’s new health Mission, Barrio Adentro – or 
“inside the barrio”. From 2003, the clinic, which has two rooms and a storage area, 
was staffed by Cuban doctors as part of deal between Chávez and Fidel Castro to 
exchange Cuban medical personal for Venezuelan oil, with Venezuelan and Bolivian 
staff and one American doctor joining the team in later years. While at first these 
doctors were visitors to the barrio, a living area would later be negotiated with the 
CEDECOL collective to enable the doctors to live full-time in Pueblo Nuevo. This 
step, one that was taken in barrio communities across the country, was intended to 
integrate the medical staff with different communities. The Mission is an example 
of Latin American Social Medicine (LASM) (Briggs et al. 2009), in line with the 
commitment to “decentralised and participative” healthcare in Article 84 of the 
1999 Constitution. Part of the idea of Barrio Adentro’s “integrated medicine” 
strategy is preventative: doctors reportedly establish close links with their host 
communities, learning the specific local causes of health problems and working to 
provide solutions that address these causes (interview w MP, 23.07.14, CD).10 
In line with the LASM ethos and the stipulations of the of 1999 Constitution, Barrio 
Adentro is intended to operate with community participation. In this way, Chávez 
was able to frame the Mission to reflect his dual promise to the Venezuelan public, 
as both a new service delivered by the President to his supporters, and as an 
example of empowering communities to determine their own needs and design 
their own solutions. The political symbolism of Barrio Adentro, however, also 
effects its use and attitudes within Pueblo Nuevo. Some opposition supporters who 
didn’t use the service repeated the criticism of the often made by opponents of the 
government, describing the Cuban doctors as “just hygienists”, and preferring to 
visit the hospital outside of the barrio. Despite the association of community 
medicine with Chávez, community health services existed in the barrio in the 1980s 
and 1990s, with a committee on the Neighbour’s Association and a clinic run by 
members of the Moaco group. 
As part of this new health strategy, house visits and a comprehensive household 
survey in 2011 (Correa and Wilson 2011) were undertaken in Pueblo Nuevo, as 
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part of this integrated strategy (interviews w MP, 23.07.14, PN; GS, 20.04.14, MC; 
and JW 31.5.14, SB). Tis included a question about the “three most urgent 
problems” facing Pueblo Nuevo and neighbouring Simon Bolivar.  
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Graph 1. “What are the three most urgent problems in the barrio?” (Correa and 
Wilson 2011)11 
The specific problems identified by the clinic staff, meanwhile, are associated with 
the lifestyles and living conditions in the barrio. Dr Maria Perez also highlighted the 
danger of water-born parasites due to the poor sanitisation and frequent flooding; 
injuries from domestic violence; diet-related problems including diabetes; 
alcoholism and drug addiction; and problems relating the mismanagement of 
pregnancy and to pregnancy among very young girls (Interview w MP, 23.07.14, 
PN). Dr Joshua Wilson also reported dealing with injuries including gun-shot 
wounds during the periods of heightened gang violence in the late 2000s 
(Interview w JW, 31.5.14, SB). During fieldwork, attitudes among the community 
towards the work Barrio Adentro were very positive,12 with particular praise for 
the free medicine and the lack of queues for patients compared with the local 
hospital (interview w JN, 06.05.14, PN), the expertise of the doctors (interview w 
GV, 14.04.14, MC) and the home visits for patients with mobility problems. 
To supplement this new health strategy, and as part of the food and nutrition 
Mission, a small  store selling subsidised groceries and basic household goods was 
set up in the occupied CEDECOL building in 2003. The store is part of a national 
network of more than 16,600 outlets and sells generic-branded goods at a fraction 
of their retail value, with prices controlled by the state-run company Mercados de 
                                                          
11 The 2012 survey is better thought about as an indication of perceived problems. The 
question format in this survey is slightly problematic in that it asks respondents for only 
their top three “problems”, and as it is limited to certain health-oriented categories, for 
example neglecting problems related to low income or from the wage inconsistencies 
associated with informal employment. The survey results also give no indication of 
respondents’ personal experience of these problems. As such there are some possible 
irregularities – for example, the breakdown of results in the document shows “drugs” scores 
higher in Pueblo Nuevo than in Simon Bolivar, although the latter is well-known locally to 
be the barrio more commonly associated with both addiction and the sale of drugs. We can 
also see that abandoning school – lower scoring than tobacco use, for example - is not seen 
as a problem, despite 76% non-completion of secondary education among the two barrios. 
Unemployment is discussed elsewhere in the report and is recorded as 8% for men and 3% 
for women, with 39% of women listed as housewives (Venezuela was the first country to 
formally recognise ama de casa or “housewife” as an occupation. Informal employment is 
21% for men and 15% for women. Responses about hours worked per week or income 
which might give us a better understanding of economic problems were not sought. 
12 From twenty five participants asked about the service, among those who had used the 
service there were no negative accounts, the only criticisms came from two people who had 
not used the clinic. 
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Alimentos (MERCAL). The store also employs one local resident, Miguel Parra, who 
has worked there since taking over from his brother in 2005. Miguel, who grew up 
in Pueblo Nuevo, is in his 50s is a visible part of community life, participating in 
different community activities, and studying with Cayapa on the Bachillerato 
course that I taught in 2014. Miguel described the Mission as a response to the 
specific problems of the community: “…it’s not that there weren’t resources or food, 
it’s just that they weren’t reaching all of the parts, for example Pueblo Nuevo and 
other barrios in the city” (Interview w MP, 16.4.14, PN). As well as selling goods, 
Miguel and volunteers from the community are part of a network of mercalitos who 
organise together to deliver to communities across the state, including 
communities who do not have their own MERCAL stores. This includes some of the 
harder to reach rural Andean communities and the poorest barrios in Mérida City, 
including Los Curros and Santa Elena.  
In 2003, this idea of passing on savings from the collective purchasing power to the 
poorest, was politicised by Chávez. After the PDVSA lock-out and the national 
strike, some food companies ceased production in what is said to have been in the 
hope of destabilising the government. Chávez then connected the issue of nutrition 
to national sovereignty and domestic class struggle. From this time, Chávez would 
begin to associate himself with the provision of food, and increasingly blame the 
opposition for shortages, a practice that Maduro has continued with throughout 
economic crisis of 2013-2015. In Pueblo Nuevo, during the chronic shortages of the 
economic crisis of 2013, a one-off delivery of food and other supplies were also 
made using a flat-bed truck. Goods were distributed from the back of a flat-bed 
truck by volunteers with red-PSUV t-shirts and baseball caps and accompanied by 
loud pro-Chávez music, including the anthem Chávez, Corazon de Todos - “Chávez, 
Heart for Everyone”. At the time, people queuing for goods in the sun did not seem 
to share the enthusiasm of the mercalitos. The mother of the family where I stayed, 
Marleny, who was an opposition supporter, watched the event from her gate, 
despite the fact that her own cupboards were was nearly empty.13 
                                                          
13 Although MERCAL is firmly associated with the Chávez government, Pueblo Nuevo also 
has its own history of collective purchasing. The Salud Para Todos collective offered 
subsidised goods in Pueblo Nuevo in the late 1980s and 1990s, taking part in the CEDECOL 
takeover in 1991 (Lopez 2009: 12). 
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Although Miguel is a Chavista, he sees the work of MERCAL as “humanitarian”, 
emphasising the “psychological” and emotional effects of having access to 
affordable goods. Miguel also accepts that the organisation has party-political 
associations for many people, with some even attending in false beards and wigs. 
He insists, however, that the supplies are intended and available for all residents, 
regardless of their politics: 
“But MERCAL is of the people. It’s an initiative of the government but 
it’s for the people. It’s not just for people who are socialists or 
Chavistas, it’s for everyone. Everyone who is in Venezuela in the 
moment that they are giving this service. There are Colombians, 
Ecuadorians, there are gringos, there are amigos!” 
Like Barrio Adentro, MERCAL has its political associations. Also like the health 
service, the food Mission fits with the dual rhetoric of Chávez as a service that is 
both participative and is provided by a benevolent patron (see Spanakos 2008: 
529). 
The other Missions launched in 2003 included three free adult education programs, 
teaching basic reading, writing, and arithmetic (Mission Robinson), higher 
education courses (Mission Sucre) and remedial high school level classes to 
Venezuelan high school dropouts (Mission Ribas), where students were also paid a 
small stipend. While there is no information about how many people from Pueblo 
Nuevo attended these courses, one teacher from Mérida, Charlie Otiz, said that the 
classes were mostly attended by residents of the cities barrios (Interview w CO, 
09.09.13, MC). Again, these programs were politicised, with government 
presenting education a tool for the empowerment of their support base (Torres 
2011). Charlie was critical of the party involvement in the recruitment and 
promotions processes. He also observed that the course reading materials were 
frequently ‘revolutionary’ texts, such as the writing of Che Guevara, meaning that 
students who were opposed to the Chávez government rarely completed the 
courses. In 2011 in Pueblo Nuevo, 76% of adults were recorded in the Barrio 
Adentro survey as not having completed high-school (Correa and Wilson 2011)  in 
part because the desire for adult learning is often frustrated by responsibilities of 
childcare and work commitments. 
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While the services delivered through the Social Missions may have been uneven, 
the new initiatives also contributed to the shift around the self-identities of the 
urban poor. Those illegitimate “migrant invaders” of the mid twentieth century, the 
disappointed new citizens of democratic transition, the criminal underclass of 
malandros blamed for the Caracazo, all now had a potential patron and a new, 
empowering political narrative. New public services delivered inside barrios like 
Pueblo Nuevo signalled to the people in the barrios that they were now seen as 
deserving food, health and education (Spanakos 208). Now, residents felt that they 
were the triumphant revolucionarios celebrating a political victory - the citizens 
whose rights were being delivered in their own communities. 
Included in Chávez’s promise for political inclusion were different groups in 
Venezuela who had not been well-represented, including women and ethnic 
minorities. In 2008, Chávez described the centrality of a shift in gender relations to 
his vision of social change:  
“There would not be a true and authentic Bolivarian Revolution 
without the Venezuelan women making their revolution.” And 
emphasising high-level roles given to women (Chávez 2008 in 
Lallander 2016: 159) 
Chávez also deployed his own mixed-heritage to ally himself with the mestizo and 
black Venezuelans, many of who lived in the country’s barrio communities. Chávez 
presented racism as both imperialist and capitalist (Chávez quoted in Cannon 
2008: 741), calling on the historically-marginalised sections of society to be the 
protagonists in a new, inclusive era.  
Escalation of malandro violence in the mid-2000s 
While the new social Missions offered improvements in living standards in Pueblo 
Nuevo in the mid-2000s, life in the community in this period was increasingly 
shaped by increasing violence as rival gangs competed for the control of the drug 
trade. Both the use and sale of drugs is said to have increased in Mérida’s barrios 
since the late 1980s (Jugo Burguera 2004, Hernández de Padrón 2000). During 
fieldwork, however, people talked about the period of around 2003 to 2007 as the 
most dangerous period in recent memory, as a war between rival gangs divided 
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Pueblo Nuevo and Simon Bolivar. Dr Joshua Wilson’s description of the violence in 
2006 suggests the seriousness of the situation: 
“When I moved to the barrio there were shootouts on average three to 
four times a week and in those shootouts someone would get killed 
maybe once every month and before that it was worse. Ten years ago 
(2003-2004) it was really bad and it got to the point where the police 
occupied certain spots in the barrio continually- there was always 
police with shotguns all down the road and that was to try and separate 
the two barrios… People before weren’t allowed to move between the 
two barrios, because if the people from Pueblo Nuevo went to Simon 
Bolivar, the people from Simon Bolivar would get really nervous that 
they were being spied on by the people from Pueblo Nuevo, in case they 
would see someone in Simon Bolivar and report back ‘this guy is sitting 
out in front of his house’ and they would go up there and shoot him. 
People in the gangs in Simon Bolivar and in Pueblo Nuevo pressured 
the people in both communities to not cross that boundary.” (Interview 
with J.W. 31.05.14, SB) 
By the time I arrived in Pueblo Nuevo in 2013, the shootouts Joshua described had 
largely ceased, but the reputation of the barrio as among the worsts “red zones” in 
Mérida remained, and even in the barrio most residents did not leave their homes 
after around nine o’clock. The shootouts Joshua describes during this period, 
however, were still talked about by various community members. None of my 
participants said that they had been active gang members during this period, but 
different participants reported seeing the dead bodies of gang members in the 
streets and said that passers-by had also been hit by stray bullets. Some 
participants had family members who had been killed, with young men the most 
targeted. Teachers at Cayapa also said that some of the young students had 
witnessed extreme gang-related violence in their homes, including the murder of 
family members.  
The separation between the two communities described by Joshua above was also 
remembered by many people in the barrio. During a focus group with residents of 
both Pueblo Nuevo and Simon Bolivar, people described not being able to pass 
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between the two communities during this era without fear of attack (Focus Group 
1 22.4.14, PN). Other residents continued to avoid the other barrio, including my 
host family, the Angulo Quinteros, who avoided the Simon Bolivar and even 
Northern part of Pueblo Nuevo entirely. This period of violence between the two 
barrios has precedents in the literature. For Wilde’s (2014: 134) study in El 
Camoruco in Valencia, the timeline of escalated violence and the descriptions of the 
violence between the two barrios match with what people had said in Pueblo 
Nuevo.14 
The constant police presence Joshua describes, however, was not reflected in other 
reports from residents who had been in Pueblo Nuevo at this time. One resident, 
Martín, described how no policemen would ever dare to enter the barrio at night 
or to respond to reports of violence (Interview with MM, 11.04.16, Pueblo Nuevo). 
Although he said he had on occasion been stopped and searched along with other 
young men in the barrio, he said that the police would only go into Pueblo Nuevo 
to make arrests on rare occasions. Other residents accused the police of having ties 
to the gangs and of contributing to the violence by releasing gang members when 
they were arrested. Again, this reflects Wilde’s account of El Camoruco (2014: 134) 
where barrio residents viewed police as simply another gang because they were 
believed to be corrupt and to supply weapons and drugs to the malandros.  
This rise in violence in Venezuela’s barrio communities was also politicised. While 
his critics drew attention to the failure of the government to address the problem, 
Chávez sought to frame the problem as a symptom of the neoliberalism of the 
1980s and 1990s – blaming the past government, where his predecessor had 
blamed the malandro barrio culture. Chávez’s policies were proving unpopular, 
meanwhile, and the opposition parties would attempt to remove Chávez from office 
again in 2004 - this time by legal means with an unsuccessful Presidential recall 
referendum in 2004. Chávez won Presidential elections again in 2006, before 
reforming his party as the United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV) and launching 
                                                          
14 In El Camoruco a gang war with neighbouring barrio José Felix Ribas broke out during 
the mid-2000s, with Wilde describing the segregation of the neighbourhoods as a result of 
blood feuds and revenge attacks by criminal gangs (Wilde 2014: 101). 
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new institutions for participation, via a transition to a system of local Consejos 
Comunales – the Communal Councils. 
The introduction of the Communal Council system, 2006 
From 2007, Chávez, like successive AD and COPEI governments in the 1960s-1980s 
(Hernández de Padrón 1998, see previous chapter) developed his own vision for 
community organising. The Law of the Communal Councils, passed in April 2006, 
introduced a system of new institutions organisations that represented smaller 
catchment areas – in line with a sentiment that had been voiced within the 
neighbourhood movement in the 1990s (Ellner 1999: 79). Under the new system, 
an initial fixed amount of 3,000 Bolivares fund was made available on a community-
by-community basis (interview w NG, 06.06.14, OF). This encouraged the 
proliferation of groups, and by 2007, the Minister for Participation and Social 
Development reported the creation of 19,500 councils (Ultimas Noticias 2007).  
This rejuvenation of the neighbourhood movement from the 1980s and 1990s was 
also accompanied by rhetoric that set out a new system for the “communal state”, 
that he said would give a new generation of Bolivarian citizens” increased control 
over their communities (Spanakos 2008: 42). 
In Pueblo Nuevo, the community divided into four catchment areas to prepare for 
council elections, corresponding to the main streets in the barrio. Running central 
and parallel to the Albarregas River, the Communal Council Calle Principal contains 
the CEDECOL building, the main street and most of the bodegas in the community. 
La Cuesta, to the East, includes the bakery and the steep road out of the barrio 
towards the Ambulatorio Venezuela and would be where I would live with the 
Angel-Quintero family during my fieldwork in 2013 and 2014. To the North West, 
Las Casitas includes the houses bordering the undeveloped area and leading to Las 
Americas Avenue, while El Campito to the south included the area beneath the 
Campo Elias Bridge. A single council was planned for Simon Bolivar, to the North 
East.  
With the exception of the council at Calle Principal (discussion to follow in Chapter 
Six), these new councils completed elections and began activities. At La Cuesta, 
these were reported to include funding repairs to local houses and contributing to 
a new entrance at the South-East edge of the barrio, while in El Campito the council 
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were said to have achieved additional funding to improve the local sports facilities 
(Interview w TR, 30.04.14, PN). Another key function for these councils was the 
distribution of basic white goods to homes in the community at rates subsidised by 
the government. The scheme - known locally as La Linea Blanca – included the sale 
of refrigerators, washing machines, boilers and ovens to homes without them.  
The role of these councils would be short lived in Pueblo Nuevo. By the time 
fieldwork commenced in 2013, Councils in Las Casitas and El Campito were 
reported to be inactive, while the Council in La Cuesta was described as being “in 
elections” by one local vocero, Nico Huero (Interview w NH, 30.04.14, PN). These 
elections, however had not yet been advertised in the community, and the 
necessary residents’ census had not been undertaken. This short period of activity 
was criticised by residents some who accused the spokesmen of stealing funds for 
their own families. One resident in the La Cuesta said that people locally believed 
that only friends and family of the spokesmen had benefitted from the money the 
council had received, commmenting that “A lot of families could have eaten here 
for the cost of the work that they had done’” (interview w TB, 14.5.13, PN). Judging 
the specific achievements of these inactive councils is particularly difficult in 
Pueblo Nuevo, due to the fact that many community members many of whom said 
that they did not understand procedures for the council or know about their 
activities. One particular example of the difficulty in assessing these councils was 
the project to improve the South-Eastern entrance. In this case, I uncovered at least 
four different versions that attributed the works to different groups and funding 
sources. 
While Pueblo Nuevo is just one example of the limited effectiveness of the council 
system, a considerable literature had grown up that seeks to assess the role that 
these institutions might have played in fulfilling Chávez’s visions both of 
Participatory Democracy, and of a nation of participating revolutionary citizens 
(Lerner 2007; Araujo 2010; Gill 2012; Wilde 2014; 2016). Similarities between the 
frustrations with the council system and those that arose around the historical 
barrio institutions – the Juntas, comités, cultural centres and neighbourhood 
organisations – will be discussed in Chapter Six. 
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3. Living with new barrio identities: polarising narratives and the call 
for political loyalty, 2013-2014 
By the time I first arrived in Venezuela in December 2012, Chávez was in hospital 
in Cuba battling cancer. After winning a new Presidential term in November 2012, 
Chávez was absent for his inauguration in January 2013, leading to questions about 
his ability to hold office. As they had in response to the coup attempt of 2004, 
Chávez’s supporters took to the streets in their hundreds of thousands to listen to 
speeches by Evo Morales, leading Chavistas and Vice President Nicolas Maduro 
who took Chávez’s place on the stage set up in front of Miraflores Palace. 
I attended the rally with a friend and former student leader, Roque Ferrandíz, who 
somewhat indulgently agreed to keep me company, grumbling about the exuberant 
Chavistas around us. Oscar had talked at length about his initial enthusiasm for 
Chavismo and his eventual disillusionment with the Chavista project. His 
frustrations came from his personal experience of struggling with public 
authorities as one of the representatives of the student body. Beyond this, Oscar 
felt frustrated by the political narratives that he thought held no place for him. As 
a student on a low income, living with an aunt in a modest downtown apartment, 
Oscar seemed caught between the two warring sides from the Bolivarian public 
narrative. On the one hand, Oscar was not a part of the urban poor, didn’t live in a 
barrio community and had been regularly robbed by malandros in the centre of 
Caracas. On the other hand, Oscar was not wealthy, held broadly left wing views, 
and found that some wealthier middle class Venezuelans saw his mixed heritage as 
a sign that he was from a different class. Oscar’s difficulty in positioning himself 
with relation to the Bolivarian narrative was an early indication of the kinds of 
tensions that I would encounter when I moved to Pueblo Nuevo, some six months 
later.  
By March 2013, two months on, Nicolas Maduro would again take centre stage. 
Those same Caracas streets were lined with people once again - this time with 
mourners queueing for days to visit Chávez’s body as he lay in state following his 
death from cancer. These debates would be conducted in somewhat essentialist 
terms, as commentators sought to neatly sum up the complexity of Chávez’s legacy 
102 
 
for the Venezuelan people, among them the residents of barrios like Pueblo Nuevo 
and disillusioned ex-Chavistas like Oscar. 
“We are not with el proceso” 
Arriving in Pueblo Nuevo on my return to Venezuela in July 2013, my host family 
gave me an immediate opportunity to talk to people who felt that they did not fit 
with the Bolivarian public narrative. Jose-Luís and Marleny Angulo Quintero are 
residents of Pueblo Nuevo and identify themselves as being “opositors” (interviews 
w MA, 19.04.14, PN; and JA, 19.04.14, PN). Marleny was born in the community and 
has raised a family there, despite the draw of leaving the barrio. She and her 
husband, Jose-Luís had married and decided to stay close to Marleny’s family and 
their community. They have lived together in the barrio for more than thirty years 
and have raised a daughter and two sons. Jose-Luís works for the postal service, 
sorting parcels, often working twelve hour days by picking up any over-time that 
he can. They share their house with their oldest daughter, her husband and their 
two children. As a household they make ice cream and pastries to sell at the front 
gate of their house, and spend evenings knitting hats and scarves to sell on a 
friend’s market stall. They eat at home and save money to visit their two sons who 
have since left the community - due in large part to fears of violent crime in the 
neighbourhood (interview w Marco, 21.9.13, PN). 
Both Marleny and Jose-Luís talked about the feeling of hope they had around 
Chávez’s first election, but say that the experience of his government has been “the 
opposite.” They both said that they felt “excluded” from the processes of 
participation in the barrio, in particular from their local Communal Council. They 
also talked about examples where they felt that they had been discriminated 
against, including the refusal of a pre-school place for their granddaughter and the 
denial of subsidised white goods as part of the government initiative known locally 
simply as la linea blanca. In the second case, they were told that a census had been 
completed that showed who was eligible, a census that they said had never arrived. 
I later asked the vocero about the process for claiming subsidised goods and was 
told that no census had been necessary:  
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“No, we don’t go to their houses. In reality, one knows the needs of 
every one, you understand? One knows the type of life that a person is 
living… I spent all my life here.” (Interview w NH, 30.04.14, PN). 
Marleny and Jose-Luís attributed this perceived discrimination to the fact that they 
are known to be “against the government.” Jose-Luís says: 
“We don’t know them. They have never come to the house… They think 
that we have a lot of money. We feel excluded from their group. They 
did this because we’re not with the process… It’s because we don’t play 
with the party from the left. They have this bad custom here that 
anyone not with the party gets frozen out.”  
As with Oscar, Jose-Luís and Marleny feel that they are excluded due to 
assumptions about their wealth and their politics, but also due to a certain sense of 
separateness from Pueblo Nuevo as a community. Both Marleny and Jose-Luís are 
among the more openly fearful residents that I come across in Pueblo Nuevo, even 
preferring not to walk up the street to the CEDECOL building.  In general they do 
not engage in community events, and their social group is largely family-based. 
Although they are working class and live in a barrio, the family are relatively 
wealthy for Pueblo Nuevo. Benefitting from Jose-Luís’s stable employment and 
their additional economic activities, they have a car and do not live in over-crowded 
conditions like many other families. Since the rise of Chavismo, their identities and 
sense of well-being are formed in the context of the Bolivarian discourse of class-
conflict that places them firmly with the bourgeoisie.  
It is likely that the exclusion felt by non-Chavista barrio residents like Marleny and 
Jose-Luís was not helped by the limited success and accessibility of the Communal 
Councils. Marleny and Jose felt that their application for subsidised goods was 
prejudiced by their political affiliation, and that they would not be welcome in 
meetings, even preferring to ask me to approach their local council spokesmen in 
their place. They also attributed the refusal to give their granddaughter a place at a 
local school to their politics, and had a much more negative view of barrio services 
like MERCAL and Barrio Adentro, both of which they refused to use.  
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As Chavismo continues in the deepening political crisis since Chávez death and the 
country’s economic collapse, it is likely that the sense of exclusion felt by barrio 
residents like Marleny and Jose-Luís is feeding into growing public discontent. 
Participatory democracy for some 
If Marleny and Jose-Luís feel “frozen out” from el proceso - the Bolivarian process - 
this connects with inconsistent notions about who the Bolivarian Revolution is for. 
In the Chavista public discourse, a constrained notion of constituency for 
Bolivarianism is built around the use and interpretation of the notion of “the 
people”. Hugo Chávez’s frequent references to el pueblo and the use of the term by 
his party and their supporters are an important part of the public narrative of 
Bolivarianism. In 2002, Chávez explained how: 
“Back in ’93 we were saying that the people were the fuel for the 
machinery of history. We also said that to have a people, from the 
sociological, socio-political perspective, it isn’t enough to have twenty 
or forty million people in a certain area. To have a people there must 
be a common sense of identity. A historian once talked about drinking 
from the collective fountain, or having a project in common, a common 
dream; to have a common thread that unites the great majority of 
citizens in that area.  
For a long time the Venezuelan people did not have a consciousness, 
they were divided, they did not have a common project; they were a 
people without hope, without direction. More than being a people, 
were a collection of human beings, but then, as a result of the historical 
process that our country has undergone over the last few decades, a 
people has been formed. We are talking about awakening a giant. 
Now, that awakening was not enough. It was crucial that the people 
organize themselves; it was crucial that the unprecedented popular 
force be unified and strengthened so instead of moving forwards along 
thousands of individual paths, it found a common direction. We needed 
to give the people direction so that they could increase their level of 
organisation, ideology, and capacity for combat. At that time we had a 
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national leadership that had come together in prison, but we did not 
want it to become an extreme hierarchy where a few of us decided 
everything, without paying attention to anyone else. We sought out 
organising models to convert the popular movement into a bottom-up 
avalanche.” (in Harnecker 2003: 157-158) 
Here, Chávez talks about ‘el pueblo’ as a fuel, as a shared identity and common 
goals, as a majority, and as a group of people who are united behind a common 
direction. He marks a clear break from the interpretation of the term as simply 
meaning a territorial population, emphasising a common social experience and 
ambitions for increased unity via a common project. In talking about a people being 
‘formed’, he also implies a temporal quality: that a people can change, develop and 
unite. Chávez talks about the people in two fundamental senses: one as a numerical 
‘majority’ who share latent interests and identity but are divided, and one as an 
organised force for social change.15  
In his book We Created Chávez, Ciccariello-Maher (2013: 8) reflects on the use of 
the Spanish el pueblo to designate the population of a specific territory, in the first 
instance, or as meaning “the common and the poor” in the second.  Ciccariello-
Maher comments (ibid) that the term has been “…taken up as a banner by precisely 
those same ‘common and poor’ whilst being deployed simultaneously by 
governments, populist and non-populist alike, in an effort to maintain the status 
quo.” He notes, after Dussel, that the idea of ‘the people’ itself is “an instance of 
struggle”, a category “of rupture” where the oppressed within the prevailing 
political order seek to transform it. For both, it is fundamentally about ‘fracture’; a 
moment where “…a victimised part of a system speaks for and tries to radically 
transform the whole.” Ciccariello-Maher and Dussel make a useful point about the 
                                                          
15 It is clear from elsewhere that Chávez did not originally see ‘el pueblo’ as simply referring 
to his supporters. He describes the survey of 100,000 people undertaken by the 
Revolutionary Bolivarian Movement (MBR) between 1996 and 1997 to find out if ‘the 
people’ supported his candidacy for President (Chávez sin Harnecker 2003: 43-44). During 
this process the MBR “sought to integrate people who were not from the movement in order 
to maintain objectivity”. Of the results - where seventy percent supported his candidacy and 
fifty seven percent said they would vote for him - Chávez said “that result was totally clear: 
the people wanted me to run for president”. In this case, it was the majority opinion among 
a group of supporters and non-supporters that is taken as the ‘will’ of the people. Here what 
mattered for Chávez, was having wider appeal. 
106 
 
importance of the term with reference both to Venezuela to Latin America more 
broadly. For all their talk of ‘rupture’, however, their interpretations may be too 
quick in accepting a stable meaning. These definitions follow Chávez in presenting 
‘the oppressed’ as an identifiable, unified fraction within a whole population. Here 
‘the people’ are agents of change with a shared experience of oppression and a 
“common identity” (ibid).  
This common identity is not felt by opositors like Marleny and Jose- Luis, and since 
Chávez’s death, seems to be reflected less at the polling stations. Even with Chávez’s 
clear endorsement of Maduro as his successor, Maduro’s victory in the Presidential 
elections of April 2013 was won with a majority of 1.7%, a significant drop from 
the 10.8% margin with which Chávez won only six months earlier. Maduro’s result, 
coming so soon after the electoral victory of 2013, underlines the importance of the 
personality of Chávez for electoral success. Since the election, this trend of 
declining approval has continued.16  
The shift in votes and attitudes tells us something about the instability of Chavista 
and opositor political identities. The existence of swing voters undermines the 
Chavista narrative that describes an “irreconcilable political bipolarity” written 
around class lines (Uzcategui 2010: 1). By undermining the idea that politics and 
class are inextricably linked in Venezuela, these results also challenge the Chavista 
claim to claim to represent the entirety of el pueblo. In this context, Maduro 
increasingly calls of lealtad – “loyalty” – from supporters. 
During fieldwork, this call for loyalty was heeded in different ways by different 
people in Mérida. Among the city-level collective I joined, the Frente de Vanguardia 
de Hugo Chávez, criticism of the PSUV was mixed with a fierce desire to defend the 
legacy of Chávez against the “destabilisation” attempts by what they saw as the US-
backed bourgeoisie protesting in the city’s streets in the spring of 2014. For these 
committed socialists, often seen marching with their militant green t-shirts and the 
occasional Che Guevara beret, the failures of the ruling party are a small setback on 
the path towards deepened social transformation. In their language and in their 
                                                          
16 Surveys by Venezuelan consultancy firms Hinterlaces, Consultores 21 and Datanalisis 
show that between two thirds and fourth fifths of the public feel the country is “heading in 
a bad direction”. This sentiment, they report, is reflected among the lowest income groups 
(Robertson, August 5th, 2014). 
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attempts to encourage support among the city’s barrios, they embody the 
combative, revolutionary identities produced during the rise of Chavismo. In 
Pueblo Nuevo, the teaching staff at Fundación Cayapa and the residents who 
participate in Barrio Adentro and MERCAL talked much less often about 
Venezuela’s contemporary economic and political crisis. These people seemed to 
be occupied with the day-to-day work of improving the community by fulfilling 
some the citizens’ rights established over the last sixteen years of the Bolivarian 
Revolution. In each case, however, participating members represent a small 
proportion of the wider community, while the example of Marleny and Jose-Luís 
shows the limits both to the appeal of Chavismo and to the ability of these 
politicised representations to reflect the different experiences and aims of different 
sections of the Venezuelan public. 
4. Conclusion: improved patronage and redeemed identities for some 
This chapter has explained the contemporary institutional landscape in Pueblo 
Nuevo in the context of changing terms of patronage with the Venezuelan State and 
new representations of the urban poor. The pro-poor politics of the new Chávez era 
responded to the increased importance of barrio populations following the 
Caracazo riots, delivering improvements to education, healthcare and basic 
services. Alongside these improved terms of patronage, the Bolivarian Revolution 
also brought new opportunities for political participation and offered redeemed 
social identities with a shift from discourses of criminality to the promise of a role 
at the centre of social transformation. The particular politicisation of these services 
and identities, however, also meant that some people in Pueblo Nuevo felt excluded 
from the opportunities offered by Chavismo, where a singular conception of the 
public good arguably sets limits to the sorts of emancipation on offer.  
The history of organising and services in Pueblo Nuevo also provides us with a 
sense of the continuity in the community’s relationship with the rest of Mérida. 
While access to healthcare and basic goods have improved in the barrio due to new 
Chavista initiatives, none of the groups and institutions described here address the 
wider social exclusion of the community. Although the insulation of Pueblo Nuevo 
is not total, the feeling of public ownership over the political process which Chávez 
fostered with the 1999 constitution, mass-movement, and class-based rhetoric, 
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have not translated into greater social inclusion for Pueblo Nuevo’s residents. Many 
families continue to have informal employment, levels of high-school completion 
remain low, and the near-total absence of the police all set the barrio apart from 
higher-income communities in the city.  
This chapter has begun to show important continuities in the relationship between 
people and government in Pueblo Nuevo - in partisan community institutions, 
patronage politics and in certain representations of barrio populations. This 
discussion of the Chávez era supports the analytical work of the thesis by providing 
the background to some of the tensions uncovered during fieldwork, when these 
areas of continuity contributed of a deepening political crisis in Venezuela. 
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4. Democracy, community and the 
Bolivarian Narrative: three literatures 
for explaining politics in Pueblo Nuevo 
 
 
Our headlights catch on rubble strewn across the road and the four-by-four I’m 
riding in screeches to a halt. The highway is blocked by large chunks of concrete 
hewn from the roadside. From the shadows step masked gunmen, their eyes 
narrowed over the scarves that hide their features. Brandishing pistols, they spread 
out to surround us. They crowd nearer and aim their weapons into the car. Our 
driver starts shouting.  We all have our hands up near the roof of the car. The other 
passengers’ eyes widen with panic. 
“Él vive allí! - He lives here!” 
Jonathan opens the passenger door, arms still raised. The pistols track him as he 
stumbles reluctantly out of the car. Gone from his face is the smile that had grown 
all day, as he serenaded Andry and Carlos and they danced the tango up and down 
Pueblo Nuevo’s main street. Jonathan is a young Chavista activist. He is on the other 
side, in theory, from the young men and women surrounding us. Together we have 
spent the day at a peace event in Pueblo Nuevo, playing dominos with the residents 
and putting on street theatre and dance. Jonathan also lives in the flats that are part 
of the occupied area of Mérida and, fortunately, it seems he is known to the gunmen. 
If they know his politics, I think, this ends badly. 
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Suddenly satisfied, the guarimberos – the road blockers - wave us on. Our tyres 
scrabble on the debris as we pull a hasty U-turn and speed off into the night. Our 
driver, Antonio, wonders aloud what would have happened if the radio had still 
been playing the Chavista songs we had listened to for the whole journey. As I peer 
through the rear window, Jonathan hunches his shoulders and slinks sheepishly 
into the darkness, flanked by the militia. 
I wake the next morning to a cock crowing somewhere. Its call is cut short by a 
curse and what sounds like a thrown shoe. As I roll out of bed, Marleny is already 
selling ice-cream at our front gate. Business is booming these days. Since Las 
Americas Avenue has been blocked by the guarimba road blocks, a long line of 
commuter traffic winds down into the barrio every morning. Where the streets 
narrow to single-file, some of the more entrepreneurial kids from the 
neighbourhood have begun implementing an informal toll. They dodge moto-taxis 
to lean into cars windows, jumping down with fists full of Bolivares, then signalling 
the traffic round the blind, single-file corner at the foot of La Cuesta. The drivers – 
nervous eyes hidden by sunglasses - all pay up, perhaps thinking it is better to deal 
with these skinny kids than with their older brothers. After rush hour the kids go 
home, full of ice cream after their morning’s work. 
I squeeze past Marleny, and knock on a neighbouring door. Gabriel’s head appears 
rom inside and beams at me through the iron bars on the window. He invites me 
inside for coffee we continue our interview from the day before.  Gabriel is eighteen 
years old. He has just finished high-school and has lived in the barrio all his life. He 
is also one of the protesters who has joined the armed barricades on Las Americas 
Avenue, described above.  
Over the year that I knew Gabriel and his family, I often thought about them as an 
example that didn’t fit with the narrative of class warfare that casts barrio residents 
as unquestioning supporters of the Chavista project. I knew that Gabriel’s politics 
did not match those of the Chavista groups that I participated with, and Gabriel 
knew that I was part of those groups. What surprised me during our interview, 
however, was his positive reflections on Hugo Chávez:  
“Yes, they did many things! The government of Chávez, of course they 
did. When they arrived and got their mandate, they did the most 
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fundamental things. They animated all of the poor people. Because 
they emphasised poor people above all else. People in the community 
say Chávez was the President who left his palace and went to the 
streets. Poor with poor, house by house. And he won the love of the 
people, the poor more than anyone.” (interview w GM, 09.04.14, PN) 
At the time of this conversation with Gabriel, coming a few weeks into my second 
fieldwork period, I saw his example as unusual. First, he was a barrio resident 
taking part in the protests of the so-called “parasitic bourgeoisie”. Second, Gabriel 
was someone who had joined up with the violent anti-government protests, and 
yet articulately reproduced the Bolivarian narrative about how Chávez had 
“awoken” the Venezuelan poor. In seeing these tensions as unusual, however, I was 
succumbing in part to the political categories reproduced in Chavista discourses 
and folk wisdom about Venezuelan political culture. With time, I would realise that 
– far from being unusual – Gabriel was just one more person making their way 
through the rich ideological landscape of Pueblo Nuevo. The complicated nature of 
Gabriel’s position is difficult to find in the schematic literature on Chávez’s 
Venezuela, where many writers seek national-level generalised “answers” to what 
is happening there.  
Different kinds of information are needed to explain examples like those of Gabriel 
and his neighbours in Pueblo Nuevo – to make sense of the people and events that 
do not fit with simplified notions about class politics. Some of the precedents for 
this analytical work are contained in the different bodies of literature that have 
developed around barrio politics and around Bolivarianism. This scholarship also 
forms part of the wider regional literature that seeks to explain and conceptualise 
the relationship between government and people in Latin America. 
Aims and structure of the chapter 
Following the introduction of barrio Pueblo Nuevo and its history in the thesis so 
far, this chapter outlines the three main bodies of literature that are used 
throughout the rest of the thesis to make sense of the events and attitudes that 
make up the political landscape in and around Pueblo Nuevo today. I describe the 
ways that information from these different bodies of literature are used to support 
the analysis in the remainder of the thesis. This scholarship does this by providing 
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reference points for thinking about the different kinds of information collected in 
interviews and during observations of community participation, and by connecting 
with the history of Pueblo Nuevo as described in the thesis so far. I show how these 
different areas of literature in turn connect with different parts of the writing on 
populism, democracy and citizenship in Latin America. 
The chapter begins by discussing the body of research that deconstructs the 
populist symbolism and politics of Bolivarianism and the “cult” of Hugo Chávez 
(Harnecker 2005: 79). This literature examines government and media 
representations as a means of understanding political support. There is less work, 
however, that explores how these political ideas are reproduced and deployed day-
to-day by people in Venezuelan communities. I explain how analyses of the 
Bolivarian public narrative will be used in the thesis to build a nuanced 
understanding of the intellectual landscape in Pueblo Nuevo, where this discourse 
forms part of the political culture and where notions of citizenship, government 
and people arose in conversation and at community meetings.  
The chapter continues by reviewing the body of literature that considers the 
evolution of the institutions and processes of democracy in Venezuela – including 
new forms of community organisations. I show how the evolution of national 
processes and institutions connects with debates about populism and democracy 
in Latin America, and discuss the suitability of liberal-democratic principles for 
explaining the relationship between people and government in Venezuela. The 
third part of the chapter discusses the community-level studies that explore 
experiences of life, politics and community participation in Venezuela’s barrios. 
This literature is mainly concerned with the day-to-day experiences of activists and 
community organisations, and the “everyday wars of position” (Fernandes 2010: 
23-24) of barrio residents. I describe how these studies will be used in the thesis to 
provide precedents for using different kinds of evidence from Pueblo Nuevo.  
The chapter concludes by connecting these bodies of literature to make sense of 
political behaviours and attitudes like Gabriel’s to demonstrate how these 
precedents can inform the analytical work of this thesis. I suggest that there is a 
need for more research that connects writing about the Bolivarian public narrative, 
institutional changes and community-level experiences to make sense of the 
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complexities of political experiences from barrios like Pueblo Nuevo. I also argue 
that, in each approach, those studies which provide historical context are especially 
useful for explaining the particular political moment considered in this thesis. 
1. Chávez, Chavistas and opositors: using literature on the Bolivarian 
public narrative to understand the intellectual landscape in Pueblo 
Nuevo 
From Hugo Chávez’s election in 1998, a body of literature has grown that examines 
his public discourse and ideology and unpacks “the ‘Bolivarian’ narrative” 
(Emerson 2011: 97). This writing is useful because it shows how some important 
formulations of the folk concepts around the urban poor and the role of 
government are being reproduced and give us a language to talk about the 
intellectual landscape in and around Pueblo Nuevo. It is this narrative that talks 
about the populations of communities like Pueblo Nuevo, setting them against the 
Venezuelan oligarchs and middle classes and drawing on and feeding into existing 
folk concepts about the capacity and role of the urban poor. The analysis done by 
these scholars therefore helps us to see the formulations of politics that Mérida’s 
anti-government protesters feel excluded from, the pro-Chávez discourse that 
Gabriel repeats, and the accepted political story of Chavista barrio dwellers that his 
personal example clashes with. 
This scholarship in turn connects with the wider scholarship on populism and neo-
populism in Latin America, where scholars have paid particular attention to the 
ways that governments in the twentieth century targeted their campaigns to “the 
atomised poor” (Boas 2005). For Roberts (2000: 127), the defining feature of 
populist governments on both the left and the right in Latin America has been “the 
political mobilisation of mass constituencies by personalistic leaders who 
challenge established elites”. This literature has developed to include neo-populist 
governments that seek to build on the mobilisation of working classes “to win mass 
support primarily from unorganized people in the informal sector, while (…) 
attacking the “political class.” (Weyland 1996). For Knight (1996), this is about “a 
particular political style, characteristically involving a proclaimed rapport with ‘the 
people”. Analysis of the Bolivarian public narrative continues this analysis.   
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Mission and missionaries: analyses of Chavista discourse 
Much of the research in this area is written with the intention of “…understanding 
Chávez's hold on power” (Zuquete 2008:93). At first, following Chávez’s election in 
1998 which ended fifty years of alternating between COPEI and AD, this writing 
was concerned with explaining Chávez’s appeal among the voter base and the 
growth of the Chavista mass-movement. As Chávez continued to win elections and 
moved towards pro-poor policies and the rhetoric of regional socialism, the 
continued electoral phenomenon of Chavismo drew attention. A large part of this 
work is concerned with representations of Hugo Chávez himself. David Smilde 
(2004), Pablo Zuquete (2008) and Javier Garcia (2008) all emphasise the religious 
symbolism in Chávez’s discourse. This symbolism is seen as being constructed 
through behaviours as well as texts, with researchers paying attention to Chávez’s 
dress, mannerisms and his construction of a public persona via his weekly Alo 
Presidente television show.1 
As well as discussing representations of Chávez, this scholarship also unpacks 
representations of the political process of Venezuela’s Bolivarian political project. 
Alberto Garrido's (2000) La historia secreta de la Revolucion Bolivariana 
emphasises the design of Bolivarianism using nationalist, militaristic, anti-
oligarchic, and populist ideas drawn from Simon Bolivar, Simon Rodriguez, and 
Ezequiel Zamora as a means of appealing to progressive elements in the armed 
forces. Emerson (2011) paints one of the fullest pictures of what he calls the 
“’Bolivarian’ narrative” and particular its reformulation of identity politics. His 
2011 article A Bolivarian People: Identity politics in Hugo Chávez’s Venezuela 
highlights many of the discursive constructions – of the folk concepts - that were 
uncovered during fieldwork for this thesis. Of particular relevance for my thesis 
(see Chapter Six) is Emerson’s discussion of the segregation of the Venezuelan 
population into distinct and antagonistic groupings in Chavista representations. 
This representation of antagonistic social groupings is also noted by Vivas (1999 in 
                                                          
1 The approach of documenting Chávez’s “verbal and non-verbal discourses” (Zuquete 
2008:92), often begins with the content of his speeches (ibid, Smilde 2004; Ochs 2014) and 
the attached symbolism of his personality and behaviours. This extends in some cases to 
the redeployment of historical discourse like the national anthem (Emerson 2011, see also 
Ciccariello-Maher 2013), or to analysis of new political slogans (e.g. Cameron and Major 
2001: 262). 
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Cameron and Major 2001), Roberts (2012: 136) and Zuquete (2008: 92) who 
describes Chávez’s “missionary politics” as: 
“…a characteristic form of political religion that has at its centre a 
charismatic leader who leads a chosen people gathered into a moral 
community struggling against all-powerful and conspiratorial 
enemies, and engaged in a mission toward redemption and salvation.”  
Here, Zuquete identifies what he calls the discursive “frames” of Bolivarianism as a 
means of constructing a communicable explanation of Venezuelan politics and a 
“social religion” of Bolivarianism. For this thesis, unpacking these representations 
helps to inform analysis of political attitudes in and around Pueblo Nuevo, where 
examples like Gabriel show a limitation to the political polarisation that is accepted 
in some of the more institutional literature (e.g. Ellner 2011).  
These writers also help to understand the Bolivarian reformulations of theories of 
social emancipation introduced in Chapter One. Within the “agonistic” Chavista 
narrative of poor vs. rich, Spanakos (2008: 527) looks at Chávez’s construction of 
his followers, including via a new notion of “Bolivarian citizenship” and the 
discourse around barrio revolucionarios. Specifically, Spanakos identifies three key 
characteristics for citizenship arising from the Bolivarian narrative: i) active 
engagement in politics, ii) inclusion in the market and iii) production and solidarity 
between groups. In Chavista rhetoric, then, the Venezuelan puiblic – including 
those in barrios like Pueblo Nuevo – have an invitation to enage directly in politics 
as part of processes of radical polticial, social and economic processes of change.   
This analysis of the Bolivarian discourse around citizenship separates Spanakos 
from those writers that accept a Bolivarian notion of citizenship as an abstract ideal 
(e.g. García-Guadilla and Pilar 2010). His writing connects the public discourse of 
the government with local forms of participation by considering how the notion 
opens up and constrains possibilities for Venezuelans. He concludes that “in 
shaping not only what is discussed but how it is discussed, Chávez has changed the 
way that citizens interact with and dissect a concept of politics…” (Spanakos 2008: 
527). 
In exploring the social connotations of meaning in this way - especially with 
relation to community participation – Smilde’s (2004) work is also useful for 
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beginning to think about the tensions within Bolivarian politics. If Chávez is 
represented as messiah and protector, then representing the people as empowered 
agents of change – as Bolivarian citizens – arguably suggests some conflict between 
notions of identity and governance. This tension is discussed in practical terms in 
Uzcategui’s Revolution as Spectacle, where the empowering rhetoric of 
Bolivarianism is contrasted with its public record in government. This study 
connects in particular with the arguments made in chapters six, seven and eight in 
this thesis, where the limits to participatory politics are shown in the processes for 
the administration and control of community organisations. Tracing these tensions 
from the pre-Chávez era is part of the main contribution of this study. 
This scholarship also provides useful material for continuing the analysis of 
Chavista talk and politics in and around Pueblo Nuevo. In Marta Harnecker’s book 
of interviews with Chávez, she asks the late President directly about the “cult of 
Chávez” (Harnecker 2005: 79) and challenges him to explain certain statements 
and parts of his political narrative. As Chávez responds and clarifies certain 
elements of his ideology, he builds notions of people, party and state, fitted into a 
temporal, narrative account of his rise to power, his record in government and his 
future goals. An earlier related work is Mufioz’s 1999 book Habla El Comandante, 
based on interviews with Chávez in the years leading up to his election in 1998. 
Mufioz (1999: 89-97) attempts a closer analysis than Harnecker, including 
highlighting the absence of any conception of citizenship in Chávez’s ideology at 
that time. 
Only a few studies make more progress in connecting government discourses to 
the local – an aim of this thesis. Garcia (2014) discusses the reproduction of 
symbols in street graffiti, while both Smilde (2004) and Spanakos (2008) use the 
content of Chávez’s speeches as a reference point for their studies with barrio 
residents. These studies that connect Bolivarian of discourses to grassroots 
accounts provide important precedents for studying the reproduction of narratives 
and identities in Pueblo Nuevo. Smilde also draws on interviews with evangelical 
Christians, seeking particularly to understand how they bridge the potential 
incompatibility between Chávez’s violent past and their faith. This evidence begins 
to show that how Chavistas deploy Bolivarian notions at different times, correlating 
them with other ideas as part of broad and intersecting sets of folk concepts. 
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Connecting analyses of Bolivarianism with the day-to-day 
This scholarship also shows us something of the challenge of writing and thinking 
about Bolivarianism. Like the literature on communities and institutions, much of 
this literature on the Bolivarian narrative seems to accept the exceptionalism of 
Chavismo. In seeking to explain what is seen as the curiosity of Chávez’s electoral 
success, there is a tacit acceptance that some kind of systemic change has taken 
place in Venezuela. The idea that Bolivarian sensationalised rhetoric has been used 
to somehow sell a radical political alternative to a naïve population also connects 
with some of the marginality thinking about the urban poor discussed in Chapter 
One. In contrast, those scholars that connect components of the narrative to 
previous political sentiments drawn on by past governments are able to show 
continuities in national political discourses (see especially Emerson 2011 and 
Garrido 2000). 
Part of this emphasis on Bolivarian discourses seems to assume the power of these 
texts over individual behaviours on a mass scale.  Accordingly, there is a neglect of 
the concrete local factors behind voting that may have little to do with Chávez’s 
rhetoric. Added to this, there is a failure to connect to non-voting behaviours, 
including community participation. This focus on voting also means that there is no 
examination of the extent to which elements of this Bolivarian narrative exist in the 
language of people who identify as members of the opposition - especially values 
such as democracy, nationalism, and grassroots empowerment that pre-date 
Chávez. What is still to be drawn out in much of this literature is an examination of 
non-voting behaviours, including how these narrative elements are differently 
altered and deployed locally. In this thesis, I ask how these ideas are used not to 
sell a different and unusual kind of politics, but to explain and mask continuity.2  
                                                          
2 An additional but related shortcoming of this literature is the extent to which this 
literature focuses on Hugo Chávez both as a political symbol and as master story-teller.  The 
political representations of different groups of Venezuelan people – for example barrio 
populations - has received little attention. In the second sense, the focus on Chávez as 
producer of discourse neglects the other personalities and influences within the broad, 
mass-movement of Bolivarianism (one exception is Garrido 2000). Focusing to this extent 
on “Chávez’s notion of citizenship” (Spanakos 2008), for example, seems to buy into a 
strategic over-simplification of Venezuelan politics. 
118 
 
Ironically, the representation of Bolivarianism is a systemic political alternative, 
the over-emphasis on the personality of Chávez, and the neglect of local-level 
differences are all features of the Chavista discourse itself. This work could be built 
on, therefore, by giving more attention to the local reformulation, deployment and 
functions of these narratives. Given that the electoral phenomenon of Chavismo is 
made up of public (i.e. voter) behaviours, a purely discursive approach can only 
infer a connection between these behaviours and political rhetoric. An expanded 
conception of discourse as something that not is formed of and constituted by 
behaviours, processes and institutions (see Laclau 2005: 68) may also offer a fuller 
explanation of contemporary Venezuelan political discourses and their results. In 
this respect, this body of literature will benefit from a greater connection both with 
the ethnographic research on grassroots politics in Venezuela. 
The body of literature around the Bolivarian narrative is an important foundation 
for my research because this narrative forms part of the political culture and 
discursive context for barrio Pueblo Nuevo. People used the language of Chavismo 
throughout fieldwork, during interviews, in conversation and at community 
meetings. The reproduction of these discourses and their specific deployment and 
alteration is an important focus. I will argue during the thesis that both participants 
and non-participants work within and around these new conceptions of 
citizenship, and different ideas about the urban poor. Analysis of the Bolivarian 
narrative is useful for analysis of Pueblo Nuevo because it is an identifiable set of 
ideas, which can be assumed to be familiar to all community members, and that - 
via this literature - have well-mapped out historical antecedents. For an outsider, 
part of the challenge is separating ‘Chavista talk’ from the connected sentiments of 
nationalism, indigenousness and the principles of fairness and democracy. This is 
possible in part through the use of some of these notions by non-Chavistas, 
including from the interview with Gabriel.3 
                                                          
 
 
3 Another useful contribution of this literature for my thesis is the fact that it brings together 
a set of concepts and their attached theory for explaining the connection of meaning and 
the material. This involves drawing on diverse bodies of literature including work on social 
narratives (for example Connolly in Emerson 2011: 97-98), Durkheim’s theory of a secular 
religion as a means of explaining national identity (in Zuquete 2008: 92) and Laclau’s 
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These analyses of the Bolivarian narrative literature also helps us to connect 
Chávez-era Venezuelan political narratives with those of other Latin American 
populist governments, both past and present. Particular similarities can be 
identified where other populist governments have worked to develop a “‘them-
and-us’ mentality” to divide their populations (Knight 1998). For Doyle (2011), the 
success of these combative narratives is due to varying levels of public trust in the 
traditional political institutions of liberal democracy across the region – meaning 
voters are attracted to candidates who portray themselves as radical “outsiders,” 
crusading against the established political order. These low levels of pubic trust are 
an important characteristic in Latin America, where democracies have often failed 
to establish legal equality for their citizens, and where horizantal accountability has 
often been seen as weak (Tesdesco 2004: 32). This also connects with the use of 
“crisis” by populist Latin American populist governments, as identified by Knight 
(1998), Weyland (1996) and Cammack (2000). It was these elements – the 
divisiveness, the sensationalism, the constant sense of crisis – that seemed to be 
part of a wider fatigue with Chavista politics that characterised Mérida at the 
moment of fieldwork. 
2. Institutions, elections and organising: using the literature around 
different kinds of political participation 
The growing literature on community organising and participatory politics in the 
Chávez era is part of a wider, ongoing debate about the role for civil society actors 
in Latin America. In the immediate pre-Chávez era, examples of participatory 
politics including the residents associations of Cuba (Alfonso and Nunez 1997), the 
participative budgeting of Porto Alegre (Baiocchi 2001) or Costa Rica’s social 
committees (Lara and Molina 1997) among others were seen by some as evidence 
                                                          
(2005: 68) understanding of discourse. The literature on Chávez’s public discourse in 
particular provides a useful set of terminology to choose from, expressing representations 
of meaning variously as rhetoric, frames, notions, narrative, symbolism, myth, culture and 
aesthetics to unpack different functions (see conceptual framework chapter). Among these 
examples, however, those that use specific social concepts to bridge the gap between 
meaning and experience, notably citizenship (Spanakos 2008) and identity (ibid, Emerson 
2011) may offer the best connection with the analytical language of the ethnographies 
considered in section three. 
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of a new, empowering context where the rules and norms of political relations were 
being defined by new actors (Kaufman 1997: 7). Running against this, writers like 
Petras (1997: 13) argued that new, decentralised roles for civil society actors in the 
1990s were part of the “de-neoliberalisation” of Latin America, where narratives of 
participatory politics are designed to “divide classes and pacify smalls groups for a 
limited time”. For Petras, participation and inclusion in some cases supports rather 
than challenges the maintenance of existing power hierarchies, while securing a 
new arena for powerful social groups to exert informal influence and continue 
historical processes of clientelism (see also García-Guadilla and Pilar 2002: 92).  
In the context of this debate, a body of literature concerned with theorising 
institutional and policy changes connected with Bolivarianism has developed 
around the task of finding new ways to explain the relationship between people 
and government under the Bolivarian Revolution. This scholarship includes some 
writers who have described Chávez-era government in Venezuela as a new type of 
democracy – more ‘participatory’, ‘direct’ or ‘protagonistic’ (see Raby 2006; Ellner 
2009, 2011; Buxton 2011). This scholarship includes the discussion of changes to 
public services and institutions for participatory politics, including the Communal 
Council system introduced in the previous chapter. This literature also includes 
analysis of elections that contributes to our understanding of the Venezuelan 
population’s voting and participation behaviours and for understanding some of 
the policies that anti-government protesters like Gabriel are responding to – and 
especially whether political conditions and local reactions can be said to be 
different to those of the pre-Chávez era.  
Theorising institutional change: new democracy or old populism? 
Many of these political commentaries seek to make sense of Chávez’s record in 
government, including debating to what sorts of changes to the democratic system 
have taken place. Kirk Hawkins locates the Bolivarian system among the complex 
history of populist governments in Latin America. His book (2010a: 193) 
Venezuela’s Chavismo and Populism in Comparative Perspective describes local 
activist associations as suffering from “weak institutionalisation” and “social 
movement-style” organisation. Hawkins (ibid: 193) is also critical of the “direct 
relationship” of local groups with Chávez, as well as identifying “disdain for existing 
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institutions of representative democracy such as parties” and “a high level of 
insularity from other components of civil society”. In his institutional critique, 
Hawkins draws on liberal democratic norms and principles, emphasising the 
potential for the framework to serve either new or relocated interests or to suffer 
from problems of inefficiency and uneven application. 
Hawkins builds on this institutional analysis with a discussion of “who mobilises?” 
(2010b). Here he uses survey data to examine the demographics of participating 
Venezuelans, finding that participants include the poor, women and the less 
educated, but that participation is often by narrow groups of activists and that 
these are disproportionately Chávez supporters. Although this research is useful 
context for understanding trends of participation, Hawkins’ explanations - he 
attributes this trend to “self-screening” by Chavistas – are tentative and would 
benefit from consideration alongside more qualitative data about participant 
motivation.  
The historian Richard Gott – known for his work on guerrilla movements in Latin 
America the 1960s - seeks to describe Chávez’s Bolivarian project in historical and 
regional context. His book In the shadow of the liberator: Hugo Chávez and the 
transformation of Venezuela (2000) considers Chávez in the context of regional 
populism and military regimes (Torrijos in Panama and Juan Velasco Alvarado in 
Peru) and also traces his political development to 19th century Venezuelan figures, 
including Bolivar, and the Venezuelan communist dissidents dating back to the 
1940s. Revisiting the theme in 2005 (and updated in 2011) in Hugo Chávez and the 
Bolivarian Revolution Gott develops a defence of Chávez, engaging with some of the 
media criticisms of Chávez’s political record and the centralisation of power in 
Venezuela. Gott (2008: 479) argues that Venezuelan socialism “has been defined 
more by what it is not than by what it might hope to be”, accepting the “originality” 
of the Chávez government’s programme as an alternative to global capitalism. 
Venezuela-based historian and political scientist Steve Ellner also provides a long-
term commentary of institutional and political change. From his 1988 book tracing 
what would become the roots of Bolivarian socialism “…from guerrilla defeat to 
innovative politics”, to responses to the ideology behind the failed Chávez coup 
(1993), Chávez’s rise to power and throughout the first decade of the Bolivarian 
122 
 
Revolution (2009, 2011), Ellner’s analysis follows the evolution Chavista politics. 
Within this commentary, democracy and participatory institutions and Bolivarian 
policies around popular power are traced from their pre-Chávez antecedents - 
including an assessment of the obstacles to the neighbourhood movement ahead of 
the 1998 election (1999), an evaluation of the Bolivarian “social-based democratic 
model” (2009 and 2011) and a particular focus on the incorporation of labour 
movements. 
Ellner’s assessment of new participatory institutions and their policy framework 
recognises the problems with inefficacy and politicisation of structures like the 
Communal Councils, but identifies an institutional “transformation” in the 
“incorporation of marginalized sectors in the political and economic life of the 
nation” (2009: 4).  Ellner therefore directs much of his writing at addressing the 
populist label attached to the Bolivarian project. Although he accepts the 
government’s failure to develop intermediary institutions, Ellner contests those 
critics writing in what he calls the “simplified framework of those writing in the 
Germani tradition” (Ellner 2011: 447; see also Germani 1962). Instead, Ellner sees 
the Chávez-masses connection as replacing the construction of effective 
intermediary institutions. However, when Ellner (2011: 447) argues that 
Venezuela’s social-based democracy “represents a model that is distinct from both 
really existing socialism and welfare-state politics” due to the number of people 
enrolling in social programmes and mobilising politically, the privileging of poor 
groups over elites, and the levels of political polarisation, he founds his argument 
in what seem like surface level-details, rather than the detail of changes in local 
experiences. 
David Raby’s (2006) book seeks to put the institutional development of the 
Bolivarian Revolution in the context of different regional “anti-capitalist 
alternatives”.  Like Gott and Ellner, Raby traces the origins of Chávez from the 
development of a political movement in the 1990s through the 1998 elections and 
the assembly in 1999 to draft a new national constitution, to the creation of new 
participatory institutions during the 2000s. In identifying a “revolutionary 
transformation” oriented around the principle of popular constituent power, Raby 
identifies a reorientation of party politics to reflect the interests of the poor, and a 
change in the party role from that of monopolising power to simply mobilising for 
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elections (ibid: 186-187). For Raby, constituent power is enshrined through the 
formal incorporation of grassroots institutions, including urban land committees, 
water committees and through the new community-focused health service Barrio 
Adentro. 
While much of Raby’s contribution is in documenting the legal steps taken to 
“empower” the grassroots, his account is also rare in that it is much more accepting 
of the role of strong leadership. Raby sees Chávez’s personal power and continued 
leadership as essential to the development of a culture of collective political 
engagement and the institution-building needed for a more popular democracy. In 
this respect, he predicts the eventual decay of traditional, representative 
institutions of constitutive power. In this prediction, and due to his fieldwork with 
grassroots networks in Venezuela, Raby’s work is also evidence of specific political 
hopes of Chavistas as they are articulated within the movement that he studies.  
Julia Buxton is another writer whose work progresses from criticism of the 
Venezuela’s pre-Chávez “degenerative democracy” (1999), to discussion of the 
development and evolution of the Bolivarian project. Buxton (2011: ix) argues that 
Venezuela’s current government should not be considered as a liberal democracy, 
or via econometric and institutional-focused analyses that do not capture the 
actions of the popular sectors. Instead, she argues, Venezuela’s “state-sponsored 
participatory democracy” (ibid: xii) should be considered in a way that accepts new 
meanings of democracy, citizenship and identity. For her, the connection between 
the studies of community, meaning and institutions offers a means of 
understanding the particular political scenario of Bolivarianism. 
Barry Cannon (2009) also uses the populist label but – like Raby - seeks to 
recapture the phrase from its negative connotations and renovate what he 
describes as a complex and useful concept for understanding Bolivarianism. 
Cannon sets out to examine Chávez’s political project in the context of both 
processes of modernisation and globalisation. Here, Cannon describes populism as 
being not in opposition but in “an intimate relationship with democracy”. 
Explaining voting and participation: a divided society? 
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While much of the literature on both narratives and institutions described above 
also considers Venezuela’s frequent national elections, several dedicated studies 
are worth highlighting. These studies are useful for researching community 
participation in Venezuela because tell us about political attitudes and support - 
both are also considered to have an important connection with other forms of 
democratic participation (Ellner 2009; Gill 2010; Hawkins 2010a, 2010b; Wilde 
2014). 
Daniel Hellinger (2005, 2011) looks at electoral politics at a national scale. He 
theorises about the class polarisation as a means of explaining voter mobilisation, 
identifying the on political and economic conditions that explain Chávez’s electoral 
success. Like Ellner (2003), Hellinger sees urban poor classes as surest supporters 
of Chávez and explains the fall of the pre-Chávez era – known as Puntofijismo - 
through a lens of class conflict. These studies on elections are particularly useful 
for gaining some sense of the scale of supporter trends for Chavismo. Usefully, 
Hellinger’s (2005) work helps to distinguish between the unemployed urban and 
rural poor and the less supportive working classes. 
Some of this work is particularly important for providing the context to begin to 
disrupt elements of the Bolivarian public narrative. One example is Canache 
(2002), who in seeking to explain Chávez’s early success, emphasises the role 
“ambivalent” voters played. This finding, based on national-level survey data, 
challenges the idea that electoral success is evidence of mass public support for 
Chavismo. Empirical detail like this shows the need for a more nuanced 
understanding of political attitudes. Another example is the McCoy and Myers 
(2006) collection, which considers voter behaviours of Venezuela’s different 
political groups, but focuses on how the population is seen to have reacted to public 
policy. Cameron and Major (2001) also provide a useful review of early responses 
to Chávez’s rise to power.  
Commentaries that seek to capture the character of institutional change have the 
challenge of representing a particularly decentralised institutional landscape. Due 
to the proliferation of Venezuela’s new grassroots institutions and the lack of 
detailed national-level data, evidencing statements about their characteristics at a 
national scale is difficult. At times, this can result in unsupported descriptions that 
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do not fit well with the messy detail of local experiences. Gott (2008: 481), for 
example, describes how  
“The jurisdiction of the councils usually covers a recognisable 
geographic unit and might involve perhaps 400 families. Some 20 
people are usually actively involved, of whom a high proportion are 
women. Nearly 20,000 councils had been created all over the country 
by 2007.” 
Here, Gott does not evidence these details of “usual” practice. Evidence from Mérida 
suggests that the registration figures for Communal Councils likely misrepresent 
the numbers of active councils (see Chapter Five and Chapter Six). Added to this, 
participation trends over time may be highly variable in many communities (see, 
for example Gill 2012). Studies like Hawkins’ (2010b) that do attempt a 
quantitative analysis of participation trends, in assessing participation and non-
participation as an either-or binary, do not capture the complexity of behaviours 
and membership at a local level.  
Neither are these studies well-placed to make claims about the impact of new 
participatory institutions. Ellner (2011: 448) claims that “participation in social 
movements and programmes and party activity has affected the lives of a large 
number of underprivileged Venezuelans, but the results have been mixed”. This 
statement – unevidenced in the text and not expanded upon- is an example of how 
this literature fails at times to explain what these mixed results might be like. A 
further characteristic of work at this level is the generalisation of diverse attitudes 
and experiences. Ellner (ibid), for example, consistently treats what he calls “rank 
and file Chavistas” as a homogenous group, attributing them shared beliefs and 
attitudes that are out-of-step with the diversity of attitudes shown in ethnographic 
research (e.g. Wilde 2014). Here Ellner reproduces a tendency of government 
discourses to generalise about “the people” that I will argue in this thesis is a 
discursive strategy both to mobilise support and create the impression of political 
legitimacy. 
For some writers, the acceptance of the exceptionalism of Venezuela’s democracy 
and institutions may be connected to a personal sympathy for elements of the 
Bolivarian ideology (Harnecker 2005, 2009; Raby 2006; Gott 2008; Dominguez 
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2011) – and in some cases a personal connection to President Chávez. A desire to 
promote Bolivarianism can result in a lack of interrogation, for example, of the 
intentions behind institutional changes. Gott (2008: 481) describes how “the 
councils were supposed to be an exercise in decentralisation, the government was 
obliged to establish a ministry in Caracas to oversee their funding and operation”. 
Here, further consideration of the different possible intentions of the government 
is needed (i.e. electioneering, mobilisation etc.).  
In another example, Raby (2006: 191) argues that “…Chávez responds positively 
and unequivocally to pressures or grievances expressed by the popular 
movements.” Again, this is a statement that, without comprehensive evidencing, 
appears to be a political rather than academic assessment. Likewise, generalised 
conclusions like Ellner’s, that “President Chávez’s centralization of power severed 
the links between traditional organizations and the state and in the process has 
broken with Venezuela’s corporatist tradition” (Ellner 2009: 6), appear political 
and do not match with the corporatist behaviours uncovered in some ethnographic 
accounts (e.g. Gill 2012; Wilde 2014). 
Other writers seem at times to write from within the Bolivarian narrative as they 
seek to describe the relationship of people and government in Venezuela. García-
Guadilla and Pilar (2010), for example, promote a new understanding of citizenship 
as “the engine of development” in Venezuela. Their writing can be contrasted with 
that of Spanakos (2008, discussion to follow), who seeks to uncover a new 
conception of citizenship from texts and local accounts. There are two related 
approaches to citizenship here: i) to posit a new conception of citizenship as a 
desired ideal and a useful concept for shaping Venezuelan political culture (i.e. 
García-Guadilla and Pilar 2010) or ii) to explore what citizenship means through 
an examination of behaviours and texts (i.e. Spanakos 2008). Both are useful as 
reference points for my study into local ideas about citizenship. 
Another example of the acceptance of government discourse is arguably the 
assumption that the Bolivarian Revolution is a significant institutional step-change 
from the kind of democracy practised in the pre-Chávez, Punto-Fijista years 
between 1958 and 1998. Cameron and Major (2001: 255), for example, ask “Has 
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Chávez saved Venezuela from the decadence of the Pacto de Punto Fijo,4 or has he 
undermined the very foundations of Venezuelan democracy?” In this thesis I make 
the case that these commentators may be too quick to accept the idea of system 
change.5 Part of the task of describing the practice and representation of 
participation, citizenship and politics is gaining a sense of what hasn’t changed. I 
argue in this thesis that the institutions, behaviours and processes in Mérida are in 
some senses better described as having continued from the pre-Chávez era. 
3. Building on ethnographic and other community studies on 
Venezuela’s barrios 
A limited number of Chávez-era ethnographic studies on Venezuela’s barrios exist, 
with the vast majority of research on participation in Venezuela focusing on 
institutional change or using shorter-term qualitative approaches (e.g. Harnecker 
2009). This may be due to the time-consuming nature of ethnographic work or to 
the perceived risks posed to the researcher in these communities. It is particularly 
notable that the longer term community-based studies I found were all written by 
English-speaking foreigners – in each case as part of PhD theses.6  
These studies in turn connect with a wider tradition of ethnographic research in 
Latin America. This is particularly the case with examples of longer-term 
community-based studies from the favelas of Rio de Janeiro. Scheper-Hughes 
(1992), Goldstein (2013), Perlman (1979, 2007), and Ireland (2011) have all 
produced work that challenges how people think about poor urban communities 
and their complex relationships with government and other political actors. A 
particular strength of this body of literature is the development of an 
                                                          
4 This was the power sharing agreement that characterised the interchange of AD and 
COPEI governments throughout the pre-Chávez era. 
5 Elsewhere, sympathetic predictions concerning the institutional evolution of the 
Revolution can now be evaluated in light of the passing of time in Venezuela. Raby (2006: 
182), for example, predicted a reduction in the role of the state to that of simply protecting 
participatory processes and ensuring the “dialectical” foundation of the Revolution. I will 
argue in this thesis that, nearly ten years after Raby’s forecast, evidence from Mérida 
suggest that this institutional change has not occurred, and the conventional institutions of 
liberal democracy – with some new and renamed additions – retain their power and 
function. 
6 Chapter Five will discuss my own positionality as an English-speaking foreigner and the 
ways that this outsider status has an influence on data collection and analysis. 
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understanding of gender as part of social and political identity. In Argentina, 
Auyero (2000, 2001) in particular has developed an explanation of the different 
political roles of different community members and the different discourses that 
are reproduced to explain how politics happens locally both from above and from 
below (see especially Chapter Six).  
In this thesis, I take precedents from this work from Venezuela, along with other 
examples from Latin America, to provide context for my description of barrio 
Pueblo Nuevo. This section of the chapter will highlight some important examples 
of ethnographies and introduce some relevant shorter-term community-based 
qualitative research. 
Important ethnographic studies 
Sujatha Fernandes’ (2010) book Who Can Stop the Drums? is an especially useful 
contribution to the study both of barrio culture and Chávez-era community 
participation. The book focuses on urban social movements and especially on the 
Caracas barrios of San Agustin, 23 de Enero and La Vega. Fernandes describes 
diverse experiences of grassroots political organising across several neighbouring 
low-income communities, emphasising the challenges of parochialism and the 
encounter with Venezuela’s ‘post-neoliberal hybrid state’. Fernandes uses a variety 
of data sources including cultural artefacts and interviews with their producers. 
Her nuanced observations and detailed personal accounts are situated in expansive 
political histories, connecting lived experiences with their ideological and policy 
contexts. Along with her book, Fernandes’ other publications on gender identities 
within these communities are among the most-cited studies on barrio culture. 
Fernandes’ (2007) describes the limited subversion of gender status in her field-
site, documenting the redistribution of women’s tasks and a reduction in machismo 
and chauvinism and the beginnings of reoriented gender identities. She observes 
Moser’s (1986 in Fernandes 2007: 119) ‘triple burden’ of productive, reproductive 
and community managing work acting as a restriction on women’s time for 
thinking about social issues, and for mobilising.  
In her work, Fernandes (2010: 23-24) draws on Gramscian theories of hegemony 
and the Foucauldian concept of governmentality to explain what she describes as 
people’s “everyday wars of position” in Venezuela’s barrios. She uses these 
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principles to unpack the “complex dynamics of power and contestation as urban 
social movements clash with the instrumental rationalities of the post-neoliberal 
state” (ibid: 24). In this way, Fernandes connects individual stories of the 
challenges of life in Venezuela’s barrios, with the changing structure of Venezuelan 
institutional politics. This approach was a key influence on my own research, in 
that I continue this task of explaining how people negotiate their positions in 
around Pueblo Nuevo both in their political behaviours and how they talk about 
these behaviours. 
Maura Duffy’s recent (2012) doctoral thesis draws on ethnographic fieldwork from 
2009 and 2010 in various barrios of Caracas, including Catia and Petare. Duffy asks 
whether social change in Venezuela has contributed to new forms of political 
awareness and popular agency if it is possible to identify a transformation of 
relations and structures of power. Her particular focus on the Bolivarian education 
missions means that her analysis deals with groups of students and their learning 
environments as well as other forms of community participation, rather than an 
ethnography focused on a single community. Duffy ultimately concludes that the 
new Bolivarian institutions do promote the political and economic incorporation 
of marginalised sectors (ibid: 253). These conclusions, draw heavily on the 
literature, along with her data, to make claims about institutional change. In this 
respect, the voices of the participants that she introduces are primarily used to 
evidence “feelings” of empowerment she has uncovered (ibid: 256). In this thesis, I 
echo this approach by connecting local accounts with the national political 
processes discussed in the literature. 
Matt Wilde (2014, 2015) is another UK-based ethnographer working on 
participation in Venezuela. His work is rare in that his fieldwork was not based in 
Caracas, drawing instead on fieldwork carried out between 2009 and 2010 in El 
Camoruco, in the south of Valencia, Venezuela’s third largest city. Wilde (2014: 3) 
assesses the impact of local Communal Councils in El Camoruco, examining what 
he calls “every day political practice” and focusing on “new social actors”, the 
problems that they encounter and conflicts between community leaders, council 
participants and local residents. Wilde links these findings to what he calls 
structural and ideological tensions “between bureaucratism and self-government, 
liberalism and socialism” within the Bolivarian project (ibid: 22). He argues that 
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Communal Councils not only produce new opportunities, but bring “new burdens” 
for local residents. As well as identifying limits to the ability and willingness of 
residents to participate, he describes how “barrio residents could be admonished, 
often by their own neighbours, for failing to live up to Chavista aspirations of 
participation” (ibid 22, emphasis in the original). This he argues, is resisted to some 
extent by accusations of corruption and self-interest as part of attempts to create a 
culture of accountability around the councils. Wilde’s rare inclusion of non-activist 
accounts in particular supports his analysis about the complex dynamics of 
participation.  
Adam Gill’s (2012) doctoral thesis is based on fieldwork conducted in Mérida City 
between 2008 and 2009. His study uses case-studies from two anonymous 
communities, focusing on their Communal Councils and on local attitudes towards 
them. Gill argues that the “state-managed” councils are part of “a ‘dual government’ 
structure” based on the principles of Socialism of the twenty-first century, as 
promoted by the United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV). In this respect, he 
challenges the idea that popular power is separate to state power. His account 
describes the party-politicisation of the councils and uncovers different corruption 
allegations regarding the distribution of state resources. In describing the council 
meetings and their mixed results, low participation and the weak legitimacy of the 
council structure, Gill’s research contributes empirical detail to debates about local 
experiences of Participatory Democracy. 
Jonathan Leary’s (2009) extended essay on the politics of representation in 
contemporary Venezuelan journalism uses an ethnographic approach to explore 
the evolution of a community news station in Catia barrio in Caracas. He describes 
the history, organisational structure and institutional context of Catia TVe, 
contrasting the participatory approach of “chavista radicalism” and what he 
describes as “liberal” attempts to present a civil society spin on private media (ibid: 
26). Leary connects the news station to the history of the barrio and the political 
changes in Venezuela. This approach – of embedding the history of a participatory 
group in the local political culture – is useful because it connects changing ideas 
about citizenship to their specific community contexts. In contrast to the focus on 
councils found in Wilde and Gill, Leary’s study offers insight into a group with a less 
formal and differently contested relationship with the state.  
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Finally, Naomi Schiller’s “critically engaged anthropology” (2011, 2011a) is 
another example of long-term grassroots research in Caracas’s barrios. Based on 
ethnographic fieldwork in Catia between 2003 and 2007, Schiller, like Leary, 
examines the participatory production of media representations through Catia 
TVe. Notably, Schiller describes herself as an “observant participant” (2011b: 256). 
Her research approach involved accompanying the various media producers 
during their work and training, while her publications focus on linking media 
representations with the political function of participatory media. This was an 
approach I would echo in my work for Fundación Cayapa. 
 
Arguments and contribution: identity, struggle and the state 
Between them, these accounts provide a detailed history of collective action in 
Venezuela, from the history of social movements in the barrios from guerrilla 
insurgency of the 1950s and 1960s, through the experiences of liberation theology-
led cultural resistance of the 1970s to the 1980s debt crisis and the genealogy and 
implementation of the Bolivarian Revolution (see especially Fernandes 2010). 
Charting the grassroots antecedents of the Bolivarian Revolution connects the 
evolution of contemporary forms of community participation back to the decades 
of popular action in the capital and the growing public dissatisfaction that 
culminated in the 1989 Caracazo riots. In focusing less on party politics and 
national changes and more on the experiences from specific low-income urban 
communities, this history is important for understanding the priorities and 
characteristics of contemporary forms of collective action. 
This body of literature is also a rich source of primary data on Chávez-era 
grassroots participation in barrio communities.  As well as providing useful 
precedents for my research, the interview excerpts and the descriptions of events 
and processes based on observations provide a complimentary series of data with 
which to examine my own primary data. Gill’s study in Mérida is in the same city, 
while the group histories in Schiller, Leary and Fernandes fit with the timeline for 
the historical development of participatory groups in Pueblo Nuevo described in 
the previous two chapters. Lallander’s (2016) recent study into the effects of 
participation both as an example of and as contributing to shifting gender and race 
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politics is another useful reference point for the discussion of the role of identity 
within participatory politics.7 
This body of literature also makes important contributions to debates about where 
Venezuela fits with regional patterns of democracy and populism, not least through 
attempts to describe the Venezuelan state and reconceptualise contemporary 
Venezuelan democracy. Part of the challenge with representing this transition is 
conceptualising democracy for the contemporary Venezuelan experience. Duffy 
(2012: 39) uses a Gramscian model of ‘democratic socialism’, arguing that the 
Chávez Government’s use of participative mechanisms to complement traditional 
representative democracy requires a redefinition of terms, employing Gandin and 
Apple’s (2002) distinction between “thin” and “thick” democracy, with the latter 
emphasising participative mechanisms and “a concern with political literacy, 
critical engagement and political action” (ibid: 40). Fernandes (2010: 234) 
similarly underlines the incompatibility of the language of ‘procedural democracy’ 
with the Venezuelan experience while Schiller (2011b: 36) reflects on a “crisis of 
categories” with reference to the Bolivarian project. The work of all three authors 
focuses on relating new, grassroots understandings of democracy with their 
corresponding “concrete struggles” (ibid) - the complex realities of participation in 
Venezuela and their evasive definitions.  
The idea of a fundamental change in the characteristics of Venezuelan democracy 
also needs exploring, however. When Gill, for example, identifies a “stark contrast” 
between historical and contemporary exclusion in Venezuela, he appears to accept 
rather than investigate this contrast. I will argue in this thesis that analysis that 
connects with the studies on Mérida’s barrios (Hernández de Padrón 1998, 1999; 
Jugo Burguera 1976) reveals important areas of continuity in the present day.8 
Wilde does question Bolivarian narratives of dramatic change in Venezuelan 
democratic experiences, observing in particular the constraints on Communal 
                                                          
7 The discussion of race, however, did not become part of the discussion of this thesis. This 
is due in part to the shared mestizo heritage of the population in Pueblo Nuevo, to the lack 
of references to race in the interviews I collected and finally to the lack of analysis of to race 
in the historical studies of Mérida’s barrios. 
8 Again, it is Fernandes’ (2010) depiction of the “post-neoliberal state” that offers a more 
critical analysis of revolutionary governance. This is her central thesis: that a “hybrid” state 
has emerged that challenges the location of power in society and prioritises the protection 
of its poorest citizens, but that is ultimately subject to the constraints of global capital. 
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Councils deriving from the Bolivarian political-legal framework. In identifying a 
tensions between practice and rhetoric, Wilde provides the context to refine the 
binary in Bolivarian discourses between constituted-representative-liberal and 
constituent-participative-socialist democracy. As this binary is accepted in much of 
the academic literature (e.g. Azzellini 2010; 2013, Ciccariello-Maher 2013), Wilde’s 
contribution shows the value of community studies for disturbing commonly 
accepted ideas about the political landscape in Venezuela. 
To add to these studies, this thesis connects different kinds of evidence from Pueblo 
Nuevo with the historical material available, to identify not only inconsistencies in 
the practice and discourse of Chavista politics, but the continuity of some of the 
characteristics of the relationship between people and government from the pre-
Chávez era. These continuities are not emphasised in the ethnographic studies 
described above, which largely accept the distinctiveness of the current period. 
Part of this work is about describing a community setting during a particularly 
interesting political moment, at a time when Chavistas and opositors in 
neighbouring communities were clashing in the streets and making international 
headlines, and Mérida City became a battleground for the debate over national 
politics. Pueblo Nuevo, therefore, where Chavistas and opositors work together for 
community change, and where local Chavistas are pragmatic in their strategies for 
securing support in a complex political environment, embodies some of the 
contradictions of Bolivarianism and some of the limits to the Chavista public 
narrative. This thesis discusses draws out these inconsistencies and continuities in 
part by connecting with analyses of the Bolivarian narrative that unpack thinking 
about political radicalism alongside thinking about marginality. 
4. Conclusion: precedents for thinking about the relationship of 
people and government in Pueblo Nuevo 
During fieldwork, participatory politics sometimes meant mass rallies for the 
government, and at other times meant street shootouts between Chavistas and 
opposition vigilantes. Public services included the door-to-door, community-
focused medical practice and the free cancer-treatment offered by Barrio Adentro, 
but also the under-funded and corrupt police system that has done little to stop 
escalating violent crime. Political rhetoric from the government included new 
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positive and empowering representations of barrio populations, and heavy-
handed, essentialising representations of political adversaries. As Chavismo 
reaches middle age after fifteen years of the Bolivarian Revolution, understanding 
how the people like Gabriel experience the complex political culture in and around 
Pueblo Nuevo means drawing on precedents from the different kinds of literature 
that describe the relationship between people and government in Venezuela.  
Throughout this thesis I try to describe those details which expose some of the 
contradictions and complexities of both community organising and day-to-day life 
in Pueblo Nuevo, including some that are not reflected in the existing literature on 
community organising in Venezuela. In making sense of these details, however, I 
draw on the three kinds of existing research into the politics of the Bolivarian 
Revolution described in this chapter. The analyses of the Bolivarian Public 
narrative provide a framework for mapping the intellectual landscape that is part 
of the political culture in and around Pueblo Nuevo. Whether or not, as Spanakos 
suggests (2008: 527), “in shaping not only what is discussed but how it is discussed, 
Chávez has changed the way that citizens interact with and dissect a concept of 
politics…”, this literature helps to make sense of the different accounts drawn on 
for the remainder of the thesis. An understanding of changes to Venezuela’s public 
institutions and to voting and other behaviours among the population also help to 
connect experiences from Pueblo Nuevo with the different ways that processes of 
Participatory Democracy have been discussed in the existing scholarship. In 
particular, it is the attempts to describe national experiences – including the idea 
of Venezuela political exceptionalism under Chávez - that provide the context for 
the study of one particular community in greater detail. Finally, the other 
ethnographic and community-based studies described above provide the sorts of 
details that help locate experiences and discourses from Pueblo Nuevo with similar 
experiences and discourse from barrio communities elsewhere in the country. 
These three bodies of literature together provide a framework for making sense of 
the different sorts of information collected during fieldwork.  
These three literatures also help us to locate experiences of community organising 
from the Bolivarian Revolution among the political experiences and trajectories of 
poor urban communities from across Latin America. In each set of scholarship, it is 
the connection with different details from the pre-Chávez era that is especially 
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useful for understanding where Pueblo Nuevo fits in evolving processes of political 
change. There is a need for more studies that provide detailed, multi-level 
descriptions of contexts where participatory politics is thought to be happening 
differently, and where either new or reproduced discourses propose an alternative 
relationship between people and government.  
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5. Building belonging and negotiating 
positionality: a methodology for living 
and researching in Pueblo Nuevo 
 
 
 
Gerardo frees the line from where it has snagged on a branch and tosses the good 
machete as far as he can up the cliff face towards us. He starts to climb hand over 
hand and I brace my feet against a tree root and take his weight on the wet rope. 
All four of us are covered in sweat now - not just the two gringos. The August sun 
is high overhead and the dappled shade of the giant tree we have set out to fell no 
longer offers any protection as it leans out over the edge of Pueblo Nuevo. Gerardo 
makes quick progress up the steep bank, his trainers scrabbling in the loose earth. 
Beyond him, the barrio drops away into the Albarregas valley: endless rows of tin 
roofs and in the distance the community radio aerial we have set out to clear a path 
for. The sound of a moto revving its way up Calle Principal cuts through the 
afternoon. From up here on the ridge it seems far, far away. 
As he nears the top Gerardo motions to me with his head. 
“It’s OK,” he says, looking up at me. “You can let go.” 
Without thinking, I let go.  
Gerardo’s shoulders shoot backwards fast and the rope runs around the tree trunk 
before I can grab it. He tumbles backwards down the hillside trailing the rope, 
performing at least two complete revolutions and disappearing from sight into a 
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chicken coup. He does not call out. The three of us share a worried look and Roberto 
begins to untie himself from his rope harness high up in the branches. It is my third 
day in Pueblo Nuevo. 
Just now, I think, the barrio doesn’t seem like such a good choice for a fieldwork 
site.  
After what must have been only a moment, Gerardo appears from the chicken coup. 
He is dazed and sore, but apparently without any major injury to either him or the 
chickens. Joshua, the North American Barrio Adentro doctor, scrambles down the 
bank and gives Gerardo – and the chicken coup - a quick once over. I cling to a 
branch and look on, feeling helpless. Gerardo shrugs, brushes himself off and the 
four of us get back to work. Not long after we give up for the day, making some 
hasty repairs to the chicken coup and make our way, sore and tired, down the bank 
to the barrio. We drink milk together in the backroom that makes for a school 
library and reflect on our adventure.  
Two long days working in the trees - dodging swinging sections of trunk and 
hauling bundles of branches - gave me a chance to build four relationships with 
four people who would become key participants for my study. On the hillside that 
day was Gerardo Lopez, the community activist who has participated in community 
politics in Pueblo Nuevo since his childhood in the 1970s. Gerardo gave me with 
not only a critical insight into the activities of the Communal Council Calle Principal, 
but also shared his carefully prepared history of barrio organising in the 1980s and 
early 1990s. Also there was Joshua Wilson, the community doctor; Roberto a local 
resident; and Miguel Parra, the local mercalito1 and the joker in the adult high-
school class I taught. 
Taking part in these improvised cayapas2 and building relationships with barrio 
residents like Gerardo and the others gave me the opportunity to build the 
relationships needed to be a temporary part of the community in Pueblo Nuevo. 
Along with my teaching work at the school and the simple act of moving to live in 
                                                          
1 Mercalitos work in the ‘MERCAL’ subsidised food stores, selling goods and coordinating 
deliveries to hard-to-reach communities. 
2 The Guajiro word for collective action – cayapa - is used in Venezuela to describe examples 
of community collaboration, including in the name for Pueblo Nuevo’s education collective, 
Fundación Cayapa.  
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the barrio, making a small contribution to community life would help build my 
barrio credibility, help me with the continuing process of negotiating access, and 
help build the friendships and networks to keep me safe there. These friendships, 
my involvement as a resident and participant in Pueblo Nuevo, and my identity and 
my personal politics also raise important questions about my research 
positionality.  
Aims and structure of the chapter 
This chapter explains how the methodology used during fieldwork supports the 
analytical work of this thesis by building a detailed picture of community 
organising in and around Pueblo Nuevo. I discuss how this methodology feeds into 
and from my research positionality – as a non-Latin American outsider to Pueblo 
Nuevo, as a participant in various community groups, and as someone who is 
broadly sympathetic to the Bolivarian goals and ideology. 
I begin by describing the process of negotiating research access to Pueblo Nuevo. I 
describe the challenges of living and researching in the community - including the 
need to adapt to ‘barrio Spanish’, negotiating the threat of violent crime, and 
working around my status as a foreign outsider. I describe how building the 
relationships and sense of belonging needed live and work in Pueblo Nuevo gave 
me the opportunity to build a detailed picture of community life as a counter-point 
to some of the essentialising narratives about Venezuela’s urban poor. The chapter 
continues by discussing my role as a participant, connecting with debates about 
activist and scholarly forms of research (Schiller 2011a) and the idea of “militant 
ethnography” (Juris 2007). I explain how the use of a dialogical interview strategy 
(Ritchie & Lewis 2003:140 in Bell 2013) helped to some extent to give my research 
participants the opportunity to contest my changing reading of Pueblo Nuevo. 
Finally, I describe the particular political moment of research, providing a timeline 
for national and local events as my fieldwork and analysis unfolded. I reflect on the 
potential for political bias as a result of my sympathy for Bolivarianism, and 
describe how historical information is used in the thesis to ground my observations 
in the longer-term trajectory of community development. 
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1. Into the barrio: access, belonging and overcoming social 
separateness 
There is a tradition of urban ethnographic research in Latin America that seeks to 
disturb essentialising notions about low-income urban communities by building 
detailed pictures of community life. By showing the complexities of local life, these 
studies move beyond folk concepts about the urban poor, using of thick description, 
personal histories and capturing the moments that disturb generalised 
expectations of poor urban life. Important examples include Scheper-Hughes 
(1992) and Goldstein’s (2013) portraits of community life in the favelas of Rio de 
Janeiro. These studies take up the urban ethnographer’s task as described by 
Englund (2000) as being about documenting local knowledge practices as a 
reference points for understanding different local configurations of modernity. In 
this way, Auyero (2000) assesses the distinct political roles of local cultural 
representations in Villa Paraiso, Buenos Aires, while Perlman (1979) explores local 
culture as a means to challenge outside ideas about the Myth of Marginality. For 
Venezuela, this tradition has been continued during the Chávez era, with studies by 
Fernandes (2007, 2010), Schiller (2011, 2011a, 2011b) and most recently Wilde 
(2014, 2016). Each of these researchers made a temporary home in the country’s 
barrio communities. In each case, activists’ accounts are woven together with 
observations of everyday life to challenge assumptions about community 
participation. For my research, this access was about understanding how the day-
to-day processes of community organising in Pueblo Nuevo connect with 
representations of barrio residents as malandros, revolutionaries and the other 
overlapping identities of the urban poor discussed in the thesis so far. 
A challenge with this research approach is in gaining safe access to the sorts of 
communities that outsiders usually fear to visit. In gaining this access, in being 
accepted, these researchers tread the line between witness and participant, 
between researcher and friend. Intertwined with this involving research process is 
a complex analytical task - to coordinate the use of different kinds of information 
from the wealth of rich material of people’s lives. These were the challenges in 
living and doing research in Pueblo Nuevo. 
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Choosing and being chosen: negotiating access to Pueblo Nuevo 
For this ethnographic approach, choosing a community is a defining moment in the 
research process. I visited Venezuela in December 2012 for a month’s scoping trip 
with the hope of identifying a suitable field site. Chávez was in hospital in Cuba, 
fighting the last weeks of his battle with cancer. After landing in Caracas I took the 
night bus to Mérida to meet the British journalist and political activist Paul Dobson 
and to observe the Governor’s elections with a political insider. Arriving in the city, 
I was struck by the way campaign slogans competed for space, not least what 
seemed like particularly ironic promises from the Chavista candidate, Alexis 
Ramirez, to “clean up Mérida” - written in six-foot high graffiti letters.  I would learn 
that much of the pro-Venezuelan Communist Party (PCV) graffiti had been painted 
by Paul and his comrades – supporters of Florencio Porras and the “revolution 
within the Revolution” from Venezuela’s traditional communist party. I also 
learned that Mérida was one of only a handful of states where a PCV competitor 
was put forward against the PUSV candidate. It was clear that this was a city where 
the simplified narrative of Bolivarianism – of Chavista against opositor – had 
another level of complexity.3 
The city, with its mix of middle class neighbourhoods and poorer areas, also 
provides a site for the encounter of two kinds of urban populations. I remember 
very clearly walking with a new Venezuelan friend over the Campo Elias Bridge one 
evening that first week. I was called to by a group of young men hanging out on the 
street corner: “Hey blondie, come talk to us”. The fearful reaction from my friend, 
Victoria, shocked me, as she quickened her pace and crossed the four-lane highway 
to avoid the group, not slowing down until we were safely home. “You don’t 
understand,” she said. “They come from down there. From the barrio under the 
bridge. There is no law down there. They are killers.” I didn’t know it at the time, 
but down there, under the Albarregas Bridge, the road winds down to the southern 
entrance of Pueblo Nuevo. 
                                                          
3 Florencio Porras, a former PSUV Governor of Mérida State lost this election, giving an 
emotive concession speech to a small packed with his supporters. I watched from the back 
of the hall, getting my first taste of impassioned Venezuelan-style political rhetoric. Despite 
his loss, in running against the Chavista candidate, Porras gave voice to the dissatisfaction 
that was already growing on the left of the Chavista party coalition, the Grand Patriotic Pole. 
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From that moment, the notorious community under the bridge that scared my 
friend so much had my attention. During this scoping trip, I had become concerned 
about the difficulty of gaining access to Venezuela’s barrios. Chavistas I had met 
boasted about the political radicalism of barrio communities, but the fear of these 
communities was tangible. Although I had made contacts who were involved in 
community organising in one way or another, all rarely ventured into the barrio 
communities. Already I was seeing how the fear of the barrios was a barrier not 
only for researchers but for any outsider to understand what life was like in 
Venezuela’s poorer urban communities.  
Back in the UK, I began to look for local organisations that were already working in 
barrio communities as a means of finding gatekeepers to cross the divide. I came 
across the video La Escuelita: barrio Pueblo Nuevo’s Alternative School on YouTube 
(see Appendix Two).4 This grainy video also was my first introduction to several 
people who would become my colleagues, friends and the key research participants 
for the next year and a half.  Looking back now, they are almost all there in that 
video – Gerardo, Janeath, Joshua, Lisbeide, Pichi, Tamara, Myriam and many of the 
young people I worked with at La Escuelita. This group, with a few new additions, 
would form the start of my network in Pueblo Nuevo. 
In July 2013, I arrived in Venezuela to begin fieldwork with a hunch that Pueblo 
Nuevo would be my field site. By then, Chávez was dead and Nicolas Maduro had 
been elected President. I headed to Mérida and again relied on Paul Dobson – this 
time to make contact with Tamara Pearson, a journalist for Venezuela Analysis who 
also volunteered with Fundación Cayapa. At my first meeting with the teaching staff 
at Fundación Cayapa I described my project and asked for access to the school as a 
research site. This initial conversation would become the blueprint for how I would 
describe my project to each new person or group I accessed throughout fieldwork. 
In as simple words as I could, I said that I had come to Venezuela because I had 
                                                          
4 This video explains the work of the barrio’s famous “little school” – la Escuelita – run by 
Fundación Cayapa, in barrios across the country. It describes the challenges the school’s 
students face in adjusting to the educational culture outside of the barrio. A second video, 
El Sabado de la Basura – “The Saturday of the Refuse” – takes the camera outside the school. 
It shows the barrio during a moment of spontaneous collective action, when residents came 
together to organise refuse collection when city authorities. Both provide an excellent sense 
of the community. 
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heard that many communities were making progress in new forms of participation. 
In my explanation, I sought to distance myself from the sorts of research that look 
for solutions to local problems, saying that instead that I had come to learn about 
forms of community-led development from groups like Cayapa.5 As with each time 
I described my research, I made sure to explain that in telling the story of the barrio 
and its organisations, I would talk about both “the good and the bad”. On the advice 
of Tamara and Joshua, I also described my work history and voluntary experiences 
and offered to contribute to the project in various ways, including teaching music 
and English language classes. 
At that first meeting, the teaching staff at Cayapa were very positive in their 
response to my research itself. I didn’t know at the time, but Gerardo Lopez was 
already involved in documenting the history of organising in Pueblo Nuevo.6 I also 
didn’t know that in that first meeting, half of the people I was speaking to were 
outsiders themselves – several were students from outside of Pueblo Nuevo, who 
had had this same experience as me, in some cases only recently. The teaching staff 
mentioned several ongoing projects, including the work of the council to address 
local flooding. Despite this receptiveness to my research on its own terms, it was 
the commitment I made to help with the work of the school that would shape my 
research approach. After Chacko (2004: 60) I had come to see my own contribution 
to Pueblo Nuevo as a means not just of ‘giving back’ to the population at my field 
site, but of empowering my participants within the researcher-participant 
relationship.7 While in retrospect this seems like an overly transactional way think 
about data collection, it would be this work in the community that would help me 
build belonging and trust among the residents and to some extent achieve the 
status of what Sherif (2001) describes as a “partial insider”.  
Moving to the barrio: earning trust and building belonging  
                                                          
5 It is possible that presenting my work like this may have made the people I spoke to eager 
to show the best things about their work, but this is something that was already the case, 
and is the case to some extent with all of the voluntary and charitable organisations I have 
worked with over the years, regardless of my relationship with them. 
6 Gerardo completed this study as part of an academic assignment. It forms part of my 
history of the barrio in Chapter Three.  
7 Chacko (2004: 60) writes about the importance of “fostering mutually rewarding 
relationships” as part of disrupting researcher-participant power dynamics.  
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Within the week I had moved to the barrio to live with my new Venezuelan family 
- Marleny, Jose-Luís and Marco Angelo-Quintero. The four of us made a tiny 
household by the over-crowded standards of Pueblo Nuevo, where some buildings 
of the same size house several families. This was evidence of a scale of wealth and 
privilege in the community, ranging down to the hastily-constructed lean-tos 
clinging to the hillside above Simon Bolivar. Living with the Angelo-Quinteros 
would provide me with a different perspective from most of my research 
participants – many of whom were connected with either the school or the various 
community organisations in and around the barrio. My host family were a different 
source of gossip from around the community, while their political views helped me 
to develop an idea of the complexity of political perspective sin Pueblo Nuevo, and 
eventually to begin to challenge notions about the political radicalism of barrio 
residents (see discussion in Chapter Six). 
Soon after moving into the barrio, I began volunteer work with the staff and the 
other volunteers at La Escuelita. I started out helping with arts and music 
workshops that took the place of the regular school sessions during the break 
between semesters,8 and continued by helping – or more accurately hindering - our 
expedition described at the start of the chapter, to fell the trees that blocked the 
signal for the community radio signal. This minor role gave me access to Cayapa’s 
weekly planning meetings, which I would diligently record to much hilarity among 
the staff, who would make jokes for the benefit of my Dictaphone which I would 
only appreciate on listening back on my return to the UK. In the coming months, 
my role would develop, and I would contribute more at meetings, take on more 
responsibilities with the young people, and eventually design and teach research 
skills sessions for the new adult high school class. 
More importantly, this growing role at the school gave me a certain status in the 
community. For the students, and eventually for their friends and neighbours, I was 
now known simply as profe - or “teacher”. I was now another of the strange group 
of students from outside the barrio who had moved into Pueblo Nuevo to work at 
La Escuelita. This status allowed me to tap into the respect for teachers that exists 
                                                          
8 These sessions were hosted by two Argentinean volunteers who were touring community 
projects across the continent. Like Joshua, they gave me both an example of how to integrate 
and were able to offer some frank advice about staying safe in the community.  
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across Latin America, where education is highly valued. Most importantly, it 
aligned me with Joshua and Tamara, other non-Latin American outsiders whose 
reputations had been built over time. It also distinguished me from the only other 
foreigners who visited the community - the occasional few who came looking to 
buy drugs.9  
Along with living in the barrio and participating in the life of the community, this 
association with the school was my passport to living safely in Pueblo Nuevo. 
Although the period of heightened gang violence and nightly street shootouts had 
now passed (see Chapter Five), the barrio is still considered to be a “red zone” - off-
limits to most non-residents. Police were never seen in Pueblo Nuevo. Even the 
political graffiti that covers every wall in the city stops at the edge of the barrio. 
During the anti-government protests, neighbourhood kids turned a profit letting 
commuter traffic use the cut-through to get across the Albarregas valley to the city 
centre from the richer suburbs to the West of the city – but even the right-wing 
militia were unwilling to extend their guarimba roadblocks into the barrio. 
Representations of Pueblo Nuevo as a dangerous place were not only made by 
people outside of the barrio. Fears about the activities of the groups of so-called 
malandros could be seen in the self-imposed curfews and in the advice that I was 
regularly given about keeping safe. People in the community also talked about the 
deaths that had happened in recent years, and most people new a relative or 
neighbour who had been caught up in the gang violence. Scores of people were said 
to have been killed during the worst of the violence, although only one murder 
happened near my house in the time that I lived there. Staff at the Ambulatorio 
reported treating the wounds from other shootings in Pueblo Nuevo during the 
same period, but local rumours of street shootouts during fieldwork were always 
vague and uncorroborated.  
My strategy to stay safe in Pueblo Nuevo was based on increasing my familiarity 
among people in the community. I worked at the school, stayed strictly to the areas 
that I became known in and made sure to greet as many people publicly as possible. 
I made sure to spend time in the barrio walking with the young people I knew, 
                                                          
9 I heard this, although I never saw any. 
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chatting publicly with the community leaders, always taking care to be seen 
shaking hands with the residents who sat out in front of their houses on my way to 
teach class. I became part of in-jokes. I was a regular climbing frame for some 
children, while others would sit on their shoes to hide them and ask for money to 
buy new ones. I was someone to share a sly slug of rum with on a street corner or 
the visiting ‘German’ who might take residents back to Europe in his suitcase. 
Gradually, I found I was known to council members and parents, to the adult 
students I taught, to my various participants and to residents I have never spoken 
to by sight and reputation. I sheltered with Goyo when the street flooded and he 
was stranded in his wheelchair on Calle Principal, sold the famous Angulo-Quintero 
ice creams from our front gate, and was deloused with oil and vinegar in solidarity 
with the children who were infested with head lice.  
On the few occasions I was mistaken for a complete outsider, I was met with 
hostility. On these occasions I would simply say “I live there on La Cuesta, I work 
there at the school, teaching the children.” At this, straight way I was “profe” again 
and thanked for my contribution. Slightly trickier were those occasions where 
participating in the social rituals of the community meant compromising the 
identify I was constructing - for example choosing between swigging rum with the 
old men on the street and maintaining a professional, child-friendly persona.  
Partial Outsider: social exclusion turned inside-out 
Even with this network and strategy, I nevertheless felt extremely limited in my 
movement around the barrio. My colleagues assured me that, whilst I was known 
to be part of the La Escuelita, I would be safe. They warned me, however, not to visit 
Simon Bolivar alone, and I took this to count for the back streets of Pueblo Nuevo 
too – the streets where I had never been seen before, and did not know who to . For 
reason, my zone of movement – if alone - was basically around the cross streets, La 
Cuesta, where I lived and Calle Principal, where I worked, and those streets that 
joined these streets to the different entrances to the barrio. This area takes in the 
majority of the barrio, and is a good deal further than the Angulo-Quinteros would 
venture – into the firing line for Simon Bolivar, from where long-range pot shots 
would be taken down into Pueblo Nuevo at least as recently ago as 2010 (interview 
w JW, 31.05.14, SB). I thought about my sphere of movement in terms of who I 
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trusted to know the community best – picking up clues here and there about where 
I might be safe.  
Of course, I was still told by anyone I met outside the barrio that I would be killed 
by the local malandros sooner or later. This constant reminder felt disempowering, 
especially when I broke my own rules by venturing out at night for community 
meetings or to meet activist friends in the bars they drank at in the city centre. On 
these occasions, I would ask taxi drivers to drive me home, and more often they 
would speed off as soon as I mentioned the address.10 On these occasions I would 
walk home cursing my poor judgment. How much any risk to my personal safety 
was a figment of my imagination I will never know. Certainly, I was not the only 
community member who was worried about violent crime at night, when and my 
friends at the CCCP would encourage me to “hurry home” from meetings. These 
fears, it is now clear, were probably disproportionate - a hangover from more 
dangerous days, remembered by the people had lived through or heard about them. 
Like Wilde (2016, personal communication), however, security concerns did 
present a practical limit to my data collection. 
I developed a certain bravado about living in a red zone, and came to enjoy the 
reactions from Merideños who had never set foot in Pueblo Nuevo when I told them 
where I lived. I also began to work these powerful feelings – of fear and bravado – 
into my understanding of the social separateness of the community. It seems clear 
that my struggle with the mythology of fear that exists around Pueblo Nuevo was 
something I was able to overcome by drawing on different kinds of social capital 
that are not available to all Venezuelans. I could afford to rent a room in one of the 
nicer homes in the barrio, I had the social skills and the network to connect with 
Fundación Cayapa, and I had a story and a persona that fitted with the other 
successful immigrants to the barrio, Joshua and Tamara. I began to think, therefore, 
in terms that turned social exclusion on its head. Although many residents of 
Pueblo Nuevo rarely left the community, they do visit the centre of Mérida on 
occasion, while my middle class friends form the city would never set foot in Pueblo 
Nuevo. In this respect, ideas about the “defensible space”– understood as the 
                                                          
10 During the heightened street violence in 2014 (see Chapter Six) when walking the streets 
was particularly dangerous, I remember asking as many as ten – I later learned that the 
rumour that a taxi driver had been beheaded in Pueblo Nuevo was the problem here.  
147 
 
protection offered by the built environment and gated communities (Tijerino 
1998) – can be to some extent turned on their head. Pueblo Nuevo’s reputation 
offers a kind of defence against the supposedly more “civilised” (ibid) outsiders 
from the city centre. It is this difficulty in even setting foot in the barrio that in part 
explains the prevalence of the sorts of preconceptions discussed in the thesis so far. 
Despite becoming a familiar part of the community, my different identity 
characteristics also limited my interactions with some community members. It was 
unusual simply that I had not lived in Pueblo Nuevo my whole life – while some 
residents grow up and leave the community, far fewer arrive. In my case, I was not 
only not from Pueblo Nuevo, but I was white, foreign, educated, and wealthy. 
Language was a particular challenge. It took time to adjust to the heavy accent and 
vernacular of ‘barrio Spanish’. This meant missing parts of conversations and 
bluffing my way through some exchanges or sitting, confused at the edges of 
meetings. I off-set this by using a Dictaphone and by following up on group 
conversations with one-to-one conversations, where I was able to control the pace 
of communication.  
It was also a curiosity that I was single and without children at thirty years old. 
Again, I was able to off-set this to some extent with my behaviours. For example, it 
was particularly important that I lived in the barrio and with a Venezuelan family, 
rather than in the centre with other foreigners or students. These sets of 
characteristics and behaviours made me a contradictory character: the naïve 
gringo idealist who instead of enjoying his privilege with a young family in Europe 
had displaced himself to live in Pueblo Nuevo, single and in danger. I was associated 
with the Venezuelan white upper class, European colonialism and, mistakenly, with 
United States neo-imperialism. While I was able to disrupt this in part, for example 
by sharing my politics and taking on the difficult work at La Escuelita, I am sure that 
I was always seen as privileged and different.  
This sense of being different would shape my research. I found my relationships 
with participating community members much easier to foster as familiarity was 
built through shared work experiences. I found that my social network began to 
mirror those of my colleagues. My social network was also gendered, as men were 
much more comfortable to talk in the street or spend time alone together.  
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For all of my familiarity and my growing network of people who knew me as a 
colleague and friend, I also felt a certain sense of unease throughout my time living 
in Pueblo Nuevo. It puzzled me for a long time how much it still “cost me” - as 
Venezuelans say - to live in the barrio. I gradually became aware of the profound 
way that the threat of violence shaped my reality, but also my research. This unease 
was offset in important ways by the sense of belonging I nurtured with the Angulo-
Quintero family that I lived with, the warmth with which I was accepted my various 
friends in the barrio and above all with the staff and students at Cayapa. By working 
in the collective, I felt that I saw a side to the community that many residents did 
not. I gained close personal friendships, overcame difficulties, made mistakes and 
rectified some of them and learned community development strategies from a 
group of teachers who are brave and humble and always learning themselves. 
Above all, it was the differences between the various, complex people I came to 
know in Pueblo Nuevo that helped shape my analysis of the limited ways that barrio 
populations are representated in Venezuela. 
2. Participation, politics and dialogue: managing different types of 
interactions in and around Pueblo Nuevo 
As an outsider to Pueblo Nuevo, I also brought with me my assumptions about the 
barrio and the people who lived there – assumptions that connected with 
narratives of both emancipation and marginality. Two connected parts of my 
methodology helped to uncover the sorts of information that would enable me to 
disturb these assumptions. These were i) my own participation in community life 
and organising, and ii) the use of a dialogical interview strategy.  
Participation and observation: activist or scholarly research? 
My roles as a resident and a teacher in Pueblo Nuevo gave me the opportunity to 
use participant observation to take detailed notes about day-to-day community life, 
community events, Communal Council meetings, and the different projects carried 
out at La Escuelita and in the CEDECOL community development centre. These 
occasions also provided the opportunity to hear the ways that these different 
groups or events were talked about by participants, both during meetings and more 
often in informal conversations at the edges of meetings. By participating in this 
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way, I became aware of some of the tensions around community organising in and 
around Pueblo Nuevo. Through planning meetings at Cayapa, I was able to observe 
the sense of autonomy enjoyed by the teaching staff, and collect information for the 
case study of their community-centred approach undertaken in Chapter Eight. I 
was also able to observe the participation of members of more notorious crime 
families, and the subtle ways teaching staff were able to build trust and offer 
support. Through attending meetings of the Communal Council Calle Principal, I 
was able to document decreasing participation, and observe the limits to group 
activity described in Chapter Six. By participating in thirty city-level meetings, I was 
able to observe limits to their membership and their consultation practices, as 
described in Chapter Seven. 
My role as a teacher and participant also meant that I would act on my field site. My 
role as a teacher at Cayapa meant bringing new, external knowledge and 
experiences to share with members of the community. This included sharing 
specialist knowledge by teaching classes that touched on social science research 
skills, world history, basic nutrition and music. These classes were all participative 
and focused on using existing student ideas and knowledge as a base for collective 
learning. In planning meetings, I sought to contribute from drawing on my own 
experience working within different organisations in the UK and by sharing some 
broad insights from my early research observations during meetings and in private. 
This was welcomed by my co-workers and in most spaces was an informal 
condition for my access.  
An important decision early on was whether to share information about different 
opportunities for participation. The Spinetti Dini Parochial Assembly began in 
October 2014. As a collective planning meeting for around twenty five Communal 
Councils, it was an opportunity to propose new projects as part of a system of public 
consultation. On finding that local groups in Pueblo Nuevo were not aware of the 
opportunity I considered how in sharing this information I would change the way 
information was shared and bias one of my key research interests. Following 
consultation with my department I finally shared the information, finding in this 
case that the act did not shape participation as other barriers to participation, 
including certain attitudes about and within the space, held out. Onn sharing the 
information, and after only a few weeks in the community, my colleagues suggested 
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that, as opposed to attending themselves, “you go and propose a project - you know 
what our needs are”. I attended the ‘working table’ sessions and made proposals 
for building repairs that were never followed up. This first dilemma, therefore, was 
important for the progression of my thinking by exposing how barriers to 
participation that were not only about information sharing. It also allowed me to 
reflect on the efficacy of the Parochial Assembly and on my own role within Cayapa. 
In turn, this gave me an opportunity to experience the ongoing efforts to negotiate 
the needs of Cayapa by other means - in part to ‘live the story’ (Connelly and 
Clandinin 1990) of participation in Pueblo Nuevo. 
This active role connects with a debate form the literature on participation in 
Venezuela. In reflecting on her own ethnographic work in Venezuela’s barrios, 
Schiller (2011: 256) distinguishes “scholarly and activist categories of analysis and 
practice”. In the ‘activist’ camp, Schiller (2001: 257) includes those researchers 
who are sympathetic to the revolutionary process in Venezuela, observing that 
their work is often typified by shift of focus away from the top-down tendencies of 
the Bolivarian system to the successes of community participation. Along with 
Fernandes, Duffy and Wilde, her work contains the normative undertones and 
employs the kind of “politically engaged and collaborative form of participant 
observation” that for Juris (2007: 164) constitutes a ‘militant ethnography’. 
Following Juris, I hope that my presence and questioning has contributed to activist 
“(self-) reflection regarding movement goals, tactics, strategies, and organizational 
forms” (Juris 2007: 165). I share Juris’s (ibid: 165) view of the need for researchers 
“to build long-term relationships of mutual commitment and trust, become 
entangled with complex relations of power, and live the emotions associated with 
direct action”. Most notably during fieldwork, this happened with Cayapa, where I 
was able to in some ways share in the emotional highs and lows of community 
work. 
Despite these similarities with activist research, identifying these competing 
‘camps’ feels like a limiting response to the important question of positionality. It 
implies stable roles that don’t fit with the dynamic, changing roles of a researcher 
who is immersed in a field site; an immersion that is differently experienced from 
moment to moment, and where the contribution I was able to make to discussions 
and activities was usually accompanied by a certain scholarly reflection. During 
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fieldwork, however, it was not only my role as participant or researcher that was 
in tension, but also my personal politics – especially in the highly-charged political 
environment during the period of anti-government protests in the Spring of 2014. 
In some cases, the public discussion of my political position was a condition of my 
access. At both the Sala de Batalla and Frente Vanguardia meetings, for example, I 
presented myself formally to the groups and fielded direct questions about my 
project. This included addressing concerns about my links to potentially hostile 
government organisations and specifically the CIA. These were questions that drew 
on assumptions about my identity and that came out of a particularly tense period 
of what some Chavistas feared was “US-backed destabilisation” in the city. In this 
respect, my political views were more exposed than they might have in a field site 
that was less sensitive to party-political preferences. Again, this experience was 
shared, as related suspicions were also applied to other new members.  
This commitment to greater openness, however, does not mean to say that my self-
presentation was always consistent. Like other participants in these spaces, I was 
involved in a process of managing my self-image to gain access and acceptance. This 
included often emphasising the fact that I lived and worked in Pueblo Nuevo. As a 
resident, I was technically a constituent for territorially-based groups like the 
Parochial Assembly, while association with a barrio that was believed to be both 
dangerous and politically radical attracted a lot of respect among Chavistas.11 This 
also drew my attention to some of the folk concepts that had evolved around Pueblo 
Nuevo. A more distanced approach where I had attempted to avoid sharing 
anything about my personal politics would certainly have hindered my access. 
Trust and solidarity are powerful currencies among Chavista groups which are 
alert to what they see as the risk of “infiltration” by non-Chavistas and which use 
word-of-mouth to communicate activities and meeting dates and times. In addition 
to showing broad support for Bolivarian socialism, at other times voicing honest 
criticism of the government seemed important for establishing myself as somebody 
who had a sense of what was happening in Venezuela. 
Reflecting on my shifting politics 
                                                          
11 This strategy was reflected in the self-presentation of others, including the Director for 
Comunas who emphasised his childhood in Caracas’s famous 23 de Enero barrio during our 
interview. 
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Like many of the researchers studying participatory politics in Venezuela’s barrios 
during the Chávez era, I became interested in the Bolivarian Revolution because of 
my personal politics. I came to focus on participatory approaches that propose an 
alternative to so-called “top-down”, mainstream development. For me, the 
Bolivarian ideology of participatory democracy talked about the sort of pro-poor 
social transformation – giving local people the opportunity to challenge the status 
quo, reintroducing the politics. This sympathy with the romantic Chavista narrative 
is a potential barrier to reflecting on the narrative of Bolivarianism. As discussed in 
Chapter Two, work that is written form a solidarity perspective can offer a limited 
analysis –including those commentaries written from within the narrative of 
Bolivarianism, rather than analysing it. At an early stage I decided, rather than to 
deny my political subjectivity, it would be better to engage with it and share this 
openly when explaining my research to my participants and in my writing.  
Before I began fieldwork, I tried to reflect honestly about how my politics might 
influence my research: 
“(I)t would satisfy me personally to find evidence of equitable and 
fairer social functioning, of tangible results delivered by 
collaborative action, and of a shift in attitudes towards solidarity 
and collective benefit (…) This bias has the potential to arise as a 
preference for accounts that are sympathetic to the revolutionary 
process, either through my sampling, questioning or analysis. By 
looking specifically at different experiences and excluded voices, 
however, I set out to encounter those that contradict my own 
perspective and that challenge my assumptions.”12 
Before fieldwork, I was optimistic about uncovering evidence of the kind of ‘social 
transformation’ Chávez talked about, towards more participatory kind of politics. 
Each time I returned from Venezuela, I felt that my idealism had been confronted 
by what I had seen in and around Pueblo Nuevo. I had begun to question the PSUV’s 
commitment to constructing rival poles of democratic authority, and had a growing 
concern with the manipulation of ‘the popular’ as an ill-defined source of legitimacy 
                                                          
12 This paragraph is an extract from my procedural upgrade paper, written in 2013. 
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for party and government. I was also concerned that the narrative of class conflict 
had potential not only to include those at the bottom of society, but to stoke 
antagonism and to exclude people from all classes who didn’t share the Chavista 
perspective. In the end, the bias I felt coming through was not a sense of rose-tinting 
community participation, but more a desire to call out those centralising or top-
down tendencies that I was observing. 
In some ways this shift facilitated the development of the analytical work of the 
thesis. It was as my observations confronted my assumptions about Bolivarianism, 
I began to think more critically about the intellectual landscape of Bolivarianism 
and consider the role of folk concepts about the urban poor. This also meant a shift 
in my own analytical language. In describing local processes I moved away from the 
sort of highly normative labels that I had been echoing from within Bolivarian 
discourses that boast of ‘dialogical’ ‘inclusive’ ‘collective’ ‘protagonistic’ or 
‘constituent’ forms of democracy. Instead, I began moving towards a common sense 
description of the specific situations that I was observing. Again, this echoes 
Englund and Leach’s (2000) challenge to avoid “abstractions” that seek to conflate 
local experiences within wider social processes. This emphasis also meant finding 
reference points for my analysis less in the contemporary analyses of the 
Revolution, and more in the historical literature about community organising in 
Pueblo Nuevo and Mérida’s other barrios (see especially Ray 1969, Burguera 1974 
and Hernández de Padrón 1998 and 1999, Buxton 1999, see especially Chapters 
Four and Five).  
My shifting subjectivities were also an ethical consideration during fieldwork. 
Many of my Chavista friends and participants quickly categorised me as a ‘political 
ally’. During this process of self-presentation, I was also conscious of the risk of 
misleading my participants by framing my research as a solidarity activity. For this 
reason, I tried to expose my political preferences by talking about my own 
experiences and attitudes with reference to politics in the UK or international 
questions of social justice, rather than only with reference to contemporary 
Venezuela. In this way I was able to present more informed, considered and stable 
opinions and find a way of sharing without committing to any fixed local political 
ideal. I also took care to assure my participants that I would write about ‘the bad 
things too’ when I introduced my work at meetings or before interviews. In 
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response, I was often encouraged simply to “describe how it really is”. Despite this 
reassurance. I saw the fairest strategy as using one that would include the voices of 
my participants and give them the opportunity to respond to some of my early 
analysis. 
Interview and dialogue: towards more collaborative story-telling 
Living in Pueblo Nuevo also meant continuing observations outside of participatory 
spaces, recording events, feelings and snippets of conversations in a field diary and 
rarely moving fully outside of the researcher role. This process gives opportunities 
to encounter the texture and detail of life that more temporally-constrained 
methods may miss. By living with the Angulo-Quinteros, by playing chess in the 
street with Jesús, by visiting the church with Mani, I was able to observe the parts 
of life that go on away from the processes of community participation – and 
separate to the narrative of embattled Chavismo. In this way, both participating and 
simply living in Pueblo Nuevo also gave me the opportunity to collect a range of 
interviews within which to reflect on what I was observing in Pueblo Nuevo.      
During fieldwork, I collected around sixty unstructured interviews and hundreds 
of informal conversations with residents of Pueblo Nuevo and other communities 
in Mérida, and with participants from groups in and around the barrio. Together, 
different accounts from these interviews contribute to what I hope approaches 
what Reissman (2002: 218) describes as a process of interwoven, collaborative 
storytelling.  
These interviews provided opportunities for people to describe their experiences 
in and around Pueblo Nuevo in their own words. I tried to treat each participant as 
an expert in some facet of community life – although I planned questions for each 
participant, I allowed interview topics to shift as I gained a better understanding of 
what a participant had particular knowledge of, or where they held views that I 
found interesting. In this way, the spokesmen at the Communal Council Calle 
Principal, offered their theories for low attendance at meetings. Teachers at Cayapa 
described the challenges of working with the Education Board, or compared their 
work to that of the new Bolivarian schools. Officials in the various government 
departments I visited gave accounts of the challenges of overcoming grassroots in-
fighting. As these participants sought to theorise their experiences, they often 
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reproduced the different folk concepts outlined in the thesis so far - although their 
accounts of their lived experiences often served to challenge these same notions.  
In eliciting these views and accounts, I used a dialogical interview style. According 
to Ritchie & Lewis (2003:140 in Bell 2013:115-116), this is where: 
“... the researcher feels free to step outside the formal role of 
the neutral asker of questions, expressing their own feelings 
and giving information about themselves ...”  
I employed this principle during private conversations, meetings and at work and 
during formal interviews as a means of building trust and acceptance and as a 
means of exposing my thinking to my participants so that my interpretations could 
be contested. This was also part of a desire to make exchanges fairer through 
reciprocal sharing of ideas and to subvert something of my researcher power (see 
also Chacko 2004: 60). 
This also meant sharing my own early analysis as it developed. In particular, this 
meant exporing sensationalised ideas about malandros, revolucionarios and other 
folk concepts where they arose in conversation. A particular focus was in asking 
participants to explain their notions of “el pueblo”. Different people made use of the 
term “the people”, in describing groups and processes. From these different 
accounts, and by raising the notion as a topic for discussion, it was possible to 
uncover the broad range of conceptions discussed in Chapter Five, unpacking 
shifting ideas about the class, wealth, nationality and of what I came to see as a 
hypothetical constituent group for the Bolivarian Revolution that connects with 
different folk concepts about the urban poor.  
Like Bell (2013), therefore, I found that the responses and subsequent exchanges 
from a dialogical approach “led to important insights”. A specific example was 
during my interview with Gabriella Verón (interview w GV, 14.04.14, MC). This was 
an interview that started off as a fairly closed discussion of her experiences with 
the evangelical church, the Iglesia Jeruslen. When we first met in the church itself, 
Gabriella knew very little about my attitudes to religion. Early in the interview 
Gabriella asked me about my own experiences with religion, and my unplanned 
response indicated my concerns about spiritual authority. It is from this point, 
however, that Gabriella opened up, giving a rich account of her own historic 
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problems with authority within the church that also emphasises the humility and 
openness of the current leadership. The sequence of our accounts presents a 
challenge for analysis: is her account a ‘response’ to my own? Is it designed to 
convince me or to ‘match’ with my story? 
It is not entirely possible to resolve these questions. The part of Gabriella’s 
interview that concerns her personal experience is full of concrete details and fits 
with reflections of other congregation members. Beyond this, I am committed to 
the idea of openness with my participants. If a participant prefers to shape their 
story in line with their immediate social interests (during the interview) or around 
a certain ideology, this is a process that I would prefer to be informed by more 
accurate rather than assumed information about my own response. In Gabriella’s 
case, I was left with a rich account that can be considered in the context of this these 
details. These moments of honesty and openness - of dialogue that was less guarded 
and information sharing that was reciprocal - were essential to building rapport 
with people and to improving my understanding of the subjectivities of their 
accounts.  
This process was helped by developing familiarity between myself and my research 
participants over time. The majority of my formal interviews were conducted in the 
last three months of data collection. This strategy was designed to give me the 
maximum insight possible into my participants and to use this insight to shape my 
questioning and my understanding of their subjectivities as well as provide context 
of their accounts and responses. By the time of my final interviews I had known 
some of my participants for as long as a year and a half. With some, this meant 
working with them regularly, overcoming professional challenges, knowing family 
and personal histories and debating my key research interests informally on many 
occasions. 13 
                                                          
13 In terms of sequencing my research period, delaying interviews in this way was a risk. It 
was unnerving to wait and develop a relationship but potentially miss out on an interview. 
As I left and returned to Pueblo Nuevo three times, this increased trust and familiarity but 
also meant losing touch with some participants and even spaces as the environment 
changed over time. One example of this was the Sala de Batalla, which ceased activities 
during the period of unrest throughout the spring of 2014 due to concerns about potential 
attacks from opposition protesters. 
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This familiarity enabled me to prepare interview questions that moved quickly 
beyond surface detail. I would typically start with open-ended personal history 
questions to help the participant feel at ease and to access detail that had not come 
up in everyday or work conversations. From here I would work through a series of 
questions tailored around what I knew of the person’s attitudes and experiences 
already, often returning to themes I had been planning to discuss for some months 
or that has been discussed in depth on previous occasions. I tried to let interviews 
follow a ‘natural’ course, most often using discussions around a shared space to 
encourage more personal reactions and reflections to concrete examples of 
organisation functioning.  
This process meant establishing emotional connections with participants that 
means they are friend first and interviewee second. In this context ‘researcher’ and 
‘research participant’ were roles we were fulfilling on a  temporary basis, although 
this sort of social integration means the edges between research and social life 
were thoroughly blurred. 
3. Using historical evidence to reflect on a particular political 
moment 
In December 2013, following the end of my first stint of fieldwork in Pueblo Nuevo, 
I arrived by moto-taxi at one of the grandest hotels in Caracas. I was wearing the 
thick beard I had been growing in the barrio and carrying my beaten-up backpack 
that had accompanied me overland from Ushuaia to Cartagena back in 2006. The 
other hotel guests were arriving in expensive cars, dressed in suits or dresses. 
Around fifty of us made up a delegation of international observers - guests of the 
National Electoral Commission (CNE) at the “8 D” national municipal elections.  
Following Chávez’s final victory in the Presidential Elections of November 2012, 
nationwide State elections in December 2012 and Nicolas Maduro’s narrow win in 
April 2013, our hosts were well drilled for the fourth series of national elections in 
a little over twelve months. For the next week, we were treated like diplomats. With 
senior officials from election ministries across the continent and as far afield as 
South Africa, and human rights lawyers from the United States, we took breakfast 
by the pool in the spacious grounds, the sun shining on the steep hillsides in the 
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distance where houses competed for space in the capital’s many barrios. After 
Pueblo Nuevo, the luxury was surreal – from the air-conditioned hallways and the 
expensive dinners, to the helipad outside my room window.14 
A visit to polling stations in the city’s barrios brought these two worlds together. 
On the day of the election, our delegation swept across the capital in our coach, 
headed for the famous barrio 23 de Enero. I had heard the name of the community 
throughout my reading on Venezuelan popular politics and Chavismo where it is 
famous for having the most militant sorts of grassroots politics in both the pre-
Chávez era and during the Bolivarian Revolution (see Ciccariello-Maher 2013: 22-
28. For our visit, we were accompanied by secret service agents with earpieces and 
flanked by a ‘flying V’ of military outriders who carved apart the thick Caracas 
traffic. Cars screeched to a halt and our bus forced its way down the highways that 
span the city. We inched up the steeper roads to the famous barrio, the 
neighbourhoods we might not dare to visit rolling past behind the tinted glass. At 
the polling station we were watched with curiosity by the voters, chatted with local 
officials for the television cameras, and whisked away to our next location.15 
Part of the analytical work of this thesis is in seeing past the “spectacle” of national 
politics in Venezuela (Uzcategui 2010), to improve on the fleeting glimpses of 
Venezuela’s unseen barrios and the politicised representations of communities like 
23 de Enero and Pueblo Nuevo. This meant two tasks: i) developing a critical 
understanding of the particular political moment of the fieldwork period, and ii) 
developing an appreciation of the barrio’s history to be able to reflect analytically 
on Bolivarian claim that a social transformation has taken place under Chavismo.  
Connecting with national politics  
Connecting studies of participatory politics with national processes is 
commonplace in the regional literature, as changes in government have led to 
changes in how community organising is practised and thought about. For this 
                                                          
14 Our days were filled with activities designed to provide us with the evidence to prove the 
fairness of the electoral system – a priority for both Chávez and now Maduro, who seem to 
see an electoral system beyond repute as part of their armoury against foreign intervention. 
15 Back in Pueblo Nuevo, I was briefly famous, having been glimpsed on TV, meeting Tibisay 
Lucena, the head of the CNE. 
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thesis, national political events overlapping with the fieldwork period between late 
2012 and 2014 helped to show how national politics is and isn’t important for 
residents of Pueblo Nuevo. The timeline below shows how national events 
progressed during fieldwork.  
National Events 2012 Research Progress 
Chávez wins a 4th Presidential 
Term with 55.07% of the vote 
November Initial reading, making contact 
with solidarity groups, met with 
Venezuela Solidarity Campaign in 
London and Diana Raby in 
Norwich. 
Nationwide Municipal 
Elections – another victory for 
Chavismo, but Chávez returns 
to Cuba for cancer treatment 
December Scoping trip to Venezuela, 
including observing the 
municipal election period in 
Mérida 
2013 
Chávez misses his Presidential 
inauguration, solidarity march 
in Caracas 
January I attend the march (description in 
Chapter Five). 
Chávez’s death is announced 
on the 5th of March. Chavistas 
mourn while the Opposition 
call for immediate presidential 
elections 
March I continue to participate with the 
VSC, including stewarding at a 
candle-lit vigil for Chávez in 
London  
Nicolas Maduro defeats MUD 
candidate Henrique Capriles 
by 1.7% 
April I record endorsements with 
Jeremy Corbyn and Ken 
Livingstone in London for use on 
Venezuelan television. 
Capriles alleges fraud and calls 
for an official recount 
May - 
August 
I arrive in Venezuela in July, 
move to Pueblo Nuevo and begin 
work at La Escuelita and 
attending community meetings. 
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After a student, Juan Carlos 
Davilla Barrios, is murdered in 
Pueblo Nuevo, protests in 
Mérida make national 
headlines 
September I begin teaching adult high school 
classes for the new school 
semester at la Escuelita 
Maduro launches the Street 
Government – an initiative 
aimed at consulting public 
opinion and reforming the 
PSUV 
October I investigate the story of the 
Communal Council and attend 
meetings of the Sala de Batalla 
and Parochial Assembly 
National price-fixing initiative 
ahead of national elections 
November I interview people queuing for 
goods in Mérida and publish my 
first article for 
Venezuelanalysis.com (see 
description in Chapter Five) 
Chavistas hold their ground in 
Nationwide Municipal 
Elections 
December I visit Caracas as an international 
observer with the CNE, before 
returning to the UK 
2014 
Following a shooting at an 
opposition march in Caracas 
Anti-government protests 
begin across the country 
February  I prepare to return to Venezuela 
The protests continue, with a 
series of Guarimba 
occupations, including several 
in Mérida City 
March I arrive in Venezuela for the third 
time. Discussion around safety of 
fieldwork site.  
Gradually across the country 
the protest occupations come 
to an end 
April - May I begin to participate with Frente 
de Vanguardia de Hugo Chávez 
and begin teaching research skills 
classes at La Escuelita 
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The PSUV attempts to shore 
up support and launches a 
project of mass public 
consultation, receiving 20,000 
submissions for grassroots 
groups 
June Events in Mérida include the 
Street Government, a local group 
discussions of the PSUV 
consultation request, and a PSUV 
consultation conference (see 
Chapter Seven) 
 
The PSUV continues attempts 
to shore up support 
July On my last day in Venezuela, a 
march through the barrio brings 
members of the Frente 
Vanguardia and other groups into 
Pueblo Nuevo for the first time 
2015 
The opposition win control of 
the National Assembly 
December After fieldwork  
 
The national story of Chavismo during the period of this research is one of a 
deepening political crisis. While Chávez’s victory in November 2012 offered a brief 
respite from the uncertainty brought on by his illness, the following year and half 
would see his death, the narrow electoral victory of his successor Nicolas Maduro, 
allegations of electoral fraud and a vote recount, and a sustained period of anti-
government protests. These different events happened against a backdrop of 
economic decline, shortages of goods, and various unsuccessful attempts by the 
PSUV to suggest that the party was being capable of reform, and to recapture the 
support of the Venezuelan public. This decline in support ultimately culminated in 
the National Assembly victory of 2015, seen by some commentators within the 
process as spelling the end for Chavismo (e.g. Denis 2015).  
During fieldwork, this national story acted as a prompt for local events to happen 
and be interacted with and talked about by my local participants. The anti-
government protest movement was felt directly in Mérida, where the first student 
protests during fieldwork were in response to the murder of a student at the 
entrance to the barrio. The guarimba protests also served as an appropriate 
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analogy for the sentiments in the city - with frustration and a sense of embattled 
determination on both political sides. The fact that these protests were at least in 
part about sections of the population who feel alienated from the public narrative 
of Chavismo, and have growing support among popular sectors, fits with the 
sentiment of discontent expressed by different local people during fieldwork (see 
especially chapters six and seven).  
The declining legitimacy of the PSUV also connects with the analytical narrative of 
this thesis. As in the 1980s, a general sense of public dissatisfaction has grown in 
Venezuela, in part due to some of the continuities with the pre-Chávez era 
discussed in the remainder of the thesis. This can be seen in the grumblings of 
Chavista activists, who sought to connect with the legend of Chávez, but mount a 
sustained criticism of the PSUV (see Chapter Seven). It can also be seen in the grand 
gestures of the PSUV to try and address this shift in support - in the Street 
Government initiative that visited Mérida City (see Chapter Seven), and in the 
price-fixing initiative (see Chapter Five). In return, these gestures were reflected 
by local responses: the march through the barrio described in the introduction to 
the thesis, and the participation in the underwhelming public consultation 
initiative described in Chapter Seven. 
Relating local experiences with wider national processes  
Part of connecting with national politics meant identifying research arenas where 
the Pueblo Nuevo bridged with the rest of the city of Mérida. In practice, this meant 
observing those spaces where people from the barrio and people from the rest of 
Mérida participated. Fundación Cayapa was the main example from inside the 
barrio. Chapter Eight describes how part of the achievements both of Fundación 
Cayapa and of the semi-independent barrio organisations in Pueblo Nuevo during 
the pre-Chávez era is to bring outsiders to the community, including student 
activists and teachers. 
Outside the barrio, more often this meant attending spaces that residents of Pueblo 
Nuevo could have attended, but did not. The reasons for the absence of residents 
from Pueblo Nuevo at the Sala de Batalla, Frente de Vanguardia de Hugo Chávez, 
Street Government and the Parochial Assembly are discussed in Chapter Seven. 
Using information from these meetings also fits with what Fernandes (2010: 30 
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states – that where organisations and networks bridge community boundaries, an 
ethnographer who is interested in activism and participation in urban settings 
must move beyond thinking about a single, boundaried community. For this reason, 
existing studies into participatory politics in Venezuela tend to focus either on 
groups (Leary 2009; Fernandes 2010; Schiller 2011b) or institutions (Gill 2012; 
Duffy 2012) that are part of a network of spaces that connect to a certain central 
community where these researchers based themselves. In some cases, however, 
this may limit the scope of analysis. Investigating the “democratisation of 
knowledge” (Leary 2009), for example, by focusing on how representations are 
produced, may miss important silent accounts that might be unearthed through a 
community, rather than organisation-based study. A more extreme example is 
where, by anonymising the communities involved in his thesis, Gill (2012) limits 
the options for considering how historical social and cultural factors have affected 
the emergence of new participatory practices. In contrast, by focusing on the wider 
community, Wilde (2014, 2015) is able to reflect the variety of experiences and the 
diversity of attitudes within his field-site. 
Attempting to understand the differences between these different groups also 
meant spreading myself quite thin, as it was important to try and capture different 
sentiments and experiences from a politically interesting moment for the city, and 
for collecting ideas about barrio populations.  This analysis is also limited in that 
these observations included only those meetings which I was aware of and was able 
to attend. Gaining access to these meetings was a part of my efforts to become part 
of the network of community activists – a process I describe in more detail in 
Chapter Four. In every case I heard about events by personal communication – 
either in person or by group text messages from activist contacts, or in some cases 
due to information received from public officials. At all meetings I made myself 
known to the organisers and asked for permission to observe and record audio. At 
the meetings I attended more regularly, the Sala de Batalla and the Frente de 
Vanguardia, I was invited to discuss my research and answer questions about my 
credentials.  
As my credibility and my network grew, I gained access to different meetings and 
institutions – giving me the opportunity to collect the evidence used to compare 
different city-level groups) and to interview different officials and to attend some 
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of their “closed” meetings where the strategy for participatory politics for Mérida 
was discussed (see especially Chapter Seven). Working at these different levels is 
about continuing the task of existing studies of community organising in Venezuela 
by Hernández de Padrón, Fernandes, Wilde and Gill as they connect those unseen 
barrio communities with the political spectacle of the Bolivarian Revolution. These 
tasks require a varied set of research methods suitable for moving between local 
detail and thick description, and the sorts of observations that can be made at those 
places and moments where these different political worlds overlap. In part, this is 
also about providing a record of a particular and interesting political moment.  As 
the Bolivarian Revolution enters a new phase without Chávez, and during a 
sustained crisis of political legitimacy for the PSUV, part of the work of this thesis 
is about describing the shifting connection between people and state as it is 
conceptualised at different times by the different people mentioned in this thesis.  
Grounding information in historical context 
Participating in day-to-day life and organising in Pueblo Nuevo, collecting accounts 
from different people and from different political spaces, and arriving with my own 
assumptions and politics at an especially dramatic political moment for Venezuela 
– these factors shape this thesis and had the potential to produce the sorts of 
analysis “from within Bolivarianism” discussed in the previous chapter. In an 
environment where the political violence in Mérida during the anti-government 
protest in particular appeared to support the sensationalised class-warfare 
narrative of Bolivarianism, an important part of the analytical work of this thesis 
was also to think about Pueblo Nuevo without reproducing Chavista versions of 
political processes or deploying the folk concepts about the Venezuelan urban poor 
expressed by my participants. This meant studying the barrio in the context of its 
seventy year history. This meant challenging the prevailing conception that is used 
to describe the Bolivarian Revolution among both its supporters and detractors – 
the idea that a profound political transformation has taken place since Chávez’s 
election in 1998. 
In the thesis so far – in chapters two and three – I made use of several studies into 
politics in the community and Mérida’s other barrios to build a picture of Pueblo 
Nuevo’s history before fieldwork, and particularly before 1998. These included 
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Jugo Burguera’s decade of studies into Mérida’s barrios from the perspective a 
town planner (completed in 1970s, published online as 2014a, 2014b, 2014c), 
Hernández de Padrón’s two studies into barrio organising in Mérida (1998 and 
1999), Prato Vicuna’s (2013) article in Mérida’s residents’ movements and various 
studies. These Mérida-focused studies – all of which I found after fieldwork was 
completed – have proven essential in developing the analysis of this thesis. This is 
particularly the case as local accounts of pre-Chávez organising were vague and 
generalised. In part, this was due to my questioning – it was difficult to ask about a 
period for which I knew very little.16 The exception was Gerardo Lopez’s study into 
the history of barrio organising during his childhood and adult life in Pueblo Nuevo.  
Following my return from Venezuela, however, these articles and Gerardo’s study 
together provided me with the material to write the history of Pueblo Nuevo spread 
over Chapter Two and Chapter Three, setting up the discussion of areas of 
continuity and change in the remainder of the thesis. Jugo Burguera’s studies over 
several years provide statistical data on the population growth for Mérida’s barrios, 
city plans, a map of Pueblo Nuevo (Chapter Two) and an eye witness account of a 
local conflict over electing spokesmen (see discussion in Chapter Six). Hernández 
de Padrón’s two articles give an overview of the development of barrio 
organisations in Mérida, explaining how national changes of government led to 
successive attempts to establish partisan organisations –and the resistance of these 
attempts by semi-independent groups.  
Making use of these studies has meant connecting primary contemporary 
information with secondary historical information. I have done this by seeking out 
commonalities between these accounts and my own observation, most often 
regarding the relationship between city authorities, political parties and local 
groups. Because Pueblo Nuevo was the city’s first barrio settlement, the detail in 
these accounts is enough to begin to draw the comparisons with the experience of 
the contemporary Brisas de Alba housing campaign (see Chapter Six) and the role 
                                                          
16 Revisiting some of the accounts in this historical literature, therefore, is a possible future 
continuation of this study. 
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of city authorities including the FUNDACOMUN (Chapter Seven) and the semi-
independent organising of Fundación Cayapa (Chapter Eight).17  
These studies from the pre-Chávez era also provide examples of different kinds of 
thinking about barrio populations. Jugo Burguera, Hernández de Padrón and Ray 
all describe barrio settlements as “land invasions” – reproducing the notions about 
belonging discussed in Chapters Two and Three. However, there is also a sense of 
different sympathies from these different writers. In Jugo Burguera’s writing, his 
background as an architect and city planner seem to inform his concerns about – 
for example - the risks of poorly-built barrio housing or the lack of suitable social 
spaces. His writing also presents barrio problems to some extent as concerns that 
might be best met by state solutions. In contrast, Hernández de Padrón emphasised 
the ways that barrio groups in Mérida were frustrated by city authorities and by 
political parties’ attempts to establish dependent community organisations. She 
appears to celebrate the examples where barrio populations from Pueblo Nuevo 
and elsewhere succeeded in resisting this.  
These studies from the pre-Chávez era, therefore, help to ground the analytical 
work of this study and locate contemporary experiences and representations of 
community organising in Pueblo Nuevo in historical context. This in turn supports 
the major contribution of this study – that of presenting evidence of important 
continuities between pre-Chávez era and the period of fieldwork. Presenting 
contemporary experiences as part of a longer-term trajectory of community 
development helps not only to challenging notions about the exceptionalism of 
Chavismo, but to better understand the character of community organising by 
exposing some of the inherited tensions around participatory politics – including 
where they draw on folk concepts about the urban poor.   
                                                          
17 The studies by Jugo Burguera and Hernández de Padrón, along with Gerardo’s study from 
Pueblo Nuevo, also connect with national accounts. This includes work by Ellner and 
Buxton on barrio organisations in the pre-Chávez era, and contemporary work by 
Fernandes (2010) and Wilde (2016) and Ciccariello-Maher (2013) that use historical 
evidence to discuss Venezuela’s contemporary social movements. 
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4. Conclusion: intersecting researcher roles and subjectivities 
This chapter has described a methodology for gaining access to and collecting 
different kinds of information i) about processes of community organising in and 
around Pueblo Nuevo and ii) about how these processes are thought about by 
different people in Mérida. Navigating these different kinds of evidence and the 
complex context of both a particular political moment and a local history seen 
through secondary sources is a challenging analytical task. These different sorts of 
information and the challenges of living and doing research in Pueblo Nuevo have 
shaped this thesis – a process that has happened in relation with my own complex 
research positionality. As a non-Latin American, many of the reference points for 
my thinking have come from my own country, and my own experiences working 
with poor urban communities in East London and Bristol. Coming from the UK, with 
our well-established ideas about liberal democracy, I am perhaps especially 
conscious of the tensions between liberalism and socialism that are being lived out 
in Venezuela’s complex experience of Twenty First Century Socialism. I am also 
especially conscious that being white and male has made issues of race and gender 
stand out less in the accounts of my participants than, for example, ideas about 
criminality or political radicalism – the two themes that were always associated in 
my mind with Venezuela’s barrio communities. 
Part of the contribution of this study, therefore, is about developing a detailed 
picture of life and politics in and around a particularly interesting community – of 
a community where people live with their reputation as a notorious, inaccessible 
barrio but where day-to-day life feels normal to its residents when compared with 
the spectacle of politics going in Mérida during fieldwork. Pueblo Nuevo is a place 
with a rich history of community organising, where some of the tensions of Chávez-
era politics are still being played out. In this context, and in the context of 
sensationalising narratives about both barrio populations and about participatory 
politics, finding a way to have a multi-faceted research experience and collect a rich 
set of different kinds of information was important to telling the story of Pueblo 
Nuevo. For this, playing an active role, building genuine relationships and finding 
opportunities to have dialogue about my own assumptions and those of the people 
around me was essential to my research participants the opportunity to contest my 
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changing reading of community politics. Finally, it is an appreciation of the history 
both of barrio experiences with community organising and with national 
discourses about the relationship between people and government that reveals 
what has changed and what hasn’t changed for the present era. 
Like Stacey (1988: 21), I am concerned about the possibilities for “exploitation, 
betrayal and abandonment” by ethnographic researchers. She emphasises the ease 
with which a researcher can detach themselves from their research context and 
networks and the ultimate ownership of their research products that they enjoy 
versus their participants. I hope, therefore, that the methodology described in this 
chapter provides a framework for encountering Pueblo Nuevo in a meaningful way, 
for accessing the spaces and building the trust to give me an opportunity to 
represent some of the accounts of the people I met in Venezuela, and for using an 
awareness of both contemporary politics and recent history to overcome some of 
my assumptions and conduct the analysis in the remainder of the thesis.  
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6. Epic strugglers and grateful clients: 
inherited tensions and strategies for 
organising in and around barrio Pueblo 
Nuevo 
 
 
 
 
In August 2013, the first weekly meeting of the Communal Council Calle Principal 
that I observed was energetic and well-attended. Chairs spilled out across Pueblo 
Nuevo’s main street outside the CEDECOL school building, forming a rough semi-
circle around the table where an amplifier broadcast proceedings out across the 
barrio. From the mural on the wall the giant faces of Hugo Chávez and Fidel Castro 
saluted the session. As dusk fell and the street lights flickered on, residents arrived 
in ones and twos, calling out to friends watching from front windows or perched 
on the bonnets of parked cars. Passing motorbikes wound in amongst the bodies, 
dodging children or stopping to share gossip. By the time the meeting began, 
around twenty-five people were seated on the school chairs in the middle of the 
street, with another twenty watching from bedroom windows or various vantage 
points just outside the circle. The spokesmen took turns speaking into the 
microphone, saying that “everyone is welcome” as “we are all citizens”.  
It was the last meeting that would take place in the street. From the following week 
the sessions moved into the cramped entrance hall of the school building. Regular 
attendance declined to around seven or eight. By the summer of 2014, the council 
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had retreated further, moving upstairs to the disused radio station above the school 
building, to a meeting room that fits only a handful of people. Numbers reduced 
further still, and one regular participant who is unable to climb the stairs was left 
in his wheelchair in the courtyard below. This decline was coupled with the 
frustration of council projects and underpinned by the refusal of formal 
registration by the Chavista city authorities. 
In contrast, just up the street above barrio Simon Bolivar, regular meetings of the 
Brisas de Alba “dignified housing” movement remained well–attended throughout 
this period. More significant, however, was the building progress, as three 
apartment blocks sprang up from occupied wasteland as part of the national social 
housing project Mission Vivienda. The Brisas group, made up mainly of mothers and 
their families from the two neighbouring barrios, had mounted a constant vigil over 
the territory they had occupied. Their overtly Chavista campaign had then been 
acknowledged by the government, who built three large apartment blocks on the 
land, eventually handing over keys to the first 135 completed apartments to the 
group in June 2014.  
In the spring of 2014 – after that first communal council but before the keys were 
handed over for the Brisas de Alba development – a different type of construction 
was going on in the area surrounding Pueblo Nuevo. In the middle-class 
urbanizaciones to the east of the barrio, in the north and south of the city, and 
cutting-off the main thoroughfare of Las Americas Avenue, the anti-government 
protest movement built barricades to stop traffic and create a zone where 
government authority was no longer recognised. Makeshift roadblocks appeared 
in January. They were soon reinforced with metal panels and slabs of concrete 
hauled from roadside verges and manned by armed vigilantes. These protests – 
known as guarimbas - sprang up at flashpoints across the country, claiming the 
lives of forty people. They would last longest in the middle-class Altamira 
neighbourhood in Caracas and in Mérida, along the main avenue that runs north to 
south at the western edge of Pueblo Nuevo. 
These different contemporary examples of community organising are also linked 
by the nature of their relationships with broader political processes. In each cases 
these relationships are defined by how the participants are able to position 
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themselves with relation to ideas about who Bolivarian popular politics is for. In 
doing so, they also seek to fit around the political identities emphasised in the thesis 
so far - as empowered citizens, as the deserving poor, and in the case of the 
protesters as a revolutionaries with a different kind of politics. While the three 
groups described here have important differences, the strategies of each group and 
their attempts to locate themselves with relation to the political discourses all 
continue characteristics of community organising from the pre-Chávez era. 
Aims and structure of the chapter 
The previous chapter described the rise of Bolivarianism as a mass movement that 
courted Venezuela’s barrio populations by presenting Chávez as both the patron 
and the emancipator of the urban poor. I demonstrated how these two 
interpretations of populism connect with different folk concepts about barrio 
populations and their capacity for participating in politics. This emancipation, 
Chávez (in interview in Harnecker 2003: 157-158) said, would come as the 
leadership had “…sought out organising models to convert the popular movement 
into a bottom-up avalanche.” This proposed shift towards bottom-up processes 
was in part a response to the alienation of the urban poor, and to their 
dissatisfaction with the clientelistic practices that characterised community 
organising during the pre-Chávez era. 
In the thesis so far I have argued that there are two tensions in the Bolivarian 
narrative of popular emancipation. The first is the tension between the notions of 
emancipation and patronage – two political promises with bases in different 
conceptions of populism and democracy, and with different folk concepts about the 
urban poor. The second related tension arises around the Chavista notion of 
“popular will” - a conception of the public good as a singular, identifiable set of 
interests that can be known and satisfied. In this respect, Chávez talked about the 
Venezuelan people as an “unprecedented popular force”, which he called on to 
“…be unified and strengthened so instead of moving forwards along thousands of 
individual paths, it found a common direction” (ibid). This notion of a common 
direction is developed alongside the “agonistic” Bolivarian public narrative of class 
politics (Emerson 2011), that sets constraints around who Chavista popular 
politics is for.  
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This chapter uses different kinds of information from in and round Pueblo Nuevo 
to connect analyses of the Bolivarian public narrative with the literature on the 
evolution of participatory politics in Venezuela. The experiences of the Communal 
Council Calle Principal, the housing collective Brisas de Alba, and the guarimba anti-
government protest movement of 2014 are each used to identify two areas of 
continuity from the pre-Chávez era. First, I demonstrate the continuation of 
experiences of community organisations that are shaped by either dependent or 
combative relationships with the Venezuelan state and ruling party. Second, I 
demonstrate the continuation of selective clientelism, grounded in Bolivarian 
notions of political constituency. These processes are then connected to Auyero’s 
(2000) study that considers how cultural representations feed into and from 
processes of clientelism and brokerage, as the urban poor represent themselves as 
either epic strugglers, or grateful clients. 
The chapter begins presenting evidence from interviews and informal 
conversations with members of the Brisas de Alba housing collective. The 
movement is shown to continue some of the characteristics of the more combative 
and independent barrio organisations of the 1960s and 1970s, as the group seek to 
unify in defence of their interests and also position themselves as clients to benefit 
from the politicisation of infrastructural projects under Chavismo. The chapter 
continues by presenting evidence about the anti-government guarimba protest 
movement of 2014. I argue that while the so-called right-wing protests do not 
necessarily fit with Chavista narratives about popular power, they continue some 
of the strategies and objectives of important leftist student movements from the 
pre-Chávez era. The chapter concludes by bringing together interviews and 
informal conversations with key participants and non-participating residents, 
along with observations of the meetings and activities of the Communal Council 
Calle Principal. These different kinds of information are used to discuss the group’s 
experience of partidismo, the resulting loss of credibility for the PSUV among the 
grassroots and the ways the group have attempted to maintain their independence. 
1. The Brisas de Alba collective: Chavismo’s revolutionary clients? 
In June 2014, the day of the ceremony handing over the keys for the first completed 
Brisas de Alba apartments was a momentous moment for the two barrios of the 
173 
 
Albarregas Valley. Until this time, and like most of the rest of the community, I had 
only seen the construction site at a distance. On arrival at the celebration, a council 
spokesman from one of the districts to the south of the city spotted me in the crowd 
and slipped me in to the middle tower block blocks for a first glimpse of the finished 
apartments. We walked down empty corridors, popping our heads into different 
apartments. In each, the grey, unfurnished rooms contrasted with the jubilant 
scenes and the red shirts and banners of the crowd glimpsed through the windows.  
Back at street level, the celebrations were gathering pace. As the youth dance 
troupe from La Escuelita wowed the crowds with their human pyramids, Governor 
Alexis Ramirez sat and checked his messages on his phone. The teaching staff from 
Fundación Cayapa mingled with the Brisas de Alba collective –there to support our 
young students and friends from the barrio. Dusk had fallen by the time the keys 
were handed out and the families celebrated – not least Janeath, the Director of La 
Escuelita who clutched her keys in the air and celebrated with her children. Now in 
her forties, Janeath had finally moved out of her family home. It was a change made 
possible by the four-year campaign and the government’s commitment to provide 
“dignified housing”. All the while, the iconic eyes of Chávez painted on to on the 
Brisas building, watching over the celebrations (see Photo 3). 
Legitimate invasiones? New land and housing movements in Pueblo Nuevo 
and Simon Bolivar  
The handing over of keys to the Brisas apartment blocks is a significant moment for 
Pueblo Nuevo and Simon Bolivar. Chapter Two described how 1973’s attempt to 
expand Pueblo Nuevo to the south was demolished by the National Guard and city 
police. Now, the latest expansion to the North of the twin barrios of the Albarregas 
Valley had been sanctioned and paid for by the Chavista government. This was a 
strikingly different response to an occupation which, like the 1973 movement, was 
planned by barrio residents as a response to over-crowding.  
In contrast to the so-called “land invasions” of the mid-twentieth century or the 
waves of barrio expansion in the 1960s and 1970s, the new apartment blocks built 
to the North of Simon Bolivar were completed on formally expropriated private 
land, and funded through the national housing Mission Vivienda. In 2010, Chávez 
began to encourage the expropriation of unused private land to help identify areas 
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suitable for Mission Vivienda construction projects. In a speech to the House of 
Representatives, he gave a call to the Venezuelan public to form social movements 
to identify and occupy suitable plots for the construction of apartments and houses, 
legislating for the seizure of ‘disaffected lands’ in the Urban Land Law – Ley de 
Tierra Urbana (Raby 2006: 178). This speech called on his constituents – the 
humble, long-suffering Venezuelan poor - and invited them to be part of the 
Bolivarian process of social transformation by taking part in the direct re-
appropriation of property from the Venezuelan bourgeoisie. 
In response to this general consent from the President, two sites bordering Pueblo 
Nuevo and Simon Bolivar were occupied. These were the land to the North East of 
Simon Bolivar used during the bullfighting festivals at the Plaza de Toros and the 
land to the West of the Ambulatorio Venezuela, owned by the Chinese family who 
ran the Yuan Lin supermarket to the south of the barrio (see Map 1).  
 
Map 1. The grey area on the left is the Yuan Lin site and the Plaza de Toros site is on the 
right. Edited from Jugo Burguera’s original version (2004: 79)1 
This movement developed as a response to the living conditions in the two barrios. 
If the Bolivarian Missions described in the previous chapter had rewarded 
Venezuela’s barrio populations for their political support, the problems facing 
residents of Pueblo Nuevo were not all addressed by the new initiatives. High levels 
of violent crime continued to shape every-day life, while addiction, unemployment, 
domestic violence and family breakdown were problems in Pueblo Nuevo that had 
                                                          
1 Key reads: “Prominent Slopes, total change in elevation 30 metres.” Title reads: map of the 
location of three neighbouring barrios in the centre of the City of Mérida in the Albarregas 
River valley.” 
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not been addressed by any state-funded initiatives. These concerns dominate the 
list collected by Barrio Adentro staff in their household survey in Pueblo Nuevo in 
2011 (Correa and Wilson 2011). Just as the desire for more living space had 
motivated the original founding of the barrio and the attempted expansion during 
the Comité de Toma of 1973, efforts to expand the community were renewed by 
campaigns by new community members for land and social housing from 2010. 
From June 2010, separate movements known as custodios – or “custodians” - 
planned and occupied the two sites and began to petition the government to begin 
construction. The members of the Plaza de Torros movement were formed from 
families from Simon Bolivar and Pueblo Nuevo, while the Yuan Lin movement also 
included members from barrio Santa Domingo and other neighbouring 
communities. During fieldwork, several attempts to make contact with the Yuan Lin 
group were unsuccessful. For this reason this description will focus on the Plaza de 
Toros movement, known as Brisas de Alba.2 
The Brisas de Alba collective began with 250 members, who maintained a constant 
presence in the occupied territory. Members committed one or two hours each a 
day and formed ten groups of around fifteen people to sleep out at nights 
(Interview w. LD, 15.7.14, BA). The participants were typically young mothers who 
lived in over-crowded conditions in the two barrios and who frequently their night-
shifts with their young children (Interview w. DO, 24.05.14, PN). As well as the 
symbolism of the occupation, the groups also had a practical purpose, including 
preventing the return of temporary squatters who had been evicted with support 
from city authorities (ibid). 
                                                          
2 I suspect in part this was due to the reluctance of any single member to speak to me 
without the other members of the group agreeing this. The story of the as-yet-undeveloped 
Yuan Lin site is one that remains to be told. It is especially interesting that the occupied land 
is owned by a Chinese family – a rarity in Venezuela. This family have also had a previous 
conflict with the barrio, as the foundations dug for building works for the supermarket 
threatened the structural integrity of the hillside, and the family were required to pay costs 
to some residents. This tension could be a fruitful avenue for further investigation, 
especially as the nationalist Chavista discourse is especially critical of foreign economic 
activity in Venezuela.  
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Photo 1. In Pueblo Nuevo and Simon Bolivar, homes have different building standards. June 
2014 
Chávez’s endorsement of the land seizures gave them a complicated legitimacy. In 
part, this is linked to the political identity of Brisas de Alba. Membership of the 
movement was determined in accordance with social housing criteria from the 
Fund for Social Inversion (FONVIS), and included as a minimum being a Venezuelan 
national, to not own a house and to have children (interviews w LD, 15.07.14, SB; 
and RL, 24.07.14, PO). However, although the group originally included non-
Chavistas, these members are all said to have left as the group developed a clear 
Chavista orientation, including using the meetings for mobilisation attending 
Chavista marches and political events in the city centre. This reduced the size of the 
collective, while others dropped out due to the time-commitment required, or to 
the dangers attached to the night occupations, members of the group also said that 
they had been witnesses to at least one shooting, and had stepped in to care for the 
injured man  (interview w CB, 15.07.14, SB). 
The perseverance of the remaining 160 families would ultimately pay off for the 
Brisas de Alba collective. Following a socio-economic survey of their members and 
a delegation of fifty members attended Caracas to petition to central government. 
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Construction began in 2010 and the first two apartment blocks opened in June 
2014 in a celebratory event attended by the Chavista Governor Alexis Ramirez (see 
Photo 2, below). The first families moved in shortly afterwards, along with six 
families of refugees who remained displaced by the mudslides of 1999, and with 
some apartments left unoccupied as of July 2014, which members of the group 
suspected were reserved for the families of government officials (Interview w DO, 
24.05.14, PN).3  
 
Photo 2. The celebratory event to hand over the keys to the first apartments. June 2014 
When I left Pueblo Nuevo, the occupation of the remaining territory by the Brisas 
de Alba collective continued at the edges of the construction site, as the third 
building was yet to be finished. The new occupants of the tower blocks were 
beginning to organise new Communal Councils for the area. As I left Pueblo Nuevo 
in 2014, it was unclear what effect this mass relocation of people would have for 
the barrio, with one local activist concerned that a new period of conflict would 
begin due to changes in the population (Interview w VR, 21.07.14, PN). The second 
movement occupying the Yuan Lin territory has been less successful. Although 
large furrows were dug in the area by government contractors prior to the elections 
                                                          
3 During fieldwork, I met one government official from a neighbouring State who had 
benefited from this arrangement - without meeting the criteria for receiving social housing. 
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in 2013, construction had not begun by the end of fieldwork in June 2014. Along 
with other plots across the city at different stages of expectation and legal process, 
the occupation continued.4 
Change and continuity: old strategies, new legitimacy? 
The question of this new series of land movements, and their inevitably partial and 
uneven success in negotiating construction projects, is a pressing theme for 
Venezuela. Chávez sought to make political capital from the lack of suitable housing 
with a pledge to build 200,000 “dignified homes”, a figure someway short of the 
amount required to rehouse the millions of barrio residents living in overcrowded 
and unsafe conditions.5 While this commitment and the distinctive yellow tower 
blocks that have sprung up across the country frequently cited as an example of the 
new pro-poor politics of Chavismo, the example of the Brisas de Alba development 
continues pre-Chávez era scenarios in three main ways. These are: i) the account 
of the “epic” (Auyero 2000: 1698-171) collaborative strategy of the Brisas 
campaign, and the illegality of the initial occupations; ii) the politicisation of the 
campaign as the collective sought to position themselves as clients of party and 
state and iii) the role played by women as leaders of the collective. These two 
characteristics also connect with different folk concepts about the urban poor – as 
successfully-collaborating social revolutionaries, as citizens claiming their 
constitutional right to housing, or finally as partisan clients making demands on 
their patron.  
While the information collected for this study does not allow us much insight into 
the institutional decision-making mechanisms behind the Brisas construction 
project,6 for the group’s members, the allocation of houses is evidence of the part 
the occupation movement played in securing this new development. Interviewees 
described how the idea of taking the land had developed from initial idea to a 
                                                          
4 In my only conversation with a member of this movement, the lack of construction was 
attributed to problems with the suitability of the land for construction, while one of the 
leaders of the Brisas de Alba collective said that the Yuan Lin movement was “disorganised, 
divided and apathetic” (interview w CB, 15.07.14, SB).  
5 One barrio in Caracas, Petare, is reported to house a million inhabitants- although 
evidence form Pueblo Nuevo shows conditions vary dramatically even within 
neighbourhoods. 
6 Chapter Seven includes an interview with Reyes Lobos, an official from FONVIS and 
discusses this further. 
179 
 
campaign that was sufficiently coordinated to maintain a permanent presence, 
night and day, on the territory for more than four years. The toma of 1973, and the 
so-called invasions to establish different barrios around the city were reportedly 
planned in Pueblo Nuevo by the prospective residents. Like the historic tomas, 
members of the collective also resisted violent attacks - although the motive for 
these attacks is not clear from the accounts of the people I spoke to, one participant 
advised this had included pressure from police forces. These accounts of the lucha 
or “struggle” for the building project (interview JL, 24.05.14, PN) told of the bravery 
of the participants, and of the independence and spontaneity of the group.  
The different accounts I heard in Pueblo Nuevo and Simon Bolivar also emphasised 
the role of group solidarity. Janeath Lopez described how the group’s strategy 
included regularly attending meetings with the city authorities en mass, regardless 
of whose offer of housing was being discussed (interview JL, 24.05.14, PN).7 As 
discussed in Chapter Four, Hernández de Padrón’s explanation forms part of a 
romantic reading of community organising in Pueblo Nuevo, that casts community 
against the city authorities. Both this reading and the contemporary accounts of the 
success of the movement connect with the “epic version” of hard-won 
infrastructural improvements collected by Auyero (2000: 170-171) from residents 
of Villa Paraiso, Buenos Aires in the 1990s. In these descriptions of the group’s 
endeavour, solidarity and success, we see the participants casting themselves as 
revolucionarios - fitting with a folk concept of empowered barrio residents who are 
changing their communities from within. Like the self-styled “heroic” residents of 
Villa Paraiso, the Brisas members saw the success of their movement as being about 
the constancy and effort of their members, where other campaigns for housing like 
the Yuan Lin occupation had lacked stamina and coordination. 
The second area of continuity with the history of organising in Pueblo Nuevo can 
be seen in the group’s overt political support for the PSUV. This connects with the 
experience of different local groups during the pre-Chávez era – described in 
Chapter Two and Chapter Three – where the political affiliation of groups was 
                                                          
7 Although Janeath did not make reference to the 1973 toma, the lack of the sort of solidarity 
she describes was part of the reason for the failure of that movement according to 
Hernández de Padrón (1998), as the state was able to negotiate with individual families 
separately and break the solidarity of the movement. 
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connected to their political success. Like those groups - and unlike the Communal 
Council Calle Principal described at the beginning of the chapter - the Brisas 
collective have established their Chavista partisanship publicly. During fieldwork, 
the Brisas collective often took part in public displays of their Chavista political 
conviction, including marching together at the workers day march (May 2014), the 
march through the city’s barrios described at the introduction to this thesis (July 
2014), and at a public pledge of loyalty in the Plaza Bolivar (July 2014). 
Participation at these events, which for some members of the group may have been 
among few occasions that they left the barrio, again chimes with observations from 
Villa Paraiso. Auyero’s (2000: 170) participants described their attendance of 
marches as “…an expression of gratitude” rather than part of an exchange of votes 
for services. At Brisas de Alba, one young mother, Yoleria, also described her 
participation as an act of gratitude, explaining that she believed that Chávez’s 
personal intervention had made the construction project happen (interview w YO, 
15.07.14, SB). Another young mother, Greny Uzcátegui, saw this as  shift from the 
old clientelism of the pre-Chávez era, saying that: “Before, they only offered things 
to look for votes, but now with Chávez I see the hope of getting my own home” (in 
Correo del Orinoco 2011). In her explanation, the shift appeared to be less about a 
change in process, and more about the improved terms of this exchange. 
Janeath, like Yolaria, also described using group meetings to mobilise for elections, 
saying that: 
“When they came around, we did use the group to discuss elections. 
If this is a project that is social and political then we have to support 
the government that is giving us this thing. And if (the opposition 
supporters) are there and they are achieving the same thing, they 
have to show respect go along with us to get the dignified housing 
that we have. And at the least they are going to be living with the 
Chavistas! It is good that they can learn to share with us.” 
This politicisation of the Brisas collective was also a constraint on membership, as 
people who “put on the red shirt” – who pretend to be Chavistas to gain some sort 
of financial or professional advantage -  are badly thought of in Venezuela amongst 
Chavistas and opositors alike. Apart from Janeath, however, the members of the 
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Brisas collective that I interviewed all agreed that any opositors had quickly left the 
group. On member, Sofia, made light of this, remarking that the opositors who had 
wanted to attend simply “…couldn’t stand the singing” (interview w SF, 12.05.14, 
PN). Despite these attempts to play down any emphasis on a political exchange, the 
participants also said that they expected a small proportion of the apartments to 
be reserved for the families of officials. This indicates an expectation of the more 
cynical characteristics of clientelism.  
It is likely that having Chavista-only membership meant the group were better 
positioned to take advantage of political support. Rewards for public displays of 
partisanship are part of the history of barrio organisations in Venezuela, where 
support for either local officials or incumbent national parties have seen clientelist 
returns (Ray 1969: 37). Again, like Auyero’s study, the Brisas group described how 
they believed they had benefitted from the involvement of particular local 
politicians. Caramoto Briseño, one of the “principal members” of the Brisas 
collective, described how the group found themselves caught between the anti-
government officials at the Mayor’s office, and the Chavista officials from the 
Governación (interview w CN, 14.07.14, SB. She described how she believed that 
different senior Chavistas had intervened to support the group, including Governor 
Alexis Ramirez, Ex-Governor Carlos Leon, and the PSUV’s 2014 mayoral candidate 
Maria Alejandra. In this way, the construction project reflects, at least in Caramoto’s 
account, both the contemporary political struggle for Mérida city, and the 
combative narrative (Emerson 29011) of the Bolivarian Revolution. 
As a politicised project, and also like the account from Auyero’s (2000: 133) study 
where images of the local mayor were painted on all around the city, the Brisas 
apartment blocks, like all public projects in Venezuela are branded with the iconic 
eyes of Hugo Chávez (see Photo 3). The connection between the building works and 
the Bolivarian project were heavily emphasised at the opening event, and were 
described in the local public newspaper, as part of the Grand Mission Vivienda. 
While the pledge to build new affordable housing is a key election promise for the 
PSUV, the politicisation of social housing project can be in Venezuela goes back to 
General Gomez, who sought to cleanse Caracas of its ‘barrio problem’ by bulldozing 
the shanties and moving residents to new high-rises (Fernandes 2010: 43). It is a 
strategy that is familiar from Latin America today, with the same strategy employed 
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in Brazil as the government sought to make space for the stadia for the 2014 
football world cup, contributing to the large and violent protest movement in 2013 
and 2014. In Mérida, the strategy, goes back to the founding of the city’s first 
workers barrio, later renamed Santa Elena, in the 1950s (Jugo Burguera 2014). 
Today, many public works in Venezuela branded are with the phrase “only possible 
in socialism” - part of a more ambitious narrative used to support not only a 
political party but a political ideology. 
 
Photo 3. Chávez’s eyes are painted on both of the two buildings completed so far 
The third area of continuity with the history of organising in Pueblo Nuevo is the 
leadership role played by the women from the barrio and from neighbouring Simon 
Bolivar. While there is not an enormous amount of evidence of women’s roles in 
barrio groups during the pre-Chávez era, Hernández de Padrón (1998) describes 
three separate occupation movements in Mérida City in the early 1970s that were 
led by mothers from the barrio communities - including the toma in Pueblo Nuevo 
in 1973. With the Brisas campaign, this was repeated. The vast majority of people 
participating in marches or other political activities were women, while 
participants said that the long nights spent keeping a constant vigil over the 
occupied land were said to have been undertaken by mothers from the barrios, 
often with accompanied by their children due to the need to balance parental 
responsibilities with campaigning.  
In both eras, women have taken these leadership roles to address the poor living 
standards facing their families – often in the absence of a male parent due to high 
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levels of family breakdown in the two communities (Correa and Wilson 2011). 
These roles fit with Lallander’s (2016: 149) observation of “protagonist” roles for 
barrio women under the Chávez era. However, this may be less about the recent 
processes of women’s “empowerment” that Lallander observes, and more a 
continuation of the ways that women in the city’s barrios have organised in the pre-
Chávez era. In both eras, these leadership roles are also evidence of what 
Fernandes observes in the barrios of Caracas. For Fernandes, active roles in 
community organising for women can be part of Moser’s (1986 in Fernandes 2007: 
119) ‘triple burden’ of productive, reproductive and community managing work – 
meaning that the “empowerment” observed by Lallander is actually an increase in 
work, responsibility and, in the case of the Brisas campaign, the risks associated 
with a semi-legal occupation. 
Together, these characteristics of the Brisas movement and building project 
connect not only with the history of community organising in and around Pueblo 
Nuevo, but with the history of clientelism as recorded in studies such as Auyero’s 
(2000) work on the Peronist reward networks in Villa Paraiso, Buenos Aires.  The 
group’s explanation of their success is similar in that both the “epic” story of their 
success, and the contradictory idea of the housing having been gifted by a 
benevolent political authority are maintained together. Maintaining these distinct 
versions of change together connects with the broader promise of emancipation 
and patronage – and the respective political identities for the group’s members - 
discussed throughout this thesis. 
2. The anti-government protest movement: revolucionarios on the 
right? 
In February 2014, in a rare calendar year free from national elections, a hard-line 
faction within the Venezuelan opposition led by Leopoldo Lopez and Maria Corina 
Machado launched a campaign of civil unrest known as La Salida – ‘The Exit’. Mass 
protests in the country’s major cities were followed by violent riots and then by the 
building of guarimba road blocks that closed highways and barricaded some 
middle class communities against the state. The government described the 
movement as an attempted coup, carried out with funds and support from the CIA, 
who hoped to replicate the temporarily successful coup of April 2002. The 
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protestors described their movement as responding to high crime, corruption and 
economic problems. Criticism of certain pro-poor policies, including free 
healthcare and education, also suggest that the protesters in some ways saw 
themselves as excluded from processes of Chavista patronage. In their own 
depictions of the dictatorship of the Bolivarianism, the protestors also built their 
own “epic version” of Venezuelan politics. 
In Mérida, rioters burnt piles of refuse and car tyres in the city centre, and then set 
about building makeshift roadblocks on main roads and around middle-class 
housing complexes. In mid-February, police attempted to clear the main Las 
Americas highway, assisted by Chavista activists and public services staff. The 
attempt was ultimately unsuccessful, with protestors replacing the roadblocks 
even as the clean-up operation was going on (interview w DV, 12.04.14, MC). 
Following this failure, the police action was minimal, and the residents of the city 
settled in to wait for the rumoured arrival of the National Guard.  From this 
moment, the roadblocks were gradually improved by the protestors, in some areas 
reaching over ten feet high and reinforced with metal panels and concrete. These 
roadblocks – the largest and most fortified a few hundred metres from my house in 
Pueblo Nuevo - were then patrolled by protestors armed with pistols, petrol bombs 
and other weapons. The roadblocks were used to control access to and from the 
fortified zones. There were reports of shoot-outs between police, protestors and 
involving the militant Chavista faction, the Tupamaros. Four deaths are recorded 
for Mérida for the period, against a national total of forty deaths and more than a 
thousand injured.  
Although the guarimba zones were supported by much of their populations, 
residents reported being intimidated or charged small bribes to go in and out. The 
support for the protestors gradually waned as public services were interrupted. 
Schools and health clinics closed or were starved of staff and resources, shops were 
looted and buildings associated with the government were attacked. Without 
health care, basic services or the collection of rubbish, populations suffered. My 
friends living in the guarimba zones were able to leave, but some reported that the 
protestors, who often wore masks to hide their faces, were becoming increasingly 
threatening and had taken to robbing residents in the dark entrances when the 
street lights had been disconnected. Chavistas suffered attacks, and many known-
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activists were forced to flee to stay with party colleagues in safe houses (interview 
w DV, 12.04.14, MC).  
Outside the guarimba zones, people made their ways through the remainder of the 
city as best they could. At night, navigating the city meant trying to work out which 
areas were now under control of the protestors, and which routes might encounter 
a new roadblock or an armed gang.  Riding on a moto became a nerve-wracking 
experience, as protestors had taken to setting improvised devices called miguelitos 
designed to burst the tyres of motorbikes. In general, people in Mérida seemed 
fearful of an escalation of the violence, in particular following the death of a 
Chavista activist. People reported hearing Colombian accents when passing the 
barricades, leading to the rumour that the protestors were not only middle class 
students, but had been joined by ex-FARC militants funded by the CIA. Violent crime 
in general was said to have risen, as the police were occupied with the protests and 
had been discredited, and street muggers grew in confidence.  
In Pueblo Nuevo, we were at the edge of the main guarimba zone on Las Americas 
but separated by the drop into the valley. An attempt by some residents to block 
the road at the southern entrance of the barrio was short-lived – with other 
residents reportedly shouting them down ad pushing their ways through. In fact, 
during the unrest the community served as an alternative route for commuters, 
who cut through the corner of the barrio as a way of avoiding the roadblocks on Las 
Americas. As a result, cars queued down the steep road into the barrio, paying local 
kids to act as traffic conductors to get them through the single-file sections. In the 
rest of the community, however, people seemed subdued but not overly worried. 
Although the Communal Council halted their meetings, at Fundación Cayapa, 
classes and meetings continued.  
In the city, some weekly Chavista meetings like the Sala de Batalla and the 
Communal Council Calle Principal were suspended because of fears of attack, but 
eventually groups began to restart their activities. At this time I began attending 
meetings of the Frente de Vanguardia de Hugo Chávez - a group set up to defend 
the legacy of Hugo Chávez. The Frente also tried to respond to the situation by 
supporting the PSUV Juventud in putting on events in barrios around the centre, as 
the Chavistas sought to consolidate support in the communities that they see as 
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their heartland. These included “day of peace” family festivals in Pueblo Nuevo, San 
Jacinto and some other barrios, put on jointly with the Communal Council and 
students from the PSUV-Juventud. 
Local support for the occupations declined, and occupations across the country 
were removed by the National Guard. In Mérida, a few of the smaller occupied areas 
returned to normal on their own, but the residents of the city on both sides of the 
political divide began to question whey the government in Caracas hadn’t sent the 
National Guard to restore order in the others. Then on 25th April, armoured mini-
tanks known as tanquetas rolled into the city accompanied by buses full of armed 
National Guards. Down in the barrio, we saw the helicopters overhead and 
onlookers gradually filled the Campo Elias Bridge as the National Guard moved in 
to the main guarimba zone at the edge of Pueblo Nuevo. Although everyone waited 
for a firefight, the protesters were said to have cleared out ahead of the operation, 
and no shots were heard. In the following weeks, windows were repaired, roads 
cleared, and life quickly returned to the occupied parts of Mérida. During a visit 
with one activist contact shortly after they had returned home from a safe house, I 
saw how the debris from the protests littered the streets and the house of one 
Chavista supporter had been burned-out completely.  
Oligarchs on the streets, or part of a rich history of student protest? 
The period of anti-government protests in 2014 is part is a long history of a 
complicated relationship between the politics of people from poorer communities 
in Latin America, and the politics of students. Examples of solidarity between leftist 
students and non-students include events from Mexico in 1968, where the National 
Strike Council (CNH) was organised by students but called for wider social changes. 
The movement faced violent state repression, including the infamous Tlatelolco 
massacre. Students have frequently been part of movements calling for democracy 
and improved civil rights. In Argentina in the 1970s, student activism formed a key 
part of the banned movement to reinstate Juan Peron as President. Despite this, 
student movements in Latin America have faced a questions about the ability of 
students – who are often from wealthier backgrounds – to represent the views and 
needs of wider populations, including working class groups or people from poor 
urban communities (Sanders 2013). 
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In Venezuela in 2014, the perceived opposition of the popular sectors and the 
university students protesting against the government can be contrasted with the 
pro-Chavista Youth PSUV, for example, who number in their hundreds in Mérida 
but whose activities are dwarfed by the scale of anti-government political action. 
There is also a contrast with the history of Venezuela’s student movement, when 
the so-called popular sectors and students often found themselves on the same side 
of the barricades together. The evolution of student activism in Venezuela began 
with opposition to the Gomez dictatorship, increasing in prominence during the 
early pre-Chávez Puntofijista era as a generation of students at Venezuela’s newly 
autonomous universities became the new critics of the country’s new democracy 
(Lopez Sanchez 2006: 76). The 1969 Movement for Academic Renovation sought 
to democratise universities with student council sand general assemblies, 
President Romulo Betancourt accused university students of terrorism and took 
the step of occupying university campuses with the military (Ciccariello-Maher 
2013: 110). From this point, the student movement would shift both to the left and 
towards more combative activities, at the same time as increasing their connection 
to what they saw as disenfranchised barrio populations (Lopez Sanchez 2006: 
654). In the university town of Mérida, only a few blocks separate the barrios of 
Pueblo Nuevo with the campuses of the University of the Andes. As discussed in the 
previous two chapters, the strong connection between Mérida’s university workers 
and students and the populations of the city’s barrios included especially strong 
ties with Pueblo Nuevo, including support for the 1973 occupation that was 
destroyed by city authorities. 
The important political role of Mérida’s student movement was seen during the 
“university rebellions” of 1987and 1988, when the death of student at the 
University of the Andes led to violent riots and saw the AD headquarters in Mérida 
burned to the ground (Ciccariello-Maher 2013: 114). These actions represented the 
most violent period in Venezuela’s history since the new democracy in 1958 and 
coincided with the peak of anti-Puntofijista sentiment in the population as a whole. 
For Lopez Sanchez (2007: 661-662), the increasingly combative strategy of the 
students was a precedent for the wider population, as “…the actions by the student 
movements in one way or another dignified violent street protests…” Ciccariello 
Maher’s (2013: 114) conclusion is that the militant street action of the “Méridazo” 
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prefigured the Caracazo of 1989 and the attempted coups of 1992, as “…many 
young students, enamoured of their deepening contact with the urban poor, left the 
university voluntarily to concentrate on barrio organising.” In this way, the student 
movement contributed to the national processes that would result in the birth of 
the Bolivarian movement and eventually Chavismo. 
The exodus of leftist students in the 1980s left the universities “in more 
conservative hands” (Ciccariello-Maher 2013: 116). This meant a period of absence 
from national political processes during the 1990s as Chavista politics, the end of 
Puntofijismo and the reorientation of government to focus on the urban poor. The 
student movements would re-emerge in 2006 with a series of riots in response to 
Chávez’s refusal to renew the media license of RCTV, one of the broadcasters seen 
as having supported the 2004 coup. The resulting riots were confined to richer 
neighbourhoods – taken by Chavistas as a sign of class-alignment – but were 
framed in the language of freedom and appealed to the human rights, as the 
protestors did in 2014. In the years between, the consolidation of anti-government 
sentiment and action among in Venezuela’s autonomous universities, including in 
part as a reaction to the perceived challenge of new Bolivarian universities that 
offered subsidised education to students from poorer backgrounds and sought to 
challenge the intellectual monopoly of Venezuela’s autonomous universities. By 
December 2012, on my first visit to Mérida, the day of the State Governor’s 
Elections was marked with the anti-government student action that had once again 
become a regular feature of life in the city. 
Unsurprisingly, this narrative of middle-class students in conflict with the 
Venezuelan public seemed to have been taken up by the Chavista support base. In 
Mérida, Chavistas at meetings would recite various horror stories including 
rumours about residents suffering heart attacks inside the guarimba zones without 
medical assistance, and a story that circulated about the rape of a mother and her 
daughters by protestors in their apartment. As Chavista groups began to meet again 
in the centre, I began to ask participants – somewhat provocatively – whether the 
guarimbas could also been seen as an example of “popular power”. The result was 
unsurprisingly a unanimous “no”. Maduro’s government, I was told, had been 
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elected by the people, and had the interests of the people at heart.8 The protesters, 
on the other hand, were seen as bourgeois and self-interested. For Carlos XXXX, a 
builder and Pueblo Nuevo resident, the anti-popular nature of the protests was also 
about the wealth of those protesting: 
“No, these protests are not popular. They are puro de plata – purely 
from money. If you go to where the protests are, the oldest car you will 
see there is a Toyota Corolla (…) The difference now is that the people 
are driving the country and have the right to say how things will be. 
Before, just because they were rich, they were driving the country. Now 
the people can say what should happen.”  
For Carlos, and for many other Chavistas that I spoke to, the protesters were simply 
protesting against the Bolivarian Revolution’s threat to their own class advantage. 
In addition to the perceived wealth of the protesters, Chavistas in Mérida criticised 
the strategy of guarimba road blocks. By interrupting the freedom of movement 
and long-fought-for public goods such as healthcare and education the protest 
movement was seen to be unfairly disadvantaging the Venezuelan people who had 
only achieved these benefits under the Chavista government.  
A connection with barrio populations 
The presence of barrio residents amongst the protestors also goes someway to 
contradicting the official version of class warfare, that brands the protesters as 
“oligarchs”. The one resident from Pueblo Nuevo that I talked to who had attended 
the protests was a high school student, Gabriel, introduced in Chapter Four. Gabriel 
said that the protestors at the barricades included students and opposition 
supporters also “many people” from Pueblo Nuevo. He explained:  
“Do you know why? Because everyone doesn’t have enough to eat… 
(And t)he insecurity affects us all. How many people have been 
killed this week and all these days? There are people who are 
worried about their brothers, we are all like this in Venezuela.” 
                                                          
8 Here the usual line from the Chavista grassroots that Venezuela’s system of representative 
democracy was “bourgeois”, seemed to have been temporarily forgotten. 
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Gabriel described how his respect for the Chávez government had been worn down 
by the threat of violence in the barrio. In particular, he explained how he felt at risk 
when returning home at night through the community from his work at a 
hamburger stall, where he serves fast food to the richer students outside the bars 
in the city centre. Although Gabriel’s experience of this violence may be different to 
those of the richer university students, his participation is evidence of some sense 
of shared interests. 
Gabriel also describes how the protests escalated in violence: 
“That was before (the protesters) started to kill people. To abuse. It 
was just normal protest things then. And everything was fine. Once I 
knew that the muchachos where I was protesting were armed, I 
withdrew a little. When I was protesting, there were the police, coming 
on motorbikes, with the Tupamaros, a government collective. They 
came to kill. They didn’t come to throw things, they came to kill. Where 
is the justice? What are the police doing? Imagine that. It’s still 
happening. And so the protesters were afraid. And what did they do? 
They went to look for arms. And how many police have died? How 
many National Guard?” 
While Gabriel’s account alone is not evidence for the mixed backgrounds of the 
protesters, concerns about the government’s failure to act on Venezuela’s violent 
crime problem are certainly a central part of the protestors’ explanation of their 
politics. People all over Venezuela, regardless of class, wealth or political affiliation, 
are concerned about violence, including in Pueblo Nuevo, where violence and 
perceived causes of violence like drug use dominated the list of community 
priorities in the Barrio Adentro Household Survey (Correa and Wilson 2011). In 
this context, the description of this as a bourgeois politics is difficult to maintain. 
While he identifies himself as an opositor, he counts himself and the other 
protesters as part of “el pueblo”, saying that the Chavista interpretation of the word 
only refers to “half the people”. 
Identifying continuities with the pre-Chávez era 
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While Ciccariello-Maher (2013: 105-125) gives a compelling account of the shift of 
politics among the student movement, this is just one of several continuities with 
student organising from the pre-Chávez era.  
Gabriel’s worries about street violence are long-standing concerns for both rich 
and poor in Venezuela that have historically been reflected in the activities of the 
student movement. The Méridazo of 1987 was sparked by a student death 
(Ciccariello-Maher 2013 114), the first large scale protests I observed during 
fieldwork followed the death of a young student, Juan Carlos Davila Barrios, who 
was killed by muggers in the entrance to Pueblo Nuevo in September 2013, two 
months after my arrival the barrio (see Appendix Six). As with twenty years earlier, 
it was these emotional protests that came before the more sustained period of civil 
unrest. 
Rioting, burning government offices and the use of the guarimba roadblocks are 
strategies used by students in Venezuela historically (ibid). Although they were 
widely criticised by Chavistas in Mérida in 2014, these are the same strategies for 
civil disobedience which according to Lopez Sanchez (2007: 661-662) were 
“dignified” through their use by student campaigners in the pre-Chávez era. 
Guarimba roadblocks in particular were also used during the Caracazo uprising of 
1989 (Gott 2011: 43) – the events of which are heralded by Chavistas as part of the 
shifting of the tide towards popular empowerment. These strategies of civil 
disobedience are well-known on the Venezuelan left, where they have been part of 
grassroots responses to feelings of disempowerment and frustration, of being 
disenfranchised from formal national political processes. 
This sentiment is also an area of continuity. Both in 1969 and 1987 and again in 
2014, students were protesting against new governments with revolutionary 
rhetoric and promises of a new kind of democracy. In each era, the criticism made 
by the student movements included the idea that the actions of the incumbent 
government were anti-democratic and represented the interests of a partidista 
minority above the public good. Like the barrio residents represented by historic 
student movements, the protesters in 2014 said that they were protesting against 
the violation of human rights, corruption and their alienation from the processes 
of Venezuelan democracy. As has been discussed above, this alienation includes 
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when Chavistas talk about opositors or escualidos – “the dirty ones” – as they are 
known,9 as if they are not counted as part of the Bolivarian people. This may be 
particularly powerful for those barrio residents who also find themselves branded 
by Chavista rhetoric as Venezuela’s “non-people”, in this way, despite being part of 
the so-called popular sectors in terms of where they live and how much money they 
have. 
In Venezuela, the protesters - and all opositors I spoke to during fieldwork in Mérida 
- described themselves as representing the interests of all of the Venezuelan 
population, connecting with precedents from Mexico in the 1960s and Argentina in 
the 1970s, among others. These protestors also faced a similar-looking government 
response – but with much less violent repression. During the protests, the 
Bolivarian Government’s moderate use of the National Guard, riot police, and the 
tanquetas used to liberate the guarimba zones in an extremely volatile and tense 
period of political period seemed necessary and proportionate. Human rights 
campaigners attributed three deaths to the disproportionate use of force by 
security forces – a number dramatically lower than the total of forty deaths 
(Robertson 2014). After the experiences of 2004, when opposition street violence 
was a part of the campaign to legitimise the coup against Chávez, the government 
seemed determined to be above reproach. After the guarimba zones were cleared, 
the numbers of National Guard on the streets slowly returned to normal levels over 
the following months. The government did not occupy campuses in 2014, and the 
escalation on both sides did not reflect the levels of violence during the Betancourt 
government in 1969 and for the Méridazo of 1987. 
In Venezuela today, therefore, there are two competing notions of “revolutionary” 
politics. In opposition to the government, there are groups who argue for social 
change conceived as a rejection of Chavismo. During fieldwork, meanwhile, 
Chavistas frequently talked about the need for “deepening” – the profundización – 
of the Bolivarian Revolution. Tied up in these debates are different ideas about 
political emancipation – as fulfilling the citizens’ rights of a historically alienated 
                                                          
9 The common use of “dirt” by Chavistas to describe the Venezuelan opposition is familiar 
from representations of poverty, but also as part of the language used to describe 
corruption, infidelity and sin. For Chavistas today, who seem to use this slur automatically, 
this second list of connotations are likely brought to mind all at once.  
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social class, or as a value that might apply to any group with minority views. This 
debate in turn connects with Beaseley-Murray’s (2009), identification of a deep-
seated tensions between the Latin American Left and liberalism, or with 
Castaneda’s (2006: 28) concerns about “close-minded and stridently populist” 
elements of the Latin American left. 
Without more detail about the class make-up of the protest movement, evidence 
from Pueblo Nuevo and fro studies like Gill’s (2012) shows that there are opositors 
living in Mérida’s barrios. The participation of barrio residents like Gabriel also 
suggests that some relationship between the so-called popular sectors and the 
more combative student movements remains from the pre-Chávez era. During 
fieldwork, some Chavistas suggested that the participation of barrio residents was 
being paid for by the protestors. It is difficult to assess the truth of this, but the idea 
shows the depth of acceptance of both the Bolivarian class narrative – that all 
barrio residents are automatically Chavistas – and the folk concepts that represent 
barrio residents as politically-unscrupulous ghetto thugs. 
Finally, it is important to note that drawing these parallels reflects a very small part 
of the story of the 2014 anti-government protests. During fieldwork, Chavistas 
pointed to the right wing demands made by the leadership and to the attacks on 
barrio health clinics as evidence of an anti-poor agenda. They also saw the scale 
and weaponry of the occupations as evidence of foreign funding, part of an attempt 
to destabilise the democratically elected government. While these ideas are 
important, the parallels with the pre-Chávez era, together with the examples of the 
Communal Council and the Brisas de Alba housing movement, still tell us something 
about the processes and discourse around community organising under 
Bolivarianism. 
3. The Communal Council Calle Principal: participation for some, and 
a loss of credibility for the PSUV 
Although I lived in the neighbouring La Cuesta council district, like the other 
teachers, my work at Fundación Cayapa meant I was quickly accepted at meetings 
of the remaining active council in Pueblo Nuevo, the Comunal Council Calle 
Principal. Following the scene described in the introduction to the chapter, at the 
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second meeting I attended I explained my research and was warmly welcomed to 
the group. Over the coming months, the voceros - the spokesmen - seemed happy 
to have an audience, and would explain points of procedure to me or throw winks 
my way when discussions became more heated. Even so, making sense of these 
meetings was slow work. My ear took time to adjust to the Spanish spoken in the 
barrio, and residents invariably explained their concerns with reference to years of 
context that was well-known to the voceros but of which, of course, I was unaware. 
On learning of the different political allegiances of the spokesmen and participants 
however, I felt like I was seeing something that I had not uncovered in the 
literature: a council where Chavistas and opositors collaborated together.  
It seemed unfortunate, therefore, as the decline in participation, regularity and 
activity described in the introduction to this chapter became the main story of the 
Communal Council Calle Principal. However, the group also revealed something 
about the applicability of different political notions. Here, the constrained “popular 
power” offered by the council system contrasted with Chavista representations of 
Participatory Democracy, while the opositor spokesmen’s frustrated desire for 
community participation did not fit with the familiar narratives of leftist grassroots 
revolutionarios . 
Two versions of declining participation 
Over time, and as I built my networks in the community, I collected two versions of 
the council’s decline in participation and activity. The first, more detailed version 
of events was told through accounts from the remaining spokesmen and 
participants. These accounts were collected in formal interviews and during 
informal conversations and discussions, often following the weekly council 
meetings. In them, participants emphasised the failure of the council’s application 
to the FUNDACOMUNAL, the body responsible for registering councils and 
administering funds. These remaining participants described how the application 
was made in the summer of 2011, five years after the launch of the council system 
and after new councils were confirmed in La Cuesta in the southern part of Pueblo 
Nuevo and in Las Casitas to the west. They described how the residents had 
completed a household census, a photographic survey, and held polls to elect 
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spokesmen for the different roles on the council. Despite following the regulations 
closely, they say, the officials at the FUNDACOMUNAL declined the application.  
Like all of those that I spoke to who had maintained their roles in the council, 
Gerardo Lopez - a spokesman at the council and a participant in community 
organisations in Pueblo Nuevo since the 1970s - explained the refusal to register 
the council as being due to “pressure from the party” on the staff at the 
FUNDACOMUNAL to prevent councils with opposition spokesmen (interview w GL, 
04.07.14, CD). He said that he knew that the participation of opposition party 
members in the councils was unacceptable to the PSUV: 
“They don’t like that these people participate, and so they said that we 
cannot register the communal council. At first they told us this. I’ll 
explain it: if one of these people was to become in charge of finances, 
they would not approve of that. But we did the election, and they got 
the most votes. The decision of the people should be respected.”  
One particular spokesman, Yonny Camacho, is a councillor for the non-Chavista 
party Acción Democrática, and agrees that his involvement with a non-Chavista 
party caused the failure of the council’s application. He says: 
“In the FUNDACOMUNAL, they established that where there are 
opositors, the councils won’t be legalised. They say that clearly. They 
don’t care that the law prohibits talking about politics in the communal 
council. They can’t discriminate against anyone that has a different 
political tendency than the government. That is established by law... 
but where there are opositors they won’t legalise the communal council 
and they aren’t afraid to say it.” (interview w YC, 27.11.13, PN) 
This interpretation was reflected by various other residents including among 
the teaching staff at Cayapa, who had been in Pueblo Nuevo in the lead up to 
these elections. Here it seemed, Yonny did not find himself to be part of 
Chávez’s “unprecedented popular force” that had been envisaged by Hugo 
Chávez (in interview in Harnecker 2003: 157-158). In this scenario, Yonny 
and the other voceros were constrained in fulfilling their potential as brokers 
for the community. 
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This denial of registration was reported as a significant handicap to the 
activities of the council. Registration with the FUNDACOMUNAL means 
receiving financial resources, applied for on a project-by-project basis. 
Ramón da Silva, the vocero in charge of finances for the council, reported that 
the failed registration led to a reduction in participation levels:  
“In the community, at first, a lot of people always went. Because we 
started to work, and work, and work, and work, and work, but they 
did not legalise the communal council and people went back to the 
shooting a little. We did the meetings and we told people what had 
happened. And practically what happened was the same as always. 
(…N)ow, we have work that has been planned, at the least we have 
completed the planning for projects on drainage and electricity. We 
have those already, but we are waiting for the elections so that they 
legalise us so that we can ask the state, the government, for the 
resources to realise them.” (interview w RS, 11.05.14, PN). 
Here, as in Gill’s (2012) thesis, inactivity was seen as having contributed to a 
decline in participation. Gerardo Lopez agreed with this conclusion, saying that 
eighty people participated in meetings before the failed application. He talked 
about the symbolic importance of registration as well as the dependence on 
resources and state support, saying:  
“So everything has been kidnapped by the party, all of the missions, all 
of their programmes. They don’t recognise us. They don’t advise us. 
And what we do, we do, some members ... because we are friends. I feel 
sad. Because they speak about revolution, they speak about 
participation, they speak about the progress that they have, and I live 
it. That’s my culture. But when I come with the people, to speak about 
this, that it could be, and we meet and we see that the state didn’t listen 
to us, the people were discouraged. So that’s your revolution. And it’s 
difficult. And you see people walking around with their faces down.” 
(interview w GL, 04.07.14, CD) 
Here, the emotional response described by Gerardo and the others is a strong link 
to the frustrated accounts from the 1980s in Hernández de Padrón (1998, 2000), 
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discussed in chapters two and three, where processes of participation were 
characterised by partisanship and clientelism. It is also a version of events that runs 
against the representations of barrios as places where empowered grassroots 
activists improve their communities with support from the Chavista that has won 
them these new rights.  
The second version of the decline of the communal council was a much more 
general account of a loss of credibility. During interviews with members of the 
community who were less involved, or who had ceased participating, there was an 
impression that the specific circumstances around the incident had faded into the 
collective memory. In response to questions about the activities of the council, the 
new Chavista system was rarely distinguished from the different Juntas and 
Neighbourhood Associations of the pre-Chávez political establishment. The state 
was largely absent from the accounts of non-participants, along with any reference 
to party politics. As with the participants in the Sala de Batalla, discussed in the 
following chapter, residents in the Calle Principal area said that they did not 
understand procedures around the Communal Councils, in part due to lack of 
communication by spokesmen. General concerns about the low results and 
effectiveness of Communal Councils did not differ in particular from those of 
residents from neighbouring councils, which are registered but where weekly 
meetings had ceased by the time of research.  
Instead, comments made about the Communal Council Calle Principal were often 
more personal, locating responsibility with the leadership of the councils, including 
as individuals. In a group discussion with students at the class I taught at La 
Escuelita, the participants praised Yonny and Gerardo as exceptions, but on the 
whole saw the spokesmen as either ineffective or corrupt (Focus Group 1: 
22.04.14). It was notable that the participants did not talk about the different local 
councils as opportunities to participate themselves, but more as institutions that 
ought to deliver material benefits for the local communities. Here, the expectations 
of the group participants fits with processes described in the literature on 
brokerage and clientelism, where community gains are part of an exchange 
brokered by well-connected individuals (e.g. Auyero 2000; Zarazaga 2014). 
Instead, recurring community issues such as the flooding of Calle Principal due to 
long-overdue and poorly finished repairs to the storm drain in the centre of the 
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street were a visual reminder of both the unresponsiveness of city authorities to 
the council’s demands. By 2013, the council’s main contribution, therefore, seemed 
to be that of mediating with minor issues such as the use of the school building in 
the evenings, and letter-writing to different authorities. In some ways, the council 
had become more of a petition group than something offering the sort of well-
resourced brokerage described by Auyero. 
Inherited responses to party pressure 
The contemporary experience of the Communal Council Calle Principal connects 
with historical accounts of community organisations in Pueblo Nuevo and the 
surrounding barrios, where city authorities are said to have local groups as an 
opportunity to exert control. As described in Chapter Two, Jugo Burguera’s (2004: 
206) visit to Pueblo Nuevo in 1975 and described “…how a functionary tried to 
direct the participants to elect their candidates…” in a  community meeting that 
may well have taken place in the same spot as the council meeting described at the 
start of the chapter. This pressure is also described in literature from the period 
from other parts of Venezuela, with Ray (1969: 45) highlighting “…a close 
connection between the amount of government assistance and the vitality of the 
Juntas” in the areas he studied. His account goes on to describe how the initial 
enthusiasm during local elections was typically followed by a drop in participation 
as ambitious proposals were not followed up and the group leaders lost credibility. 
This connects to the experience described by Gerardo and the other spokesmen.  
In Jugo Burguera’s (2014: 206) analysis, he suggested that these residents in 
Pueblo Nuevo kept their own leaders only at the price of damaging their working 
relationship with city authorities. This scenario was played out in many of Mérida’s 
barrios, as discussed in chapters two and three. This sense of resistance observed 
by Jugo Burguera in the 1970s persists in Pueblo Nuevo today. Yonny described, 
however, how the loss of funds and prestige “… didn’t stop us.” He said that: 
“Without doubt I wanted to renounce my position as spokesman, 
to not have this type lock and that the communal council would be 
legalised, that the communal council would have the liberty not to 
be held back by one figure from being legalised. And I did resign, 
and no one accepted it. And the members of the PSUV who are in 
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the communal council did not accept it either. They said that they 
would not accept this resignation, because the community elected 
me and that the PSUV have to accept me as well because it was a 
decision of the community.” 
While they were disappointed, Yonny and the other spokesmen and participants 
also talked about the problems that would have come with FUNDACOMUNAL 
financing. Yonny explained that he thought that communities can be destabilised 
where funding decisions are not communicated effectively or simply where 
residents misunderstand the collective way projects have to be approved and 
expect cash hand-outs.10 Here, we can identify a familiar tone both from the 
romantic reading of the history of barrio organising as told by Hernández de 
Padrón (1998, 2000), and from the “epic version” of community improvements 
from Auyero’s account of politics in Villa Paraiso, discussed above. For the voceros, 
it is collective good will and solidarity that might hold the answer to community 
problems, while the involvement of city authorities threatens to corrupt this. Here, 
the different voceros cast themselves as the real revolutionaries – local 
representatives of their neighbourhood who are more legitimate than state or 
party. 
Pablo, another resident in Pueblo Nuevo, also downplays the importance of 
finances for Communal Council Calle Principal, saying that “That doesn’t really 
matter- but a lot of people think it matters and they are part of the problem…” 
(interview w PJ, 01.07.14, PN). As he saw it, these people often want “to be the 
hands between the government and the people” to achieve status and influence. 
Therefore, for Pablo, “…when money shows up it makes everything much harder”. 
This attitude is also tied up with the epic narrative of communities finding their 
own solution – a process that might be corrupted by formalisation and the 
provision of resources. This idea was repeated in activist accounts across the city, 
where the notion of “popular” meant something ‘pure’, and where group value and 
                                                          
10 This interpretation is supported by interviews from the neighbouring La Cuesta 
Communal Council, where some residents believed funds had been misappropriated 
(interviews w MA, 19.04.14, PN; and JA, 19.04.14, PN). 
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identity included a desire to separate themselves from the Venezuelan public 
authorities, with their historical and contemporary failures.  
According to Pablo and several other residents, the commitment of certain 
community members to carry on without resources from the government was 
illustrated in February 2012 during Mérida’s basura - “refuse” - crisis. On this 
occasion, the response from the community involved the cooperation between the 
different parts of Pueblo Nuevo and Simon Bolivar, and occurred outside of the 
Communal Council or missions frameworks. After Léster Rodriguez, the city Mayor 
for COPEI, allegedly embezzled the funds for refuse collection in the city, rubbish 
piled up on street corners around Mérida. While Chavistas accused the opposition 
Mayor of embezzlement of the funds for the collection service and of seeking to 
destabilise the city to discredit Chavismo, the opposition supporters accused 
Chavistas of trying to discredit the Mayor because of his plans to campaign to be 
Governor in December 2014. Conflicts over issue of refuse collection in the city date 
back to the 1970s and 1980s (Garcia et al. 1994: 116), but on this occasion the total 
suspension of the service left dangerous amounts of rubbish in the streets. 
In Pueblo Nuevo, household waste continued to pile in the streets, prompting 
residents to form an emergency committee to organise a collaborative refuse 
collection service. Representatives were nominated to manage funds and 
coordinate a response, and the committee was independent of the Communal 
Councils (interview w YC, 27.11.13, PN) - although prominent members of the 
Communal Council Calle Principal were involved in coordinating the new service, 
and are credited by some residents with its organisation (interview MA, 19.04.14, 
PN, other informal conversations). The service was paid for by donations from the 
houses in the community, with households who were able to paying twenty five 
Bolivares (0.25 USD at the black market rate) each to fund the hire of the refuse 
trucks (interview w YC, 27.11.13, PN). Residents then worked together to load the 
trucks. The events were captured in a video made by teenage students of Fundación 
Cayapa, El Sabado de La Basura (2012; see Appendix Two). These locally-
coordinated actions happened in communities around the city, until in October a 
health emergency was declared and the Ministry for Popular Power and the 
Environment also sent trucks from Caracas to relieve the city, before regular 
collection services finally resumed. 
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The Sabado de la Basura collaboration is an example of how barrio residents are 
turning to informal forms of organising, as they did in the pre-Chávez era, packaged 
within similar ‘epic’ narratives of self-help and emancipation. Again, the notion is 
of a self-reliant, independent and arguably more revolutionary activist identity. 
Without registration and funds, the council spokesmen have also turned to other 
options. Gerardo, Yonny and Ramón all described using personal “contacts” to find 
other resources for projects. This included asking Mérida’s opposition Mayor, 
Lester Rodriguez, to contribute to the repairs to the East entrance to the barrio.11 
For an informal communal council, applying for alternative funding in this way may 
reinforce the social power associated with certain personal identity characteristics, 
including gender, education level, professional experience, membership of 
informal networks and the understanding of the social rules and language used to 
approach potential funders. The three most active remaining voceros, for example, 
are all employed or retired men over the age of forty who have completed 
secondary education. They have access to political networks and as such can act as 
brokers, with the additional and at times problematic social power that this 
intermediary role can bring. In addition, the fact that women in the barrio are less 
likely to have these contacts is a barrier to their participation, as they may feel 
unable to play the brokering role encouraged by the lack of dedicated funding. 
Ironically, these ‘contacts’ include non-Chavista members of the conventional 
bureaucracy. Here we see how the denial of registration, whether for party-political 
or procedural reasons, is making the space less egalitarian and more informally-
regulated, reproducing elements of the dynamic of “clientelismo” from the 1970s 
and 1980s as described by Hernández de Padrón and Ellner, and from 1990s 
Argentina, as described by Auyero (2000).  
4. Conclusion: three experiences of organising 
These three contemporary examples of community organising in and around 
Pueblo Nuevo show important continuities with the pre-Chávez era, including in 
the ways that local processes in Pueblo Nuevo fit with familiar explanations of 
community improvements: as part of a grateful patronage, or as due to the epic 
                                                          
11 Although accounts differed as to who actually paid for resources for this. 
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struggle of community members. All three also connect wih experiences from 
across Latin America. 
With the Brisas de Alba housing movement, the collaboration and the tenacious 
sense of social justice behind the lengthy occupations connect with Venezuela’s rich 
history of collective action around land and housing rights, not least in barrios such 
as Pueblo Nuevo. In their ability to position themselves as clients of Chavismo, the 
group also showed their ability to adjust effectively to the wider political 
environment. While it is this environment that may have enabled this project to 
succeed - and build houses where the historic toma campaign had been met with 
state violence – the groups’ partisan identity arguably demonstrates the continuity 
of less-emancipatory political processes. In addition, while the campaign has 
resulted in leadership roles for a generation of women from the two barrios, this 
was the case with the pre-Chávez era, when women faced even greater challenges 
in a less-sympathetic political context. These roles for women, along with the 
success of the group’s collective mediation with the state connect the Brisas 
experience to other land movements in Latin America, notably the Movement of 
Rural Landless Workers (MST) in Brazil. As with the MST, the astute political 
framing of the movement appears to be a large part of the group’s success (see 
Wolford 2003, Caldeira 2008). 
With the anti-government protest movement, we see a certain shift in politics 
among the protesters, as compared with the pre-Chávez era, but also the continuity 
of protest strategies. In protesting the nature of democracy and representation in 
Venezuela, these protestors also continue the long-running theme of student 
politics. While it is not clear how far government representations of these 
“bourgeois” campaigns match with the mixed backgrounds of the protesters, their 
exclusion from discourses of popular politics shows the ways that Chavista notions 
of political empowerment have been constrained and politicised to support a 
particular, partisan understanding of empowerment. These experiences can be 
linked to some extent with those of student groups in Chile in 2006 and 2011, when 
student mobilisations struggled to make headway in a corporatist civil society 
culture (Reyes 2012). 
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In the experience of the Communal Council Calle Principal, we see the continuation 
of the sort of partisan and dependent institutional structures that are familiar from 
across the continent – both in the Twentieth Century and in examples from after 
Latin America’s ‘left turn’ (see especially Cannon and Kirby 2012). We also see the 
community’s response: to collaborate outside of formal structures and to negotiate 
privately with political contacts in the form of polticial brokerage described ins 
tudies from Argentina (Auyero 2000) and Brazil (Arias 2006). Both were 
characteristics of organising in Pueblo Nuevo and Mérida’s other barrios in the pre-
Chávez era, when the dependent institutions (the Juntas and Neighbours 
Associations) were supplemented by more combative, semi-independent 
organising (Comités de toma, cultural centres and the Moaco collective). In 
addition, these less-regulated forms of organising may be arenas in which barrio 
women are disadvantaged against male participants by having less of the official 
contacts that are needed to fulfil a more classic brokering role. Here, we again see 
the limits to the Chavista public narrative of bourgeoisie vs. pueblo. Not only do 
residents who support the opposition and Chavismo live in the same barrio and 
share some of the same local interests, but they work together and appeal to the 
same independent, community-spirited and collaborating identities of the 
revolucionarios. Ironically, these spontaneous forms of community organising, 
explained through the familiar “epic” story of community self-help appear to be a 
better fit for the narrative of Bolivarian Participatory Democracy, than the 
dependent organising of the Communal Council system. 
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7. New party, old partidismo? Inherited 
tensions around the administration of 
participatory politics  
 
 
 
 
 “My question is: apart from the recycling project, which of the projects 
on your list actually exists? How can we agree to sign off these projects 
– to ‘close the cycles’ - if they do not exist?” 
Gloria is interrupted as the hall erupts into frantic conversation, drowning out the 
reply of the chairperson at the front of the meeting. As the United Socialist Party of 
Venezuela (PSUV) representatives on the stage attempt to make themselves heard 
against the wall of noise in the hall, Gloria – the Communal Council spokesperson 
for barrio Santa Domingo1 - is passed a printout listing the projects for the past 
year. She runs through the list, muttering under her voice, saying: “Does this project 
exist? Or this one? (…) Who here has ever made a single proposal for a socio-
economic project? I am not in agreement that this is a priority!” 
Some forty residents of the Spinetti Dini district – the administrative area where 
Pueblo Nuevo is located – are spread thinly around a large and dilapidated hall just 
past the western edge of the barrio. We are some eighty feet from my front door on 
La Cuesta, but I have only ever recognised residents of the barrio here on one 
                                                          
1 Santa Domingo is the third barrio in the Albarregas valley, just to the South of Pueblo 
Nuevo and separated by the Camp Elias Bridge, see Map 2 in Chapter Two. 
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occasion - the first meeting I attended with other teachers from Fundación Cayapa. 
Since that day, I have attended weekly meetings on my own, gently chided by my 
colleagues who send me in their place as “our spy” and chuckle at the idea that 
meaningful “participación” – participation - might happen there.  
After three hours of failing to reach an agreement about which projects can be said 
to have taken place, and despite insistence from the chairperson that only after 
signing off past projects can the group make new proposals, the Sala de Batalla – 
the ‘battle room’ – closes. The participants disperse, grumbling, into the warmth of 
the night.  
The following week I climb the hill and find a handful of regular participants in 
conversation outside the meeting place. The hall doors are chained shut. Gloria’s 
husband, Herman, tells me that the party representatives could not return, as they 
are visiting the houses of Chavistas in the neighbouring barrios to encourage them 
to turn out at the following month’s Municipal Elections. Amongst the chorus of 
crickets and over a public broadcast on a car radio, talk turns to the PSUV. 
 “What we need is to have a nucleus of formación – of ideological 
development. This is the first thing. (…) Now we are in power and what 
have we done? Where is the popular power? There are how many 
Communal Councils, and what?” 
“The projects that they talk about, all of them have received funds (…) 
They gave sixty thousand Bolivares.2 Ask them ‘where are the sixty 
thousand Bolivars?’ I asked the chairperson and she said ‘No! That 
money was for the campaign’ and I said ‘What campaign?’”  
Concerns about the ineffectiveness of participatory politics and the subversion of 
participants’ interests to party interests were voiced frequently during fieldwork. 
Spaces at the edges of meetings were often used to question the responsiveness of 
the party and the ideological development – the formación - of leaders. These 
Chavista participants felt their roles to be constrained by the PSUV’s hold on the 
formal channels of Participatory Democracy. They complained about processes 
                                                          
2 Around 10,000 USD at the official rate, around 1,000 USD at the black market rate. 
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that are not clear, where decisions happen in the dark, driven by agendas that are 
unknown. Above all, they complained that at the meetings people “…just talk”.  
The assembly in November 2013 described above was the last that I attended of 
the weekly Sala de Batalla. By February 2014, the surrounding area was occupied 
by anti-government protesters, making the large and rowdy meetings too 
dangerous to hold in public. Together, the grumblings of the participants and the 
violent reaction of the anti-government protesters reveal something important 
about the contemporary culture of partidismo – of partisan politics - in Venezuela. 
It is not only the opponents of Chavismo that feel alienated from the formal 
channels of Participatory Democracy, but those at the grassroots of the movement 
who see themselves as the constituents of Bolivarianism. These frustrations and 
the exclusion of non-Chavistas are connected to the way grassroots politics has 
been conducted in Venezuela since the proliferation of barrio communities in 
Mérida in the mid-twentieth century, and the fundamental tension between the 
competing notions of governance and of the urban poor described throughout this 
thesis. 
Aims and structure of the chapter 
In previous chapters I have demonstrated how both before and after the rise of 
Bolivarianism, political parties have appealed for legitimacy among barrio 
populations with two competing premises. Prior to Chávez’s election in 1998, AD 
and COPEI presented themselves as the patrons of the Venezuelan public, 
brokering oil money to deliver jobs and public services (Buxton 2000: 3), and 
protecting against the threats posed by both greedy elites and ghetto thugs 
(Emerson 2011: 90). They also presented themselves as emancipators, 
encouraging community organisations and promoting the values of democracy and 
political inclusion for the poorest (Ray 1969: 31). Since Chávez’s election campaign 
in 1998, the Bolivarian parties - first as the Revolutionary Bolivarian Movement 
(MBR) and then its successor the PSUV – have also sought to present themselves as 
patrons and emancipators. They have presented themselves as both the benevolent 
providers for the country’s poorest, and as the passive facilitators of a new form of 
direct, ‘protagonistic’ democracy. I have argued that these premises reflect 
different folk concepts about the political roles of the public and of state and party 
207 
 
that in turn connect to different ways of thinking about poor urban populations in 
Latin America. Do the city authorities want participating people to be empowered 
revolucionarios, or do they want them to be passive clients of the state? This chapter 
adds to this discussion by showing how these inherited practices and ways of 
thinking about barrio residents can be seen in the role of state and party in 
administering participatory politics in Mérida today. 
During the pre-Chávez Puntofijismo era, the tension between these different 
notions, and the different governance roles they imply, was played out in the 
experiences of community organisations during successive Acción Democrática 
(AD) and Christian Democrat (COPEI) governments. Hernández de Padrón (1998: 
82) describes how in the early 1960s, institutions were set up by the Betancourt 
administration to act as “intermediaries” with organisations in the country’s 
barrios, with the aim of securing popular support for state plans for 
redevelopment. This resulted, she writes, in the “disarticulation” of community 
concerns. In line with marginality thinking about poor urban communities, 
participatory institutions are said to have become primarily mechanisms for 
modernisation, with most of the activities of community organisations initiated by 
the state (Hurtado 1991: 12). As described in the Chapter Two and Chapter Three, 
in Mérida this led to the penetration of city-level meetings by party representatives, 
leading to nepotistic practices and the subordination of local concerns (Hernández 
de Padrón 2000: 197). In the 1980s and 1990s, groups in Mérida were part of 
national debates among the neighbourhood movement about whether the 
neighbourhood movement should be apolitical or whether they should be involved 
with party politics and elections (Emerson 1999),3 ultimately participating in 
election campaigns in 1989, 1992 and 1995 (Hernández de Padrón 2000: 204). In 
response, community organisers sought to find new channels away from party and 
state controls to try and recapture the identity of the movements as being about 
barrios and other neighbourhoods, rather than about centralised party or state 
objectives (ibid: 200-202). Discontent around the practice of participatory politics 
                                                          
3 Velasco (2011: 168-174) also describes how neighbours’ movements in barrio 
communities had to reconcile ideas about longer-term political struggles associated with 
the radical guerrilla movement of the 1960s, with shorter-term social demands which 
became more prominent in the 1970s as residents organised to improve access to water, 
public services and amenities. 
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was important for the decline of Puntofijismo, as state and party alienated the 
community organisations they depended upon for electoral mobilisation. 
The contemporary relationships between community organisations, the 
government and the PSUV has received limited attention from scholars seeking to 
evaluate the quality of Bolivarian Participative Democracy. As with Puntofijismo, 
some commentators have criticised the partisan politicisation of the participative 
processes (McCoy 2006; Gott 2008; Araujo 2010). Hawkins (2010a) emphasises 
the ‘direct relationship’ between participants and politicians, and demonstrates a 
nationwide trend in Chavista-only participation. Another area of continuity is the 
perceived conflict between the objectives of community organisers and the 
objectives of representatives of party and state. Fernandes (2007:118) describes a 
“cultural” conflict with representatives of the traditional bureaucracy, arguing that 
they hold attitudes to women’s political participation that are out of step with local 
attitudes. While neither the conflict Fernandes’ identifies between government and 
community organisations, nor Hawkins’ concerns about partidismo are news to 
Venezuelans, our understanding of the relationship between party, state and 
people is hindered by a lack of studies that connect the day-to-day experiences of 
community groups with the accounts of representatives of party and state.  
This chapter presents different kinds of evidence to identify continuities in the role 
of party and state in community organising in Mérida in the years before and after 
Chávez’s election in 1998. The chapter begins by bringing together observations 
from thirty city-level community meetings. I identify how certain characteristics of 
these meetings work both to exclude non-Chavistas and to fuel discontent among 
the Chavista grassroots. The chapter continues with analysis from interviews with 
key bureaucrats from seven government institutions, outlining the extensive 
bureaucracy involved with administrating Mérida’s community organisations. 
These accounts are used to show the tensions faced by bureaucrats to balance 
inclusiveness with more conventional bureaucratic priorities and the influence of 
the PSUV. Finally, the accounts of community organisers and officials are 
contrasted to show the contemporary tension around party and state authority 
over participation. I argue that these three sorts of evidence show inherited 
tensions in the ways that participatory politics happens that connect to the 
different ways that the relationship between government and people is thought 
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about in Venezuela. As throughout the thesis, I also use these continuities to discuss 
what is different about the present time period. 
1. Constrained participation in invited spaces: evidence from public 
meetings 
This section brings together observations from thirty public meetings observed in 
Mérida during 2013 and 2014. They show that certain characteristics identified in 
the scholarship on pre-Chávez participatory politics can be seen today. In the 
scholarship, these characteristics were i) the subordination of local concerns 
(Hurtado 1991, Hernández de Padrón 1998), ii) the use of meetings for 
disseminating party and state information, rather than for decision-making 
(Hernández de Padrón 1998, 2000) and iii) the domination of community groups 
by party leadership (Hernández de Padrón 1998, 2000; Ellner 1999; Jugo Burguera 
2014). Observations of these meetings and the people that attend them help not 
only to establish these areas of continuity, but to provide context for the accounts 
of officials and participants discussed in sections two and three. 
Different examples of the seven types listed in Table 1 made up most of these thirty 
meetings. These have been highlighted as the meetings that included, or were 
talked about as including, some contribution both from community organisations 
and from representatives of party or state. None of the meetings described here 
occurred within barrio Pueblo Nuevo, although two are groups for residents of 
Spinetti Dini District, within which Pueblo Nuevo is located. 
Table 1. Key Public Meetings observed during fieldwork 
 
1. Frente de Vanguardia Hugo Chávez: a weekly forum for 
representatives of different organisations to plan collaborative 
events and discuss city politics 
 
2. Sala de Batalla: a weekly meeting for residents of the Spinetti Dini 
district to discuss local projects and hear communications from the 
PSUV  
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3. Parochial Assembly: one-off assembly for residents of the Spinetti 
Dini district to propose new projects at round-table discussions 
 
4. Communes Conference: a semi-regular event bringing together 
Commune activists from around Mérida State to share best practice 
and discuss strategies 
 
5. The Street Government: (May 2014) a public consultation drive 
visiting cities across the country as part of, with a series of different 
events held in Mérida over one weekend 
 
6. The ‘HBCh’: weekly forums for smaller residents groups of PSUV 
activists, similar to the Bolivarian Circles seen in the 2000s 
7. Closed meetings: three separate examples of “closed” meetings 
with limited attendance from representatives of community 
organisations 
Understanding the logic of these different types of meetings during fieldwork was 
challenging. This was due in part to a lack of clarity in the descriptions of different 
participants around what the functions of different groups were, coupled with the 
changing activities from week to week. This lack of clarity is in itself revealing. 
Participants seemed to attend meetings without knowing what to expect, while the 
content of the meetings that were held weekly (1, 2 and 6) mostly lacked a sense of 
continuity from week to week – with the exception of election-related discussions. 
Most of these meetings lasted only a couple of hours, while the series of meetings 
making up the Communes Conference was spread over two days. The smallest 
meeting, the HUBECHE was attended by only seven people. Most were attended by 
between twenty and thirty people. Apart from the four weekly meeting types, the 
others were one-off events. Four of the meeting types were intended for residents 
only (2, 3, 4 and 6), while the “closed” government meetings were by invitation 
only. 
Meeting formats: working table discussions and the ‘right to speak’ 
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Parts of these thirty meetings can be separated into three basic formats: semi-
scripted speeches or presentations, more rambling, undirected open discussions 
and more structured “working table” discussions intended to lead to consensus and 
some kind of action. 
The events or parts of events with greater planning and association with the state 
and party typically favoured the use of semi-scripted speeches and presentations. 
This included parts of the Communes Conference, the PSUV ideological discussions 
and the high-profile Street Government. In October 2013 Nicolas Maduro’s 
Gobierno del Calle – or Street Government – visited Mérida city. Events ran over a 
single weekend and included the destruction of hundreds of confiscated firearms 
in the Plaza Bolivar, a public hospital tour and an event for women’s groups at a 
Cultural Centre in the downtown neighbourhood of Santa Elena. This last event was 
attended by more than a hundred representatives from women’s groups from 
across the city, who filled the hall and sat in rows wearing pink T-shirts with pro-
Chavista slogans. The event consisted of a lengthy speech during which the Deputy 
Minister for Women and Gender Equality recounted the Revolution’s achievements 
on progressing women’s rights. To the surprise of some in the audience, the event 
ended without questions from the floor, and without hearing from the delegates on 
stage - who each stood to receive enthusiastic applause before returning to their 
seats.  
In its lack of dialogue or space for discussion, this event was a rarity, made 
especially notable by the way the Street Government had been described in party 
publications. This event was part of what President Nicolas Maduro has described 
as a national initiative of public consultation, intended as a key part of a new system 
of “popular government” (Maduro in Robertson 2013) which is reported as having 
consulted tens of thousands of people across the country since its introduction in 
2013.  
With the exception of the Street Government event, speeches in these meetings 
were always followed by opportunities to use the second format: the open 
discussion. This practice was a particular feature of the Sala de Batalla. The chapter 
opening – Gloria’s questions at the Sala de Batalla – was a notable example of the 
use of questions to challenge what had been said by the leaders. Typically the 
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chairperson would take numbers and those with raised hands would respond at 
length to what had been said. Participants practiced the principle they described as 
derecho de palabra – or “the right to speak”. Defined in the 1999 Constitution as the 
right “to be part of debates” (Article 245), in practice this right roughly translates 
into a license to talk indefinitely without interruption. The capacity of speakers 
from the floor to talk without notes seemed to be matter of personal pride. It is also 
a tradition that connects to the historical literature: Ray (1969: 22) commented 
that barrio residents thought nothing of wandering into government offices to 
approach officials, and evidence from these meetings suggests that this certainly 
continues today, as many participants in meetings seem to be unafraid to contradict 
high-ranking speakers from party and state. 
At the Frente de Vanguardia, lengthy political anecdotes were a regular feature of 
meetings, with some members seemingly taking the opportunity to demonstrate 
their capacity for ideological elaboration.  The problem of “too much derecho de 
palabra” was also raised during Frente sessions due to the impact of the principle 
on the length of meetings and concerns about a lack of concrete action. Andry 
Rangel - a youth organiser with training in techniques for structuring meetings - 
tried to encourage the use of stricter agendas for meetings in other groups, 
including the Frente Vanguardia.4 She said: 
“This happens a lot. Too much (...) It is difficult to have control. 
Sometime people come to meetings to show how they feel. To have 
catharsis there. But they have to understand to respect the time of 
everyone else, But look, you have to understand the people (in 
Venezuela) are very relaxed!” (interview w AR 03.06.14, MC) 
The third meeting format, the mesa de trabajo – or “working table” discussion – is 
in part designed to balance participation more evenly. These were smaller 
discussions with predetermined themes, a chair person and often a minute taker, 
and shorter contributions as each member takes turns around the table. This 
simple format was used at the Parochial Assembly in October 2013 to suggest new 
                                                          
4 At Youth PSUV meetings, I observed Andry use these techniques to keep meetings running 
to a minute-by-minute schedule – in contrast to every other meeting I attended in 
Venezuela. 
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project proposals for eight different project areas. A strength of the approach is that 
the tangential derecho de palabra anecdotes are cut out – perhaps because the 
audience for the rhetoric is reduced - and each participant is encouraged to 
contribute.5 
The working table format didn’t always succeed in disturbing the different levels 
of authority of different participants. At the Communes Conference, the people 
attending were divided, attending separate round table discussions on a first-
come-first-served basis. The group discussing “security”, was attended by two 
National Guard Generals, and the Governor for Mérida State, the former student 
leader Alexis Ramirez. As Governor, Alexis is both the President of the State’s 
branch of the PSUV, and the administrative chief of its bureaucracy. The crowded 
class room was standing-room only. The facilitator explained the procedure for the 
round-table session: the community representatives and officials around the table 
could raise questions in turn, and then the group as a whole would work through a 
set format to discuss solutions and assign responsibility for taking action using 
boards on the wall. This attempt to bring local organising techniques to a high-level 
meeting didn’t work. As each commune member described the security concerns 
in their communities, either of the two Generals or Governor Alexis seemed 
compelled to respond at length. Following each concern raised, one or another of 
the three officials would speak to the group for several minutes, outlining the 
progress being made by their organisations, and the difficulties they faced in doing 
so. After each exchange, the facilitator politely reminded all present of the format, 
and explained that the participants were there as equals: the National Guard and 
the Governor were expected neither to defend their actions nor provide solutions. 
Despite these explanations, the pattern continued – first local speakers, then direct 
responses from the different representatives of party and state, who seemed 
increasingly frustrated by the conversation. Eventually, first Alexis and then the 
Generals in turn announced other commitments, and excused themselves from the 
meeting. As the meeting closed, the white board was littered with problems, few 
                                                          
5 One practical shortcoming of this method is that different working table discussions often 
happen at the same time – as in the case of the Parochial Assembly and the Communes 
Conference. One spokesperson attending the Parochial Assembly said that they had learned 
to plan for these events to work in teams and divide their efforts in order to make proposals 
in different areas. 
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solutions, and the column intended for “assigning responsibility” was left almost 
blank.  
In some ways, this scene serves as an appropriate metaphor for the relationship 
between Mérida’s community organisations and the state administration. The 
Governor and National Guard Generals, pulled away from the day-to-day business 
of a State in the latter stages of a military crisis, appeared uncomfortable and 
confused by a format that neither recognised nor made demands of their authority. 
One of the community organisers involved with facilitating the discussion reflected 
on this, explaining how trying this sort of joint-working is necessary, but that the 
organisers recognise that the culture of more egalitarian participation that they are 
trying to develop is in its early stages, and is hampered by the lack of authority that 
has been delegated to the Communes.  
These different formats also connect to the direction of travel of information at the 
meetings. During speeches, information was given from speakers to the audiences. 
Examples included announcements of government or party successes (Street 
Government, Communes Conferences) information regarding mobilisation for 
election campaigns (Sala de Batalla) disseminating ideological content (PSUV 
Juventud, PSUV ideological discussions, HBCh, Sala de Batalla) or directions for 
coordinating between the different bodies of popular power (“Closed” meetings). 
Of them all, only the Sala de Batalla meeting described at the start of the chapter 
contained specific information about local spending. 
Where open discussions or questions followed these speeches, these were 
opportunities for community representatives to challenge what had been said (Sala 
de Batalla, Parochial Assembly, PSUV ideological discussions, HBCh). These 
discussions, however, were notable for the lack of dialogue between participants 
and representatives of state or party. Speakers from the floor would make their 
point, often speaking at length using the principle of derecho de palabra. The 
representatives of party or state would then thank them for their contribution, 
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perhaps making notes or assuring them that their concerns would be considered, 
and then move on to the next statement from the floor.6 
Another function of these meetings was for the meeting convenors to receive 
information from the attending representatives of community groups. Working 
table discussions collected information including the project proposals at the 
Parochial Assembly, and concerns and suggestions from community groups at the 
Communes Conference. Other information was designed to help plan mobilisation 
as part of national election campaigns.7  
The absence of any mechanisms for decision-making at any of these meetings was 
particularly notable. With the exception of agreeing proposals to submit to party 
and state authorities for consideration, the only firm decisions made during 
meetings were around scheduling future locations and times for future meetings. 
These were decided with a show of hands. At the Frente de Vanguardia, where 
practical decisions needed to be made to coordinate community outreach activities, 
these were typically made by a smaller leadership group away from the main 
meetings.8 
Given the lack of decision-making that happens at these meetings, the attendance 
of the participants needs an alternative explanation. In the 1960s, Ray (1969: 21) 
observed that barrio residents felt “assimilated” by being in touch with party 
structure and having a sense of participation in city life. Today, Chavista 
participants – from different sorts of communities - explained their participation in 
                                                          
6 Partly, this dynamic was about the size of these meetings, for example compared with the 
working table discussions, but the result was that any challenges to what had been said so 
far would not receive a response. One example was Gloria’s challenge to the projects report 
at the Sala de Batalla described at the start of the chapter, a direct challenge to the 
information presented. This comment was lost in a sea of questions and received only 
anecdotal responses from other speakers from the floor. 
7 In October 2013 the Sala de Batalla issued short questionnaires on party affiliation for 
community organisers to take back to their communities and complete, ahead of visits by 
candidates for the Municipal Elections. 
8 As discussed above, these meetings were of different types and were not necessarily 
thought about as opportunities for decision-making. At local level meetings, such as 
Communal Council meetings, or meetings of campaign or services-based groups with 
activities to coordinate, such as the PSUV Juventud or Fundación Cayapa, decision-making 
is much more regular. However, the implication behind narratives of “protagonistic” 
democracy is that there are regular opportunities for public influence over policy. The 
meetings discussed here were opportunities for this to happen, where it did not. 
216 
 
terms of a commitment to the wider project of participatory socialism.9 In part, this 
appears to be about connecting with a powerful narrative of social change and class 
justice. It is also about participants constructing identities for themselves – at times 
as triumphant social revolucionarios, at times as embattled defenders of Chávez’s 
legacy. 
Attendance limits: the right kind of participants 
Observing meetings as a fly-on-the-wall or occasional contributor meant that 
gauging the demographic characteristics of the participants was not systematic. 
The following assessments were done by sight only.  
The meetings described here were all mixed gender, usually with a roughly even 
mix of male and female participants, and with both men and women making similar 
numbers of contributions from the floor. This fits with the research collected by 
Hawkins’ (2010) national study into participant demographics in Venezuela’s 
different community groups. Speakers and chairpersons at meetings were also 
mixed gender, although all of the more senior officials were men - the National 
Guard Generals, The Governor, and higher-ranking PSUV representatives and 
bureaucrats - with the exception of the Deputy Minister for Women and Gender 
Equality, who was female. While the ages of participants were mixed from late 
teens to people in their seventies, the majority of participants at all of the events 
here were aged between forty and sixty.10 In part, in Mérida this age range may be 
connected to the existence of a large and active anti-government student 
movement, and to the existence of the Youth PSUV, whose activities were largely 
conducted at separate student-age events. 
Making judgements about the social class of participants was harder, including 
whether they were residents of poorer areas. Ray (1969: 20) suggested that barrio 
residents were easily identifiable outside of their communities due to “their barrio 
clothes”. Making these sorts of visual judgments today would not be reliable, if it 
                                                          
9 A further explanation is that participants expected material gains, for example benefits 
like consideration for subsidised white goods or housing, both of which were seen locally 
as being connected party membership (see Chapter Six). 
10 This age range also fits with the findings from Hawkins’ (2010) study. 
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ever was.11 Instead, I relied on conversations with participants. Across the different 
meetings these revealed a variety of professions, including university professors, 
students, tourism workers, teachers and the retired. Throughout fieldwork 
spotting residents of Pueblo Nuevo, of whom I knew dozens by sight, was very rare. 
I did meet spokesmen of the two neighbouring barrios, Simón Bolivar and Santa 
Domingo, at several meetings, notably the Sala de Batalla and Parochial Assembly. 
At the Frente de Vanguardia, which included meetings to coordinate events in 
Mérida’s barrios, the lack of participants from barrio communities was a particular 
concern. One member, Maria Cotta said: 
“This is one of our faults. We have not incorporated la gente del pueblo 
- the popular sectors (…) We need to do this to help our group.” 
(interview w MC, 03.07.16, MC). 
The concerns of Maria and other participants in the Frente de Vanguardia about 
the lack of participants from the popular sectors in their group are notable because 
the Frente declares itself to be committed to popular politics, was active in 
community engagement projects in Mérida’s barrios, and because Frente meetings 
were held at the Julio Febres Cultural Centre, some thirty feet from the North-East 
entrance to Pueblo Nuevo. From frequent conversations on the issue, it was clear 
that Maria and her group saw people from poorer communities not only as people 
that her group ought to include, but as the participants that could bring a certain 
capacity for political action. Here we see the folk concept of the barrio 
revolutionary in practice: the assumption that people in Mérida’s barrios are 
experience or inclined towards political radicalism of the political radicalism. 
These notions do not fit with my day-to-day experiences of either participating or 
non-participating people in Pueblo Nuevo, where throughout fieldwork, residents 
of Pueblo Nuevo and Simon Bolivar expressed their concerns about problems 
                                                          
11 During fieldwork, I found that middle class friends in Mérida shared Ray’s belief that they 
could judge what sort of neighbourhood a person lived in by their clothes and appearance. 
While it is not unreasonable to imagine there is some sort of connection between how you 
dress and where you live, both Ray and my Mérideña friends are likely forgetting that the 
barrios are home to extremely diverse populations. The extremely smart Sunday church 
Sunday best worn by the churchgoers and the expensive-looking gym gear worn by Marleny 
and Jose-Luís on their trips to the local aerobics park would contradict these assumptions. 
These examples show some limits to this kind of marginality thinking about barrio 
populations. 
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facing the two barrios, but rarely talked about problems facing the rest of the city, 
even during the tense months of the anti-government occupations. This scenario 
appears to represent a continuation of the trend of “comunitarismo” observed by 
Hernández de Padrón (1998: 209) about organising in the city in the 1980s and 
1990s, when barrio populations began to look inwards, due, she says, to 
dissatisfaction with the sorts of participation that happened in city-level 
organising. 
In addition to these limits, the biggest constraint on participation stemmed from 
the affiliation of these events to the PSUV and the broader Chavista movement. 
While participants voiced concerns about low participation from barrio residents, 
the fact that these meetings were all spaces intended only for Chavista participants 
was something that seemed to be taken for granted by those in attendance. At the 
Communes Conference, for example, I asked a delegate from Los Chorros - a low-
income barrio to the south of Mérida City - who participated in her commune:  
“Why, all the world, of course. The entire community- everyone is 
there. We make sure to include them all.” 
“Even opositors- opposition supporters?” 
“Opositors? No, of course not.” 
This response – “all the world” – was a common one, as if the idea of non-Chavistas 
attending meetings was unthinkable. Various practices contributed to the 
identification of these meetings as spaces with a specific political affiliation. It is 
important to reiterate that these events – with the exception of the Street 
Government, the Parochial Assembly and the Sala de Batalla - were not occasions 
that were presented as examples of public consultation in decision-making about 
services and public spending. In most cases, the intended audience of the event was 
highlighted through symbolism of either the PSUV or the wider Chavista 
movement. This included the use of the PSUV logo on presentation slides and hand-
outs, pro-Chávez banners and t-shirts and in the case of the Street Government, 
singing the PSUV anthem to open the event. The spaces were further branded 
through shared practices including call-and-response chanting of political slogans, 
most commonly Chávez vive: la lucha sigue! – ‘Chávez lives the struggle goes on!’ 
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Other verbal signals included members expressing concerns about the infiltration 
of the space by opposition informants and derogatory comments about these 
escualidos – ‘the dirty ones’ – as they are known.  
In addition, information about these events was almost always shared directly 
through closed activist networks, by word-of-mouth or group text messages. At the 
Sala de Batalla, a register was completed with details about where participants 
lived, contact information and National Identification numbers. Together, these 
practices consolidated these spaces as ones where only Chavista supporters could 
participate freely. This scenario can be considered against the evidence collected 
by Hellinger (2011: 44-45), that suggests that nearly all participants in “highly 
organised” groups agreed with opposition involvement in public meetings in 
principle.12 Among the participants at these meetings in Mérida, I frequently raised 
the question of non-Chavista participation, in an attempt to see what responses I 
could get to the tension between participants’ commitment to popular power and 
the partisan nature of these spaces.  
One participant with various local groups, Angel Vierno, who is also a Communal 
Council spokesperson from Vice Hermosa, disagreed that spaces like the Sal de 
Batalla wanted to exclude opposition supporters: 
“It is not about opposition or Chavismo. More important is that they 
have consciousness (…) to work to the same objectives. For example, 
all of the city is interested in (improving) security. Green, white, red 
and black. What we want is to have one space to work towards this.” 
(interview w GV, 29.05.14, MC). 
Andry Rangel, the youth organiser, reminded me that legally meetings must be 
open to all participants (interview w AR 03.06.14, MC). She attributes 
responsibility to the individual:  
“This is a contradiction of the Communal Councils, for example. That it 
is for everyone in all of the community. They cannot be prevented from 
                                                          
12 Hellinger’s study totalled 850 respondents from eleven barrios and three urbanizacíon 
(typically middle-class) communities which were all said to be “highly organised”. In the 
barrios 96.9% thought everyone should always participate, and 98.7% in the 
urbanizaciones.  
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attending. It is those same people (opposition supporters) who have to 
work and participate.” 
Other Chavista participants were concerned that if opposition members did attend, 
they would disrupt meetings and not share the goals of the Chavista participants. 
This view was fuelled by the experience of some participants, who reported that 
opposition participants had blocked or derailed projects in the city (interview w JP, 
29.05.14, MC). These Chavistas participants saw their plans as synonymous with 
the needs of poorer communities – just as the needs of el pueblo also appear as 
synonymous with government actions in Chávez’s rhetoric (see Harnecker 2010, 
see also Chapter Three). In this way, these participants were able to reconcile the 
partisan membership of their groups with the inclusive principles of derecho de 
palabra and community democracy. 
It is important to distinguish here between the affiliation of participants with the 
PSUV and with the broader Chavista movement. During their time in office, both 
the PSUV and the two Puntofijista-era parties have been successful in blurring the 
lines between the party and the state. Part of this is about building legitimacy by 
acting as brokers for public services (Buxton 2000: 3). The equivalence of party and 
state, however, is not reflected in the thinking of community organisers who more 
typically see themselves as supporters of Chávez’s legacy and as activists within the 
broader mass movement for the Bolivarian Revolution. The Frente de Vanguardia 
Hugo Chávez, for example, is named after the late President, and was formed to 
protect his legacy after his death in 2013 (interview w LB, 03.07.16, MC). Meetings 
almost always included plenty of criticism of party practices (see discussion 
below). Maria Cotta described her decision to join the collective “because I had 
heard that there weren’t any PSUV people there” (interview w MP, 03.07.16, MC). 
Although Maria was critical of both the party and bureaucracy during group 
discussions, I marched with her through the city carrying a flag bearing Chávez’s 
face on more than one occasion. This attitude is widespread, and included the vast 
majority of organisers and activists encountered throughout all my time in 
Venezuela. Therefore, when activists like Maria use the pejorative “partidista”, they 
make a criticism not of Chavista partisanship, but of the PSUV’s reputation for 
ignoring the grassroots. This arguably shows the inadequacy of terms like 
“partisan” (e.g. Hawkins 2010; Hellinger 2011) for describing Venezuelan political 
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processes. Patterns of support can be distinguished between support for the 
Chavista mass movement, the President, or much more rarely, for the PSUV. As a 
result, it is important to discuss the relationship between party, state and mass 
movement in Venezuela in a more nuanced way. 
Observations from these different meetings, and conversations with different 
participants gives us a picture of the constrained and ways that participation is 
happening in and around Pueblo Nuevo. While the values associated with the 
protagonistic, empowered Bolivarian ideal of Participatory Democracy are part of 
the narrative woven around these groups and spaces, these constraints are a in 
some ways a continuation of some of the frustrated experiences of community 
organising and partidismo from the pre-Chávez era, described in chapters two and 
three. Part of explaining this continuity is about understanding how different 
notions about the role of government and people are thought about by bureaucrats 
who coordinate Mérida’s community organisations.  
2. Patrons or emancipators? The inherited challenge for Mérida’s 
partisan bureaucrats 
This section brings together interview responses from key members of the 
institutions tasked with administering Mérida’s community organisations (see 
Table 2). Each participant also identified themselves as a supporter of the 
Bolivarian movement. These interviews were mostly conducted in the offices of the 
relevant institutions, either with prior arrangement or opportunistically. While 
these locations mean that these participants may have felt pressure to give 
responses that fit with government discourses, their accounts still show something 
of the challenge of reconciling the Bolivarian commitment to participatory politics 
both with these institutions’ authority and with the influence of the PSUV. 
Table 2. Key Officials involved with the administration of Mérida’s 
community organisations 
 
1. Nelson Ruiz, State Director for the Ministry of Communes and Social 
Movements 
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2. Noriada Gomez, Programmes Coordinator, FUNDACOMUNAL 
 
3. Herberto Martinez Torres, State Coordinator for the Prefects Secretariat 
 
4. Gudilo Rangel, Coordinator General at the Secretariat of Public Politics 
 
5. Bridget Rodriguez, Participation Coordinator at the State Legislative 
Council 
 
6. Gabriel Madera, Planning and Engineering Coordinator, Corpo Andes 
 
7. Reyes Lobo, Community Articulation Officer at the Fund for Social 
Inversion (FONVIS)13 
 
 
The scholarship on participatory politics in the pre-Chávez era identifies certain 
characteristics of the administration of community organising. These include i) the 
establishment of an extensive bureaucracy; ii) centralised processes for the 
registration and regulation of groups; iii) the prioritisation of state objectives over 
local concerns; and iv) the existence of direct party influence on these processes 
(see especially Ray 1969; Hurtado 1991; Hernández de Padrón 1998; and Ellner 
1999). There is less available evidence about the attitudes of bureaucrats in the 
pre-Chávez era, or describing the political culture inside of the state institutions. I 
add these details here as evidence of another way that notions about the state and 
public roles that fit with the different folk concepts identified in earlier chapters 
that can be identified in both eras. 
Mapping Mérida’s bureaucracy for participatory politics 
Proponents of Participatory Democracy predict the eventual reduction in 
Venezuela’s state apparatus (e.g. Raby 2006). Staff at the Ministry of Communes 
said that at the time of fieldwork, Mérida State had 2068 Communal Councils, 45 
communes more than 350 registered social movements (interview w NR, 06.06.14, 
OF). These are joined by numerous residents’ associations that often share 
                                                          
13 I have added the acronyms for those institutions which are commonly known by them. 
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development work with electoral campaigning for the PSUV, such as those 
described in the previous section. Under the Bolivarian Revolution, however, 
Venezuela has also experienced an expansion of state bureaucracy reminiscent of 
the oil boom years of the 1970s. At the local office of the National Housing Fund 
(FONVIS), Reyes Lobo said that in Mérida State the Governacíon now reportedly 
employs over twenty seven thousand staff, including those tasked with community 
development planning and with the coordination of ‘popular power’ (interview w 
RL, 12.05.14, OF). Various pre-Revolution institutions which had engaged with 
public politics have reoriented to work with this expansion of organised civil 
society groups, while other new institutions have been created to implement the 
new legislation that governs their practices. 
Several offices deal with different aspects of the coordination of community groups. 
The FUNDACOMUNAL, manages the registration of Communal Councils, monitors 
their elections and allocates funds for small projects. Corpo Andes provides funding 
and technical coordination for larger development projects, typically those that 
span more than one community. The National Housing Fund (FONVIS) coordinates 
the Vivienda social housing mission, including dealing with the collective 
applications that are made by the campaign groups known as custódios or jurídicos 
including the Brisas de Alba housing collective described in the previous chapter.  
The regional office of the Ministry of Popular Power for the Communes and Social 
Movements deals with the development and registration of groups of local councils 
as they seek to form inter-community residents’ associations. The other 
organisations mentioned in this chapter are smaller and each report within the 
Governacíon – the State Department. Their responsibilities include dealing with 
neighbourhood disputes, supporting local planning and coordinating the ‘public 
politics’ aspects of Mérida’s State Development Plan. 
While these institutions are now part of the infrastructure of participatory politics 
in Mérida, each has their roots in departments from the pre-Chávez era. The three 
national institutions have all been renamed during the Chávez era, when most 
government departments changed their names to emphasise the ethic of popular 
politics. The Ministry of Popular Power for the Communes and Social Movements, 
for example, has been through various changes to its responsibilities, most recently 
combining the administration of participatory government with more protectionist 
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responsibilities as the Ministry of Popular Power for the Communes and Social 
Protection.14 The FUNDACOMUNAL dates its origins to 1962, when the 
FUNDACOMUN was established as one of the first Organisations of Social 
Development (ORDES) of Betancourt’s Presidency. At State level, this rebranding 
has not occurred. At Corpo Andes, Gabriel Madera also reported how, after fifteen 
years of Bolivarianism some of the staff remained in place from Puntofijismo, 
including people who were known to be opponents to Chavismo (interview w GM, 
02.06.14, OF).15   
These institutions have also inherited their day-to-day activities and processes 
from the pre-Chávez era. Where the FUNDACOMUNAL registered the prescribed 
processes for the Juntas Comunales and later the Neighbours’ Associations, the 
institution now fulfils the same task for the Communal Councils. FONVIS’ work to 
support Mission Vivienda is a cornerstone of Bolivarian welfare policy, offering 
“dignified housing” to vulnerable people, including those suffering overcrowding 
in barrio communities domestic refugees whose houses have been destroyed in 
natural disasters. The Mission - which builds iconic yellow tower blocks - is a 
central part of the government’s package of support for the most vulnerable. It also 
revisits a state policy first seen under the government of General Perez Jiménez in 
the 1950s dur8ing the era of the New National Ideal, when apartment blocks were 
built on the hillsides of Caracas, with the same goal of relieving low living 
conditions in urban areas (Fernandes 2010: 43). 
In response to questions about the roles of their institutions, the different officials 
all made reference to both Bolivarian emancipatory ideals and the need to regulate 
participation. Nelson Ruiz, State Director of the Ministry of Communes and Social 
Movements, emphasised the different needs of different communities, and the need 
to found participatory action as a response to these particular local characteristics. 
                                                          
14 These blanket changes raise the question: if all government departments are rebranded 
in this way, does the affix “Popular Power” lose its meaning? 
15 Most of their offices are clustered around the historical and commercial centre of the city, 
with the colonial Governacíon building taking up a city block at the south edge of Plaza 
Bolivar. The FUNDACOMUNAL and Corpo Andes – the offices concerned with administering 
funds – are further out of town to the north of the city. 
225 
 
Despite this, Nelson also talked repeatedly about using community organisations 
as a means of increasing productive capacity:  
“It is necessary to strengthen territorial control - to guarantee the 
autonomy in the theme of productivity, in the theme of the economy, 
and to have these networks of social productivity that guarantee the 
productive autonomy of the territory.” 
This emphasis on productivity reflects an institutional objective that is somewhat 
distanced from the way local economic needs are articulated within community 
groups,16 while the objective of “territorial control” seems to clash with 
Bolivarianism’s emancipatory ideals. Nelson’s account gives an indication of the 
challenge he faces to reconcile more conventional development priorities with the 
commitment to emancipation via new mechanisms self-government. 
At Corpo Andes, Gabriel Madera also faces the challenge of balancing his own 
professional assessment with the opinions of community members. He describe 
show his team, who deal with larger or inter-community projects, look for 
“technical viability” and evidence of benefits for “the whole community” (interview 
w GM, 02.06.14, OF). From his description, collecting the ideas of local residents is 
an important first step to any project, but the ultimate assessments about the 
benefits of any scheme are made by Gabriel and his team.  
Like Nelson and Gabriel, Reyes Lobo, a Community Articulation Worker at FONVI, 
emphasised the ways that his work responds to community priorities: 
“We work together with popular power. It isn’t just us assigning 
houses. We do it in a way that corresponds to popular power and to the 
society and the communities. There is participation (…) People and 
institution united.” 
Here Reyes echoes Chávez’s (in Harnecker 2005: 1263-164) representation of 
unity between government and popular actors.  Despite this ‘togetherness’, 
                                                          
16 At Fundación Cayapa, for example, “socio productive workshops” are the closest to a 
concern with productivity, but are designed in large part as a part of alternative education 
strategy that is in tensions with ideas about education as a vehicle for state objectives (see 
Chapter Eight). 
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however, Reyes’ office is principally concerned with assessments of eligibility 
criteria. These were reflected in his frequent references to “necessity” and 
“conditions” throughout his interview. At FONVI, these values are set internally, 
then used for means-testing to decide who qualifies for social housing. 
Nearly all of the officials made some mention of peace or social harmony. Herberto 
Martinez Torres, State Coordinator of the Prefects Secretariat, described how the 
prefects support the organisation of the Communal Councils (interview w HM, 
05.06.14, MC). He highlighted their work to help people “live in peace, with good 
conviviality, and quickly resolve the conflicts between them”. Herberto described 
using citizen’s assemblies to discuss neighbourhood disputes, in “…the hope that 
the government resolves them”. The Prefectura are another institution inherited 
their structure and function from the pre-Chávez era, and although this explanation 
talks about using a public meeting to address problems, the government is 
ultimately presented as the agent of change. 
Bridget Rodriguez works at the Participation team at the State Legislative Council, 
who work with Communal Councils and other groups to offer training and advice. 
Bridget described the team’s work as being largely “corrective” (interview w BR, 
22.04.14, OF). While they don’t control funds for community projects, the team are 
an additional part of the packed bureaucracy around popular power, with their 
own regulations and regulators. According to Bridget, the emphasis is on helping 
groups “conform” to the bureaucratic requirements and speed up the process of 
getting funding and registration. Their role includes blocking some local 
suggestions and even giving recommendations to Corpo Andes on project 
decisions. As with Herberto, Bridget emphasised the importance of avoiding 
conflict, by using working table discussions offering practical workshops “to 
maintain the calm, the tranquillity and the peace and cordiality inside that 
communal council (…) to put things in order.”  
In these interviews, language such as community benefit, social harmony, family 
necessity, peace and conviviality share space with more institutional sorts of 
language such as productivity, viability, and a desire to implement “correct” 
practice and resolve problems quickly. This gives some indication of the challenges 
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faced by these bureaucrats in assessing these goods in a way that matches both 
institutional processes and local attitudes.  
Processes for regulation, registration and assessment 
As they did on the pre-Chávez era, these institutions also continue to centralise 
processes for participatory politics. The public faces of these institutions are the 
cubicles or offices where clerks receive and assess paperwork and the busy waiting 
rooms where community leaders, activists and other residents queue in line, 
checking and rechecking their paperwork. At the FONVIS, for example, campaign 
groups like the Brisas de Alba campaign group apply for housing collectively. As 
described in Chapter Six, the resulting new social housing project to the North of 
Pueblo Nuevo is are considered locally to be the product of ‘popular power’. Despite 
this, the institutions cartographers, engineers and specialists ultimately decide on 
the suitability of terrain for construction (interview w RL, 24.07.14, OF), the 
function of the housing campaigns may be largely to aggregate local needs. 
Eligibility criteria also applies for Communal Councils and Communes, where 
registration processes have to be completed for groups to receive funding and 
support. In Mérida, only registered Communal Councils or social movements can 
apply for project funding from Corpo Andes or the Fundacomunal. The 
formalisation of the collective strategies and needs of these groups happens in 
Community Development Plans, in the case of Communal Councils and as Project 
Proposals in the case of Corpo Andes.  
Noriada Gomez, Programs Coordinator at the FUNDACOMUNAL, described how 
with the Communal Councils the assemblies, voting, elections and the pre-election 
residents’ census are all prescribed and centrally assessed by state officials 
(interview w NG, 06.06.14, OF). A threshold of thirty percent attendance is 
specified to pass decisions - a measure designed to reduce the chance of councils 
being dominated by a powerful minority.17 Once registered, she said, the process of 
                                                          
17 In Calle Principal, however, voceros cite this threshold as an obstacle to completing 
electoral procedures necessary to register, while persistent low turn-out at councils that 
are already registered can result in paralysis. One participating member from another of 
Mérida’s barrios advised me that her Communal Council had been stalled for several 
months at the point of electing a new team of spokesmen, due to a failure to get sufficient 
numbers to attend a meeting to ratify the appointments. 
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attaining funding for development projects is similarly centralised. For most 
projects, Communal Councils apply to the FUNDACOMUNAL on a project-by-
project basis. This is a change from the original fiscal autonomy enjoyed by the first 
Communal Councils. Noriada explained how originally, each new council was “born 
with resources”. On registration, each group would receive the considerable sum 
of 30,000 Bolivars18 and were given authority over spending it. This provision has 
now been removed, with greater control returning to the FUNDACOMUNAL. 
Noriada did not see this as a centralisation of control around her office, however. 
Instead, she emphasised how the decisions on finances are largely concerned with 
correspondence with the Integrated Community Development Plans that are 
designed by local councils themselves. Of course, these plans are also subject to 
approval by the FUNDACOMUNAL.  
At the Ministry of Communes and Social Movements, Nelson Ruiz also played down 
the regulatory role of his institution:   
“We are not the bosses of popular power, we are the acompanantes – 
companions - of the people. We accompany their process. So the real 
power doesn’t exist. I will touch on registration. It’s a process that is 
born of the people. We are just talking about formality. (…) What can I 
tell you? How do you refer to power? I can tell you, if I have an idea for 
the Communal Councils, I can suddenly convene a meeting, but it is on 
them to decide if they want to accept. I can’t oblige them to participate, 
understand? Us, what we are doing is the opposite. We are transferring 
all of the power that we have, if you want to call it that, all the things 
that we can do, do the people.” 
Here, Nelson reproduced an idea about the decentralisation of power that is familiar 
from government discourses around Communal Councils and Communes. It is an 
explanation, however, that conflicts with the frustrated accounts of community 
participants in section three of this chapter. 
Party influence on Mérida’s institutions 
                                                          
18 For 2014, this would amount to as much as 30,000 USD. 
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As well as balancing overlapping institutional and local priorities, these officials all 
described the close relationship of the institutions with the PSUV. Their waiting 
rooms, offices and corridors typically feature portraits of President Nicolas Maduro 
and the late Hugo Chávez alongside posters with revolutionary slogans or 
advertising upcoming United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV) events. There are 
different allegations about the influence of party politics on the practices of the 
Venezuelan bureaucracy in general, including those institutions concerned with 
the coordination of popular power.  
It is widely rumoured that non-Chavistas are frequently arbitrarily sacked from 
government jobs for political reasons. In one example from Pueblo Nuevo, Marleny 
Angulo-Quintero described her dismissal from a local department of the 
Governación due, she believed, to her personal politics, following the election of a 
Chavista Governor (interview w MA, 19.04.14, PN). Other allegations involve 
recruitment discrimination using the infamous la lista Tascón - the list of signatures 
used to force the unsuccessful presidential Recall Referendum in 2004 that is now 
rumoured to be used to block the appointment of any signatory to a position in a 
public office (Carroll 2013; 26). During fieldwork, people with experience of 
government institutions complained also about the promotion of officials due to 
their political rather than professional attributes (interview w CO, 09.09.13, MC). 
More widely, when bureaucrats attend marches or meetings it is viewed with 
scrutiny among Chavistas - as the participation of bureaucrats in public political 
activity is widely interpreted as an attempt to either avoid penalties in the work 
place or to accrue favour. 
In line with ideas about the partisanship of public officials, I first met some of these 
officials at party-political events, while staff at the FUNDACOMUNAL, Corpo Andes, 
FONVI and the Secretariat for Public Politics, revealed themselves to be supportive 
of the revolutionary process though their language and comments. However, these 
officials also confirmed that there were also staff working at their institutions who 
were known to be supporters of the opposition. At Corpo Andes and FONVIS, the 
only non-Chavista staff were described as generally being longer-serving 
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bureaucrats who remained in post from the pre-Chávez era.19 At Corpo Andes, 
however, Gabriel Madera did suggest that recruiters look for “both technical and 
political profiles” when they appoint new staff. This profiling was the clearest 
indication of discrimination in terms of recruitment.  
Gabriel also said that the institution’s staff are involved with active campaigning, 
including attending events, “participating” with the party and giving logistical 
support for election campaigns. He explained this by connecting political ideology 
and professional working practices:  
 “We know that, when we are in a public institution, of the 
government, we have to fit with the politica actual –the current 
politics- right? So, yes. To work in Corpo Andes we have to be clear 
about the current politics of the government, at the least socialism, 
revolution, that’s what we’re working with, right? (…B)ut the 
majority that are here now are in line with the revolutionary 
process, we have seen that the other way doesn’t serve our country, 
we’ve learned the history of our country, and also we (Chavistas) 
are multiplying in all of the public institutions - Communal Councils, 
Communes, all of them. We go on with the power of the people, 
right?” 
Here, Gabriel’s explanation frames Corpo Andes’ work as part of the broader 
revolutionary process. This attitude connects to the way that the PSUV has been 
successfully represented as ‘more than a party’ – as the AD and COPEI parties 
achieved during the first years of Puntofijismo (see Buxton 1999). This blurring of 
the lines between the party, the “mass popular movement” of Chavismo and the 
contemporary Venezuelan state, is sued to try and legitimise the PSUV’s influence 
within public institutions.  
                                                          
19 At the Fonvi Reyes said that there was no discrimination around the political preferences 
of staff, giving his own membership of the Communist Party of Venezuela (PCV), as an 
example of political diversity. The PCV are members of the leftist Grand Patriotic Pole in 
Venezuela, but are separate from the PSUV and increasingly critical. Although they support 
the PSUV in presidential elections, they occasionally put forward rival candidates in 
municipal and state elections. In contrast, I was advised by another PCV party member that 
after the PSUV victory, some PCV members in the Governación did lose their positions.  
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At the FUNDACOMUNAL, Noriada agreed. She said that the Chavista ideology is “not 
just party”, but is also a “way of working” that is about being “less individualistic” 
(interview w NG, 06.06.14, OF). Among the different accounts, there was general 
agreement about the need for non-Chavistas to respect what were seen as the new 
working practices of Bolivarianism. Gudilo Rangel, Coordinator General at the 
Secretariat of Public Politics explained his expectations of his opositor colleagues: 
“If we are in this process, they should respect this process. And we 
try to win them over to the process (…) The party links the 
government institutions of the government with the people who are 
there below. Chávez always wanted that.” 
Here, the role of the party is to connect state and society – something that might be 
difficult to accept for the increasing number of people in Venezuela who are critical 
of the PSUV agenda and methods. 
It is demonstrative of the extent of acceptance of the party role that the theme of 
party politics does not appear to be a sensitive area for these interviewees. It is 
possible that these answers have been rehearsed, but the speakers in each case 
seemed very relaxed and comfortable talking about the influence of the PSUV. In 
my interview with Gudilo, we joked about his having a poster of President Nicolas 
Maduro on his wall (interview w GM, 04.06.14, OF). He went on to talk about 
meeting Chávez as a student activist, explaining how the inclusive vision for 
Venezuelan politics that he was looking for as a young man is now coming to pass. 
He talked about the importance of being “a good politogo” by listening to reasoned 
arguments and debating the ideas rather than thinking about party politics. Gudilo, 
however, also recognised that: 
“…there are radicals in the structure, who look for confrontation. 
Something that this process does have is ideology. And part of this 
ideology is dialogue and the discussion of ideas. The confrontation 
of ideas.”  
In this explanation political ideology again is represented not as ‘party influence’ 
but as a principle for good practice – practice that potentially includes challenging 
the new Chavista politics. 
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For Noriada, the important thing is that the personnel in the party and the 
Communal Councils are also equivalent. She said: 
“Yes we have contact with (the PSUV). Remember that in the case of 
Venezuela, all of the people involved with... (pauses) all of the 
institutions that convey popular power come directly from the 
party or from a current within (the Chavista coalition) the Grand 
Patriotic Pole.” 
Noriada adds that mainly in Latin America ‘poor people’ have a ‘left-wing ideology’. 
In her different responses we see how the Bolivarianism occurs as party, as a 
certain collective work ethic, as part of a homogenous participant identity and now 
as a rough proxy for social class. These ideas were commonplace during fieldwork 
– where the lines were often blurred between class, the PSUV and the broader 
Chavista movement. In part, this draws on Chávez’s ability to present his policies 
and ideas – now referred to nostalgically as “the road of Chávez” – as equivalent to 
the interests of the people. In this way, Chávez framed government itself as an 
institution of popular power (see Chapter Three). This reasoning conflicts with 
theories that define participatory democracy, popular governance and “constituent 
power” as separate to representative democracy, populism and “constituted” 
power (e.g. Negri 1999). It is a conflict that most Chavistas, and in particular these 
bureaucrats, seem comfortable with, as they reconcile radical discourses of 
grassroots empowerment with the conventional roles of state institutions and the 
PSUV as described in this section. 
3. Notions about government and people: the disordered public and 
the dominant state 
The two sets of information presented above show the tensions between state 
officials’ and community organisers attitudes about the role of state and party 
participatory politics. For the officials, the maintenance of institutions’ authority 
fits with inherited marginality-type ideas about the public as disordered parochials 
who are in need of corrective measures. For the organisers, the unresponsiveness 
of the state and the dominance of the PSUV fail to deliver on promises of more 
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direct democracy and a new era of participatory socialism for the revolutionary 
Venezuelan poor. 
The disordered public? A rationale for funcionalismo 
In their commitment to participation, different officials showed a certain regard for 
the capability of the public. At the FUNDACOMUNAL, Noriada described how, in 
most cases, council members were extremely cost-effective, using their resources 
for materials and using volunteers to undertake unpaid labour and administrative 
duties. These local cayapas, she said, can see mass involvement of communities, 
with resident often working every Saturday and Sunday to complete repaving work 
on roads, or building or improving shared sports facilities. According to Noriada, 
the resulting construction projects often achieve much more than a private firm 
could have delivered, maximising the community improvements from the finances 
available. Her description reproduces ideas that are familiar from government 
discourses about the failings of the private sector and the superiority of communal 
development approaches as not only fairer but more efficient than the 
individualism of capitalism.  
Despite these successes, however, Noriada described other “fiascos”, where groups 
were unused to cooperative working. In these cases, she says, the community 
participants struggled to share responsibility for significant funds, resulting in 
infighting and project failures. These difficulties, she says, contributed to the 2011 
change to the centralised financing decisions that remain in place today. She talked 
about government institutions having to propel the council process so that later the 
people can “walk alone”. While Noriada’s responses may have been elicited in part 
by my line of questioning into the justifications for institutional oversight, her 
descriptions of the public were consistently reproduced by the other officials.  
Nelson Ruiz expanded on the particular nature of urban populations, giving this as 
an explanation for slower progress among the Communes in Mérida City. He 
explained how, for him, people in the cities are “different” and their problems, such 
as delinquency and addiction are “more complicated”. He said that people in rural 
areas were more convinced of the Bolivarian ideology, while those in urban areas 
had less understanding to go with a general “lack of harmony”.  
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Herberto’s account of the work of the Prefectura, presented the state intervention 
as necessary to deliver peaceful resolutions, implying that without their 
intervention, meetings could not have progressed safely. At the Legislative Council, 
Bridget characterised community participants as disordered and parochial. She 
talked about resisting engaging with ‘gossip’ and intervening when Communal 
Councils “…do things they shouldn’t”. The idea of these participants as in need of 
some sort of paternal support or oversight was also seen at the State Council. 
Gudilo emphasised the importance of ‘accompanying’ the communities, while at 
the Fundacomunal, A recurring idea was that community groups are made up of 
individuals who are somehow underdeveloped and in need of instruction in terms 
of how to participate the ‘correct’ way. At FONVI, Reyes talks about the local failure 
to respect “norms” and other participants to be tolerant of the “laws” of 
participating. He identified a problem with personal attitudes, education and 
ideological “formacíon”. This is echoed elsewhere, for example as lack of 
preparation and a resulting lack of political “consciousness”. 
These descriptions of community participants as disordered and parochial, and of 
the state role to regulate these spaces, connect with certain ways of thinking about 
poor urban communities and their populations discussed in the thesis so far. Slater 
(2010) describes how “folk concepts” about marginality can be used by officials and 
politicians to justify certain policies and practices. Here, evidence from Mérida 
implies a certain way of thinking about community participants on the part of 
government officials suggests that notions about barrio populations being 
disordered, delinquent and as “different” are part of a rationale for continuing the 
kinds of funcionalismo – of bureaucratic oversight - seen in the pre-Chávez era.  
The dominant state? Growing dissatisfaction with partidismo 
These practices and ways of thinking clash with those expressed by community 
participants at the meetings described in section one. Like the comments from the 
chapter opening, the spaces at the edges of meetings were often used to grumble 
about the limits to participation identified in section one. Above all, the most 
common criticism by participants in these meetings was of what they saw as a lack 
of space for dialogue and autocritica - or “self-criticism”. This principle, 
championed by Chávez and later Maduro, has become a by-word for the tensions 
235 
 
between the grassroots and the PSUV. For some, the lack of autocritica was 
interpreted as the subordination of public needs to private interests: 
“The problem is we are still currently in plain capitalism. With all this 
speculation. We are not yet in socialism. What we have is an idea (…) 
The people who are right at the top are working for the Revolution, but 
those who are just below are in it for business.”  
Others participants were more sympathetic. Juan Valeri is a teacher at the 
Fundación Cayapa, and a resident in the part of Pueblo Nuevo represented by the 
Communal Council Calle Principal. Juan described how:  
“…(W)hat can happen as well is that there are some compañeros who 
come to instances of power that are there. And they get confused, and 
they think that to build the Revolution is to defend their power. They 
are confused, and this is a contradiction. They are confused, and they 
have political attitudes that are not really revolutionary.” (interview w 
JV 05.06.14, PN) 
Here, Juan sees the tendencies of the state as tied up with a commitment to the 
Bolivarianism rather than any fundamental self-interest. Like Juan, others 
described what they saw as the “bourgeois” tendencies as a misunderstanding of 
the anti-authoritarian principles of participatory socialism. This was often 
described as a lack of formación – ideological development.  
As well as these grumblings at the edges of meetings, other expressions of 
discontent about the relationship between the grassroots were more public. In May 
2014 an occupation was held outside the Governor’s offices to protest the 
treatment of a prefect and Communal Council spokesperson for Campo de Oro, a 
barrio to the north of the city. The occupation was a fairly small assembly of 
community organisers from different parts of the city, positioned so that the 
occupiers could start conversations with other activists and junior officials as they 
entered the offices. One, Juan Bartoli, explained that they were representing a 
spokesmen whose community development projects – including some for 
developing new economic opportunities in his barrio - had not been supported by 
the PSUV (interview with JB, 29.05.14, MC). Juan described how the projects had 
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failed due to the withdrawal of support, something he attributed to “pressure from 
above (and) a structural and legal failing” on the part of the PSUV to consult the 
public as Chávez had wanted. These examples of informal solidarity away from the 
formal channels of participation may be an increasing trend. In June 2014, a group 
of activists from Caracas visited the city, attending meetings including those of the 
Frente de Vanguardia to promote a new alternative network of organisers with 
ambitions to expand nationally.  
On occasion, public meetings attended by higher-ranking state or party officials 
were also treated as a forum for raising concerns with the way participatory 
politics happened. One meeting led by more senior representatives of the state 
bureaucracy gave a clear impression of the attitude of the bureaucrats towards the 
grassroots. The convenor explained in his introduction that: 
“Today, this is not an open meeting, it is a closed meeting (…) We need 
to have the jefes – the bosses - here, because here, we are going to make 
decisions”. 
The meeting proceeded using an official PowerPoint that outlined the 
government’s strategy for the “territorial coordination” of the different community 
organisations. On this occasion, however, contributions from the floor included 
those from representatives of civil society, who challenged the speaker’s emphasis 
on territory and argued that the participatory processes should be owned by the 
communities. The speakers – including participants from the Frente de Vanguardia 
and spokespersons from local Communes - argued that the coordination of 
community organisations in the way proposed was a deviation from the original 
idea, and risked leading to organisations “of paper” where the real power was held 
by conventional authorities.  At this meeting, these comments were received 
gracefully, but provided only a short postscript following the clear plan for 
coordination outlined in the previous two hours.   
In July 2014, the PSUV responded to the growing alienation of the grassroots 
Chavistas, by calling on the country’s social movements and community 
organisations to submit their suggestions for consideration at the Third National 
Congress of the PSUV. 20,000 submissions were rumoured to have been collected 
nationwide. At the Frente de Vanguardia, this opportunity was used to 
237 
 
unequivocally raise the question of party responsiveness and the lack of spaces for 
dialogue and autocritica. The group used a working table format to design a 
submission of proposals that sums up many of the arguments about the 
relationship between the party and popular sectors. The document calls for 
“….communal spaces (for) critical discussion and self-criticism”; meeting 
supporters and potential supporters in their homes; an end to the election of 
spokespersons without consultation; and the inclusion of community 
organisations in political decision-making (pp1-2). A “new culture” is suggested for 
the relationships between party, government and popular power, with the goal of 
bringing an end to the “bourgeois state” by giving public institutions over to worker 
and community control (p4). 
While these proposals were carefully prepared by the Frente, the HBCh, the Sala de 
Batalla and other groups and submitted to the PSUV the week before a national 
congress to consider. Just how the 20,000 expected proposals could be read and 
assimilated in just one week was not made clear. Following the event, the gossip in 
Chavista circles was that the PSUV Congress had proceeded como siempre – “as 
always” – and had been dominated by a list of familiar party delegates. The 
following month, a packed hall of grassroots activists attending to share their 
feedback in person were first treated to a lengthy speech from a senior PSUV official 
visiting from Caracas, who repeated the Revolution’s latest buzzword, in calling for 
grassroots lealtad – “loyalty”. In response, a representative from the Frente de 
Vanguardia spoke first, arguing that affirmed that “some who ask for our loyalty 
ask us not to criticize, but criticism is an act of loyalty”. 
4. Conclusion: old partidismo, new tolerance? 
Writing in 1998 about community organising in Mérida, Hernández de Padrón 
(1998: 198) described the “brutal partidista penetration” of public meetings and 
state institutions by AD and COPEI in the 1980s and 1990s. Among the Chavista 
grassroots, the role of the PSUV is talked about in similarly emotive terms today, 
while the opposition street occupations of the spring of 2014 suggest among 
opposition supporters have given up on democratic mechanisms altogether. 
Among Chavistas in Mérida, however, framing problems with state and party 
responsiveness as about either commercial interests or a lack of formación shows 
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an important difference from the dissatisfaction during the 1980s and 1990s. 
Under Puntofijismo, problems with clientelism and partidismo were seen as 
fundamental characteristics of the political system. Then, party and state officials 
became seen as class enemies, and critics – including Chávez and the MBR - called 
for an end to the two-party system altogether. Today, the criticisms are directed at 
the PSUV and state officials without necessarily rejecting the broader Bolivarian 
movement. Support for Chávez, whose personal commitment to participatory 
methods was never questioned among the grassroots Chavistas during fieldwork, 
is also unwavering. In part, this seems to be to do with not only feelings of loyalty 
to Chávez, but also feelings of association with and hope for the Bolivarian 
movement as a step towards participatory socialism. It seems reasonable to 
suggest that this association has been helped by the emphasis on the more positive 
notions about the role of the urban poor in social change: as revolucionarios.   
Despite this important difference in the way political discontent is expressed on the 
left in Mérida, this chapter has demonstrated other important similarities with how 
public consultation happens, and in how the public are thought about by state 
officials tasked with coordinating community organisations. Section one showed 
how public meetings in Mérida are still used for electoral mobilising and 
disseminating party and state information - as they were in the pre-Chávez era and 
similar to the use of public meetings in Cuba since 1959 (Alfonzo and Nunez 1997). 
Concerns about a lack of dialogue with state and party representatives continue, 
with different sorts of opportunities for participants to express their concerns, but 
a lack of accountability. Section two showed how the institutions concerned with 
administering public participation remain, and continue to control the registration 
of groups, approve projects and adjudicate in community disputes. Accounts of 
officials were used to show how party influence on these institutions also 
continues. Section three showed how the competing notions about the political 
roles of the state and the public remain from the pre-Chávez era. These notions of 
patronage and emancipation are carried on through a new language of 
participatory socialism. These characteristics together arguably continue patterns 
of “dominated” (Hernández de Padrón 1998) or “disarticulated” (Jugo-Burguera 
2004) forms of participation from the pre-Chávez era. 
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8. Fundación Cayapa and Pueblo Nuevo’s 
‘Little School’: continuing the tradition of 
semi-independent barrio organising   
 
 
 
“Chamos, chamos! Escuchamos!” 
Juan calls out across the classroom to where the students have spread out. Los 
chamos - the kids - have just finished breakfast in the kitchen and paraded through 
the small courtyard to the teaching salon, pushing each other as they go. Several 
have to be called down from the rafters near the ceiling where their game of hide-
and-seek has taken them, or pulled back from the front door where the motos whir 
by in the street outside. Now Juan calls their attention to the board, where the 
following week’s blank schedule is written up. Along with about a dozen chamos, 
who vary from five or six to as old as fourteen, at the back of the room several adults 
lean on any unused desks: two more teachers, a guest visiting from the PROUT 
institute in Caracas and myself. 
“Now we are going to choose the theme for next week,” says Juan. Who has a 
suggestion?” 
The class falls silent. 
“Nobody? It can be anything you like. No suggestions? It can be anything at all…. 
For example we could study plants…” 
“Yes, plants!” shout several of the students. 
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“That’s just an example,” says Juan. “It can be anything you like. For example, it 
could be plants…” 
“Yes, plants! Profe! Plants!” 
“… well Ok. But first let’s hear some more suggestions.” 
After some effort Juan draws up a shortlist that includes plants, bears, the stars and 
several suggestions that seem like regulars. A vote is taken and carefully counted 
and the unanimous decision is unsurprising: plants.  
“OK, plants it is.” Juan smiles at the adults at the back of the room. “Now, how do 
you want to study plants? Do you want to read books about them? Or plant some 
yourselves? Or visit a forest or a farm? Or watch a film about plants? Or invite an 
expert in to talk about them? Which will work best, and which day shall we do 
what?” 
Slowly the week’s schedule fills up according to the preferences of the students, 
with two day trips planned and a session planting seeds in the schoolyard. Each 
idea is debated and discussed among the children, who remind the teachers about 
the need to leave space for football matches and dance practice. By the end of the 
following week, the courtyard and the classroom will be filled with seedlings 
sprouting from yoghurt pots and another vote will be taken to decide a new theme. 
In the afternoon the children move outside and the adult high-school begins, taught 
by Vannesa Rosales and Lisbeide Rangel, both student teachers from the 
Polytechnic Territorial University of Mérida (UPTM). Both are Merideñas who grew 
up in the city centre and have now moved to live in Pueblo Nuevo. On this occasion 
we are making toothpaste to practice chemistry and maths and to learn about 
sterilisation. The small class is attended by young mothers from Pueblo Nuevo and 
Simon Bolivar, some with their children. Miguel, the local mercalito,1 closes his 
store to join us. The students seem nervous handling the equipment, but grow in 
confidence, as they did when visiting the city centre to find ingredients during the 
last lesson.  
                                                          
1 First introduced in Chapter Three, Miguel runs Pueblo Nuevo’s branch of the MERCAL 
subsidised food store, selling groceries and household goods from a room at the front of the 
CEDECOL building. 
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The adult course is a recent addition to Pueblo Nuevo’s little school - La Escuelita - 
and the group are still working each other out. In the small community, they have 
known of each other and share relatives but some have never spoken – a difference, 
for now, from the familiarity shared by the chamos. Like the younger students, the 
adult group have designed their curriculum from scratch, choosing this class in part 
because of the scarcity of toothpaste - an imported product- during the economic 
crisis. At the end of the class, with some students still wearing their paper masks, 
the group completes the daily systematizacíon together, listing which areas the 
students feel they have covered to present to the board of education as evidence of 
their learning. 
As the adults leave, the chamos return to take over the building for the remainder 
of the day, playing games on the last working computer. Later on the older children 
disturb the Communal Council meeting by smuggling a motorbike through the front 
door under the noses of the voceros.  The children tolerate the adults as playthings 
or nuisances, safe in the confidence that comes with being told daily that this is 
their space. As night falls they drag the audio equipment down the stairs from the 
radio station to play reggaeton and practice dance routines under the stars.  
Aims and structure of the chapter 
The thesis so far has demonstrated how community organising is happening in and 
around Pueblo Nuevo in the context of tensions inherited from the pre-Chávez era. 
These tensions can be seen in the ways local groups are administered by state and 
party, as well as in the response and strategies of local groups to fulfil their 
objectives in a new national political landscape. This analysis has in turn been 
connected to the ways that the identities and political roles of barrio populations 
have been thought about in folk logic, academic writing and in the Bolivarian public 
narrative. This chapter continues this analysis by discussing how Fundación 
Cayapa’s little school continues precedents for semi-independent community 
organising from the pre-Chávez era. In a case study of the work of the group I knew 
best in Mérida, I present a detailed picture of the work of the group, as well as 
continuing the broader analytical work of the thesis by adding detail to the folk 
concept of the barrio revolutionary. 
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During my time working at Fundación Cayapa, I returned often to the question of 
how Pueblo Nuevo’s “little school” fits with the broader processes of institutional 
change of the Bolivarian Revolution as an example of community organising. In 
some ways the education and community development collective is tied up with 
these processes: the school’s alternative methods match the government’s 
promotion of Latin American popular education principles, a mural of Chávez and 
Castro marks the front of the school, and teachers’ salaries are partly paid by the 
board of education. In other ways, the school is out of step with the practical reality 
of the new “Bolivarian Schools” and Education Missions: party-politics are never 
discussed in class or meetings, coordination of the group’s activities is independent 
and democratic, and learning methods are more of a departure from conventional 
teaching. This chapter discusses the messy role of Fundación Cayapa as part of an 
attempt to better conceptualise how community organisations fit within local and 
national political histories.  
The chapter draws on observations made during the nine-months spent working 
as a volunteer teacher with Fundación Cayapa and on interviews with staff 
members and recordings of staff meetings.2 I begin by using the accounts of 
teaching staff to describe the development of the school project. These accounts are 
used to show how the work of the school may be contributing to different kinds of 
community improvements in Pueblo Nuevo, including the reduction in street 
violence and improved community cohesion. The chapter continues by locating this 
work in two connected traditions of alternative education: the processes of 
Bolivarian educational reform in Venezuela, and the wider movement for 
alternative education in Latin America. The analysis concludes by tracing 
precedents from Pueblo Nuevo’s history of student-led, alternative community 
organising. I argue that in making up for state failures, their pragmatic strategy and 
their semi-independent status, Cayapa continues important characteristics from 
                                                          
2 During the nine months I spent in Pueblo Nuevo, I taught at and participated in the daily 
adult high-school classes, including leading sessions on basic research skills for application 
in the community. I also ran arts workshops for the young people, taught guitar classes and 
gave occasional English classes to residents and students. I also participated in and helped 
plan various events including different excursions for the young students and helped make 
two short films about the work of the school. 
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the rich tradition of semi-independent organising in the barrio during the pre-
Chávez era. 
1. Teaching Pueblo Nuevo: meeting barrio circumstances with 
holistic education  
While this chapter will identify three connected sets of precedents for the work at 
La Escuelita, the teaching staff all gave explanations of their work that framed their 
project as a response to the conditions of everyday life in the barrio. The staff 
described how Fundación Cayapa grew out of four separate community projects 
which were running in Pueblo Nuevo in 2009. These four projects were: the Tareas 
Dirijidas – or “directed tasks” – after-school club, the Barrio Adentro clinic, Lisbeide 
Rangel’s dance workshops and Radio ECOS. The teachers, who each started with a 
connection to one project or another, described how they began to communicate 
together, recognise shared problems and eventually conceive the idea for what 
they describe as an “alternative school” to combine their different activities 
(interviews w JW, 31.5.14, SB, and LR, 16.5.14; VR, 21.7.14; JV, 5.6.14 all PN).  
The most notable activity of the organisation was its primary school, which by the 
time of fieldwork in 2013-2015 had around twenty students aged between five and 
twelve years old. These students attend morning classes and receive daily 
breakfast and other meals. A new adult-high school started in 2013 and various 
workshops, sports and cultural events are also run by the group. In the video 
describing the work of the school, filmed in 2011 (Sosa et al 2011), the group 
describe themselves as responding to the high number of school-age children in 
Pueblo Nuevo who had dropped out of or never attended education. This in a 
generational problem for Pueblo Nuevo, where 25% of women and 26% of men 
had not completed primary education, compared with a national average of 8.4 and 
11.5.3  
                                                          
3 These statistics are from the 2011 household survey completed by Barrio Adentro, 
education completion in Pueblo Nuevo. In addition, 67% of women and 70% of men had 
not finished secondary education, compared with 64.4% and 76.2% at national level. 
Statistics for school-age attendance are not available for Pueblo Nuevo, but if national rates 
are reflected, it is likely that children remain more likely to complete both primary and 
secondary education than their parents, reproducing the trend Ray (1969: 26) observed in 
Venezuelan barrios the 1960s. 
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Janeath Lopez, a life-long resident of the barrio now in her late forties, is now the 
director of Cayapa. She describes how the project began when she began to rebuild 
the community library that had existed in the 1970s as the community work part 
of a teaching degree at the University of the Andes (ULA) (interview JL, 24.05.14, 
PN). Janeath describes how she and her classmates cleaned and painted the back 
room of the CEDECOL building and acquired a collection of books for residents to 
borrow. Surprised at the enthusiasm and high levels of participation among the 
other residents, and after realising the teaching needs of the many young people 
who came to use the space, Janeath began teaching an after-school class in the new 
library. She describes this as a response the needs of many of the children in Pueblo 
Nuevo and Simon Bolivar, many of whom by twelve years old had never attended 
school as they are “without papers”. This means that the government has no record 
of their existence, “…even though they lived so close to the centre of the city”. 
Janeath, who is a single parent with three children, describes how other children 
had dropped out of the school they attended just beyond the edge of the barrio. She 
describes how they were unable to cope with the rule-based learning environment 
after what she sees as their more “disordered” living situations in Pueblo Nuevo.  
As lessons continued to be well-attended, Janeath was encouraged by Professor 
Myriam Anzola at the ULA to continue the classes when she graduated, and would 
eventually combine with the projects described below to open the barrio’s 
Alternative School in 2010. Connection with the activities at the CEDECOL building, 
including the increasingly active Barrio Adentro clinic, added impetus to the group 
as an increasingly joined-up service developed. Cayapa’s teaching staff recalled 
how their methodology quickly evolved from a rule-based classroom to the more 
democratic practices described in the opening section (interview w LR, 16.5.14; 
interview w JV, 5.6.14, PN). As the group developed varied activities to keep the 
young students interested, they also developed a broad conception of “what is a 
school”, as Juan put it, (ibid). For the teaching staff, this means engaging not only 
with the students but with their families, and working towards improved social 
harmony. In the twin barrios of Pueblo Nuevo and Simon Bolivar. 
Engaging “lo privado”: collective responses to family problems 
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The conception of the work of community organisations in literature on Venezuela 
is overwhelming public in its focus. Institution-level work on cooperatives 
(Harnecker 2009) Communal Councils, and regional work on social movements 
focus on shared, community-level solutions and negotiations between 
communitiesm, political parties and the state (e.g. Fernandes 2010; Duffy 2012; Gill 
2012). This literature largely reflects the focus of government discourses in 
Venezuela, which focus on the resolution of more public, shared community 
problems (e.g. Chávez in Harnecker 2005: 162-177). Much of these public activities 
have a strong bearing on what might be termed ‘family matters’, through the 
provision of health, food and education services to family members. However, there 
is a certain dissonance between the sorts of private issues that fill in-depth works 
in urban slum communities in the region (e.g. Scheper-Hughes 1992) and what 
appears as the public realm of self-help groups and community activism. Many of 
the community needs in Pueblo Nuevo - identified above - do not take place at a 
public community level, and in the words of Cayapa staff fall under the heading of 
lo privado - “the private”. 
Like any community, Pueblo Nuevo has a mix of different family scenarios. As seen 
in studies of low-income urban communities in Latin America Pueblo Nuevo has 
high levels of parental absence – most commonly the father. Under-age and 
unplanned pregnancies in the community are common, results which were 
supported by interviews with Barrio Adentro staff (interview w MP, 23.07.14, BA, 
and GB, 20.04.14, MC) and Cayapa’s teaching staff. Many of the family scenarios of 
Cayapa students include those where drug addiction or alcoholism are present, or 
where the arrest and imprisonment for drug-related crime results in parental 
absence. As a response to overcrowding in the community which dates back to the 
1960s (Jugo Burguera 2014), most homes house several generations, with 
maternal roles in some cases being filled by grandparents or siblings in place of 
absent parents. Among these families are those where there is no or only irregular 
economic activity. Domestic violence is also reported to be a problem. Several 
teachers reported that they knew some of the young students had witnessed 
extreme violence or the deaths of family members in their homes. 
In this context family engagement at Cayapa is a fundamental part of the group’s 
strategy. Although parents’ evenings were not well attended during fieldwork, the 
246 
 
family background of each student was well known to teachers and new students 
were introduced with a staff meeting discussion around the challenges likely to 
arise from a student’s background. Engagement during fieldwork extended beyond 
a counselling role, however, and included visits to students’ homes to discuss 
barriers to attendance, often with other students in tow. Other examples of the 
work in this area included mediating following a violent family conflict, discussing 
treatment for addiction and mediating around the issue of a young female student’s 
relationship with an older local man.  
In one particular occasion, different kinds of support were offered over a long 
period to a family who had had their adult family members arrested during a night 
police raid. Supported offered by Cayapa included arranging legal advice, helping 
with childcare, offering emotional support and included a series of meetings to plan 
and arrange alternative economic activities for family members on their release. 
This support amounted to a long-term strategy both for moving on from criminal 
activity and for coping with the sudden absence of parental figures. The closeness 
of teaching staff to these family members from working with their children 
appeared to help the organisation respond to this crisis, including through the use 
of family meetings with Cayapa staff and on school premises. Staff were also able 
to act as a bridge to services outside of the barrio. 
The broad community work role increasingly assumed by Cayapa’s staff remains 
defined in terms of what works for the younger students. From the way Cayapa was 
talked about in the community throughout fieldwork, it is clear that staff retain 
their identities as teachers first and foremost, meaning important work to resolve 
private problems in the community continues under the organisation’s non-
threatening identity as a school. This intensive work with students’ families is 
something that has developed as the credibility of the teachers has grown in the 
community. Janeath describes how at first many of these families were in “a state 
of hermetismo”. She explains how the social isolation of the barrio had prevented 
visits from teachers (interview w JL, 24.05.14, PN). She adds that the intention had 
never been to work with students’ families, but that this element of Cayapa’s work 
is something that “just happened”. Later on, from 2013, the creation of a new 
participatory adult high school curriculum formalised this work with non-school 
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age members of the two barrios.  Here we see how the teachers see the holism of 
their roles as an evolving response to community needs. 
In Pueblo Nuevo, this extra support occurs in two ways. First, teachers work to 
provide a familial and compassionate environment for students, as Joshua Wilson 
describes, for teachers “…to become family members to the kids and give them their 
love and their attention and their time and be positive role models” (interview w 
JW, 31.5.14, PN). Second, teachers engage directly with the challenges and conflicts 
taking place within students’ families. 
Socialisation and sharing: combatting delinquency and gang-violence 
As described in the Chapter Three, levels of everyday violence rose in Mérida’s 
barrios as the drug trade became a source of income from the 1980s (Jugo Burguera 
2014). As Pueblo Nuevo and neighbouring Simon Bolivar became notorious for the 
sale and consumption of drugs, street shootouts over the control of trade and the 
muggings seen as being perpetrated by the gangs’ customers contributed to a 
general sense of lawlessness and a de facto curfew for residents as the streets 
became unsafe after dark (Focus Group 1, 22.4.14, PN). The two barrios underwent 
a period of heightened gang violence and drug-related crime in the period from 
2003 to around 2007. A near-total absence of police in the neighbourhoods has left 
the barrio’s most difficult and arguably most urgent social problem solely in the 
hands of residents’ groups. 
One of the founding members of Cayapa, Dr Joshua Wilson explains how for him, 
the idea of the school was connected to a desire to address the fundamental 
problem with crime in the community – something he had witnessed first-hand 
when dealing with gun-shot wounds at the near-by Ambulatorio Venezuela: 
“The idea with the school was, try to grab these kids before they pick 
up the guns and give them a healthy environment, a support structure 
and a place for them to develop themselves in order to keep them from 
falling into that cycle of violence. So particularly children from the 
families that had been part of that cycle constantly.” (interview w JW, 
31.5.14, PN) 
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By providing this space and support, Joshua believes that Fundación Cayapa has 
contributed to “interrupting the cycle of violence” in Pueblo Nuevo.”. The first part 
of this strategy involves providing a safe space where children are less likely - and 
in less need of – being recruited by gangs, and where they can engage with non-
violent forms of self-expression.  
 
Photo 2. Cayapa Street Art workshop, May 2014. Sketch reads: ‘I love you’ 
What takes place in the school environment is summarised by Joshua as “basic 
socialisation”, as participating young people gradually learned to share the school 
space together. Several of the teachers reflected on the extremely high-levels of 
student violence in the early days of the school. They saw this as having only been 
addressed through the abandonment of conventional teaching practices and the 
shift towards more flexible and more empowered forms of learning. As Janeath 
says: “What they have seen in the adults they repeat in their childhood experiences 
with other people.” In this way, the democratic practices described at the start of 
the chapter are introducing an alternative to the violent responses to 
disagreements associated with gang culture and in the home lives of many of the 
students. In this respect, Cayapa may be providing an alternative to the processes 
of “gang socialisation” which are seen as being a cause of cultures of youth violence 
in other low-income urban communities (e.g. Stretesky and Pogrebin 2007). 
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This shift was facilitated through the expertise of Professor Myriam Anzola at the 
University of the Andes (ULA) (interview w JV, 5.6.14, PN). Cayapa’s teaching staff, 
however, recalled how their teaching practices quickly evolved from a rule-based 
classroom to the more democratic practices described in the opening section 
(interview w LR, 16.5.14; interview w JV, 5.6.14, PN). For them, this was simply a 
response to their early experiences – as quickly found to a rule-based teaching 
environment to be inappropriate for their student group. 
As well as this work with the young people in the community, Cayapa works with 
certain families who have been relying on crime for their income to seek out 
alternative economic activities. This is an area of work that has no comparable 
government project in the barrio. In addition to working with residents whose 
activities might be seen as more directly contributing to violence, the various 
workshops, classes and events run by Cayapa also provide a space where people 
from both Pueblo Nuevo and Simon Bolivar can spend time together – in contrast 
to the separation and mutual distrust and suspicion during the more violent period. 
During a focus group with the students of the adult bachillerato courses, 
participants emphasised the change in tensions between the two communities, 
describing “a new era” and “a changed mentality” (Focus Group 1, 22.4.14, PN). For 
many of the participants, this was about the communal events staged by Cayapa, 
with one saying “I think that more than anything it is here, in La Escuelita they put 
on many things that can help the community”. Several of the participants attributed 
better community relations within Pueblo Nuevo to this, and criticised the cultural 
centre in Simon Bolivar that is now largely unused. Again, these assessments fit 
with much of what has been written on the role of using community activities to 
reduce conflict and crime, including the use of team sports in combatting gang 
violence in the community of Revenga in Central Venezuela by teaching discipline 
and teamwork (Project Alcatraz 2014).  
The positive reflections of staff and regular participants ought to be viewed with 
some scrutiny. On several occasions, different people in Pueblo Nuevo gave the 
simple explanation that those responsible for crime had either died or been 
arrested. When I asked Joshua specifically about this during our interview, he 
defended the work of the school in response to the common perception, saying: 
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“I know what people are talking about, but that’s not accurate. Because 
there has always been those cycles where the most violent people, 
would be killed and it would just be a matter of months before 
someone else came in and took power back. They (people saying that) 
are wrong. Most of the gun violence in the streets was being 
perpetrated by very small groups of people that were usually from the 
same households and families. And a lot of people form those families, 
those were the families that we started working with principally. And 
so the youth in those families had that cycle interrupted. (…) And it 
sounds really audacious or arrogant and there would be a danger of 
over-simplifying it like that but… it did! That’s what changed. And it 
changed the whole dynamic of the street. And it also changed the whole 
dynamic of this barrier between the barrios because we were working 
with youth from both neighbourhoods that before couldn’t really be 
friends but all of a sudden now were not just playing together but 
passing time together all of the time.” 
Cayapa staff are likely to reflect positively on the impact of their organisation. It is 
reasonable to assume, however, that and new shared community and young 
persons’ services for the two barrios might have contributed to rebuilding the 
shared sense of community needed to lower gang crime and street violence. 
Deconstructing marginality: bridging Pueblo Nuevo and the city 
While the different community problems described above are the result of Pueblo 
Nuevo’s particular history and setting, they are also characteristics that are typical 
for barrios communities: those lower-income urban communities which remain 
disconnected from the imaginary of the rest of the city. A third part of Cayapa’s 
strategy therefore involves bridging the community with other parts of Mérida. 
During fieldwork, Cayapa’s teaching and community work helped to achieve this in 
two ways. First, the group gives a reason for non-residents to visit the community. 
Second, the school provides opportunities for students to leave the barrio and visit 
other communities.  
Cayapa sees non-residents visit Pueblo Nuevo, not only to work on community 
projects but to live full-time and become – in the words of several residents “a part 
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of the community”. During my time at Cayapa those of us living and working full-
time in the community were also joined by outsiders who came specifically to visit 
the school, including activists from the PROUT institute in Caracas, temporary 
volunteers from other barrio communities and other projects in Mérida, 
representatives of a Caracas-based CSR initiative, journalists from the UK and 
Australia, artists from a local mural-painting collective, a photographer from the 
USA and musicians from Cuba and Venezuela. A cultural day in 2014 run by 
teaching staff and volunteers from the Youth PSUV turned Calle Principal into a 
dance and music festival, attracting many residents who have not historically been 
involved with Cayapa. These visitors were attracted to the barrio by word-of-
mouth and a growing online reputation, as the reputation of La Escuelita and the 
alternative form of education practised there grows - due in large part to the video 
about the school that has been uploaded to YouTube in both English and Spanish 
(Sosa, C., Rangel, L. and Salcedo, F. 2011). 
These are by no means the first visitors to Pueblo Nuevo, and to some extent the 
two evangelical churches in the community perform a similar function for their 
congregations and the Barrio Adentro clinic also brings Cuban doctors into the 
community. However, in attracting this attention to the barrio the school provides 
one of few important links with the outside world. 
Juan Valeri describes his experience of moving to Pueblo Nuevo: 
“I am from the middle class, like my parents. I did not know the true 
reality of Mérida. I knew that here in the valley are barrios, there in the 
mountains are barrios, but I didn’t really know who was living in the 
barrios…”  
Juan Valeri, Fundación Cayapa Facilitator, 5.6.14, PN 
Challenging ideas about what sort of people live in Pueblo Nuevo has become part 
of the strategy of the school. The various opportunities provided by Cayapa for 
their students to visit other parts of Mérida are part of a conscious effort in 
recognition of the limited chance school-age children and young, non-working 
parents have for leaving the barrio. Opportunities to visit other communities 
during fieldwork included inter-barrio sports tournaments, dance competitions 
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with other schools, a near-by hip-hop event, visits to the centre to buy provisions 
for lessons, and trips to the pool and the mountains in the valley to the North of the 
City, and in 2013 an expedition to Caracas to showcase the photography of the 
young students. For many students these are the only occasions when they leave 
the barrio. 
 
Photo 3. Young Cayapa students visit a cabin in El Vallecito in May 2014 
Although these opportunities provided by Cayapa are not the first or only means 
by which residents and non-residents can bridge the divide between Pueblo Nuevo 
and the outside world, they are nonetheless important for connecting the barrio 
and the rest of Mérida. This is an area of need for the community that is not 
addressed by existing institutions of Bolivarian popular power, as the Barrio 
Adentro, Communal Councils and MERCAL all bring services into the barrio, and 
reduce the need for residents to leave, and inter-community meetings in the district 
were not attended by residents of Pueblo Nuevo during fieldwork (see Chapter 
Seven). 
Although the classes for school-age children and adults provide different classes 
for around thirty local people, the holism of the schools approach – to work with 
their families and build relationships with and notions about the wider community 
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– is a contribution that goes beyond the remit of conventional education. While the 
teaching staff mentioned here described their work primarily as an undirected, 
pragmatic response to a growing understanding of “what works” in Pueblo Nuevo, 
the remaining sections in this chapter will consider the precedents for this work in 
Bolivarianism, the regional alternative education movement, and Pueblo Nuevo’s 
history of student-led, semi-independent community organising.  
2. “Our Revolution, here”: Cayapa as part of Bolivarian education 
reform 
Both the extension of education among barrio populations and the move towards 
teaching methods that reflect the different needs and contexts in these 
communities is part of a national process of Bolivarian education reform. 
 
Improving education for barrio populations 
 
Hugo Chávez’s election campaign in 1998 made education part of a new 
commitment to improved social conditions for the county’s poorest. As in low-
income urban communities across the continent, Venezuela’s barrio communities 
had low completion rates for education throughout the twentieth century. Ray 
(1969: 26-27) describes how campesinos arriving in Venezuelan cities during the 
mass rural-urban migration in the 1940s-1960s had very low levels of education, 
leading to a situation where almost no adults had completed primary education.4 
Low literacy and education completion remained general characteristics of social 
exclusion for Venezuela’s barrio populations in the latter half of the twentieth 
century, with knock-on effects for employment opportunities. High dropout rates 
were attributed to the inadequate education infrastructure in the country, 
particularly where separate cohorts of students attended a shorter, five hour 
morning or afternoon school session (Griffiths 2010: 614). These ‘double-session’ 
schools were part of a fragmented system that are seen to have inhibited the 
attendance of marginalised populations (ibid). 
                                                          
4 Ray also presents the lack of schools in rural areas as part of the explanation for their 
migration to cities (ibid: 169). The first generation of children to be born in barrio 
communities were more likely to move on to secondary education (ibid), leaving a legacy 
of a less-educated older population. 
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In this context, Chávez made universal education part of his commitment to his core 
voter based – the urban poor. After his election victory, education was enshrined 
in twelve articles of the new Venezuelan Constitution as “a fundamental human 
right and social obligation which is free, obligatory and democratic”. In the first 
years of his presidency, Chávez using the military to build mobile classrooms under 
Plan Bolivar 2000 (Chávez in Harnecker 2005: 77).5 As well as promoting adult 
education, the Education Department attempted to reform education for school-
age children. This followed what the government described as an Educational 
Constituent Process with hundreds of meetings with parents and teachers. This led 
to the design of a National Education Project (PEN), which included the creation of 
“Bolivarian Schools” (ibid: 139-140). The primary task was improving retention 
rates, with only around 50% of students staying on until 6th grade, 30% to 9th 
grade, and around 15% or less to Year 11 (Ministry of Education and Sport 2004: 
16). Public schools transferring to become Bolivarian Schools abolished their fees, 
provided free school meals, more scholarships and improved public transport 
(ibid: 17). A single eight-hour school day was introduced in Bolivarian Schools as 
part of efforts to target and incorporate historically excluded groups (Griffiths 
2010:  614). The government’s stated objective here is to incorporate all learners 
into the Bolivarian system as new schools are built and existing schools are 
repaired. By 2010, approximately 34% of all primary school students within the 
public school system were enrolled in schools described as Bolivarian (ibid: 614-
615). 
 
The Bolivarian Government also supported their education reforms with a rise in 
funding: from 3.38% of GDP in 1998 when Chávez was first elected, to 5.43% of 
GDP in 2007, or more than 7% if federal government expenditure on the 
educational missions is included (Chávez 2008). This increased spending appears 
                                                          
5 While Chávez was able to present this work as part of his personal response to the needs 
of the poor and as part of the new era of revolutionary government, in fact this echoed the 
strategy from the 1960s when National Guardsmen were used as instructors for literacy 
classes (Ray 1969: 26). Here we see how – as with discourses around participatory 
democracy – the Bolivarian political process was framed as being connected to social 
transformation and specifically to the empowerment of the urban poor (see also Spanakos 
2008). 
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to have had significant effects. In 2007, the government reported increases on the 
participation rates between 1998 and 2006 from 44.7 to 60.6% for pre-school (0–
6 years) children; from 89.7 to 99.5% for primary school-age children; from 27.3 
to 41% for secondary school-age children; and from 21.8 to 30.2% for tertiary 
education (ibid: 47–57). Enrolments have also improved, with significant increases 
in the rates for primary and secondary schooling, while the largest gains have come 
in higher education, with increases of 86% from 1999 to 2007 (Weisbrot et al 2009: 
13). Graph 1 shows the improvements in the enrolment rate at national level. 
 
 
 
Graph 1. National Education profile, ECLAC CEPALSTAT database: accessed 02.06.14 
 
From 2003 the Bolivarian Social missions also began the work of extending adult 
education, including teaching basic reading, writing, and arithmetic (Mission 
Robinson), higher education courses (Mission Sucre) and remedial classes for high 
school dropouts (Mission Ribas), where students were also paid a small stipend. 
Mission Robinson in particular has been reported as having been particularly 
successful, leading the UNESCO to declare Venezuela free from illiteracy in 2005 
(Telesur 2014). Again, these education reforms were framed both as part of the 
delivery of new and empowering citizen’s rights and as the gift of the benevolent 
President (Spanakos 2008). This extension of adult education now puts Venezuela 
some way ahead of the regional average (see Graph 2).  
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over 
Venezuela 11.5 36.1 28.6 23.8 8.4 28.9 27.2 35.6 
Latin 
America 
22.5 30.3 26.1 21.1 24.3 27.6 24.7 23.4 
Graph 2. Years of education completed for male and female population between 25-
59 years old (ECLAC CEPALSTAT database, 2014) 
 
The Bolivarian commitment to popular education 
As well as extending access to basic education, the Bolivarian Schools’ curriculum 
and educational Social Missions for adults are part of a wider goal to deliver 
popular education as a means to transform Venezuelan society. The Ministry of 
Education identifies a major goal of the public schooling as “to bring access and 
permanence to the marginalised urban and rural population at the school and pre-
school level, (and) to bring quality comprehensive education capable of 
overcoming inequality and generating opportunities for human development” 
(Ministerio de Educación y Deportes 2006: 44). Griffiths (2010: 615) describes the 
strategy as “the socialisation and preparation of citizens to actively participate in 
the development of the Bolivarian socialist political project”. Here, education is 
seen as part of the broader revolutionary program, with teachers working to instil 
“socialist values” in line with Cuban-style mass education. Preparing citizens for an 
empowered and participatory civic role in particular “…rests on student 
involvement in the development and implementation of local multidisciplinary 
projects, in consultation with local school communities” (ibid). 
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Here, Bolivarian discourses around the emancipation of low-income urban 
populations draw on the popular education commitment to student empowerment 
outside of the classroom with its overtly political objectives, including addressing 
inequality, particularly around gender and income-levels. In Venezuela this 
approach is therefore intended to extend beyond the class room and school-age 
students. Chávez reportedly saw the entire revolutionary process as dependent on 
an organised and conscious people, setting out to “educate them” in his weekly 
radio and television show Alo Presidente (Harnecker 2005: 12).6 Specifically, the 
consciousness raising and promotion of solidarity is about general political 
mobilisation and the erosion of what was commonly referred to during fieldwork 
as la mentalidad Venezolana – “the Venezuelan mentality”. Here the dependent 
mind-sets associated with rentier capitalism are seen as an obstacle to 
participatory socialism – a view frequently encountered among Chavista 
supporters during fieldwork.  
Cayapa as part of education reform? 
At Cayapa, different members of the group described their work as both dependent 
on the Bolivarian Revolution, and as an important part of the revolutionary 
process: 
“I believe that under another system of government we would not be 
able to do what we are doing. No, I don’t believe so. We’ve had the 
liberty to do it because we’ve been given this environment, right? Right 
through the social plans, through the objectives in education that is the 
integration it is possible to do this. Yes, we have felt that it is a new 
vision of the life, of the politics, of the education, in all of the limits 
we’ve been given an opening that we can work in this way- this way to 
integrate with the community, to integrate with the families, to 
integrate with all of the spaces that we are given like this one. A 
window has been opened for us” 
                                                          
6 Other examples of the influence of popular education ideas on participatory Chavista 
initiatives include BanMujer, the women’s development bank which draws directly on The 
Pedagogy of the Oppressed as a premise for its grassroots activities (Ciccariello-Maher 2013: 
281). 
258 
 
Janeath Lopez, Founding member and Director of Fundación Cayapa, 
24.05.14, PN  
 “When I came to work at the school.... I realised that the work... the first tarea 
to do in the Bolivarian process is education. It’s a pedagogical work. It’s a 
work to look to form yourself (formarse).” 
Juan Valeri, Fundación Cayapa Facilitator, 5.6.14, PN 
These two comments sum up two sentiments that the teachers described about 
how Cayapa connects with Bolivarianism. The first idea is that the school is made 
possible due to new processes of national political change. The second idea is that 
the work of the school is part of a broader process of social transformation.  
Despite this, every member of the group also displayed a weary cynicism about the 
centralising tendencies of the Venezuelan Bureaucracy and the partidismo of the 
PSUV, as described in the chapters six and seven. Only one volunteer teacher was a 
current PSUV member, and political sympathies for the broader Chavista project 
were not overtly expressed.  
Vannesa described how the absence of party politics at Cayapa developed without 
discussion: 
“…(I)t’s organic. In reality it took us a long time to give an 
understanding of our political posture to the community. Which as well 
for me was a mistake. Before, no one knew that we were leftists, no one 
knew that we were inclined towards socialism. … until a little bit before 
the death of Chávez.” 
Vannesa Rosales, Fundación Cayapa Facilitator, 21.7.14, PN 
It is a political posture that is demonstrated visibly now, as the exterior wall of the 
building is now painted with a mural of Chávez and Fidel Castro (see Photo 1.). 
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Photo 1. The mural at the front of the CEDECOL building 
While most of the residents involved with the group identify as ‘Chavista’, the 
party-political discussions that occur in the majority of spaces in this study almost 
never occur at Cayapa. Bolivarian education policy has been criticised in the 
western media for the introduction of politics into the classroom (e.g. Economist 
2001) – a practice that one teacher at a local educational mission advised is 
resulting in drop-outs from less-ideologically sympathetic students (interview w 
CO, 09.09.13). In contrast, at Cayapa, the Revolution, the PSUV and Chávez himself 
are all mentioned extremely rarely and important Revolutionary constructs like 
‘the opposition’ are mentioned infrequently or with humour.  In downplaying their 
shared leftist ideology, the group are able to include opposition supporters among 
their members and collaborators. Participants in the space talk about their 
motivation with reference to the needs of Pueblo Nuevo, and the inclusion of non-
Chavistas is welcomed.7 This inclusiveness is in contrast with the explicit exclusion 
of los escualidos - the dirty ones, as opposition supporters are known - from the 
residents’ meetings I attended outside of the barrio, including the Parochial 
                                                          
7 Although no overtly socialist content is included, sessions on the Pinochet coup, for 
example, provided an opportunity to reflect on regional politics. 
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Assembly, Street Government, various public consultation events and the Mérida 
State Conference of the Communes in May 2014 (see Chapter Seven). 
More progressive than Bolivarianism?  
At Cayapa, teachers described the Bolivarian Schools as failing to live up to popular 
education principles. While the government’s rhetoric is progressive, they agreed, 
classes at Bolivarian Schools are taught by teachers who were trained in 
conventional learning and assessment methods. In taking popular education 
precedents from the wider region, they argue, Cayapa represents a better fit for the 
educational needs of Pueblo Nuevo.  
Although not a Bolivarian School, Cayapa also has other ties to the national 
education processes. Several teachers at Cayapa receive salaries from the board of 
education and are employed through the Miraflor Mayor, a neighbouring school at 
the western edge of Pueblo Nuevo, beyond the borders of the community. This 
relationship has developed since the project took off. As attendance at La Escuelita 
increased, the group eventually attracted funding as the teaching staff successfully 
negotiated with the board of education for the recognition of the lessons taking 
place there. This means that the development of Cayapa’s practices the group’s 
involvement with the institutions of state education.  
The shared CEDECOL building itself had been leased from the Chavista-run 
Governacíon, but this has currently lapsed (interview w VR, 21.7.14, PN), meaning 
the different collectives are effectively reverted in the informal occupation of the 
1990s. La Escuelita also shares the building with the other organisations that make 
up the La Lyria Community Development Centre (CEDECOL). Radio ECOS, the 
Communal Council Calle Principal, MERCAL, the Barrio Adentro clinic and 
INFOCENTRO computer access salon all have their own funding processes and 
institutional ties. Cayapa is involved with cultural events, health service delivery, 
‘socio-economic workshops’ and there is a collective ethos that sees staff from the 
different organisations frequently working together. The general coordinating role 
of their staff gives Cayapa a complex community role. Supporting these different 
services may help build important for the PSUV credibility, but the school sits 
outside of the party’s groupings  of ‘social movements’, ‘communal power ’ and 
‘missions’,  and the sets of administrative procedures that come with them. 
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Perhaps most importantly in thinking about Cayapa’s connection to education 
reform, the week-to-week curriculum is which is decided by students, as described 
in the chapter opening. This freedom is an important difference from Bolivarian 
schools, where conventional classes are still taught. Similarly, the emphasis on 
socialisation, mentioned in the previous chapter, also echoes the language Griffiths 
(2010: 615) uses to describe Bolivarian educational objectives.  
At Cayapa, however, teachers described how their move from conventional 
practices happened organically. Janeath describes how they were unable to cope 
with the rule-based learning environment after what she sees as their more 
“disordered” living situations in Pueblo Nuevo. Unlike most schools in Venezuela- 
Cayapa’s recent history means the group’s working practices are a local reaction to 
community needs- with the group only later receiving recognition and funds from 
the state. This process, however, is also in line with the Bolivarian rhetoric around 
citizenship: Hugo Chávez (in Harnecker 2005: 162) expected local groups and 
networks to be ideologically ahead of both party and bureaucracy and thereby form 
“…the transformational river of our movement.” It is an ideal in some ways fulfilled 
by Cayapa, who continue the trend observed by Ciccariello-Maher (2010) of local 
groups leading and feeding into Chavismo, rather than following from it. 
3. Cayapa as part of a regional culture of popular education 
From La Escuelita’s democratic processes for designing a curriculum and 
facilitating collective learning, to their anti-hierarchical management processes 
and independent origins, Cayapa draws on principles from a rich regional history 
of popular education. This methodology both chimes with the Bolivarian 
commitment to grassroots empowerment, and clashes with the centralising 
tendencies of the Venezuelan bureaucracy.  
In addition to studying texts from Paolo Freire and other alternative education 
scholars from the wider region, the school is connected to a network of teachers 
and researchers involved with alternative education movement in Venezuela and 
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the wider region.8 Representatives of the PROUT9 institute in Caracas visited La 
Escuelita on different occasions during fieldwork, and the students from Cayapa 
visited the institute during a trip to display their participatory photo project at a 
gallery in the capital. Two Argentinian students also visited the barrio for an 
extended stay, travelling over-land from an alternative school in Cordoba, 
Argentina, bringing materials from the Freire institute in Sao Paolo. Above all, 
Professor Myriam Anzola was instrumental on the development of the project and 
she and her husband, Monchu, continue to help plan the strategy of the school. In 
this context, Cayapa might be better thought about as part of a tradition of popular 
education from the region. 
The popular education movement in Latin America and Venezuela 
Popular education, also known as Freirian or empowerment education (Wiggins 
2011) or as non-formal learning (Paulston 1980; Brennan 1997; Romi et al. 2009), 
is a well-established movement in Latin America that endorses teaching 
methodologies - and holds social and political objectives - that challenge so-called 
conventional approaches to education. Wiggins’ (2011: 357-358) review of 
research from the region conceptualises popular education as: 
“…a philosophy and methodology that aims to construct a just society 
by creating settings in which people who have historically lacked 
power can discover and expand their knowledge and use it to eliminate 
societal inequities.” 
Conventional approaches are seen as Western-centric and neoliberal by popular 
education practitioners, who argue that their own approaches offer student 
empowerment and social transformation (Torres 2011). Popular schools are 
concentrated among communities that are seen as disadvantaged and 
                                                          
8 Juan Valeri had also found a copy of A. C. Neil’s book on the pioneering British democratic 
school, Summer Hill. I also visited Summer Hill in February 2014 - between my two 
fieldwork periods in Pueblo Nuevo - to get materials and find out about their democratic 
processes to share with the teachers at Cayapa. 
9 The PROUT institute in Caracas is part of an international movement involved with 
grassroots learning about cooperatives and alternative economics. 
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disempowered, including poorer rural settings in Bolivia and Peru, the favelas of 
Sao Paolo and Rio de Janeiro and in Venezuelan barrios like Pueblo Nuevo.10 
Popular education is strongly associated with the Brazilian educationalist Paolo 
Freire, but has its roots in Marxist-influenced “popular universities” in Latin 
America in the early twentieth century that taught socialist practices to workers 
and farmers (Gómez and Puiggrós 1986; Becker 1995). Other precedents included 
the literacy and political consciousness-raising efforts of Augusto Sandino in 
Nicaragua and Lázaro Cárdenas in Mexico (Gómez and Puiggrós 1986). These 
precedents were inherited by Paolo Freire in his work in the 1940s and 1950s, as 
he developed his ideas in the Pedagogy of the Oppressed (1972). Freire would set 
new principles for the growing movement in this landmark work and in subsequent 
writings until his death in 1997.  
During the era of Pink Tide, leftist governments that began with the election of 
Hugo Chávez, the movement for more popular education practices has gathered 
pace. In 2009, CONFINTEA VI, a regional conference held in Brazil brought together 
civil society actors from across Latin America to share ideas and set principles for 
popular education. Participants voiced concerns about the penetration of 
neoliberalism into education institutions, rejecting the idea that education should 
contribute only to economic development or employment promotion (Torres 
2011: 44-45). They agreed that this should be replaced by an emphasis on the 
transformative potential of the methodology, including a new vision of democratic 
citizenship (ibid). 
This new vision of citizenship - the part that was most been taken up by Chávez 
government- is part of a political project for popular educators. For Freire (1972: 
48), changing education is deeply connected to changes outside the classroom, with 
learners expected to gain a new awareness of the “social contradiction” of 
modernity and to engage in a struggle for liberation and the transformation of 
                                                          
10 Popular education has had a strong influence on other leftist social movements including 
the Zapatista National Liberation Front in Mexico and Brazil’s Landless Rural Workers 
Movement (MST) (Caldart 2004; Cho et al. 2004). Popular education has also attracted 
attention from a range of connected disciplines, including from health experts interested in 
building patients’ capacity to change their own lives (Wallerstein and Bernstein 1988).  
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society (49-52). This transformation is to be achieved, for Freire, as students and 
educators use problem-posing education as part of a revolutionary praxis (52, 66). 
For Freire, revolutionary struggle is synonymous with the participative and non-
systematic educational projects of a new, inclusive pedagogy (31). For its 
advocates, this means not just fostering social inclusion by helping more favela 
residents reach university (see Paster 2014), but equipping students to change 
wider society. Students are seen as having the potential to become new 
“revolutionaries”, fulfilling Che Guevara’s (1965) vision of el hombre nuevo: the 
socialist men and women capable of transforming social relations. 
In Venezuela, the principles of popular education have been a part of the language 
and ideas of leftist social movements for more than fifty years. The anti-
government guerrilla movement in the 1970s emphasised the importance of 
Freirian ideas about “liberatory education” and saw schools as spaces for 
revolutionary struggle (Ciccariello-Maher 2013: 112). Freire’s consciousness 
raising techniques were also used by leftist community leaders in barrios in 
Caracas (Fernandes 2010: 50) and feminist groups in the late 1970s (Ciccariello-
Maher 2013: 131). These principles were also found in the barrio movements in 
Mérida, including Pueblo Nuevo, where the cultural centres in the early 1970s used 
participative techniques and consciousness-raising activities to engage with 
residents (Lopez 2009: 4) in a antecedent of Cayapa’s contemporary work. 
Cayapa’s democratic classrooms and horizontal structure 
Where Cayapa moves beyond the practices of Bolivarian Schools is in the 
reconfiguration of student-teacher roles, with particular reference to curriculum 
planning. These methods draw on the personal study of teaching staff and the 
guidance of Myriam Anzola, their practical experiences in Pueblo Nuevo and other 
communities and on contacts within a national and international networks of 
popular educators, including an alternative school in Cordoba, Argentina and 
organisations with similar ethics elsewhere in Venezuela, for example the PROUT 
institute in Caracas. The day-in-the-life outlined at the start of the chapter captures 
the something of the emphasis on participation, student-empowerment and 
democratic decision-making that is fostered by the teaching staff at Cayapa. The 
continuous involvement of students in planning both learning themes and methods 
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–weekly for primary school and more irregularly for the adults – reflects the 
fundamental message of Freire’s critique of education.  
Freire (1972: 45) saw the conventional form of education he had encountered in 
Brazil as “suffering from narration sickness”, as teachers confused professional 
authority with authority of knowledge. According to Freire, in conventional 
education learners’ ideas and existing knowledge are of little relevance and 
students receive information passively from their teachers (47).11 Freire’s 
reconceptualization of education therefore involves the disruption of conventional 
teacher and student roles, as teachers are encouraged to enter into dialogue with 
students, learning alongside them rather than making arguments based simply on 
their authority as educators (53). These principles appear in the practice and 
reflections of Cayapa staff. As well as taking place in an overtly democratic 
environment, lessons at La Escuelita make use of action-learning, with practical 
activities such as and film-making. Lessons also focus on the community setting of 
the barrio – including the research skills sessions I delivered in 2014 – and on 
situating the community in regional and national context. Learning is also 
“applied”, in that rather than having set maths classes and chemistry classes, 
sessions like the one making toothpaste are used to introduce chemistry and maths 
learning as part of a practical activity.12 For adults, sessions also draw heavily on 
the existing knowledge of the student group –as opposed to didactic learning- for 
example basing sessions on nutrition around the dietary choices of the class.  
The democratic ethos is easily observed within the organisation. Although the 
teachers form a clear leadership group, staff meetings are open to students – 
behaviour permitting - while as a foreign and slightly unusual outsider I felt that 
my input was valued from the first week I attended. In dozens of staff meetings 
votes were never taken, with decision-making conducted via consensus and 
                                                          
11 This results, Freire (1972: 46-49) argues, in the oppressive regulation of information the 
conception of education as “a mirror of society” (46) rather than an active, dialogical 
process. Here, educators present only a partial view of reality – one that reinforces the 
status quo and serves the interests of an oppressive social class. 
12 According to Freire, (1972: 56) popular education is intended to be as “problem-posing” 
and highly contextualised, replacing doxa-level knowledge with logos-level knowledge (54). 
This often means learning by praxis: a rejection of the dichotomy between reflection and 
action (56). 
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following lengthy deliberations.13 Weekly staff meetings often ran to four or five 
hours, as ideas were shared and tasks allocated as staff members volunteer based 
on their strengths and experience. On joining the teaching staff in August 2013, I 
was struck by the horizontal structure of the group. It was several months until 
Janeath’s nominal role as Director was ever mentioned, and then only in passing.14 
Marta Harnecker (2009) suggests that it is the experience of democratic decision-
making in an organisation which fosters community compassion and solidarity, 
drawing on a case study of Venezuelan cooperatives. Likewise, at Cayapa, it is 
hoped that this egalitarian ethic can be an example to the school’s student 
participants, many of whom are reportedly more used to disharmony and conflict 
their home lives. One indication of the burgeoning democratic culture at La 
Escuelita came during a meeting to discuss the ongoing use of the space by the 
young people. In November 2013, the young students attended a meeting of the 
Communal Council Calle Principal to negotiate a compromise with a group of 
women who had requested to use the basketball court for dance therapy classes 
throughout the week. The young people crowded into the entrance hall of the 
CEDECOL building, swelling the ranks of the weekly council meeting. A lengthy 
discussion was then chaired by the voceros, taking questions and arguments from 
children as young as ten as the group sought to defend their access and reassure 
the older residents that “nothing would happen” to the women who wanted to 
share the space in the evening. As the meeting progressed, a wider discussion 
developed about the legitimacy of the council itself to implement decisions about 
                                                          
13 Despite this, status and some sense of informal hierarchy based around experience and 
length of time spent with the project does exist within the group. Those who had been there 
longer tended to take the lead, speak for longer, and to some extent filled some of the more 
desirable roles – mainly working with the young people rather than the newer and less-
engaged adult students. Tensions around this were minor, however, and one of few areas 
of disharmony for which I was looking very carefully. Staff were able to reflect on this 
critically, and trialled a mechanism for limiting speaking time if another staff member 
raised their hand – a tactic that was left unused in all but one meeting. 
14 The way meetings were carried out at Cayapa was a contrast with the meetings of various 
Chavista group I observed outside of the barrio. In those, the principle of derecho de palabra 
– or ‘right to speak’ – was followed, effectively meaning participants who were so inclined 
could deliver lengthy and vague monologues, often to the frustration of the other 
participants. The mesas de trabajo ‘round table’ model was also used at several meetings, 
however, in a deliberate attempt to foster more democratic and inclusive discussions. A 
short-coming of this model is that when different mesas are run simultaneously, individuals 
cannot follow events at more than one, while small groups who attend with a common goal 
are able to represent their interests in each discussion. 
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the space, with the young people questioning their exclusion from voting in 
elections. This debate and the eventual consensual compromise, pleased both the 
women and the voceros, with one later commenting that they had seen “…Pueblo 
Nuevo’s voceros of the future” in action that night.  
The patience shown during this meeting in November 2013 can be contrasted with 
the extremely violent and conflictive behaviours the different teaching staff 
described encountering during the first weeks of lessons in 2010 (interviews w JW, 
31.5.14, PN; and JV, 5.6.14, PN). The belief among the staff is that this is about the 
feeling of ownership of the space among the young people in particular. Added to 
this, a growth in confidence and engagement among the adult students, as they 
came to realise that curriculum decisions would not be taken for them, was clear 
from the semester I spent teaching Bachillerato for Adults. 
Transforming community and people? 
Although the day-to-day decisions and activities at Cayapa grow out of 
discussions of community needs and the ideas originating in the student body, the 
staff see the student body as part of a broader process of social transformation: 
“If you work with children, from young, and they are growing and 
forming, with values of solidarity, and the socialist values we have 
arrived at - like with La Escuelita where the focus is more on solidarity, 
no? In participation, in organisation. We believe, then, that this is the 
seedbed of the new citizens of a distinct society.” 
Juan Valeri, Fundación Cayapa Facilitator, 5.6.14, PN 
“The way the youth has organised itself was started by the teachers but 
later became completely autonomous. So what the gymnastics 
organisation and the youth coordination, what that is, is that those 
youths have learned that they have to organise themselves to get what 
they want (…) And they are part of the future of the next generation.” 
Joshua Wilson, Fundación Cayapa Founding Member, 31.5.14, PN 
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These hopes for the potential of Cayapa’s students match those of Paolo Freire and 
the Bolivarian government’s vision for empowered citizens.15 No overtly socialist 
content is included at Cayapa. This is contrast to what has been reported in the 
Western about the education Missions and Bolivarian Schools (e.g. Economist 
2005) – claims that were supported by one teacher at a local Mission that I spoke 
to during fieldwork (interview w CO, 09.09.13, MC). Despite this, sessions on the 
Pinochet coup, for example, provided an opportunity to reflect on regional politics. 
Venezuela’s indigenous history was also emphasised, and symbolised by the 
organisation’s name, Cayapa, which is the Guajiro word for collective action. 
There has also been a debate at Cayapa about whether to be explicit about whether 
or not the project is “a feminist project”. Heated discussions around this issue were 
recalled by different people at Cayapa, who said that in the period just before my 
arrival in Pueblo Nuevo, teaching staff had disagreed about whether or not the 
group would declare a shared attitude to gender politics (interview w VR, 21.07.14, 
PN, and LR, 16.05.14, PN). Eventually, it was agreed that the project did have a 
feminist identity. As with the shared Chavista politics of the group, however, the 
main ways that feminist principles were fostered at Cayapa during fieldwork was 
through working practices. Janeath’s role as founder and Director of the group and 
the leadership roles played by Lisbeide, Vannesa and other female members of the 
staff and volunteer team fit with what Lallander (2016: 149) describes as “… the 
empowerment of Venezuelan women (…) achieved through their protagonist roles 
in the new participatory democratic model…” These women also model these roles 
for the women of the barrios, including the school-age students at La Escuelita and 
the adult high-school classes which was usually made up of about two thirds with 
young mothers. In addition, the male staff and volunteers at Cayapa fulfilled what 
have historically been seen as women’s tasks in Venezuela – for example preparing 
the young students’ breakfasts. For Fernandes’ (2007), sharing of supposedly 
gendered tasks plays an important part in challenging gendered ideas about social 
                                                          
15 I found a similar ethic at Summer Hill, the famous alternative school in Suffolk, on visiting 
in February 2014 to begin to build a relationship with Cayapa. The teaching staff saw the 
students as their immediate priority, and processes of wider change in education – or the 
potential societal contribution of graduating students - as something of a distraction from 
the task of providing a student-focused learning environment. 
269 
 
roles in Venezuela’s barrios. It is another, less explicit way that the politics of 
Cayapa’s participants are feeding into the social environment in Pueblo Nuevo. 
The ethos of Cayapa to work with students’ families to address barriers to 
education and promote a better home life is another area that connects with 
precedents from the alternative education movement. Treating students’ home 
lives as part of the sphere of activities for teachers is increasingly common in 
contemporary thinking about education in what is termed as ‘family engagement’. 
Favela and Torres (2014: 51) promote building genuine relationships and focusing 
on student needs outside of school, arguing that “…embracing the role of advocate 
is critical in order to respond to students’ increasingly complex lives.” While some 
of this involves expanded counselling roles, other examples draw on alternative 
education principles and see educators move outside of the school themselves. 
Auerbach (2009: 9) describes family engagement in poorer urban areas of Los 
Angeles as “…part of a broader moral commitment to social justice and educational 
equity for disenfranchised Latino families”, including moving towards strategies of 
home-visits and taking principles from community organising into the classroom. 
This expanded role for teachers matches that adopted by Freirian-style educators 
who use their trusted reputations, their status and their access to families to fulfil 
broad social work roles in poor urban communities.16 
Also in line with empowerment education principles, student assessment is 
unconventional. The adult students, for example, take part in a process known 
simply as systemtización: a technique developed by Vannesa Rosales during her 
time at Cayapa as an alternative to accreditation via examinations or written 
coursework. The end of each class is spent asking the students what they feel they 
have learned, and charting the progress throughout the semester. At the end of the 
semester, the records are taped up around the classroom as a visual representation 
to aid reflection on the learning journey for the whole semester. This approach is 
seen intended to be more empowered, as students rather than examiners take 
control of assessing their own progress. This unconventional assessment approach 
                                                          
16 Providing engaging activities and a safe space for social interaction is also a common 
principle for community workers using alternative education, principles – and was also part 
of the approach used in a particularly similar favela youth work project I visited in Rio de 
Janeiro in June 2014. 
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is an example of ongoing negotiation with the board of education (interview w VR, 
21.7.14, PN). In defining their own processes and in negotiating their own 
autonomy from public authorities, Cayapa arguably draws on a local tradition of 
“combative” organising in Pueblo Nuevo from the pre-Chávez era (Hernández de 
Padrón 1998: 81). 
4. Cayapa’s history and context: a continuation of pre-Revolution 
organising 
Although the teaching staff said that the process of setting up Cayapa started in 
2009, the broad community role of the school connects with the history of barrio 
organising in Pueblo Nuevo from the pre-Chávez era. During meetings Cayapa staff 
frequently talk about the need to “defend the space” from outside influences which 
might derail the “organic” process of the school. This shared language is part of the 
way that Cayapa’s staff differentiate their work from conventional education and a 
recognition of the pressures to conform to a standardised assessment procedures 
and work-patterns. In resisting these outside influences – most notably from the 
board of education – Cayapa draws on precedents of student-led, semi-
independent community organising in Pueblo Nuevo from the 1960s-1990s. The 
challenge facing Cayapa, therefore, is to position themselves as clients within the 
Bolivarian process, while avoiding the centralising tendencies of the Venezuelan 
bureaucracy. 
Student politics and the barrio 
As discussed in Chapter Six, the landscape of Venezuelan student politics has 
shifted to the right under the Bolivarian Revolution, with the shift demonstrated 
most notably by Mérida’s increasingly militant anti-government politics at the ULA 
among both the academic staff and student body. In the 1960s and 1970s, many 
barrio organisations were supported and in some cases led by Mérida’s student 
activists, including as part of Pueblo Nuevo’s Comité de Toma in 1973 (Hernández 
de Padrón 1998). The leftist student groups shared barricades and causes with 
barrio residents and university workers, while city authorities endeavoured to 
divide them with deals for either side and oppose them through increasingly 
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violent repression (ibid, see also Chapter Two). Among the leftist students of the 
last century are those who have grown up to form part of the new Bolivarian 
bureaucracy (interview w GM, 04.06.14, OF) or have moved into new Chavista 
groups like the predominantly lower-middle class collective Frente de Vanguardia 
Hugo Chávez. Under the Bolivarian Revolution this opposition of the state has 
continued in Venezuela’s universities, with many students now occupying 
increasingly right-wing political positions in response to what they see as Chávez’s 
irresponsible populism. Among the grievances of several students encountered 
during fieldwork was the opening up of university access to barrio residents under 
Chávez. Student protests continue in Mérida, but appear to have lost their solidarity 
with the working classes: protests during fieldwork included those in favour of 
lecturers’ salary increases (in 2012 and 2013) and against the violent crime 
students see as being perpetrated by barrio residents (in 2013 and 2014). The 
backlash against the state culminated in the ‘Guarimba’ anti-government 
neighbourhood occupations of spring 2014, where violence was seen by some as 
being targeted at poorer Venezuelans.17 
Despite this shift in student politics in Mérida and Venezuela, a strong 
undercurrent of leftist students remains, with a connection to Pueblo Nuevo that 
has come to focus on Fundación Cayapa. Some of these students have moved not 
only to work on community projects but to live full-time and become – in the words 
of several residents - “a part of the community”. During my time at Cayapa those of 
us living and working full-time in the community were also joined by outsiders who 
came specifically to visit the school, including activists from the PROUT institute in 
Caracas, temporary volunteers from other barrio communities and other projects 
in Mérida, representatives of a Caracas-based CSR initiative, journalists from the 
UK and Australia, artists from a local mural-painting collective, a photographer 
from the USA and musicians from Cuba and Venezuela. A cultural day in 2014 run 
by teaching staff and volunteers from the Youth PSUV turned Calle Principal into a 
dance and music festival, attracting many residents who have not historically been 
                                                          
17 In particular the tactic of using wire garrottes strung across roads at neck height to target 
motorbike riders – was seen as a way of targeting the poor, as only lower-income 
Venezuelans tend to ride motorcycles (interview w DV, 12.04.14, MC). This strategy – if true 
- may rest on the assumption that poorer citizens are proportionally more likely to be 
Chavistas, or simply an act of aggression against the lower classes.  
272 
 
involved with Cayapa. These visitors were attracted to the barrio by word-of-
mouth and a growing online reputation, as the reputation of La Escuelita and the 
alternative form of education practised there grows - due in large part to a video 
about the school that has been uploaded to YouTube in both English and Spanish. 
While it is unsurprising that the paid teaching staff at Cayapa are either current or 
ex-students, those who have moved to live in the barrio from more middle-class 
area of the city are part of a tradition which dates to the community organisations 
in the 1960s. Hernández de Padrón (1998:80) describes how the first grassroots 
organisations in Mérida - the Pro-Defence Comités tasked with protecting the new 
campesinos settlements like Pueblo Nuevo. This role continued as students helped 
with the second wave of invasiones in the 1950s:  
“The dirigentes comunistas, above all the students and a few university 
workers like in my case, we entered the struggle in defence of the most 
poor that live in “ranchos”. We decided to organise them, to seize land 
and to support them in the construction of their houses… it was a 
constitutional right that had to be defended… the students were the 
great support within the Pro-Defence Committees…” (University 
Worker and ‘Communist Militant’, cited in Hernández de Padrón 1998: 
81)  
Hernández de Padrón’s account found that these leftist dirigentes – or leaders - had 
given the invasions of 1958-59 “un character contestatario”: a combative attitude 
towards the state and an emphasis on the rights of all Venezuelans to land and 
housing. Many of these students lived in the barrios. In Pueblo Nuevo this 
relationship culminated in the 1973 Comité de Toma, as students and residents 
seized the land to the south of the barrio (see discussion in Chapter Two). This 
relationship live don in the Cultural Centes of the 1970s, while the connection with 
the ULA was maintained through the health activities of the Moaco collective in 
Pueblo Nuevo the 1980s and early 1990s (Lopez 2009). 
Today, this tradition is continued through those members of Cayapa who were not 
born in the barrio. During fieldwork, Lisbeide, Pichi, Vannesa, Juan, Andrey and 
Griseide were the core Venezuelan staff and volunteer members not form Pueblo 
Nuevo who have shaped the organisation and complement the staff and volunteers 
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who grew up in the barrio. Their numbers are added to by international volunteers, 
invariably leftist ex-students, including myself. This new generation of student 
dirigentes come from middle class areas, and most have changed their lives 
dramatically to work with Cayapa. While Juan Valeri “…did not know the true 
reality of Mérida” until visiting Pueblo Nuevo, he now lives across the street from 
Cayapa on Calle Principal, having left his own neighbourhood and given up plans to 
join a monastery to live and work in the barrio (interview w JV, 5.6.14, PN). 
Juan and the other teachers in Pueblo Nuevo – including those who were born in 
the barrio like Janeath and Gerardo Lopez - also hold the radical leftist politics of 
the earlier generations of student activists. Their politics became clear working 
alongside the staff, and over many late night conversations at candle-lit tables in 
conversation in those of Mérida’s student bars which are filled with Youth PSUV 
and Venezuelan Communist Party (PCV) activists. In line with Freirian principles 
and Bolivarian educational objectives discussed above, the group saw their work 
as part of encouraging grassroots reflection and action, the long process of 
fostering improved community organising and the broader process of social 
transformation. Despite this, and like the semi-independent groups from the pre-
Chávez era described in Chapters Two and Three, a pro-government political 
posture is a part of the ways that Cayapa is able to negotiate autonomy over their 
activities. 
Clients with independence: balancing support and autonomy 
Perhaps the defining feature of pre-Chávez community organisations in Pueblo 
Nuevo and Mérida’s other barrios was the extent to which different groups were 
more or less dependent on the state and ruling parties. Chapters two and three 
described how the Juntas Pro-Mejoras and the Neighbourhood Associations in the 
city were largely clients of the ruling parties, acting as agents of Accíon Democrática 
(AD) and the Christian Democrats (COPEI) in barrio communities and positioning 
themselves as clients to receive any available funds and accrue status as 
community representatives (see also Hernández de Padrón 1998; Jugo Burguera 
2014). These groups are contrasted in the literature with the more informal, 
student-led Comités de Toma, Comités Pro-Defensa, the Cultural Centres and 
groups like Pueblo Nuevo’s Moaco collective which were more critical of the state 
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and whose politics made them less willing to align themselves with the major 
parties. As a result, these more independent organisations were replaced, 
destroyed, or penetrated by state and party forces, while the dependent 
organisations lost credibility with barrio populations. Cayapa arguably sits 
somewhere between these two categories, and is engaged in the challenging work 
of securing accreditation for students, support and funding, while also maintaining 
credibility in the community and protecting the organisation’s activities from 
bureaucratic controls. 
An important factor in avoiding institutional controls is the complex role of Cayapa 
and the way the organisation bridges different administrative areas. As a 
community organisation, Cayapa’s identity as a school means the group sits outside 
of the state’s groupings  of ‘social movements’, ‘communal power ’ and ‘missions’,  
and the sets of administrative procedures that come with them. The group’s 
complex funding streams also helps avoid oversight. As well as the teachers who 
are paid via Miraflor Mayor, another teacher is employed by National Institute of 
Socialist Information Capacitation (INCIS), while two other members of the staff 
team are student doctors who worked previously in the Barrio Adentro in Pueblo 
Nuevo and now work at hospitals in the city, but continue to give their time and 
expertise to Cayapa. Other part-time teachers work as volunteers, including those 
working with loosely affiliated groups from other barrio communities and the 
international volunteers. Other sources of funding include private donations and 
the upcoming investment as part of the ‘Profit’ corporate social responsibility 
scheme. This new opportunity is a way of earning significant funds from the 
expertise of the group in a way that is independent from state institutions or the 
PSUV. In constructing accountability in diverse spheres, the group constructs what 
Edwards and Hulme (1997: 38) describe as “freedom for manoeuvre” - a substitute 
for autonomy acquired by groups which report to different arenas. 
Despite Cayapa’s ability to attract diverse sources of funding, the Board of 
Education - the Zona Educativa - maintains an influence over the organisation. The 
most notable constraints are attached to accreditation. Vannesa Rosales is the 
teacher at Cayapa who is in charge of the adult bachillerato daily course and deals 
with frustrations around registration as many students lack the necessary 
identification documents. While a large part of her time and energy is taken up 
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chasing documentation to help maintain accreditation, she sees this as worthwhile, 
due to the fact that “…what we do has formal recognition we also have the liberty 
to follow our pedagogical strategy” (interview w VR, 21.7.14, PN). Here, some state 
controls appear to be unavoidable, as students want recognition of their learning 
that is valid outside of Pueblo Nuevo, both to help them to find work and for the 
symbolic value of a formal qualification.   
A further tension exists around the group’s preferred strategy in that the board of 
education expect the teachers to work set hours. The teachers feel that they need 
to available at night to work with the families, and on an ad hoc basis to respond to 
events in the community. Disagreement over this issue, however, does not 
currently affect the teachers’ practices. The Director of the parent school Miraflor 
Mayor, for example, visits infrequently and briefly and is reportedly “very afraid” 
of the barrio (interview JL, 24.05.14, PN). This is an example of where space is 
particularly important for constructing group autonomy, as day-to-day teaching 
behaviours are largely invisible to the state. 
The continued ability of the group to source different kinds of funding and 
resources appears to be a factor in keeping Fundación Cayapa free from 
institutional controls. As well as the Profit CSR scheme, other potential funders are 
becoming interested in the space. For Janeath, this is connected to the group’s 
growing reputation: 
“In terms of resources we haven’t received a lot because we haven’t 
been very visible. Only right now are they understanding what la 
Escuelita is. We didn’t have a directive. We didn’t know how it worked 
–nothing. It is only now that we are articulating more and working in 
other communities that this is changing.” (Interview w JL, 24.05.14, 
PN) 
For Janeath, having less resources also means having more freedom and autonomy 
“…because we didn’t have any liabilities nor politics, nor partisan commitment, or 
any other type of compromise.” According to Janeath, it is the capacity of the staff 
and community members are the most important resource for Cayapa. In this 
respect, her views reflect those of the voceros from the Community Council Calle 
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Principal, discussed in Chapter Six, who gave an “epic version” (Auyero 2000: 170-
171) of participant capacity to deliver community changes under their own steam. 
Despite this, and the fact that the space is open to residents of any political 
sympathy, for one founding member, Lisbeide Rangel, what she describes as the 
“political posture” of the organisation is particularly important for building their 
autonomy (interview w LR, 16.5.14, PN). Although Cayapa is a space largely free 
from party politics or explicit Revolutionary speech and symbolism, Lisbeide 
describes how the alignment of the organisation with the politics and ideology of 
Bolivarianism means that the basic impetus to apply bureaucratic controls is not 
there. She says that this is about “the discourse” of Fundación Cayapa. By building 
an understandable political narrative around the complex role of the group, with 
its inclusiveness to non-Chavistas and its independent and organic processes, the 
group achieves a certain independence. For Lisbeide, the identity of the group 
means achieving support without having to fulfil partisan behaviours: 
“If you help with elections, or with plans that the party has, then you 
will receive much more benefits than if you don’t. That’s like a 
tendency. But you see the school, that is autonomous, without these 
pressures, is the same. People come, who are very clear politically, 
and they say ‘this space is very important, we are going to help.’” 
Vannesa Rosales agreed that the reputation of La Escuelita primary school gives 
the group security over their future (interview w VR, 21.7.14, PN), but it is a 
security that is limited. As a result of their success in positioning themselves as 
clients, Cayapa staff acknowledged that they are vulnerable to a change in 
government – something not seen in Venezuela now since 1998. This is consistent 
with experiences in Pueblo Nuevo dating back to the first national democratic 
transition in 1958. Like the Communal Councils discussed in Chapter Six, the 
connection of party and community organising which is said to have historically 
discredited Venezuela’s neighbourhood organisations (Hernández de Padrón 
1998; Ellner 1999; Buxton 1999) may continue. In achieving support whilst 
maintaining a certain independence, however, the organisation have negotiated 
the freedom to implement a strategy which addresses Pueblo Nuevo’s needs in a 
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way that may have been previously hindered by either lack of funds or by greater 
orientation to partisan politics. 
5. Conclusion: Cayapa as an example of organising in and around 
national political processes 
In this chapter I have sought to demonstrate how the different precedents for 
Fundación Cayapa feed into a set of activities which fit some of the unmet needs of 
barrio Pueblo Nuevo. While alignment with the principles of Bolivarian education 
reform and the political posture of the group help secure support and resources for 
the school, the organisation also draws on the history of combative, student-led 
organising in Pueblo Nuevo to avoid controls on their activities and follow Latin 
American popular education principles. By responding to a specific set of local 
needs – by addressing what are considered to be “private” family problems, by 
combatting delinquency and violence and by building social ties to the outside 
world - Fundación Cayapa is responding to local needs not met by either 
conventional apparatus of the Venezuelan state, or by new Bolivarian popular 
institutions. In working with a small group of students and their families to meet 
these problems, and in providing a space where people of different ages from both 
Pueblo Nuevo and Simon Bolivar can meet and spend time together, the busy 
school building also provides meeting a need identified from the 1970s.18 In 
adopting this role – one that is not well-fulfilled by the largely dysfunctional 
Communal Councils in the two barrios – Cayapa not only aligns with Bolivarian 
notions about Participatory Democracy but also continues tradition from the 
student-led, semi-independent barrio organisations seen in Pueblo Nuevo in the 
pre-Chávez era. 
This chapter fits with the broader work of the thesis by demonstrating continuity 
in the contested relationship between barrio organisations and city authorities. It 
adds to this argument by demonstrating how a local community organisation can 
outpace institutional changes to services for barrio populations in Venezuela to 
deliver the kind of popular solution that is the more radical part of the Bolivarian 
                                                          
18 Julio Burguera (2004: 36) had identified the lack of opportunities for young people to mix 
socially as part of the infrastructure lacking in Pueblo Nuevo. 
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ideology which itself has its roots partly in barrio organisations and grassroots 
social movements of the second half of the 20th century (see Ciccariello-Maher 
2013). Finally, in developing this picture of a community organisation, we can see 
how folk concepts about barrio revolutionaries are not a particularly good match 
for Cayapa, certainly the most active community organisation in the barrio. The 
staff and volunteers at Cayapa are Chavista, but not PSUVista. Along with local staff 
and volunteers, they include students from outside of the barrio who are 
continuing a tradition from the pre-Chávez era of bringing in ideas and 
methodologies from the wider regional movement. Above all, however, they are 
concerned with ‘what works’ in Pueblo Nuevo, as a part of a process of social 
transformation that connects with national politics but that is both smaller and 
bigger in scope than Bolivarianism.  
Part of the analytical work of this thesis has been to identify different areas of 
continuity in community organising and in how people think about the relationship 
between people and government in and around Pueblo Nuevo. Challenging aspects 
of the political landscape in Mérida include the enduring culture of partidismo, the 
centralising tendencies of the Venezuelan state and political parties, essentialising 
notions about barrio populations and politicised narrative of class conflict. This last 
chapter, however, has used a study of the case I know the best to identify a more 
positive area of continuity, as a tenacious and pragmatic group of barrio residents 
are joined by leftist students who bring energy and expertise from outside the 
community. This group is engaged in interacting with this political landscape to do 
what successive local groups have done since the barrio’s founding – to work 
together in a challenging political environment to find small ways of making Pueblo 
Nuevo a better place to live.  
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9. Pueblo Nuevo: sigue! Sigue!1 
 
 
 
Across the street, a man waiting at a bus stop tosses his cigarette and taps his friend 
on the shoulder. The pair step out of the shade, squinting their eyes against the 
afternoon sun. I turn and follow their gaze down Don Tulio Febres Cordero Avenue 
and see the first bus. It is one of the beaten-up American school buses that I have 
ridden on many times – the buses that someone once drove down from the United 
States, winding their way through half a continent to reach Venezuela.  This bus, 
however, is driven by a soldier in the green uniform and peaked cap of the National 
Guard. As it passes we see it is full of young, nervous-looking recruits, sat side-by-
side with their rifles. The bus is gone in an instant, followed by the usual swathe of 
Mérida’s afternoon traffic. Before long, the bus is followed by another, just the 
same. And another, shortly after, followed by a haulage truck with a tanqueta – one 
of the grey-blue police mini-tanks – loaded on the back. I share a smile with the men 
across the street, turn, and head for home. It is the 25th of April 2014. 
By the time I get back to Pueblo Nuevo, the news is already buzzing around the 
barrio. I take the steps down the Eastern entrance two at a time, casting half an eye 
on the sky above. On Calle Principal, the old men have left the shade in front of the 
bodega and are squinting up, to where military helicopters have begun to circle 
overhead. As I turn up La Cuesta I see Marleny leaning on the railings of our house. 
She has already heard the gossip by telephone, as usual, from a cousin here or there. 
She is waiting for Jose-Luis to come home, and hoping to ask passers by what they 
                                                          
1 Sigue means “to continue” or “to go on” – as in the popular Chavista call and response, 
“Chavez lives, lives! The Revolution goers on, goes on!” 
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have seen and heard. “It’s started,” she says, and warn me to keep off the streets 
today. 
Somewhere in the guarimba zones, behind the barricades that have stood for 
nearly three months, the protesters must have seen the helicopters and heard the 
news of the arrival of the National Guard. It is a day they must have planned for, 
and a day that the city of Mérida has waited for anxiously.  
In the end, we heard, the protesters gave in without much of a fight, and without 
any shots being fired. Whether they had lost the support of the exhausted residents 
in the occupied communities, or felt their point had been proven, or whether they 
had never really had the capacity to defend these communities is unclear. After 
months of tension and intermittent violence, however, the end of the occupation 
was something of an anti-climax. Over the next few weeks and months, the city 
slowly returned to normal. In the guarimba zones, roads and businesses reopened, 
and Chavista activists returned home from their safe-houses. A small presence of 
National Guard remained, and the city breathed a collective sigh of relief. Down in 
the barrio, life went on for most people - just as it had during the occupation. 
Marleny was disappointed that the government had not been toppled by the 
protests, but even she was tired of worrying about Jose-Luis getting home safe from 
work. The market-traders and beggars from the barrio returned to the Campo Elias 
Bridge, and meetings of the Communal Council Calle Principal resumed. At the 
CEDECOL building, classes continued, and the teachers carried on their little corner 
of the Revolution as if nothing had happened.  
If Mérida recovered quickly from the disruption brought about by the protests, 
Pueblo Nuevo’s continuation of day-to-day life throughout this period showed 
something about the resilience and insulation of the community to the politics of 
spectacle (Uzcategui 2011) happening in rest of the city. This thesis has used 
different kinds of information from Pueblo Nuevo to disrupt the idealised 
narratives about the relationship between people and government in Venezuela – 
including ideas about the exceptionalism of the Bolivarian Revolution and 
Participatory Democracy. I have done this in part by developing a description of 
community organising in and around the barrio, and by connecting contemporary 
experiences and discourses with those from the pre-Chávez era. In place of the 
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agonistic narrative of rich opositors against poor Chavistas, I have developed a 
more nuanced description of the relationship between people and government to 
feed into wider discussions both about Bolivarianism and about populism and 
democracy in Latin America.    
1. Continuity and change: Pueblo Nuevo through the Chávez era  
Pueblo Nuevo’s experience of community organising in the pre-Chávez era fits with 
evidence from elsewhere in Venezuela. The centralising tendencies, repressive 
tactics and partidista culture of Puntofijismo meant groups in the barrio sought 
more, leading to the emergence of more combative, semi-independent alternatives 
including the toma land occupations, the Cultural Centres and the Moaco collective 
in the 1980s and 1990s. These experiences took place against a backdrop of shifting 
attitudes towards barrio populations, first as the migrant invaders, then as the 
rightful citizens of a new democratic era, and in the wake of the 1989 Caracazo as 
the criminal underclass who threatened the lives of normal Venezuelans. These 
different ideas were also accompanied by different government and party 
strategies for Mérida’s barrios: to remove them, to contain them, or to permit their 
expansion in return for party loyalty. Different kinds of evidence presented in this 
thesis have shown how these experiences were in some ways continued during the 
Chávez era.  
After the increased political importance of barrio populations after the Caracazo 
fed into the rise of the Bolivarian Revolution and a new era of pro-poor politics. 
This the call for Bolivarian citizens to take protagonist roles in Participatory 
Democracy, drawing on the revolutionary history of Venezuela’s urban poor and 
feeding into new, more empowering representations of barrio populations. From 
1998, Pueblo Nuevo experienced this pro-poor politics as an expansions of services 
– notably the new MERCAL food store, the Barrio Adentro health clinic, the 
provision of resources for the CEDECOL community centre and the new housing 
development to the north of the barrio. These services were accompanied by new 
opportunities to participate – including the community assemblies to contribute to 
1999 Venezuelan Constitution, a new system of Communal Councils and the inter-
barrio Sala de Batalla and Parochial Assembly.  
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This thesis has shown how these new services and opportunities continue some 
important characteristics of the relationship of people and government in 
Venezuela from the pre-Chávez era. Evidence from local accounts and observations 
of council meeting have been used to show the loss of faith in the Communal 
Councils following what have been seen as corrupt practices and the exclusion of 
non-Chavistas. Where opositors and Chavistas do collaborate together, in the case 
of the Communal Council Calle Principal, this is believed to have resulted in the 
denial of registration and funds. This experience, one that reflects the partisan 
state-led organising of Puntofijismo has also resulted in the lower participation 
levels and the move to the brokerage roles of the old system of clientelismo. 
Interviews with members of the Brisas de Alba housing collective, along with 
observations of their political activities, has suggested that the most substantial 
project to benefit people from the barrio has been allocated in part on party-
political grounds. Although MERCAL and the Barrio Adentro services are open to 
everyone in Pueblo Nuevo, non-Chavistas said that they avoided these services. 
This appears to be linked to the heavy politicisation of these services by the PSUV, 
along with the oppositional Bolivarian public narrative that sets Chavistas against 
opositors. 
Evidence from city-level meetings, including the Street Government, Sala de Batalla 
and Parochial Assembly have also demonstrated the limited ways that people in 
Pueblo Nuevo and Mérida can take up their new protagonistic democratic roles. 
The partisan branding of spaces, one-way communication and the lack of decision-
making about project details all limit the involvement of participants and 
contribute to the low numbers of barrio residents taking up these opportunities to 
participate. Interviews with key officials from the institutions tasked with 
coordinating participatory politics have demonstrated how this frustrated forms of 
participation have in part been inherited from the previous system. They show how 
inherited ideas about the need to “control” or “correct” what they see as 
“disordered” and parochial community groups are part of the rational for 
continued bureaucratic oversight. 
The continuation of these politicised and dependent processes from the pre-Chávez 
era have been connected with a general loss of support for the PSUV, and two 
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connected responses from the people in and around Pueblo Nuevo. First, 
experience of the period of anti-government protests in the spring of 2014 showed 
how despite being excluded from local narratives of popular power, these protest 
groups continued some of the themes and strategies from the left-wing student 
protests movements of the pre-Chávez era. This was especially the case where 
street occupations were used to challenge the rule of law and protest the legitimacy 
of the Bolivarian Government. Second, evidence from Pueblo Nuevo has shown how 
people have turned to more independent opportunities for participating in 
community development by organising around the state.2. Negotiating politics, 
identities and organising around the state 
In some ways, the tensions identified around the processes for community 
organising in Pueblo Nuevo relate to an inherent tension in participatory 
approaches – what can public authorities do to facilitate ‘the right kind change’ 
from below (Cooke and Kothari 2001; Hickey and Mohan 2004)? The evidence from 
Pueblo Nuevo tells us: when authorities get it wrong, or seek to control these 
processes, people ‘below’ can find ways to work around them. 
I have framed this tension around participatory politics in Venezuela in terms of 
two different, neo-populist ways of conceiving of the relationship between people 
and government - as being about patronage and as being about emancipation. The 
evidence collected during fieldwork shows different ways that this tension is 
experienced in and around Pueblo Nuevo – as partidismo, as one-way 
communication in public meetings, as bureaucratic attempts to control 
“disordered” barrio populations, and even as building apartment blocks to house 
groups of political supporters. This thesis is partly a story about these processes as 
part of a particularly volatile political moment. As the anti-government protest 
movement gathers momentum, the PSUV seeks to keep its support among the 
populations of barrios like Pueblo Nuevo as Chávez did: both through providing 
opportunities for emancipation, and through delivering on promises of improved 
services. It is also partly a story about the ways that people work around the formal 
channels designed to administer community development: by collaborating to 
collect a community’s refuse, by developing participatory teaching practices in a 
barrio where education inspectors do not care to visit, and by making sure the loss 
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of the funds and prestige of Communal Council registration “… didn’t stop us” 
(interview w YC 27.11.13, PN).  
Within this complex story of community organising are the roles that have been 
created and taken up by women from Pueblo Nuevo. These include leadership roles 
at Fundación Cayapa and the Brisas de Alba housing campaign – the two 
organisations with the highest participation, the more discernible contributions to 
community development and the most success at adapting to take advantage of the 
Chavista political environment. In contrast, however, the broker roles that have 
been taken up by the remaining active spokesmen at the Communal Council Calle 
Principal seem encourage the sort of reliance on informal contacts that may 
privilege barrio men and act as a barrier to the participation of women. These 
options to participate, combined with the high rate of single-parent families in the 
barrio, also contribute to Moser’s (1986 in Fernandes 2007: 119) ‘triple burden’ of 
productive, reproductive and community managing work for barrio women – 
although this is being mediated to some extent by the efforts of men to fulfil what 
have been seen as women’s roles in Venezuela, including cooking for the school age 
children at Cayapa. This story of women’s “protagonist” roles in the Bolivarian 
Revolution however may be less about “empowerment” during the Chávez -era, as 
Lallander (2016: 149) suggests, and more about a continuation of the kind of 
combative, collaborative ways that women have responded to their families’ needs 
since the founding the Mérida’s barrios, not least during the toma movements of 
the early 1970s.  
In both the formal processes and in the creative and collaborative ways that people 
in Pueblo Nuevo work around them, these experiences of community organising 
have been shown to connect with experiences from the pre-Chávez era. If people in 
Pueblo Nuevo are engaged in what Fernandes (2010: 23-24) describes as 
“everyday wars of position” with city and national authorities, it is difficult to 
separate this description from that given by Padron (1998, 2000) and Jugo 
Burguera (2004, 2014) in their accounts of Mérida’s barrio politics in the second 
half of the Twentieth Century. Important continuities have also been identified in 
the discourses around citizenship and the political identities that are used to 
explain the relationship between government and people in Venezuela’s barrios. 
While barrio populations are no longer described as “migrant invaders”, ideas 
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about criminality and parochialism which are associated with theories of urban 
marginality are reproduced among public officials, people in Mérida, and also by 
people in Pueblo Nuevo. More emancipatory representations of barrio populations 
as rightful citizens of the Bolivarian Revolution, and as social revolucionarios form 
part of the public narrative of Chavismo - but these representations can also be 
traced to the pre-Chávez era, including from the movement for democracy in the 
mid-twentieth century (Emerson 2011; Velasco 2011). Finally, ideas about barrio 
residents as clients of the state can be traced through both eras. Today, votes and 
political support continue to be involved with negotiations for improved public 
services and basic goods, including the allocation of white goods and the allocation 
of the newly built Brisas de Alba apartments.  
In this thesis, I have shown how these different identities are part of how people 
talk about politics in Pueblo Nuevo – drawing on different notions at different times 
to make sense of some of the contradictory processes of participatory politics. 
These identities are joined by representations of opositor and Chavista, in the 
“retold” story (Arberola in Uzcategui 2010: 1) of class warfare at the centre of 
Bolivarian public narrative. Despite these essentialising ideas, it is important that 
various community members also talked in ways that subvert them – not least in 
resisting the constrained notions of el pueblo to talk about the variety of identities 
and experiences in Pueblo Nuevo. This was demonstrated in particular by Miguel’s 
commentary from Chapter Three, when, despite his fear that opositor protesters 
might fire-bomb his MERCAL store while he was sleeping inside, Miguel Parra 
insisted that:  
“But MERCAL is of the people. It’s an initiative of the government but 
it’s for the people. It’s not just for people who are socialists or 
Chavistas, it’s for everyone. Everyone who is in Venezuela in the 
moment that they are giving this service. There are Colombians, 
Ecuadorians, there are gringos, there are amigos!” (interview w MP, 
16.04.14, CD). 
As Miguel and the other people in Pueblo Nuevo with their different party politics 
continue in their “everyday wars of position” (Fernandes 2010: 23-24) with city 
authorities, it is clear that this ongoing negotiation is, as Canel (1997: 190) puts it, 
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for identities as well as for services. If for Wacquant (2008: 272), the urban poor 
are imprisoned and divided “creatures”, if for Suttles (1982: 4), they are “largely… 
pathological families” living lives that are “…more transient, depressed if not 
brutal…” - this is not my experience from living in Pueblo Nuevo. There, different 
people and different times showed dignity, community-heartedness and kindness. 
This was especially the case with my Venezuelan family, Marleny, Jose Luis and 
Marco, and the teaching staff and volunteers at Fundación Cayapa. At La Escuelita, 
these sentiments are part of humble ambitions for what might grow from “…the 
seedbed of the new citizens of a distinct society.” (interview w JV 5.6.14, PN). 
2. Populism, democracy and Revolution: what next for Pueblo Nuevo 
and Latin America? 
Since the end of fieldwork for this thesis, in July 2014, Venezuela has continued into 
a deepening political and economic crisis. The chronic scarcity of some foods and 
basic goods and the plummeting value of the Bolivar have meant dwindling 
credibility for the PSUV, whose strategy of blaming foreign and domestic agitators 
has become less and less convincing for the Venezuelan public. Hellinger’s (2001: 
42-44) study found that providing basic services and “meeting the demands of the 
poor” are considered far more important elements of democracy than political 
pluralism or representing minority views. As the Andres Peres government 
discovered in the 1980s, dependent community organisations and partidismo may 
be tolerated less when the supermarkets have empty shelves, living costs rocket 
and wages fall far behind inflation. 
President Maduro does not seem to have Chávez’s ability to separate his own 
legitimacy from that of his ailing party in the minds of supporters. This crisis of 
legitimacy resulted in the first major electoral defeat for Chavismo, as the MUD 
opposition coalition won a two-thirds majority in the National Assembly in 
December 2015. While Presidential elections will not be held until 2019 – unless 
there is a successful recall referendum – this result limits Maduro’s ability to make 
policies and to deepen the Revolution. Just preceding this result, in a now-famous 
article for left wing public media forum Aporrea.org, one notable Chavista 
commentator, Roland Denis (2015), had already wished “goodbye to Chavismo”. In 
it, he argued that the movement has reached its end point, “corroded by the 
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structures of the bureaucratic state", which Chávez had failed to transform, having 
“never shook off the caudillo that they obliged him to be… ”. This then, may be the 
new narrative of the Venezuelan left, who may argue as Chavistas did during 
fieldwork, that Venezuela’s problems are about ‘not enough Revolution’ rather than 
about any tensions within the Bolivarian ideology. 
Since the death of Chávez, victory for centre-right Presidential candidates in 
Argentina (2015) multi-class anti-government campaigns in Brazil, new economic 
policies in Cuba but also the continuation of left-wing governments in Bolivia, 
Ecuador, Chile and Uruguay, leave the direction for Latin American regional politics 
unclear. If Chavismo is to survive, it may be necessary to shift from its pro-poor 
ideology back to the sort of catch-all, multiclass two-party system of the 1970s and 
1980s (Heath 2009: 185). With the depth of the current economic crisis, however, 
it seems unlikely that any strategy would win over the Venezuelans who did not 
support Maduro in his narrow win in 2013. While Chavismo’s longevity has to some 
extent been achieved by representing a systemic choice between the oligarquía – 
the oligarchy - of the opposition and the people’s government, of Chavismo. This 
all-or-nothing narrative, however, has meant an end to the regular clean slates 
offered by the back-and-forth power-sharing of Puntofijismo. In the event of a loss 
for Maduro in 2019, the response to rank-and-file Chavistas will tell us something 
about how their commitment to socialism compares with their commitment to 
democracy.  
Although Pueblo Nuevo is just one barrio community, the description developed in 
this thesis also feeds into discussions about populism and democracy in Latin 
America today. If some of the tensions around processes and discourses of 
community organising have been inherited from the pre-Chávez era, this points to 
a need to think about longer term political trajectories, examined through the detail 
of local community histories. This study has shown how some of the tensions 
between liberalism and socialism – as discourses and experiences of politics - can 
be seen in the relationships between people and government at a local level. While 
it would be difficult to make the case that a revolution has occurred in the 
relationship between people and government in and around Pueblo Nuevo, much 
of what continues is to be celebrated, not least the history of tenacious and creative 
organising that can also be seen in barrios across the country.  
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Just as the Bolivarian Revolution has not led to the “Cubanisation” of Venezuela 
(Raby 2006: 160), it seems likely that a new Venezuelan government led by the 
MUD is unlikely to means a shift to something like the fascist authoritarianism of 
Pinochet, as Chavistas fear. It is my hope that the end or interruption of the 
Bolivarian Revolution, if it comes, will matter less for barrio communities like 
Pueblo Nuevo than many Chavistas might think. On Calle Principal, if the Barrio 
Adentro clinic closes, it may mean a return to the health project collaborative 
between the Moaco collective, the Neighbourhood Association and the ULA during 
the 1980s and 1990s. If MERCAL no longer offers subsidised food, then Gerardo 
and Janeath might continue to make breakfast for the children of the barrio. I hope 
that La Escuelita might continue to operate with little oversight from the Board of 
Education, and continue to be a place for communities to work and meet together 
to connect with the outside world and build the peace between Simon Bolivar and 
Pueblo Nuevo. I hope too that the more empowering barrio identities might also 
continue to appear here and there among the age-old ideas about Pueblo Nuevo’s 
malandros. 
If, in unexpected and ungoverned ways, el proceso continues in Pueblo Nuevo 
without the big politics of the Bolivarian Revolution, then there is much to be 
optimistic about for the people on the Left who look to Venezuela’s barrios - as they 
have looked at different to the Indignados, to the Zapatistas and to Occupy.  There 
may not be a perfectly-functioning Participatory Democracy in Venezuela, but in 
poor urban communities like Pueblo Nuevo, small groups of committed people are 
working together with love and compassion and drawing on a rich history of 
community organising in ways that do endure.  
 
289 
 
References 
 
Alfonzo, D. and Nunez, G. (1997) ‘The Cuban Revolution as Socialist Human 
Development’, in Kaufman, M. and Alfonso, H. (Ed.s) Community Power and Grassroots 
Democracy: the Transformation of Social Life, London: Zed Books 
Araujo, X. (2010) Decentralisation in Venezuela and citizen participation in 
local government: the case of local councils for public planning and the 
Communal Councils, Doctoral dissertation, Loughborough University, accessed 
online on 3.8.16 at https://dspace.lboro.ac.uk/dspace-
jspui/handle/2134/7002 
Arias, E. and Rodrigues, C. (2006) ‘The Myth of Personal Security: Criminal 
Gangs, Dispute Resolution, and Identity in Rio de Janeiro's Favelas’, in Latin 
American Politics & Society, 48(4), 53-81 
Auerbach, S. (2009) ‘Walking the walk: Portraits in leadership for family 
engagement in urban schools’, in School Community Journal, 19(1), 9-31 
Auyero, J. (2000) ‘The logic of clientelism in Argentina: an ethnographic 
account’, in Latin American research review, 35(3), 55-81 
Auyero, J. (2001) ‘Poor people's politics: Peronist survival networks and the 
legacy of Evita’, London: Duke University Press 
Azzelini, D. (2010) ‘Constituent Power in Motion: Ten Years of 
Transformation in Venezuela’, in Socialism and Democracy, 24(2), 8-31 
Baocchi, G. (2001) `Participation, activism and politics: the Porto Alegre 
experiment and deliberative democratic theory’, Politics and Society, 29(1), 
43-72 
Barrios, R. (1997) ‘Descentralización fiscal y estabilidad macroeconómica en 
Venezuela’, in Serie Política Fiscal, 94, 1-48 
290 
 
Becker, M. (1995) Setting the Virgin on Fire: Lázaro Cardenas, Michoacán 
Peasants, and the Redemption of the Mexican Revolution, University of 
California Press: Los Angeles 
Beasley-Murray, J., Cameron, M. and Hershberg, E. (2009) ‘Latin America's left 
turns: an introduction’, in Third World Quarterly, 30(2), 319-330 
Bell, K. (2013) ‘Doing qualitative fieldwork in Cuba: social research in politically 
sensitive locations’, in International Journal of Social Research Methodology, 16(2), 
109–124 
Blanco Muñoz, A. (1998) Habla el comandante, Caracas: Universidad Central 
de Venezuela 
Boas, T. C. (2005) ‘Television and neopopulism in Latin America: Media effects 
in Brazil and Peru’, in Latin American research review, 40(2), 27-49 
Bourdieu, P. (1979) Distinction: a social critique of the judgement of taste, 
London: Routledge 
Bourgois, P. (1995) In search of respect: selling crack in el barrio, New York: 
Cambridge University Press 
Brennan, B. (1997) ‘Reconceptualizing non‐formal education’, in International 
Journal of Lifelong Education, 16(3), 185-200 
Briggs, C. L. and Mantini-Briggs, C. (2009) ‘Confronting health disparities: 
Latin American social medicine in Venezuela’, in American journal of public 
health, 99(3), 549-555 
Buxton, J. (1999) The Venezuelan Party System 1988-1995, with reference to 
the rise and decline of Radical Cause. Ph.D. Doctoral dissertation, London 
School of Economics and Political Science University of London 
Buxton, J. (2011) ‘Venezuela’s Bolivarian Democracy’, in Smilde, D. and 
Hellinger, D. (Eds.). Venezuela’s Bolivarian Democracy: participation, politics 
and culture under Chávez, London: Duke University Press 
291 
 
Caldeira, R. (2008) ‘My land, your social transformation’: Conflicts within the 
landless people movement (MST), Rio de Janeiro, Brazil’, in. Journal of Rural 
Studies, 24(2), 150-160 
Cameron, M. and Major, F. (2001) ‘Venezuela's Hugo Chávez: Saviour or 
Threat to Democracy?’, in Latin American Research Review, 36 (3), 255-266 
Cammack, P. (2000) ‘The resurgence of populism in Latin America’, in Bulletin 
of Latin American Research, 19(2), 149-161 
Canache, D. (2002) ‘From bullets to ballots: The emergence of popular 
support for Hugo Chávez’, in Latin American Politics and Society, 44(1), 69-90 
Canel, E. (1997) ‘New Social Movement Theory and Resource Mobilisation 
Theory: the need for integration’, in Kaufman, M. and Alfonso, H. (Ed.s) 
Community Power and Grassroots Democracy: the Transformation of Social Life, 
London: Zed Books 
Cannon, B. and Kirby, P. (Ed.s) (2012) Civil Society and the State in Left-led 
Latin America: challenges and limitations to democratization, London: Zed 
Books  
Cannon, B. (2005) Populist leadership in the context of globalisation: a comparative 
study of President Chávez of Venezuela and ex-President Fujimori of Peru, PhD thesis, 
Dublin City University 
Cannon, B. (2009) Hugo Chávez and the Bolivarian revolution: populism and 
democracy in a globalised age, Oxford: Oxford University Press 
Carroll, R. (2014). Comandante: Hugo Chávez's Venezuela. Penguin Group USA. 
Castañeda, J. (2006) ‘Latin America's left turn’, in Foreign Affairs, 85, 28-39 
Chacko, E. (2004) ‘Positionality and praxis: fieldwork experiences in rural 
India’, in Singapore Journal of Tropical Geography, 25(1), 51-63 
Chacón Mora, G. (2014) ‘Imagining the malandro: antipolitics and 
representations of the malandro in Venezuelan cinema’, panel discussion, 
Venezuelan Research Network, Cambridge University, September 2014 
292 
 
Chaves, L. (1985) ‘División político-territorial y ordenación del territorio: El 
caso del Estado Mérida’, in Revista Geográfica, 102, 143-157 
Chávez, H. (2008) ‘Revolución bolivariana: 9 años de logros’, Caracas: 
Ministerio del Poder Popular para la Comunicación y la Información, online 
content accessed 12.08.16 at 
http://www.alternativabolivariana.org/modules.php?name=Downloads&d_o
p=getit&lid=34 
Ciccariello-Maher, G. (2013) We Created Chávez: a people’s history of the 
Venezuelan Revolution, London: Duke University Press 
Cho, E. (2004) Building a Race and Immigration Dialogue in the Global 
Economy: A Popular Education Resource for Immigrant and Refugee 
Community Organizers, National Network for Immigrant and Refugee Rights, 
Oakland, CA 
Connelly, M. and Clandinin, J. (1990) ‘Stories of Experience and Narrative 
Inquiry’, in Educational Researcher, 19(5), 2-14 
Conniff, M. , Roberts, K., Basurto, J., Drake, P. and Ellner, S. (2012) Populism in 
Latin America, Alabama: University of Alabama Press.  
Cooke, B. and Kothari, U. (2001) Participation: The New Tyranny? London: Zed Books 
Correa, D. and Wilson, J. (2011) Analysis Situacion Salud, unpublished report 
prepared by Barrio Adentro Clinic, Pueblo Nuevo 
Correo del Orinoco (2011) Vivienda Venezuela construye 200 apartamentos en 
Brisas del Alba de Mérida, editorial, 17th October, accessed 3.8.16 at 
http://www.correodelorinoco.gob.ve/nacionales/vivienda-venezuela-
construye-200-apartamentos-Brisas -alba-Mérida/ 
De la Torre, C. (1997) ‘Populism and democracy: Political discourses and 
cultures in contemporary Ecuadori, in Latin American Perspectives, 24(3), 12-
24. 
293 
 
Delfino, A. (2012) ‘La noción de marginalidad en la teoría social 
latinoamericana: surgimiento y actualidad’, in Universitas Humanística, 74(2): 
17-34 
Dennis, R. (2015), ‘Goodbye to Chavismo’, online content accessed 12.08.16 at 
http://venezuelanalysis.com/analysis/11545 
Dike, S. (2014) ‘La Vida en La Colonia: Oscar Lewis, the Culture of Poverty, and 
the Struggle for the Meaning of the Puerto Rican Nation’, in Centro Journal, 
26(1), 172 
Domínguez, F. (2011) ‘Venezuela’s opposition: desperately seeking to 
overthrow Chávez’, in Dominguez, F., Lievesley, G and Ludlam, S. (Ed.s) Right-
wing politics in the new Latin America: reaction and revolt, London: Zed Books 
Donís Ríos, M. (2008) ‘Una aproximación a la historia territorial de la 
provincia de Mérida en el siglo XIX’, in Presente y Pasado, 13(26), 213-248 
Doyle, D. (2011) ‘The Legitimacy of Political Institutions Explaining 
Contemporary Populism in Latin America’, in Comparative Political Studies, 
44(11), 1447-1473 
Duffy, M. (2012) Venezuela’s Bolivarian Revolution: Power to the People? 
doctoral thesis submitted to the University of Manchester 
ECLAC (2014), National Education profile for Venezuela, ECLAC CEPALSTAT 
database: accessed 02.06.14 
Edwards, M. and Hulme, D. (Eds.) (1995) Non-governmental Organisations: 
performance and accountability beyond the magic bullet, London: Earthscan 
Ellner, S. (1993) ‘The deepening of democracy in a crisis setting: political 
reform and the electoral process in Venezuela’, in Journal of Interamerican 
Studies and World Affairs, 35(4), 1-42 
Ellner, S. (1999) ‘Obstacles to the Consolidation of the Venezuelan 
Neighbourhood Movement: National and Local Cleavages’, in Journal of Latin 
American Studies, 31(01), 75-97 
294 
 
Ellner, S. (2009) ‘The “Top-Down” and “Bottom-up” approach of the Chávez 
Movements and Government’, prepared for delivery at the Meeting of the Latin 
American Studies Association, Rio de Janeiro 
Ellner, S. (2011) ‘The distinguishing features of Latin America’s new left in 
power: the Chávez, Morales and Correa governments’, Latin American 
Perspectives, 39(1), 96-114 
Ellner, S. and Rosen, F. (2002) ‘Chavismo at the crossroads: Hardliners, 
moderates and a regime under attack’, NACLA Report on the Americas, 35(6), 
8-12 
Emerson, R. G. (2011) ‘A Bolivarian People: identity politics in Hugo Chávez’s 
Venezuela’, in Humanities Research, 17(1), 87-107 
Englund, H. and Leach, J. (2000) ‘Ethnography and the Meta‐Narratives of 
Modernity’, in Current anthropology, 41(2), 225-248 
Enríquez, L. (2013) ‘The paradoxes of Latin America’s ‘Pink Tide’: Venezuela 
and the project of agrarian reform’, in The Journal of Peasant Studies, 40(4), 
611-38 
Escobar, E. (1998) ‘Whose Knowledge, Whose nature? Biodiversity, 
Conservation, and the Political Ecology of Social Movements’, Political Ecology, 
5(1), 53-82 
Escobar, A. and Alvarez, S. (1992) ‘Introduction: Theory and Protest in Latin 
America Today’ in Escobar, A. and Alvarez, S. (Ed.s) The Making of Social 
Movements in Latin America: identity, strategy and democracy, Oxford: 
Westview Press 
Fernandes, S. (2007) ‘Barrio Women and Popular Politics in Chávez's Venezuela’, in 
Latin American Politics and Society, 49(3), 97-127 
Fernandes, S. (2010) Who Can Stop the Drums? Urban Social Movements in 
Chávez’s Venezuela, London: Duke University Press  
Ferrándiz Martin, F. (2004). The Body as Wound Possession, Malandros and 
Everyday Violence in Venezuela. Critique of Anthropology, 24(2), 107-133.  
295 
 
Foley, J. and Irazábal, C. (2010) ‘Reflections on the Venezuelan Transition from a 
Capitalist Representative to a Socialist Participatory Democracy: What Are Planners 
to Do?’, in Latin American Perspectives, 37(1), 97-122  
Freire, P. (1972) Pedagogy of the Oppressed, Harmondsworth: Penguin Books  
Friedmann, J. (1992) Empowerment: The Politics of Alternative Development, Oxford: 
Blackwell 
Foucault, M. (1980) ‘Truth and Power’ in Power and Knowledge, New York: Harvester 
Wheatsheaf 
Gandin, L. and Apple, M. (2002) ‘Thin versus thick democracy in education: Porto 
Alegre and the creation of alternatives to neo-liberalism’, in International Studies in 
Sociology of Education, 12(2), 99-116 
Gans, H. J. (1982) Urban Villagers: group and class in the life of Italian-Americans, 
London: Free Press 
García-Guadilla, M. P., & Pérez, C. (2002) ‘Democracy, decentralization, and 
clientelism: new relationships and old practices’, in Latin American 
Perspectives, 29(5), 90-109 
Garrido, A. (2000) ‘La historia secreta de la Revolución Bolivariana’ 
in Producciones Karol, Caracas 
García, C., Pargas, L. and Aguilera, O. (1994) ‘Imágenes de la ciudad: La 
violencia en Mérida’, Fermentum, 4(11), 112-121 
Germani, G. (1980) El concepto de marginalidad, Buenos Aires: Nueva Visión     
Gilbert, A. (2007) ‘The return of the slum: does language matter?’, in 
International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 31(4), 697-713 
Gill, A. (2012) State-Managed Participatory Democracy in Venezuela: the case 
of the Communal Councils, PhD Dissertation, Department of Latin American 
Studies, University of Liverpool 
Goldstein, D. (2013) Laughter out of place: Race, class, violence, and sexuality in 
a Rio shantytown, Los Angeles: University of California Press  
296 
 
Gómez, M. and Puiggrós, A. (1986) La Educación popular en América Latina: 
antología. Vol. 1, Secretaría de Educación Pública 
Gott, R. (2011) Hugo Chávez and the Bolivarian revolution, London: Verso 
Books. 
Gott, R. (2008) ‘Venezuela under Hugo Chávez: The Originality of the 
‘Bolivarian’ Project’, in New Political Economy, 13(4), 475-490 
Gott, R. (2005) The Bolivarian Revolution, London: Verso 
Gottberg, L. (2011) ‘The color of mobs: racial politics, ethnopopulism, and 
representation in the Chávez era’, in Smilde, D., & Hellinger, D. (Eds.). 
Venezuela’s Bolivarian Democracy: participation, politics and culture under 
Chávez, London: Duke University Press 
Gramsci, A. (1971) Selections from the Prison Notebooks¸ London: Lawrence 
and Wishart 
Griffiths, T. G. (2010) ‘Schooling for twenty‐first‐century socialism: 
Venezuela’s Bolivarian project’, in Compare, 40(5), 607-622 
Guevara, C. & Castro, F. (1989) Socialism and man in Cuba, New York: 
Pathfinder 
Harnecker, M. (2005) Understanding the Venezuelan Revolution: Hugo Chávez 
talks to Marta Harnecker, New York: Monthly Review Press 
Harnecker, C. P. (2009) ‘Workplace democracy and social consciousness: a 
study of Venezuelan cooperatives’, in Science & Society, 73(3), 309-339 
Harrison-Conwill, G. (2011) ‘The Race toward Caraqueño Citizenship 
Negotiating Race, Class, and Participatory Democracy’, in The Annals of the 
American Academy of Political and Social Science, 637(1), 165-183 
Hawkins, K. (2010) ‘Who Mobilizes? Participatory Democracy in Chávez's 
Bolivarian Revolution’, in Latin American Politics and Society, 52(3), 31-66 
Hawkins, K. (2010a) Venezuela's Chavismo and Populism in Comparative Perspective, 
Cambridge University Press 
297 
 
Heath, O. (2009) ‘Explaining the Rise of Class Politics in Venezuela’, in Bulletin 
of Latin American Research, 28(2), 185–203  
Hellinger, D. (2005) ‘When" No" Means" Yes to Revolution": electoral politics 
in Bolivarian Venezuela’, in Latin American Perspectives, 32(3), 8-32 
Hellinger, D. (2011) ‘Defying the Iron Law of Oligarchy 1: how does el pueblo 
conceive democracy?’, in Smilde, D., & Hellinger, D. (Eds.) Venezuela’s 
Bolivarian Democracy: participation, politics and culture under Chávez, 
London: Duke University Press 
Hickey, S. and Mohan, G. (2004) Participation - from tyranny to 
transformation? Exploring new approaches to participation in development, 
London: Zed books 
Hurtado, S. (1991) ‘Matrilinealidad o crisis familiar en Venezuela’, in 
Fermentum, 1(02), 85-94 
Ireland, R. (2011) ‘Citizenship and Democratisation in Brazil's Favelas: The End of the 
Dream?’, in Journal of Iberian and Latin American Research, 17(2), 147-162 
Jugo Burguera, L. (2004) El Desarrollo Integral de las Comunidades Populares, 
IMC, Mérida. Accessed online 12.08.16 at 
http://www.saber.ula.ve/handle/123456789/84 
Jugo Burguera, L. (2014) ‘De la Mérida desarticulada: 1958-2012 Hacia el reto 
intergeneracional: Mérida sostenible sustentable 2012-2058 Una propuesta: 
Mérida Ciudad Educativa-Ciudad Parque’, in Consciencia y Diálogo, 4(4), 91-
112 
Juris, J. (2007) ‘Practicing Militant Ethnography with the Movement for Global 
Resistance (MRG) in Barcelona’, in Shukaitis, S. and Graeber, D. (Ed.s) Constituent 
Imagination: Militant Investigation, Collective Theorization, Oakland: AK Press 
Kaufman, M. and Alfonso, H. editors, (1997) Community Power and Grassroots 
Democracy: the Transformation of Social Life, London: Zed Books 
Knight, A. (1998) ‘Populism and neo-populism in Latin America, especially 
Mexico’, in Journal of Latin American Studies, 30(2), 223-248 
298 
 
Koonings, K. and Kruijt, D. (2007). Fractured cities: social exclusion, urban 
violence and contested spaces in Latin America, London: Zed Books 
La Escuelita (2012) El Sabado de la Basura: Barrio Pueblo Nuevo, Mérida, 
Venezuela, video accessed online 1.8.16 at 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dU6w1aDBqJU 
Laclau, E. (2005) On Populist Reason¸ New York: Verso 
Laffaille, J. and Ferrer, C. (2005) El terremoto de Mérida de 1812: 
escrudiñando entre las páginas de una novela inconclusa en busca de 
información acerca de una historia real, Revista Geográfica Venezolana, 46, 
217-232 
Lalander, R. (2016) ‘Gendering Popular Participation: Identity-Politics and 
Radical Democracy in Bolivarian Venezuela’, in Kettunen, H. and Korpisaari, A. 
(Ed.s) Multidisciplinary Latin American Studies, Helsinki: Renvall Institute 
Publications 
Leal, P. (2007) ‘Participation: The Ascendancy of a Buzzword in the Neo-Liberal Era’, 
in Development in Practice, 17(4/5), 539-548 
Lerner, J. (2007) ‘Communal Councils in Venezuela: Can 200 families revolutionize 
democracy?’ ZNET article, accessed 09.10.12 at: 
www.zcommunications.org/communal-councils-in-venezuela-by-josh-lerner 
Leary, J. (2009) ‘TV Urgente: Urban Exclusion, Civil Society, and the Politics of 
Television in Venezuela’, in Social Text 99, 27(2), 25-53 
Lewis, O. (1966) La vida: a Puerto Rican family in the culture of poverty, San Juan and 
New York, London: Random House 
Lezama, P. V. (2012) ‘El Caracazo (1989) y la tragedia (1999): Economía 
moral e instrumentalización política del saqueo en Venezuela’, in Cuadernos 
Unimetanos, 30, 5-15 
Lopez, G. (2009) Experiencia y Aprendisaja Aquiridas en el Area de 
comunicación Y Organización Comunitaria, Unpublished portfolio, Pueblo 
Nuevo, Mérida 
299 
 
McCoy, J. and Myers, D. (2006) The unraveling of representative democracy in 
Venezuela, New York: JHU Press 
Mainwaring, S. and Scully, T. (Eds.) (1995) Building democratic institutions: 
Party systems in Latin America, Stanford: Stanford University Press 
Matos Mar, J. (1960) Informe Sobre las Zonas de Ranchos de Parate Bueno y 
Pinto, Bogota: Instituto de Investigación de Recursos Biológicos Alexander 
von Humboldt 
Motta, S. (2009) ‘Venezuela: reinventing social democracy from below?’ in 
Lievesly, G. and Ludlam, S. (Ed.s) Reclaiming Latin America: experiments in 
radical social democracy, London: Zed Books  
Murmis, M. (1969) Tipos de marginalidad y posición en el proceso 
productive, in Revista Latinoamericana de Sociología, 2, 413-421 
Negri, A. (1999) Insurgencies: Constituent power and the modern state, 
Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press 
Hernández de Padrón, M. (1998) ‘La Historia de las Organizaciones de base en 
los barrios populares de Mérida. En el contexto de consolidación democrático 
y urbanizacion creciente (1958-1980)’, in Fermentum, 8(21), 77-96 
Hernández de Padrón, M. (2000) ‘El dilema entre lo social y lo politico: El caso 
del Movimiento Vecinal’, in Fermentum, 28, 197-215 
Paster, Z. (2014) Higher Education in Brazil: The Role of Grassroots NGOs in 
Preparing Low-Income Youth, Doctoral dissertation, Harvard University 
Paulston, R. (1980) ‘Education as Anti‐structure: non‐formal education in 
social and ethnic movements’, in Comparative Education, 16(1), 55-66 
Perlman, J. E. (1979) The myth of marginality: Urban poverty and politics in Rio 
de Janeiro, Berkley: University of California Press 
Perlman, J. E. (2005) ‘The myth of marginality revisited: the case of favelas in 
Rio de Janeiro’, in Becoming global and the new poverty of cities, Woodrow 
Wilson International Centre for Scholars, USAID 
300 
 
Petras, J. (1997) ‘Imperialism and NGOs in Latin America’, in Monthly Review; 49(7), 
10-27 
Prato Vicuña, R. (2013) ‘El Espacio Urbano en los Desarrollos Espontáneos, 
Casos estudios: Barrio Escondido el Palmo y Barrio Pueblo Nuevo Simón 
Bolívar’, Mérida-Venezuela: Cuadernos de Vivienda 
Project Alcatraz (2014) Vision Revenga, online content accessed 31.07.14 at: 
http://www.proyectoalcatraz.org/english/vision_revenga.htm 
Raby, D. (2006) Democracy and revolution: Latin America and socialism today, 
London: Pluto  
Ramakrishnan, K. (2014) ‘Disrupted futures: Unpacking metaphors of 
marginalization in eviction and resettlement narratives’, Antip, 46(3), 754-
772 
Ray, T. (1969) The Politics of the Barrios of Venezuela, Berkeley: University of 
California Press 
Reyes, J. (2012) ‘State-civil society relations during student mobilisations in 
Chile in 2006 and 2011’, in Cannon, B. and Kirby, P. (Ed.s) Civil Society and the 
State in Left-led Latin America Challenges and Limitations to Democratization, 
London: Zed books 
Roberts, K. (2003) Social correlates of party system demise and populist 
resurgence in Venezuela, Latin American Politics and Society, 45(3), 35-57 
Roberts, B. (1995) The making of citizens: cities of peasants revisited, London: 
Arnold 
Roberts, K. (2006) ‘Populism, political conflict, and grass-roots organization in 
Latin America’, in Comparative Politics, 38(2), 127-148 
Robertson, E. (2013) Where is Venezuela’s Political Violence Coming From? A 
Complete List of Fatalities from the Disturbances, online content from 
Venezuelanalysis.com, accessed on 3.8.16 at 
http://venezuelanalysis.com/analysis/10580 
301 
 
Rogler, L. (1967) ‘Slum Neighbourhoods in Latin America’, in Journal of Inter-
American Studies, 9(4), 507-528 
Romero Salazar, A. and Rujano Wilde (2016, R. (2007) ‘Impunidad, anomia y 
cultura de la muerte: los linchamientos en Venezuela’, in Espiral, 13(39), 139-
161 
Romi, S. and Schmida 1, M. (2009) ‘Non‐formal education: a major educational 
force in the postmodern era’, in Cambridge Journal of Education, 39(2), 257-
273  
Sanders, S. (2013) ‘The Mexican student movement of 1968: national protests 
in national and transnational contexts’, in Mor, J. (Ed.) Human Rights and 
Transnational Solidarity in Cold War Latin America, Madison: University of 
Wisconsin Press 
Saskia, R. (2016) ‘Clientelism and the Utility of the Left-Right Dimension in 
Latin America’, in Latin American Politics and Society, 58(1), 72-98 
Schamis, H. (2006) ‘Populism, socialism, and democratic institutions’, in 
Journal of democracy, 17(4), 20-34 
Scheper-Hughes, N. (1992) Death without weeping: The violence of everyday 
life in Brazil, Berkley: University of California Press 
Sherif, B. (2001) ‘The ambiguity of boundaries in the fieldwork experience: 
Establishing rapport and negotiating insider/outsider status’, in Qualitative 
Inquiry, 7(4), 436-447 
Schiller, N. (2011) ‘Points of departure for a constructive critique of the Bolivarian 
Revolution’, in Dialect Anthropol, 35, 255–260 
Schiller, N. (2011a) ‘Liberal and Bolivarian Regimes of Truth: toward a critically 
engaged anthropology in Caracas, Venezuela’, inTransforming Anthropology, 19(1), 
35–42 
Schiller, N. (2011b) ‘Catia sees you: Community television, clientelism and the state in 
the Chávez Era: Venezuela’s Bolivarian democracy’, in Smilde, D., & Hellinger, D. 
302 
 
(Eds.) Venezuela’s Bolivarian Democracy: participation, politics and culture under 
Chávez, London: Duke University Press 
Schultz, T. P. (1971) ‘Rural-urban migration in Colombia’, in The Review of 
Economics and Statistics, 53(2), 157-163 
Slater, T. (2010) ‘Ghetto Blasting: On Loïc Wacquant's Urban Outcasts’, in 
Urban Geography, 31(2), 162-168 
Smilde, D. (2011) ‘Participation, politics and culture: emerging fragments of 
Bolivarian participatory democracy’, in Smilde, D., & Hellinger, D. (Eds.). 
Venezuela’s Bolivarian Democracy: participation, politics and culture under 
Chávez, London: Duke University Press. 
Sosa, C., Rangel, L. and Salcedo, F. (2011) La Escuelita: Escuela Alternativa de 
Barrio Pueblo Nuevo, documentary film, Fundacon Cayapa, accessed online on 
17.07.16 at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sA6DF5Y-K6Y 
Spanakos, A. (2008). ‘New Wine, Old Bottles, Flamboyant Sommelier: Chávez, 
Citizenship, and Populism’, in New Political Science, 30(4), 521-544 
Stretesky, P. and Pogrebin, M. (2007) ‘Gang-related gun violence: 
socialization, identity, and self’, in Journal of Contemporary Ethnography, 
36(1), 85-114 
Suttles, G. (1968) The social order of the slum, Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press 
Tedesco, L. (2004) ‘Democracy in Latin América: issues of governance in the 
Southern Cone’, in Bulletin of Latin American Research, 23(1), 30-42 
Telesur (2014) Venezuela Celebrates 9 Years Free of Illiteracy, online content 
accessed 31.07.15 at http://www.telesurtv.net/english/news/Venezuela-
Celebrates-9-Years-Free-of-Illiteracy-20141028-0011.html 
The Economist (2005) Venezuela’s revolution reaches the classroom, January 
25th, accessed 27.07.2015 online at 
http://www.economist.com/node/485739 
303 
 
Tijerino, R. (1998) ‘Civil spaces: A critical perspective of defensible space’, in 
Journal of Architectural and Planning Research, 15(4) 321-337. 
Torres, C. A. (2011). ‘Dancing on the deck of the Titanic? Adult education, the 
nation-state and new social movements’, in International Review of Education, 
57(1-2), 39-55. 
Tran, M. (2007) ‘Venezuela quits IMF and World Bank’, The Guardian, 
accessed online 12.08.16 at: 
https://www.theguardian.com/business/2007/may/01/venezuela.imf 
Turaine, A. (1977) ‘La marginalidad urbana’, in Revista Mexicana de Sociología, 
39(4), 1105-1142 
Uzcategui, R. (2010) Venezuela: Revolution as Spectacle, Tuscon: See Sharp 
Press 
Vekemans, S. and Giusti, J. (1969) ‘Marginality and ideology in latin american 
development’, in Studies in Comparative International Development, 5(11), 
221-234 
Velasco, F. (2011) ‘“We are still rebels”: the challenge of popular history in 
Bolivarian Venezuela’, in Smilde, D., & Hellinger, D. (Ed.s) Venezuela’s 
Bolivarian Democracy: participation, politics and culture under Chávez, 
London: Duke University Press 
Wallerstein, N. and Bernstein, E. (1988) ‘Empowerment education: Freire's 
ideas adapted to health education’, in Health Education & Behavior, 15(4), 
379-394 
Walton, J. (1979) ‘Urban political movements and revolutionary change in the 
Third World’, in Urban Affairs Review, 15(1), 3-22 
Wacquant, L. (2003) ‘Toward a dictatorship over the poor? Notes on the 
penalization of poverty in Brazil’, in Punishment & Society, 5(2), 197-205 
Wacquant, L. (2008) Urban Outcasts: a comparative study of advanced 
marginality, Cambridge: Polity Press 
304 
 
Weisbrot, M., Ray, R. and Sandoval, L. (2009) The Chávez administration at 10 
years: The economy and social indicators, The Centre for Economic and Policy 
Research (CEPR), Washington DC, February, 5. 
Weyland, K. (1996) ‘Neopopulism and neoliberalism in Latin America: 
Unexpected affinities’, in Studies in Comparative International Development, 
31(3), 3-31 
Wiggins, N. (2011) ‘Popular education for health promotion and community 
empowerment: a review of the literature’, in Health promotion international, 
46. 356-371 
Wilde, M. (2014) “We Shall Overcome”: Radical Populism, Political Morality 
and Participatory Democracy in a Venezuelan Barrio, PhD thesis, London 
School of Economics 
Wilde, M. (2016) ‘Contested spaces: the Communal Councils and participatory 
democracy in Chávez's Venezuela’, in Latin American Perspectives, 16-36 
http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/62020/ 
Wilson, F. (2000) ‘Indians and mestizos: identity and urban popular culture in 
Andean Peru’, Journal of Southern African Studies, 26(2), 239-253 
Wolford, W. (2003) ‘Producing community: the MST and land reform 
settlements in Brazil’, in Journal of Agrarian Change, 3(4), 500-520 
Yap, L. (1976) ‘Rural-urban migration and urban underemployment in Brazil’, 
in Journal of Development Economics, 3(3), 227-243 
Zarazaga, R. (2014) ‘Brokers beyond clientelism: A new perspective through 
the Argentine case’, in Latin American Politics and Society, 56(3), 23-45 
Zuquete, J. (2008) ‘The Missionary Politics of Hugo Chávez’, in Latin American 
Politics and Society, 50 (1) 91-121 
 
305 
 
Appendices 
 
Appendix 1. List of focus groups and interviews  
Focus Groups1 
Focus 
Group 
Location Date Main theme 
1.  CEDEL Community 
Centre, Pueblo Nuevo 
22.04.14 Community organising, 
politics and history 
2.  CEDEL Community 
Centre, Pueblo Nuevo 
08.04.14 Drugs, policing, street 
violence 
 
Interviews Cited in Text 
Participant Groups Interview Locations 
FC Staff and volunteers at 
Fundación Cayapa 
PN Inside people’s homes in Pueblo 
Nuevo 
CC Communal Council spokesmen 
and participants 
MC Various locations in Mérida City 
centre 
BA Barrio Adentro staff SB Barrio Simon Bolivar 
PN Other residents of Pueblo Nuevo CD At the CEDECOL Community 
Centre 
SB Residents of Simon Bolivar PO At various Public Offices in 
Mérida City centre 
MC Other people from Mérida   
OF Public officials   
FR Members of city-level 
community organisations 
  
                                                          
1 These two focus groups were collected somewhat opportunistically as a result of the 
course I taught on research skills. I used these discussion topics as a way of showing the 
advanatges and disadvantages of how a focus group can work to draws out differences of 
opinion.  
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Number Name Initials 
used 
Date Location Group 
1.  Marleny Angulo 
Quintero 
MA 19.04.14 PN PN 
2.  Jose Luis Angulo 
Quintero 
JA 19.04.14 
 
PN PN 
3.  Orlando Velásquez OV 09.04.14 PN PN 
4.  Pastor William PW 05.05.14 PN PN 
5.  Dafne Vega DV 19.09.13 PN PN 
6.  Marco Angulo 
Quintero 
MA 21.9.13 
 
PN PN 
7.  Gabriel Montoya GM 
 
09.04.14 
 
PN PN 
8.  Jesús Navarro JN 06.05.14 PN PN 
9.  Pablo Javier PJ 01.07.14 PN PN 
10.  Roberto Andrea RA 10.04.14 CD PN 
11.  Martín Messano JM 11.04.16 PN PN 
12.  Vannesa Rosales VR 21.07.14  PN FC 
13.  Lisbeide Rangel LR 16.05.14 PN FC 
14.  Juan Valeri JV 05.06.14 PN FC 
15.  Gerardo Lopez GL 04.07.14 CD FC/CC 
16.  Andry Rangel AR  03.06.14 MC FC 
17.  Janeath Lopez JL 24.05.14 PN FC 
18.  Joshua Wilson JW 31.05.14 SB FC / 
BA 
19.  Miguel Parra MP 16.04.14 CD FC 
20.  Griseda Briceño GB 20.04.14 MC BA 
21.  Maria Perez MP 23.07.14 CD BA 
22.  Nico Huero NH  30.04.14 PN CC 
23.  Ramón  RS 11.05.14 PN CC 
24.  Reyes Lobos RL 24.07.14 PO OF 
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25.  Yonny Camancho YC 27.11.13 PN CC 
26.  Ricki Sanchez RS 22.11.13 CD CC 
27.  Maria Nunez MN 28.05.14 MC OF 
28.  Gudilo Rangel GR 04.06.14 PO OF 
29.  Noriada Gomez NG 06.06.14 PO OF 
30.  Reyes Lobo RL 12.05.14 PO OF 
31.  Gabriel Madera GM 28.05.14 and 
02.06.14 
PO OF 
32.  Herberto Martinez 
Torres 
HT 05.06.14 MC OF 
33.  Bridget Rodriguez BR 22.04.14 PO OF 
34.  Danilo Alvarez 
 
DA 
 
 
12.05.14 PO OF 
35.  Gudilo Rangel GR 04.06.14 
 
GN OF 
36.  Caramoto Briseño CB 15.07.14 SB SB 
37.  Luciana Diaz 
 
LD 15.07.14 SB SB 
38.  Yoleria Ortiz 
 
YO 15.07.14 SB SB 
39.  Mani Toledo MT 18.04.14 SB SB 
40.  Dionisio Vincenzo DV 12.04.14 MC MC 
41.  Maria Cotta MC 03.07.16 MC FR 
42.  Angel Vierno  AV 29.05.14 MC FR 
43.  Luis Belasario LB 03.07.16 MC FR 
44.  Jesús Cruz JC 11.10.13 MC FR 
45.  Juan Bartoli JB 29.05.14 MC FR 
46.  Luciano Luis  LL 07.04.16 MC MC 
47.  Gabriella Verón GV 14.04.14 MC MC 
48.  Charlie Ortiz  CR 09.09.13 MC MC 
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Appendix Two: three videos by and about Fundación Cayapa 
Three videos made by participants at Fundación Cayapa describe the work of the 
school up to 2011, the collective response to the basura - or refuse – crisis of 2012, 
and the new adult high-school class I taught on as part of my responsibilities while 
living in Pueblo Nuevo. Several of the people mentioned in the thesis are introduced 
in the different videos. 
1. La Escuelita: Escuela Alternativa de Barrio Pueblo Nuevo. Mérida, 
Venezuela (2011). 
Watch in Spanish at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sA6DF5Y-K6Y 
Or watch with English subtitles at: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mHG89aHxHIo 
2. El Sabado de la Basura: Barrio Pueblo Nuevo, Mérida, Venezuela 
(2012) 
Watch in Spanish at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dU6w1aDBqJU 
3. Bachillerato de Adult@s: Escuela Alternativa de Barrio Pueblo 
Nuevo. Mérida, Venezuela (2014) 
Watch in Spanish at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vOtpRV5WkWQ 
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Appendix Three: Article written for Veneuzelanalaysis.com, 
November 2013 
I wrote this article after conducting interviews with people in Mérida City during 
the period of price controls in 2013, described at the start of Chapter Three.  
OPINION AND ANALYSIS: ECONOMY 
Venezuelan Public Make Use of Price Controls 
  
By HARRY GREATOREX , November 18th 2013 
TAGS 
Price Controls 
Researcher Harry Greatorex walks the centre of the Andean city of Mérida to find 
out the public's impressions of the government’s crackdown on high prices and 
speculation. 
This weekend saw queues around the block at selected stores across Venezuela as 
bargain-hunters arrived in search of discounted electronics goods, clothes and 
medicine as the Venezuelan Government stepped up its fight against price 
speculation and hording.  The enforced discounts are being implemented by 
Venezuela’s consumer protection agency where prices are judged to have been 
artificially inflated. While the private press has widely reported the limited 
instances of looting, on Saturday a relaxed environment prevailed in Mérida’s 
town centre as officers from the National Guard entered several stores to 
supervise reductions. Their involvement continues the late president Hugo 
Chavez’s long-standing strategy of using military manpower to give impetus to 
projects to help the poorest. 
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Citizens queuing outside electronics store Yamil last Saturday in the hope of buying reduced price 
goods (all images courtesy of Harry Greatorex) 
 
Numbering people's place in the queue has been a common practice to maintain order as the public 
has flocked to the shops to take advantage of the price reductions. 
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With Christmas around the corner and prices down by up to seventy percent in 
targeted stores, the government inspections are being felt in the pockets of 
Venezuelans consumers. At Kristy’s clothes store, three generations of one family 
used the imposed store-wide 50% discount to buy new clothes. Alba, Morliana 
and Lilia described the reductions as a necessary action in the face of increasing 
price speculation. Alba said that “I hope that it will continue and not just be left at 
this. This has helped us so much… Before the prices were all different to what had 
been advertised so it was difficult to even bring the right money. At times they 
were as much as four times what the goods were really worth, with prices rising 
all the time.” 
At Yamil electronics store, goods arrived as faster than people could buy them as 
vans shuttled hoarded goods from the owners’ warehouses. One shopper queuing 
to purchase a discounted television accused retail owners of using the official 
exchange rate to buy cheap dollars to sell on the black market. “We agree with the 
government’s decision. In anywhere else in the world you make fifteen or twenty 
percent profit, not one or two thousand percent profit. It’s economic warfare.” 
 
312 
 
Other bargain hunters were less approving of the government action. Students 
Belkis and Renson saw the new scrutiny around prices as an attempt to centralise 
power over the retail sector. However, away from the selected stores, the public 
action is already having a broader effect on the cost of goods. One shopkeeper was 
already slashing prices on his own initiative, saying that he preferred to do so 
himself than be forced to. He added that he planned to leave the country as a 
result of the increased attention to his business practice, saying that ‘there is no 
life here in Venezuela’. Other shopkeepers have simply chosen to lock up and 
leave town to avoid investigation of their accounts. 
Outside the Traki department store, retail worker Fernando praised the 
enforcement of the regulations on pricing, saying that he had previously had to 
work for two weeks to buy two pairs of trousers. He commented that even 
opponents of the price controls were taking advantage of them, saying that 
“Everyone is content with this decision. The only ones who are not happy are the 
stores themselves.” 
Harry Greatorex is a doctoral researcher for DEV at the University of East Anglia, 
UK 
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Appendix Four: Article written for Veneuzelanalaysis.com, May 2014 
I wrote this article to share the accounts of different people who took part in the 
May Day workers’ march through Mérida City in 2014, including some members 
of my adopted collective, the Frente de Vanguardia de Hugo Chavez, discussed in 
Chapter Seven. 
 
OPINION AND ANALYSIS: PARTICIPATION | SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 
In Their Own Words: Venezuelan Workers Reclaim the Streets 
  
By HARRY GREATOREX, May 2nd 2014 
TAGS 
Mérida 
Workers movement 
Workers' rights 
A familiar sea of red shirts, large banners and a revolutionary sing-along 
soundtrack: at first glance this year’s march for the International Workers Day 
was business-as-usual in Mérida City, Venezuela. The celebratory atmosphere was 
due in part to the announcement by President Nicolas Maduro on 30th April of a 
30% increase in the national minimum wage. A closer look, however, revealed a 
certain determination and a higher turnout as local activists reacted en mass to 
three months of blockades, violent attacks and assassinations by anti-government 
groups that are seen as representing the interests of the city’s other social class. 
As the National Guard moved in and removed Mérida’s last and deadliest 
barricades last week, the expected violent response in Las Americas and the 
surrounding areas did not materialise. It seemed even the middle class residents 
who had supported the groups barricading their communities for the last three 
months had had enough of life under siege. Celebrations were short-lived. Even as 
the helicopters left and shops and roads reopened, rumours were spreading of a 
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second phase of anti-government violence based around targeted hit-and-run 
attacks on individuals and institutions. 
The murder of former soldier and renowned revolutionary Eliecer Otaiza in 
Caracas on Tuesday 29th April and the deaths of two public sector workers in 
Guairico the following day were seen by some as confirmation of this new stage of 
political violence, and meant heightened tension for the thousands of Venezuelans 
taking to the streets in solidarity with international workers on 1ST of May. In 
Mérida City, I talked to some of those marching about why they were reclaiming 
the streets for the working classes. 
Continuing a Rich History of Workers' Movements 
Luis Belisario, from the Frente Vanguardia de Hugo Chavez. (Harry Greatorex) 
“We are here in defence of the Revolution, in one of the parts of the country most 
penetrated by North American imperialism. Today is a very special day, a day in 
commemoration of international workers, but particularly here in Venezuela we 
remember the oil workers who rebelled in the nineteen thirties, the peasant 
rebellion against the Spanish and the slave rebellions here- these are all part of 
the workers' movement. The famous uprising here in 1989 known as the 
Caracazo was also part of the Venezuelan workers' movement, a movement that 
saw Commandante Hugo Chavez arrive in power in 1999. And when that 
happened the world oligarchy, and the Venezuelan oligarchy and their people 
have tried to destroy this government of the workers. 
This movement of the workers is not just Venezuelan, but Latin American, and 
when they attack it, they attack the workers' movements of the world. This date is 
very important not just for Mérida, not just for Venezuela, but for workers all over 
the world. There is a mega-march in Caracas today. Here we are organising 
against everything that has occurred when Mérida was occupied, with the 
barricades and paramilitary action. People are afraid, but the workers of Mérida 
are brave and they will defend their city, for that reason we are here in the street. 
There is danger, but we have to confront it. The message of the revolution is 
peace.” 
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Luis Belisario, from the Frente Vanguardia de Hugo Chavez. (Harry Greatorex) 
Celebrating and Protecting Progress on Legislation for Workers Rights 
Juan Luis Suarez, District Attorney for the State of Mérida 
“This is a spontaneous march at a national level, a mobilisation of the workers and 
trade unions of Venezuela. We are celebrating the fact that we have achieved a 
new law, a regional, national and international law given to us by President 
Maduro to indicate the minimum dignified conditions of labour for workers and 
confirming their right to participate in decisions concerning their work. We are 
re-writing all the neoliberal socio-economic concepts that existed before. This 
means that all of the progress made by workers internationally is enshrined in a 
law in Venezuela, to protect their salaries from the fluctuations in the price of oil 
that we have seen over the years. 
The theme of industrial security is also a priority for us in the state of Mérida, so 
we also have a new law safeguarding the physical and psychological wellbeing of 
our workers with new institutions. And this new alternative will include the 
participation of all the sectors, the poor, agricultural workers, women, the young 
and the old. 
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The streets belong to the people and for that reason we will defend them. Today is 
an expression of the working people. We are teaching ourselves to defend 
ourselves like this- peacefully, by mobilising and defending our rights and 
deciding ourselves how we will engage with national and international economic 
interests. Education, work, health, security and the economy: these are the 
priorities of the revolution, of our President Nicolas Maduro, himself a former 
trade-union leader. We are expanding privileges to the masses that were enjoyed 
by very few people before. This is a revolution for all Venezuelans, including the 
middle and upper classes, including those who have no class consciousness as 
well. We have broken the rules that said that one man could exploit another man 
in Venezuela. We are looking for the maximum possible happiness for everyone.” 
 
Juan Luis Suarez is the District Attorney for the State of Mérida. (Harry Greatorex) 
Re-writing the Story of Venezuela 
Marcelo Lischinsky, Community Organiser 
“The reason we commemorate and also celebrate the first of May in Venezuela is 
because the working classes of Venezuela have initiated an historic process of 
liberation, with the oversight of the late President Hugo Chavez: liberation from 
Venezuela’s position as a colony of North America. The Bolivarian Revolution has 
317 
 
not only given us strategic control of our own resources, such as oil, but has 
enabled us to recuperate our own collective memory: our memory of struggle, our 
memory of battle. The Bolivarian Revolution has converted the forgotten story of 
Venezuela into the official story of Venezuela. Where before we had the 
perspective of the dominant class, now we have the perspective of the dominated 
class. 
This new official story is not a colonised story, it is a story of liberation, a story of 
the people, a story of oppression. The working class of Venezuela has achieved 
significant things even though we are still not in socialism. The Bolivarian 
Revolution is following a historic process, creating the conditions to advance 
socialism. The mark of this struggle, of this transition towards socialism, is the 
Organic Law of the Workers, which lays out the norms of the Venezuelan workers, 
in their rights, in the conditions of their work environment, in their social 
security. This extends not just their rights to fair pay. What has been protected by 
the Bolivarian Revolution includes the limitation of the working day to seven 
hours, so that workers have the possibility to share their lives with their families, 
to study, and to grow spiritually and improve as individuals, to improve from 
conditions of exploitation. That is where we are going. 
We have succeeded in overcoming the barricading of communities, which was a 
serious strategy aimed at overthrowing the government. The ‘soft coup’ as they 
say, was intended to destabilise the government of Nicolas Maduro and to 
produce the conditions for an ultra-right-wing coup through a North American 
military operation. This strategy was a challenge for the Venezuelan 
revolutionaries, for their patience, for their serenity, but our people did not allow 
themselves to be provoked. It was not because our people did not want to 
confront the barricaders, because they are not brave. The Venezuelan 
revolutionaries did not confront the barricaders because it was an order from our 
President Nicolas Maduro. They did not allow themselves to be provoked and 
supply the conditions for a civil war. We know their strategy, and we remain 
alert.” 
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Marcelo Lischinsky is a community organiser. (Harry Greatorex) 
These comments reflect what is at stake for Venezuela’s working classes as 
destabilisation attempts continue and international concern mounts. The 
significant achievement of the Bolivarian Revolution is in progressive legislation 
and in writing new national narratives, oriented to reflect the concerns and 
stories of the previously excluded. The 30% increase in the minimum wage is a 
clear example of this process. It is to protect these achievements that Venezuelan 
workers took to the streets on May 1st in support of their Revolution, despite the 
continued threat of anti-government political violence. Peaceful mobilisation, 
local political organising and innovation in development of communities and 
workplaces are the means not only to resist destabilisation but to continue 
Venezuela’s path towards an inclusive form of socialism. It is for this status as a 
work in progress, as part of an ongoing dialectic, as an example of what begins 
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when the door is opened to the rights and agency of the working classes, that the 
Bolivarian Revolution ought to be supported. 
Harry Greatorex is a postgraduate researcher at the School of International 
Development, UEA. 
 
Appendix Five: Article written for collectivedevelopment.org, March 
2013 
I wrote this commentary after the death of Chavez in 2013 – and after my return 
form my first scoping trip to Venezuela. The article shows something of my 
sympathy for the Bolivarian project, at a time before I had fully begun to use 
analyses of the discourse of Chavismo to unpack what I was seeing In Venezuela. 
‘…Or Dictator?’ How media narratives mask the debate about Chavez’s Venezuela 
collectivedev / March 22, 2013 
When I arrived in Caracas in December, Chavez was in Cuba being treated for the cancer 
that would eventually take his life, sparking international debate around his character 
and legacy.For the Chavistas I know, the reactionary and sensationalist editorial policies 
of the Guardian and other supposedly left-wing broadsheets were nothing new. What was 
most concerning was the symbolic function of the ubiquitous “…or Dictator” narrative. 
The constant questioning of Chavez’s political legitimacy detracts very effectively from the 
detail of an important case study. A visionary leader, Chavez’s legacy is more than poverty 
reduction, growth and social empowerment: it is that of getting the arguments right. By 
association with a lazy negative stereotype, these arguments are rendered as something 
normatively irrelevant to important global debates over social organisation. 
On paper, this is a revolution of the most progressive kind. The more I read, the more I 
imagine Chavez walking the floors of the Miraflores Palace with a copy of Pedagogy of the 
Oppressed in his back pocket. This was a man determined to avoid the mistakes of 
twentieth century socialism. Only reluctantly he constructed a party that could win 
elections against a US-backed opposition, consistently preferring a dialectic approach. 
From the collaborative drafting of the constitution to the fundamental place for communal 
councils in his vision for Venezuela, Chavez’s vision was of participative democracy 
founded on popular power. 
320 
 
 
London Candle Lit Vigil for Chavez Venezuela Solidarity Campaign 
Chavez’s revolution is not just about halving extreme poverty, reversing decades-long 
trends of inflation and economic decline, achieving consistent growth throughout a global 
recession, tripling pensions and healthcare access and eradicating illiteracy (see link 
below). But to participate meaningfully you must be fed, educated and healthy. 
My experiences in Venezuela merge in and around this account, adding faces to the 
revolutionary story. This is no Catalonian utopia, not yet. Traffic is lethal and pollution is 
everywhere, from the gutter to the most breathtaking vistas. In Caracas, barrios seep to 
the horizon, beautiful and menacing, while in leafy suburbs the rich hide behind electrified 
fences. I am never robbed, rarely threatened, but I am warned constantly that I am not 
safe. 
The upside is easily visible. An array of visible public goods include subsidised meals, 
groceries, telecommunications and public transport including free cable-cars and trams, 
new public parks and outdoor gyms and of course petrol as cheap as water. I stay in free 
student accommodation and receive excellent, free healthcare. I hear how the Communal 
Council system means residents have direct control of local decision making on spending, 
licensing, investment, infrastructural improvements and policing. I take to the streets with 
smiling activists, old and young, putting their bodies on the line as fears of opposition 
violence mount in Chavez’s absence. I have never seen a protest for the government 
before. 
321 
 
In Venezuela, opinions of Chavez almost always divide along class lines. I meet middle-
class students who feel threatened by having to compete for jobs with graduates of the 
free Bolivarian universities. I sit with rich expats on my flights in and out of Caracas who 
have been ‘forced’ to relocate to Belgravia and Hyde Park apartments to wait out the 
revolution. Their views contrast with the accounts of poor families whose experience of 
change is simple: now they have hope and self-respect. They are included. 
Chavez’s death, on the 5th of March, rocks the country and is reported all over the world. 
In Venezuela many are devastated, prostrate and weeping in the streets in their millions. 
Some, overjoyed, celebrate in their gated communities. In the British papers the eulogies 
are either derisory or undecided. Was Chavez hero or tyrant? Saviour or dictator? I hear 
these debates repeated by left-wing friends but little talk of the urgent questions 
concerning a country daring to follow a truly alternative path of development. 
 
Crowds gather for the London Candle Lit Vigil for Chavez Venezuela Solidarity Campaign 
This was a popular leader elected with a clear majority and a twelve point margin 
(compared to 26% of the electorate who voted for David Cameron). As President, Chavez 
has also overseen more elections in the last fourteen years than in the previous forty with 
a voting system regarded as among the fairest in the world. There is undoubtedly some 
centralisation of power, designed to circumnavigate an aging and famously corrupt 
bureaucracy. He is a leader who repaid World Bank loans in full while in national debt in 
the global North sky-rocketed, who consistently tolerated the hysterically anti-Chavez 
private press, insisting on the principles of press freedom. Venezuela’s seven political 
prisoners are a marked contrast to a decade of illegal rendition by the US and UK. 
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Both in remembering Chavez and analysing Venezuela today, we would do better to ask: 
what is distinctive here? This is a revolution centred on social transformation: on 
devolving political decision-making, challenging clientelist dynamics and above all on 
rewriting the narratives at the heart of a society to challenge structures 
of disempowerment and material inequality. This discourse is especially relevant as 
people around the world suffer austerity and look for alternatives. Claims of radical, pro-
poor, systemic change should be empirically interrogated in our media and our 
universities, not detracted from by tired tabloid slurs, even when they do have a question 
mark at the end. 
Presidential elections are set for 14th April in Venezuela, where the media vilification of 
Vice-President Nicolas Maduro is already underway. He is widely tipped not only for 
victory but to continue policies that will deepen and strengthen the revolutionary process. 
Even in mourning, Chavez’s supporters are adamant that his vision of popular 
empowerment will continue. This emancipation is his most important contribution. 
 
Appendix Six: Article in Pico Bolivar describing the murder of Juan 
Carlos Dávila Barrios in September 2013 
 
This article from Pico Bolivar, Mérida’s local paper on the 29th September 
2013describes the murder of Juan Carlos Dávila Barrios in the entrance to Pueblo 
Nuevo. The incident preceded an increase in anti-government student activity in 
the month preceding the guarimba occupations of 2014. The second article (inset) 
describes the use of the incident by the opposition MUD. 
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Appendix Seven: Chavista Pamphlet from November 2013 
From all the Chavista pamphlets and literature I saw in Veenzuela, this pamphlet, 
circulated at Chavista meetings in Mérida ahead of the ‘8D’ Nationals Municipal 
Elections in December 2013, gives the best example of the ways the PSUV represent 
themselves and their supporters. The pamphlet shows the continued use of Chávez 
as a symbol of the movement and explains “what it means to be Chavista”. This 
includes following a leader who is “from the people”, the values of solidarity, 
equality, diversity, the sharing of rights and a call to “fight against all forms of 
domination”.  
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